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ABSTRACT
i)
This thesis is concerned with the way that modern 
political change affects social relationships in a prosperous 
predominantly Greek-Cypriot village. The first chapter 
traces the main social, political, demographic and economic 
changes to have affected the village in this century. The 
second chapter considers in detail the importance of land­
holdings, of supplementary occupations, and of status 
distinctions derived from education and work in the villagers* 
system of social evaluation. Chapter 3, in considering 
kinship and affinity as institutional constraints on the 
conduct of individuals, also stresses one prize of success 
in the village arena - the desirability of one's children 
as marriage partners. The fourth chapter is concerned with 
other types of social relations which constrain men, in 
particular fictive kinship, friendship and membership in 
the village itself (which is defined in a number of ways); 
this leads directly to the description of the village as a 
solidary community.
Chapter 5 analyses the leadership opportunities 
provided by administrative office in the village, and considers 
how far power is achieved and diffused in other ways. Chapter 
6 examined the scope of politics in the village, particularly 
the meaning of the opposition between left and right wing 
supporters, as well as the benefits of political alignment.
The seventh chapter is a brief survey of politics leading up 
to Independence in 1959-60, and a slightly fuller discussion 
of the events of the last decade.
ii)
Chapter 8 to 11 are all concerned with the detailed 
description and analysis of the most important political 
processes to affect the village since Independence. A 
number of internal disputes are the subject of chapter 85 
in chapter 9 the village, in alliance with neighbouring 
villages, struggles to get government to start building a 
dam; in chapter 10 the administration of an agricultural 
cooperative shows prominent villagers in action, while 
chapter 11 concerns the first important elections to have 
taken place in the island for ten years, as they were seen 
to affect the village. In the final chapter I assess the 
introduction of new political resources into village 
politics, and the various ways in which some measure of 
control over political conflict is maintained.
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INTRODUCTION
There is one unusual feature of the fieldwork 
which led to this thesis, which is that it was carried out 
in a village where I was not only an observer, but for many 
people a kinsman and, in a limited sense, a fellow villager 
(chorianos). I was horn in London of a Scots-Irish mother 
and Greek-Cypriot father, brought up by my mother and her 
brothers and sisters, speaking English only; my contact with 
my father was scant, and until 1966 my knowledge of Greek 
language or culture limited to what accompanied the study 
of Classical Greek to Ordinary level, G.C.E.
In 1966 the possibility of doing fieldwork in Cyprus 
was discussed with Professor Raymond Firth, and in the summer 
of that year I visited the island for the first time, spending 
six weeks mainly in the village where my father was born, 
here called Kallo. I was warmly received by a number of 
relatives and their friends, and enjoyed my stay, while also 
looking at Kallo and other villages with a view to fieldwork. 
On returning to London there were further discussions with 
Professor Pirth, who thought that in the absence of major 
sociological or social anthropological research on the island 
there was a strong case to be made for my going ahead, if 
for no other reason than to fill, however inadequately, a 
major ethnographic gap. Then, too, there was the assurance 
of practical local support in the initial stages of study; 
finally, there was the fact of my personal interest in under­
standing rural Cypriot society coupled with my cultural 
distance from it, a normal situation for a fieldworker, but
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marked by the assurance of certain privileged initial access 
to information, and goodwill.
For obvious reasons, we discussed whether or not 
my father*s village was a sensible choice for the major 
portion of fieldwork. It was clearly not the normal way to 
select a village, and as it turned out, Kallo is unusually 
wealthy, and perhaps unusually politically active. But the 
typicality of rural communities remains an unsolved problem 
for fieldworkers, and Professor Firth was of the opinion that 
"If you have a strong suit, lead from it*', adding the caveat 
that if after a few weeks or months, the costs of my kinship 
ties were seen to outweigh their benefits to my work, it 
would always be possible to move to another community, and 
keep the Kallo situation as a control.
In the event, although the dual roles of kinsman 
and anthropologist were at times a strain, the benefits 
seemed to me then, and still do seem, to outweigh the dis­
advantages. This is an issue which I hope at some future 
time to analyse in detail, but I shall not pursue it further 
here, except to express the hope that those people who have 
made it possible for me to carry out this study will not 
regret that they once encouraged me to remain in Kallo, and 
not to have gone elsewhere.
Most of the material described here, then, comes 
from this village in which I was a very privileged stranger, 
a village which was not selected by any criterion of random­
ness or typicality.
The first period of fieldwork was from February
1968 until May 1969, some fourteen months, during which two
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short breakB were taken in Israel which together came to 
a month; the second was in company with two villagers, for 
one of whom we were seeking special medical care. In December
1969 and January 1970 I spent a further three weeks in Cyprus, 
most of which was in Kallo. Finally, there was a further 
three months in Cyprus, from the end of May 1970 to the 
start of September 1970, about one full month of which was 
spent in Kallo. For the major fieldwork I was supported 
by the SSRC. For the two shorter periods I was grateful for 
a Nuffield Small Grant, and was able to take a colleague,
Dr. Edward Hammonds, a lecturer in Government at the Polytech­
nic of Central London, with me, to contribute to my study 
of the 1970 elections. However, all the data described in 
this thesis are the results of my own fieldwork.
During the major period of fieldwork a certain 
amount of quantitative work was done. Genealogies and life 
histories were taken from thirty of the oldest men and women 
in the village, which initially helped me form a picture of 
life before 1930. Since the cultivation of citrus trees plays 
so Important a part in the village, at an early point a small 
survey of 23 men owning mature citrus trees was done to find 
out how they sold their fruit, the prices they obtained, with 
whom they cooperated economically and other such details.
After ten months, a census of 200 from the 318 household 
heads in the village was carried out. This took nearly ten 
weeks, and although it had originally been Intended to survey 
all households, I decided in view of the time factor to 
content myself with two-thirds only. Finally, in the last 
months in the village, 23 open ended depth interviews were
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done with a number of informants already interviewed in the 
main census. These interviews were structured on certain 
topics - the numbers of certain kin and their residence, 
disputes recalled by informants, data on share-cropping, 
other forms of economic cooperation, and the use of personal 
contacts to secure administrative decisions of various kinds, 
outside the village. These interviews often took three hours 
or more to complete, and since a great deal of information 
had been obtained previously about the topics this phase 
proved extremely valuable. The schedules for these surveys 
are provided in appendices.
D^uring preparation for fieldwork, I had decided to 
concentrate chiefly on aspects of property transfer, with 
special reference to the provision of houses at marriage, 
the composition of dowry, the way in which marriages were 
arranged and the consequences for village stratification of 
competition for the most eligible marriage partners. I had 
also read certain critiques of peasant village studies 
which led me to think that the intellectual difficulties of 
using a village as a unit of study and analysis were very 
great. There were several reasons for this view. One was 
that the analytic emphasis from Barnes (1954) to Mayer (1966) 
on networks and actions-sets had stressed the individual 
actor at the expense of larger collectivities. The literature 
of the Mediterranean and on Latin America, with some of which 
I was familiar, also stressed the contractual, impermanent 
aspect of social relations. The dyadic contract, as charact­
erised by Poster and the ties between patron and client, from
vii)
the work of Pitt-Rivers onwards, tended to emphasise the 
choices of individuals, and the achieved nature of many 
aspects of peasant social relations. The absence of 
unilineal descent groups in Cypriot Greek life, and what 
Firth has termed the optative nature of relations within 
the kindred, also strengthened my view that much of my field­
work would be concerned with individuals rather than with 
corporate groups.
There were other reasons for my expecting the 
village itself possibly to be a marginal unit of analysis 
only. A number of anthropologists had studied villages in 
the Mediterranean which were either poor, relatively small 
and isolated, or some combination of these. Pitt-Rivers’ 
Alcala, Kenny’s Romosierra, Friedl’s Vasilika and Stirling's 
two [Turkish villages all belonged to a first generation of 
studies where, although the village was taken as the main 
unit of analysis, there were clear indications (as there 
were in the work of Campbell) that the laws and agencies 
of the nation-state had been playing an ever-increasing part 
in structuring social relations. A second generation of 
fieldworkers, including Boissevain 0-965), made it clear that 
the interpenetration of village and nation was such that 
it would have been quite unjustified to study a village as 
if it were a social isolate, Cohen (1965) was equally explicit 
about this. Lison-Tolosana (1966), while concentrating in 
the main on the interior relations of Belmonte, showed in 
his discussion of the period 1930-29 that political parties 
and ideologies from the national arena had had their
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counterparts and consequences in the life of Belmonte.
Although he did not discuss the articulation of the two 
units at the time of his fieldwork, this was an understandable 
omission in viaw of the obvious sensitivity to his informants 
of such issues.
The logical implication of stressing the individual 
actor, taken with the knowledge that the nation appeared to 
be swamping the rural communities of the Mediterranean, and 
thus producing rapid social change, led me seriously to 
question the value of taking a village as the prime unit of 
observation or analysis. I further argued that a village 
like Kallo, connected by only 26 miles of metalled road to 
the capital of Cyprus, and in terms of having modern houses, 
tractors and motor cars increasingly affected by modern 
technology, might well prove to have little in common with 
places like Alcala and Sakaltutan (which had in any case been 
originally studied twenty years earlier). Lison-Tolosana1s 
study of Belmonte, with its emphasis on the important and 
subtle differences in social differentiation suggested that 
a concentration on the relation between marriage and strati­
fication might be rewarding; but it was not by any means 
certain to me that the way to do this was to look at a village.
I considered selecting a cohort of people born in a particular 
place and following them in whatever directions their lives 
had taken them, and perhaps finding that the place itself - 
a former peasant village - was now little more than the figment 
of anthropological imagination, with its tendency to romanticise 
the gemeinschaft features of peasant communities in the way
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that Redfield had done. Since writers like Lev/is and 
Goldkind had argued the importance of stratification and 
social conflict, it was conceivable that notions such as 
village solidarity, or Pitt-Rivers* 'moral unity of the 
pueblo' would have totally disintegrated (in fact or theory) 
by the time I reached Kallo.
It came therefore as a considerable surprise, in 
early stages of drafting this thesis, to discover that one 
of the dominant themes which emerged was the extent to which 
a conscious preservation both of the village, its orderly 
life and prosperity, guided the actions (or at very least 
the tactical arguments) of village leaders} and that this 
commitment to the village itself clearly modified the impact 
of national politics and village life.
As must always be the case, my initial preconceptions 
and interests were greatly altered by fieldwork. The most 
notable change is shown by the fact that this thesis is 
mainly concerned with politics, rather than with kinship, 
marriage and property transfer. Secondly, that the village 
has emerged as a major focus of analysis.
Throughout my fieldwork I accompanied village leaders, 
and indeed all sort of villagers, on many visits outside the 
village. Many of these visits were to civil servants in the 
capital, or to village leaders in surrounding villages. Had 
I been aware of Bailey’s important comments on single-interest 
relations, and Gluckman and Devons’ recommendations on 
circumscription (Bailey, 1964; Devons and Gluckman, 1964)
I might have adopted a more formal approach to fixing the 
boundaries of my study. A3 it was, the sensitivity of many 
issues the villagers took to men in the capital provided me 
v/ith a rough rule-of-thumb: if, as was often the case, it
appeared that there was an element of guardedness on the 
part of the officials or politicians the villagers contacted,
I did not try directly to get from them information on the 
reasons for their policies. That is, once having appeared 
with a village committee in a government office, I did not 
later return to the official in question, and seek in a 
private interview his views on the situation. Though this 
would undoubtedly have yielded important data, I felt rightly 
or wrongly that such actions might have both loot me rapport 
with the villagers themselves, created disquiet among the 
officials, and in the end have either altered the course of 
event3 or hampered my ability to collect data.
In a recent article Weingrod (1967) has criticised 
Bailey for the limitations of his 1965 study of the higher 
levels of Orissa politics. In my view Weingrod’s comments, 
while logically correct, overlook the intricacies of fieldwork. 
The charge that there are gaps# or limits, to the data the 
individual fieldworker can collect is unanswerable but often 
trivial. In the final analysis, it is always a matter of 
judgement, whether or not to seek information on sensitive 
topics, the very quest for whioh may forfeit future cooperation. 
It is possible that, particularly v/ith reference to the events 
described in chapters 8 and 9» I acted v/ith too much caution, 
and much moro, and highly valuable data could have been 
obtained. I cannot say.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
E2££
Abstract i) - ii)
Introduction iii) - x)
Table of Contents xi) - xili)
Chapter 1 The recent history of Kallo village 1/1 - 1/40
2 Land, work and prestige 2/1 - 2/47
3 Kinship and Affinity 3/1 - 3/48
4 Extra-familial relationships and 
village solidarity 4/1 - 4/47
5 Power and Leadership 5/1 - 5/26
6 The scope of politics in the 
village 6/1 - 6/30
7 An outline of Greek Cypriot 
politics, 1078-1970 7/1 - 7/23
8 Village solidarit; and the 
political process, 1963-70 8/1 - 8/50
9 The village and the larger society: 
campaign for a dan 9/1 - 9/50
10 The politics of administration: 
the Citrus Cooperative 10/1 - 10/48
11 The limits of village solidarity: 
the 1970 election 11/1 - 11/69
12 Conclusion: new resources, 
conflict and solidarity in the 
political process 12/1 - 12/27
Appendix 1 The Turks of Kallo 13/1 - 13/s,
2 The social origins of EOKA 
militants 13/4 - 13/e
3 Interview schedules used 13/7 -13/14
Bibliography 13/15 -13/20
total pages 545
xii)
List of Tables page
1. Population of Kallo, 1881-1960 1/5
2. Changes in Occupation in Kallo Village 1/14
3. The rise of membership 1923-42 in the Kallo
Agricultural Credit Cooperative Society 1/17
4. Percentage of People aged over 5 years who
could read and write 1 /2 3
5. Land received at marriage: 1S1 households 2/9
6 . Changes in size of land holding for 82
householders who first married 1931-50 2 /1 0
7. Land at maximum and number of children of
82 households where first marriage of heads 
occurred between 1931 and 1950 2 /1 2
8 . Land at maximum and other occupations 2/14
9. Land holdings at maximum of 16 pioneer
citrus growers 2 /3 6
10. Second wave (1955-60) citrus growers and
non-growers, by land at marriage 2 /3 8
11. Marriages in Kallo by relative contribution 
of bride or groom's family to the couple’s
house 3/5
12. The careers of Fanos' children 3/16
13. The first cousins of 24 selected informants 3/20
14. Ill disputes between selected informants by
cause of dispute and social relationship 3/41
15. Political alignments in two generations 3/44a
16. Village links to highly-placed persons
1968-69 4/25
17. Overlapping leadership roles in the village 5/11
18. Kallo Committeemen 1968-69 5/12
19. CITCOP Management Committees 1963-70: origin,
education and jobs of committeemen 10/39a
*J II)
!>&£L0.
20. The 1970 Legislative Annmnbly 
Returns for Knllo and Kauirnari
JOLocti on 
Vi 11 <4(C0 n I l /2a
2 1. The 1970 Leftiultttlvo Aonoiribly 
Returns for Nicosia 1)1 striot
cc***
1 1 /? h
22. Sorne links between Kctllo political lotidnrn 
and activists, Juno 1970 1.1/47
List of Diagramh
1. CoiriTron interonfcn amonff bho villager? in two 
political infpjofi with Market Town
1/1
CHAPTER 1
THE RECEKT HISTORY OF KALLO VILLAGE
i) Traditional Agriculture
Kallo village lies in the west central lowlands 
of Cyprus in an area which Christodoulou (1959:205) has 
described as the alluvial fan region. The I960 Census put 
the village population at thirteen hundred; three miles to 
the west is Market Tovm with ten thousand people, and twenty- 
three miles to the east the island's capital, Nicosia, with 
over ninety thousand. The village is connected to both 
towns by good asphalt roads, as it is to a cluster of 
surrounding villages which provide most of those marriage 
partners who are not found within the village itself.
The village is among the richest in the island, 
since it enjoys perennial water from underground sources, 
and has through cash-cropping of potatoes, carrots and citrus 
fruits put this recent advantage to good use. Over the last 
sixty years the village population has steadily increased 
and there has been little emigration. From the approach 
roads, modern two- and three-storey brick houses can be 
seen above the citrus groves which have furnished the profits 
to build them. A closer look, nearer the nucleus of the 
village, shows the traditional mud-and-straw houses standing 
in walled courtyards, with outhouses for small stock and 
fowls. In poorer parts of the central lowlands, which lack
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perennial water, such traditional houses still predominate, 
but the Market Town region has become a byword throughout 
the island for prosperity, and for the extravagant luxury 
of the new houses built.
The last hundred years have seen particularly 
rapid and important change in the lives of the villagers, 
and some of these changes will be the main concern of this 
chapter. The transition from an agriculture mainly based 
before 1920 on subsistence dry-farming of cereals, and 
legumes, and animal husbandry, to irrigated, mechanised 
cash-cropping is one which has been accompanied by other 
changes in communications, administration and politics.
Each type of change has moved at its own pace, and each has 
affected and been affected by the others. The net result 
has undoubtedly been an increase in security for most 
villagers, and this is how they see the matter themselves.
Old men talking about the past rarely fail to insist itan 
phtoschla tottes, 'those were days of poverty'.
In what follows I try to reconstruct some aspects 
of the period of traditional agriculture, parts of which 
are only now changing, but for which a rough transition 
point may be placed between 1920 and 1 9 4 0, for reasons 
shortly to be made clear. Traditional agriculture relied 
on oxen to draw light scratch-ploughs, and the main crops 
were wheat, barley and oats, dependent on an erratic winter 
rainfall. Cereal farming was combined with small stock 
keeping. Oxen were needed for ploughing and threshing; 
sheep and goats were kept in mixed or separate flocks, and 
pigs and chickens were kept by most families, in their yards.
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The oldest men had fixed on a figure of a hundred households 
for the village in the ’old days1, and said that about 
two-thirds of these had either one or two oxen. Data from 
193l(l) are somewhat different, since they show only enough 
oxen for two-thirds of the 166 householders to have one each. 
This point is important, for it has been persuasively argued 
by Stirling (1963:201-213) that in the traditional dry- 
farming situation of the Turkish villages he studied there 
were three key factors which affected household viability - 
manpower, land and oxen. His comments apply in the main 
to the Kallo situation: in Kallo, if one of the three
factors was in short supply it seriously hampered the 
economic development of the domestic group. Those with a 
single ox only teamed up with other households which had 
only one ox; but such a strategy ceased to be completely 
efficient if one household, with an adequate amount of land, 
needed the continual (as opposed to the occasional) use of 
two oxen during the ploughing season.
Households with oxen which were not fully occupied 
hired them sometimes to those who needed them. Some families 
yoked an ox with a mule. Some ploughed with mules alone; 
others sharecropped. The people i^ ith greatest difficulties 
were those with neither land nor draft animals, since they 
had only their labour to sell either as ploughmen for the 
largest landowning peasants, or outside the village on 
various government road-building projects which flourished 
throughout the island from the arrival of the British in 
1878. Genealogies, informant memories and the village birth
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register all show the existence of landless labourers in 
the village who sometimes emigrated permanently in search 
of a living.
It is clear from other sources that the possession 
of a pair of oxen was regarded as some sort of norm for 
household viability, at least to the authorities: 
Christodoulou (1959:94), quoting Lang, tells us that in the 
1860's the Turkish rulers wanted to float funds for an 
Agricultural Bank and collected a bushel of wheat and a 
bushel of barley from every owner of a pair of ploughing 
oxen. Oxen as the basis for such a levy, and grain as its 
medium, suggest the subsistence character of the village.
The Agricultural Bank did not get started at this time since 
the ensuing revenue was embezzled. Such events seem not 
to have been uncommon in the nineteenth century, and roust 
have played some part in shaping the villager's expectations 
of government initiatives.
Table 1 shows how population has changed in 
Kallo. Both houses and peoole were static from 1881 to 
1 9 0 1, but twenty years later the population has gone up by 
over 40% although the number of houses increased by only a 
quarter. There was another static period, 1921 to 1951, 
but by the 1946 census the 1881 population has doubled, and 
continued to rise to I960. The oldest Kallotes remembered 
their fathers had ploughed up unoccupied land near the 
village; this was often halitika. unoccupied government 
owned land, Yet in the early period there were landless 
families, some of whose members left the village in search
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TABLE 1
POPULATION OF KAILO. 1881-1960
Christians Muslims Total House
1881 N A N A 451 114
1891 329 116 445 121
1901 348 104 452 122
1911 423 97 520 130
1921 546 101 647 150
1931 598 68 666 166
1946 898 76 974 2.12
I960 1,219 72 1,291 287
1969 (estimate) 1,431 318
Source: Cyprus Government Censuses
Note (1) There was no 1941 Census due to the 
1939-45 World War.
(2) At time of writing no more recent 
census has been carried out.
(4) For a discussion of the Muslim 
population, see Appendix
(5) In 1969 I counted 318 houses in Kallo 
Allowing an average of 4.5 persons 
per house, this yields 1 ,4 3 1 for the 
village population.
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of wages. The probable explanation for the failure of the 
landless to themselves occupy some of the vacant land which 
existed around the outskirts of the village must lay in 
their lack of resources. Effectively to take over free 
land needed personal courage or kin-support, seed-corn, 
use of oxen and tools as well as sufficient food in the 
shape of dry corn to live for at least one season without 
working for others.
Old people say t at when they were young land was 
'very cheap1 and quote purchases of a donum for a pound or 
two; but when asked about wage-labouring rates, the price 
of corn and other staples, the size of wedding gifts, they 
produce figures which show their claim to have been illusory. 
Proportionately, land may have been somewhat cheaper than 
it is today, but it was certainly not as cheap as old 
people think when looking back.
One way in which a landless man could break out of
the difficulties of hi3 position was to hire himself out to
/
a land-rich villager as a mistarkos, a wage-labourer. He 
would often eat and sleep in the house of his employer, and 
spend his days either ploughing or shepherding. If he went 
on doing this and saved his entire earnings for five or ten 
years he could end up with enough money to purchase a minimal 
small-holding. In some cases if he was a good worker and 
of sound character he might have ended up by marrying one 
of his employer's daughters, and receiving land in this way. 
Several of the older men who are now regarded in the village 
as prosperous started out in this way, and it may have even 
been commoner in earlier periods.
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It was possible then for a landless man slowly through 
hard work and thrift to acquire cash and land; it was much 
easier for a man with some land to lose it through a variety 
of factors. Any of these factors could also interfere with 
the efforts of a landless man to improve his position, and 
this undoubtedly happened. But it is not what informants 
tend to remember: they remember dramatic success and dramatic
failure. In 1878 the British found the prisons full of 
debtors, and commentators on conditions between this time 
and 1940 rarely fail to mention the proneness of the peasantry 
to indebtedness. In this matter Kallo was no exception. 
Informants give a variety of reasons for starting on the 
short, sharp slide into bankruptcy - unexpected sickness 
(particularly tuberculosis) could through the high costs of 
medical care at the hands of town doctors consume the land 
of a previously prosperous family in a year or two; drought 
years, especially when as in 18 70-74 several such years 
followed each other in succession, could hit a family with 
small margins very hard; litigation of any kind was 
sometimes the precipitating factor, arising over matters of 
inheritance, trespass or debt; natural hazards, the fierce 
hailstorms which are common in Cyprus, and for many years 
the plagues of locusts, also added to the list. There were 
also reasons which reflected more on character - those debts 
which resulted from gambling, from lavish hospitality, or 
from the pursuit of women. For each context the villagers 
remember at least one person whose loss of property illustrates 
either the hazards of life or weakness of character - an
additional hazard which they believe to bo inherited, but 
yet subject to some measure of personal control.
In this traditional period the existence of money­
lenders satisfied the perennial peasant need ;l.’or seasonal 
credit, in addition to the kind of credit which might be 
needed as a result of one or several of the factors ,)ust 
mentioned. The moneylenders were sometimes townsmen:
Storrs (1939:491 ) found four out of the twelve-man 
Legislative Assembly worn so involved, but were also often 
the more prosperous peasants in the village. Informants
when remembering certain men always characterise them by
/ / 
this occupation - tokistls - from the word to Icon meaning
•interest'. It was usually necessary to pledge a piece of
land for cash or for grain. The old men say 'in those days
v/e were hungry. My father had to give a donum of land for
a sack of corn to eat.' Once a man had borrowed cash against
land It wan all too probable that the mounting interest would
soon compel him to mortgage yet other fields. Hero the idiom
✓ v
used Is tokos epl tokon, that is, Interest upon interest, to
describe the rapidly mounting spiral of debt, which might
end in foreclosure. The whole moneylending transaction
produced great bitterness In the village, and suggests that during
(?)periodic crises the rich got rioher and the poor poorer' .
However, as Surridge pointed out In his examination 
of village debt (1 9 3 0:36-/1^ , there was another common kind 
of rural debt - that caused by expansion, or prestige spending. 
Whenever people had surplus cash they tonded to buy more 
land, often by making a downpayment, and hoping to pay off 
the balance in a short period. Obviously, a short run of
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bad luck could turn the expansion into contraction, but 
this suggests the value the traditional peasant put on 
increasing his holding; holdings were unlikely to remain 
stable through time but tended to get bigger or smaller.
It is obvious that there is both a strong element of 
uncontrollable risk in such a system as well as ample room 
for good decisions to pay off and poor decisions to prove 
harmful. The place of prestige spending, which in this 
context usually involved the costs of seeing one’s children 
married and set up in their own domestic unit with their own 
land, would also have been critical. Surridge mentions 
that at the time he carried out his survey, officials were 
wont to complain that villagers were prone to get into debt 
through marrying off their children. This is a feature of 
village life which does not seem to have declined but if 
anything to have intensified in recent years.
il) Changes in Traditional Agriculture
The picture of a traditional village economy based 
in the main on mixed farming of cereals and legumes, with 
occasional sales of surpluses was to be modified by a number 
of changes dating roughly from the 1920's^. These involved 
the increasing use of summer irrigation, the cultivation 
of new land, changes in the occupational structure, and 
the control of peasant debt through a credit cooperative 
society; to all these must be added the continued increase 
in village population previously mentioned. Political changes 
will be discussed in a later section.
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The dry-farming period came to a close when in 1916 
a group of twenty Kallotes, including several Turks, decided 
to form a company to bring up the underground water of the 
region by the chain-of-wells system. This technique had been 
tried over twenty years earlier by some of the Market Town 
farmers, and it is probable that when the Kallo company 
formed, it was following some demonstrated Market Town 
success^ . The technique required a cash outlay since 
it involved substantial underground tunnelling by specialists, 
and it is probable t.iat the men putting up the money would 
not in any case have wished to do such heavy manual work.
The chain of v/ells was dug, starting from the east and running 
for several miles until it reached Kallo. The summer water 
thus brought up was divided among the share-holders in units 
of not less than three hours each according to the amount of 
capital they had put up. Water came to each member roughly 
every eight days, for as many units as he was entitled, and 
with this water he irrigated his summer crop.
The value of such a system was immediately apparent 
to the whole village and within a short time a second company 
had formed with some sixty members which proceeded to dig 
its own chain of wells parallel to those of the first company. 
There were vigorous protests from the members of the first 
company for they feared that the competing well system would 
encroach on their own water supply. Their fears proved 
justified so they retaliated by deepening their own well 
system until they had regained their water at the expense 
of the water of the second company. Informants say that the
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dispute split the village into two opposed factions, and 
that it divided kinsmen and friends. One informant claimed 
his mother and father were members of different companies, 
one by inheritance and the other by purchase.
After several attempts by each side to settle the
matter by further deepening of the wells - each attempt
(5)costing more money - the two companies went to court . 
Informants said that the court case went on for two years 
and cost the village £3,0 0 0, which taking the price of good 
land as an index would have been worth £1 5 0 ,0 0 0 by present 
day prices. This seems a vast sum but informants were 
insistent t at the dispute ’ruined the village* when the 
well-digging and legal fees were added to the bad feeling 
that resulted. In the event the court’s .judgement was 
interesting and may have provided, in view of the high costs 
of the conflict, a model to the village of how to conduct 
such matters in future. The ruling was that the two companies 
should merge. There were to be eighty members, each receiving 
his share of water every fifteen and a half days. The members 
of the first company also had their share of water reduced, 
so the gross effect for them seems to have been a loss of 
nearly half their volume of water over time. In the end 
about half of all the households in the village had access 
to some quantity of summer water. The water company still 
exists in the village, and 81 out of the 318 households are 
members. Although it is probably only chance that has left 
the present number of owners so close to the original number, 
it seems from the current shares that relatively little
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subdivision has taken place. In 1970 only 15 of the 81 
shares were less than three hours; and three hours of water 
will irrigate a field of two donums. Some owners have merged 
smaller shares, and some people who inherited shares but 
had no land have sold them.
It is not possible to decide how much the authority 
of the court contributed to this solution, and how much 
the villager’s own perceptions of the costs of intransigence 
played a part. The men I interviewed were in late adolescence 
or their early twenties when these events took place, and 
it was their fathers and grandfathers who took the decisions. 
Certainly legal disputes over water rights have a very long 
history in Cyprus, as Christodoulou makes clear (1959:88-90); 
nor is the principle of a shareholding company necessarily 
a new one. The one certain point is that before 1920 there 
was relatively little summer water available for Kallo’s 
land, but from the time the water companies became active, 
more and more summer cropping became possible.
Unfortunately, the actual extent of the increase 
cannot be gauged with great precision. A survey published
fr\
in 1931 gives the following information: there were
3*231 donums of arable land - about 1,000 acres. The 169 
households - three more than listed as complete in the 1931 
census - had between them 118 oxen, 193 donkeys, 11 mules 
and 3 horses. 16 persons had less than five donums and 21 
persons had no land at all, but I assume that by persons, 
married householders were meant. Thus, at very test 27 of 
the 169 households had less than enough land to live on^ ^ .
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Some clue as to how at least 15$ of the households survived 
without enough land is given by Table 2. If all persons 
who did not return 'farmer' as their occupation in the 
1923-35 data are added, the total is 42$. The listing of 
unskilled labourers (er^atis), shepherds, muleteers and 
artisans is suggestive of the patterns of supplementary- 
work described by Davis (196^1969) for Pisticci. If the 
3 ,2 3 1 donums had been divided equally between 169 households, 
this would have given each household nearly 20 donums. The 
1931 data show that 15$ of the households fell a long way 
short of 20 donums, and it is a reasonable inference that 
the 42$ who were not farmers also fell short of 20 donums, 
a figure adequate for subsistence.
The 3,231 donums in the report present a problem 
of interpretation, since what is meant by arable land is 
not explained. It might have been land irrigated in summer, 
but it might have been land used through winter rainfall 
only. Since very roughly one hour of water from the merged 
water company would have generously watered one donum every 
fifteen days, the conclusion is that there was roughly ten 
times more 'arable' land then available summer water; it 
is therefore more probable that the arable land refers to 
land put under cereals from winter rainfall.
By 1950, when Christodoulou (1959:205-6,216-17) 
included ICallo in his land use study, the village ranked 
highest of 27 sample villages for the extent of its summer 
irrigation, with 81$ of its land so irrigated. The method 
cannot have been through powered pumps, for only 1 .1$ of 
the agricultural land is listed as mechanically irrigated;
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TABLE 2
CHANGES IK OCCUPATION IN KALLO VILLAGE
Occupation
Civil servants 
(police, teachers, 
firemen, clerks, etc. ')
1923-35 
1°
0
1968-69
1°
9.5
(2)
Pull time farmers 58 41
Skilled manual workers 
(tailors, builders, 
carpenters, etc.) 15 8
Unskilled labourers 10 15
Shepherds 7 .5 4 .5
Muleteers 6 0
Car owners/drivers 0 10
Others: coffee shop owners,
retailers, etc. 3 .5 1 1 .5
(1) Ease number - 81 non-repeated sequential entries 
in the muktar1s register of births. There is 
reason to think that the large majority - though 
not all - births were registered in the village 
in this period. Those which were not would have 
been children of wealthier farmers.
(2) Base number - 195 person census of male household 
heads.
(3) I learned from informants that at least two unmarried 
elementary school teachers were resident in the 
village in this period. One was from Kallo, one
was not.
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the chain-of-we11s method which had started the original 
water company in 1916 had been employed by several other 
companies to give some x^ ater to most village land. However, 
the crop figures suggest a strong continuity with traditional 
agriculture: wheat accounted for 24-i° of land under 
cultivation; barley and oats another 19i° The other main 
crops were: cumin and aniseed 13.3$; food legumes 8.8^ ;
and potatoes 8.5$. There were also about 2,000 olive trees 
on village land.
By 1969, when the village tax lists were consulted^ , 
the picture was this: 4,529 donums of irrigated land were
taxed within the village boundaries, and all but 278 donums 
were owned by persons resident in the village. Village 
residents also paid irrigation tax on between 300 and 400 
donums of land in the boundaries of some adjoining villages, 
bringing the total to nearly 5,000 donums of irrigated land. 
The total village land was reckoned to be 6,500 donums in 
all, within the tax boundaries of the village. There were 
at least 27 pumps operating to supply village lands with 
water, and permits for pumps are subject to government 
licensing.
The 1931 ana 1950 data do not make certain issues 
of boundaries and land categories clear, but the general 
picture suggests a great deal more land came under irrigation 
since 1931. The population of the village more than doubled 
between 1931 and I960, but the area of irrigated land 
increased by two-thirds of the 1931 figure. During the 
latter part of this period too the use of fertilisers, later 
of tractors, and of trucks to take produce to larger markets
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were altering the pattern of agriculture. Yet, as is shown 
by Table 2, the proportion of household heads employed as 
full time farmers fell from 58I to 41#. In real numbers, 
with adjustments for population increase, the picture is 
different again. The 58# of 166 household heads in 1931 
would have yielded nearly 100 farmers. In 1969 there were 
318 households, and 40# of these is over 120 farmers. This 
brings some of the data into perspective, and can be restated 
thus: the larger population was cultivating more land in
1969, and although the number of farmers probably increased 
the proportion of farmers was smaller. To anticipate the 
next chapter, by 1969 both the number and proportion of 
households without land had fallen from the 1931 figures.
It is worth noting in passing other changes in 
village occupations which underline the changes in the 
larger society. By 1969, muleteers have given place tc 
car drivers, ant. a new category of civil servants has 
appeared.
Before leaving the question of the changes from 
traditional subsistence mixed farming, the results of which 
will be dealt with in more detail in the next chapter, the 
change in the structure of debt must be mentioned. Briefly, 
as shown in Table 3, from 1923 the village possessed a 
local branch of the Cooperative Credit Society. At first 
the fledgling society had trouble finding a man with 
sufficient command of figures to handle the book-keeping.
One of the village priests tried the job, but found it too 
hard on his fragile literacy. Then Evghenis, a prosperous
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TABLE 3
THE RISE Q± MEMBERSHIP 1923 - 42 IN SHE 
KALLO AGRICULTURAL CREDIT GOOPERATIVE SOCIETY
Year Membership Numbers
Registered
1923 1 - 1 7
1926 18 - 43
1927 44 - 61
1928 62 - 75
1929 76 - 98
1931 99 -100
1938 102 -110
1939 111 -152
1940 153 -157
1941-2 168 -217
Source: Records of the Kallo Agricultural
Credit Cooperative Society.
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farmer of communist views, and a high standard of literacy, 
took it over for a number of years. He had differences 
with the committee and a poorer man took over the job, who 
was to keep it for over 30 years and still held it in 1970.
The administration of the Credit Cooperative, and the 
difficulties that attended the proposed retirement of the 
secretary, are the subjects of later chapters, here it is 
enough to note the continued growth of membership during 
the period under review, which coincided with a decline 
in the role of private moneylenders; debt and credit 
entered the control both of the village itself (for the 
Society is administered by a working committee of villagers) 
and of the government, which regularly audits the books and 
from which basic regulations are derived.
Before leaving the subject of agriculture it is of 
note that sometime after the merger of the two competing 
water companies a new Kallo company was formed in which many 
shareholders were residents of Kammari village, one mile to 
the south of Kallo. This was in the early 1930's. The new 
company operated successfully for many years, but its 
operation did not prevent the continual outbreak of disputes, 
sometimes violent, between Kallotes and Kammarites over 
the soringtime flow of the Kari river, which flows past land 
of both villages. Springtime water could be brought to their 
fields through irrigation channels, and it was over their 
management that disputes took place. Prom the villagers 
accounts it seems that the quarrels and fights arose because 
no agreed convention existed for water division between the
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villages. This issue was finally decided in the same way 
"that the two companies issue had been decided — by a court 
ruling which made a clear allotment. However, for at least 
twenty years, while some individuals in the two villages 
cooperated through the new water company, others came into 
conflict over the river water. Although I hesitate to lay 
great emphasis on this, a further difference can be noted: 
individual Kallotes sometimes came to blows over water 
rights, but the issue between the two rival water companies 
did not produce physical violence, although it was costly 
in other ways. On the one hand fights between the tv/o 
villages over the river water involved numbers of men and 
not isolated individuals. In later chapters I shall describe 
how the Kallotes continued to stop short of permitting 
violence between political -roups within the village, 
although violence between individuals continues to occur.
(ill) Other Changes
There is no reason to think that village society 
was either closed or static during the nineteenth century; 
but it needs to be stressed since much of this chapter is 
concerned with change, and uses data which inevitably becomes 
more detailed as the present is approached. Even though it 
is probable that the majority of villagers who were farmers 
had few reasons connected with work to go far from the 
village, there were still occasions for travel. The capital 
was about eight hours away by mule, and serioiis sickness 
sometimes involved such a journey to seek a doctor. Those 
with cheese, melons, figs or other produce to sell went to
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Nicosia, and sometimes much further afield, to the mountains 
of Troodos, or even to Paphos. Religious festivals were the 
times when villagers visited monasteries all over the island, 
or churches where there were icons with special powers to heal 
the sick. Some villagers had married outside Kallo or moved 
away, and sometimes Kallotes visited them for a baptism, 
wedding or funerary ritual.
Gome news aiso reached the village through visits 
of government officials, the police, merchants seeking produce, 
peddlars ana itinerant ballad-singers. Old men and women were 
abxe to repeat tchattismata, the rhyming couplets in which 
nearly all peasant verse is formed, commemorating a notorious 
murder or the exploits of a celebrated bandit.
The life histories and genealogies of the oldest 
villagers showed how some of their forebears had left the 
viixage for longer or shorter periods. One Kaliotis became 
a monk, another the director of a hospital in mainland Greece, 
at least two had been on trips to Greece for some education 
before the turn of the century. Several volunteered for the 
Greek Army during the engagements which continued on and off 
with the Turks and the Bulgarians between 1898 and 1915; others 
joined the British Army as muleteers during the two viorld Wars. 
At least two became merchant seamen and disappeared for many 
years; one man settled in Egypt and was a teacher. More 
recently, since i92Q one Kaliotis emigrated to the U.S.A. and 
at least a dozen Kallo families are presently living in Britain. 
Others moved to the five towns of the island throughout the 
period; the main reasons which are usually given by informants
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then ichen tlpotes 'he had nothing', marriage, or the achieve­
ment of a status which made them out of piace in or dissatisfied 
with village life.
The village then was not closed or static even if 
the patterns of agriculture and other work lent themselves 
to an inward-looking community. Education was a further factor 
which inevitably acted to introduce outside ideas. Before the 
British arrived there was already an expansion of popular 
education in the island, but after 1878 the pace of change 
undoubtedly quickened. Kallo perhaps already had its school, 
for omy three years later in 1881 a government report ^  
states that Neophyttos Petrou received £16-13 for the year, 
rased by voluntary contribution, for teaching twenty Christian 
boys in Kallo, while Muxa Mustapha for teaching twelve Muslim 
boys and three Muslim girls received a government payment of 
£10. In 1883 the number of Christian boys had risen to 59.
In some other villages at this period the amounts paid to 
teachers ranged from 7/6 to £1 per pupil per year - a wide 
range which suggests that villagers may have bargained with 
teachers on annual contract, as old informants insist. In 
one village at least, the records mention a teacher who was 
to be paid by resuxts, for h<=> was to get money only "when the 
children can read and write and do accounts", a comment which 
suggests also the practical side of peasant interest in 
education.
In 188i. only 151° of school age children were in 
attendance but by 1901 this proportion had risen to 38$ 
(Christodoulou, x959:59). As the expansion of popular education
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continued (Table 4) towards the point when practically every 
village in the island was to have its own elementary schools, 
Churchmen and members of the Legislative Assembly were prone 
to intervene in the appointment of teachers, since the teachers
as the grateful recipients of such patronage could be relied
on to mooiiise support in villages for particular national 
figures. In 192S Governor Stcrrs was meeting strong opposition 
from the patrons in his attempt to take the appointments of 
teachers out of such directly interested hands, and place tnem
in those of the civil service.
In chapter seven, which discusses the political history 
of the island since 1678, the role of the schoolteachers as 
agents of nationalism is analysed. Here the concern has teen 
with the history of the village, and it is necessary to note 
merely that teachers in general were strongly identified with 
the mainland, to whom they still refer as mother Greece. The 
literacy they taught could not have failed to introduce 
villagers to nationalist ideas, for the simple reason that 
the gap was so great between village dialect and written Greek, 
whether Eemotiki or Katharevousa. The very act of learning 
to read and write the Greek -Language involved the creation 
of a xink zo a much wider society than the village imagine - 
and potentially, an addition to social identity, for those 
who wished to develop it.
(iv) The Concerns of Pre-^ar Village Politics
In the fiexd of politics there had been formal 
possibilities of villagers participating in the life of the
TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OP PEOPLE AGED OVER 5 YEARS
WHO COULD READ AND WRITE
Year Males Females
1911^ 44 14
1931 66.5 35.5
1946 71 49.5
Source: Christodoulou (.1.959:59)
Note (l) There are no figures for literacy 
before 1911.
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nation since 1882, when a Legislative Assembly of twelve 
members was created, with a suffrage extended to all males 
aged eighteen upwards, who had paid the verghi, a tax on 
abxe-bodied maie householders or bread-winners, collected 
ky muktars. How such formal participation worked in practice 
it is hard to say, but in October 1906 little more than 20,000 
people voted, although the island's population at this time 
was over 235,OOO^10 .^ Intimidation sometimes took place at 
elections: of the 106 registered voters of PULzokarpasso who
wished to vote for a certain candidate, only 20 voted at all, 
and of these only one for the man of his choice (Hill, 1952).
Kallo informants were able to remember two elections 
from the 1920's to the Legislative Assembly. They describe 
the 1926 election as if it were a contest between two men - 
Neoptolemos Paskalis, and a certain HajiPavlou. Paskalis 
they remember as a rich lawyer and moneylender, taking a pro­
government position and ambivalent to Enosls. HajiPavlou 
though also a lawyer was from a poor family and from the Paphos 
district, renowned for its poverty and backwardness. Apart
from being a fervent Enosist he declared that he would abolish 
/
the dekartia. an agricultural tax which was a tithe on most 
produce. Paskalis said that if it was abolished it would 
only re-appear in other forms so it was a pointless exercise. 
MajiPavlou riposted. There was no reason why only farmers 
should pay tax, and if the luxuries that city people used were 
taxed - here he mantioned lipstick and perfume - it would be 
fairer. He also suggested that Church lands should be sold 
cheaply to farmers. Both these men made speeches in Kano and
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in the case of HajiPavlou not only his ideas but the actual 
words he used are remembered by the older men. There is a 
reason for this: they emphasise that he was first and foremost
an orator, even a demagogue, and among other methods by which 
he fired people up were the use of the demotic or popular 
language (as opposed to the more complex, remote and archaic 
form used in speeches by most educated people, Katharevousa, 
Purified Greek); he aiso seems to have produced in each 
village he spoke in a simple rhyming tag, to characterise 
that particular village as a lead-in to his speech. Some tags 
were still remembered in 1970. HajiPaviou won the 1926 election 
handsomely.
Informants of varied political persuasions now 
remember the two men to have represented parties of the rich 
and of the poor respectively. However, the limited data 
obtained about how individual Kallotes voted do not support 
such a view^^. The situation was probably more complex. 
Although Paskalis, like certain other Representatives, was 
a moneylender and therefore had a high interest in agricultural 
debt, both literally and metaphorically, he got strong support 
in Kallo, and not always from the richer peasants, some of 
whom voted for JJajiPavlou. Not all the villagers with large 
landholdings indulged in money-lending, since some of them 
preferred to put all surplus cash straight into land, and 
these men had no particular reasons to support Paskalis. 
Secondly, it must be remembered that even then the issue of 
Enosis had the effect of cutting across simple divisions of 
wealth. Furthermore, as Hill makes clear, from the earliest
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years of British rule right down to the 1950's there was a 
fundamental dispute among Greek Cypriot politicians over the 
issue of cooperation with the government or complete boycott 
in the cause of Enosis. This helps to explain why Paskalis, 
who in the early 1920's had been a strong advocate of Enosis, 
could in a later period be seen by villagers as 'pro-government' 
- whoever in the Legislative Assembly voted in favour of any 
government policy ran the risk of being called a traitor if 
a period of nationalist agitation was starting up.
There was another reason for Faskalis' support in
Kallo which once again is not a simple matter of rich and 
poor men's parties. Paskalis was the defence lawyer for certain 
Kallotes, the Anariadis family, who were accused of murder 
in 1926. They got off. The Andriades were at the time a
group of eight brothers, who were physically tough, and
managed between them to retain control of the muktarship for
(i p )
most of the period 1920-1955 . Some of them had a good
deal of land, some had little. Occasionally they quarrelled 
among themselves but often stood together in the face of any 
challenge by other villagers. In 1926 several members of this 
group of cognates and affines killed a poor man from a weak 
family in a drunken brawl. In spite of attempts by the 
murdered man's kin to get justice - which included appeals to 
high police officials, the police seem to have found it 
impossible to get any useful witnesses to the murder, although 
the whole village knew who had done it, and several bystanders 
had seen it happen. The murdered man's relatives told me that 
since the Andriadis family had had one of its members as muktar,
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it had built up good relations with police and other government 
officials, and had got the case dropped ’by feeding many people'. 
It seems probable that since the police did not get helpful 
testimony they would have had difficulty in securing a conviction 
in any case. One result of the affair was that Paskalis, as 
lawyer for some of the Andriades, received extra support during 
the elections, and although he lost ac the district level, he 
received more votes than his rival in Kallo.
The office of muktar was clearly important in the 
village. Informants say that in the old days auktars were 
always well-off because among other things they had to have 
the spare time for the paper work the job involved; and 
furthermore they nad to be able to offer hospitality to visitors. 
Their duties included responsibility for reporting crime and 
calling in the police; cooperation with any visiting officials; 
the official registration of births, deaths and land transfers, 
and the collection of certain taxes. In Kallo there were 
elections for the post, and informants remember that there 
were two factions in continual opposition over it. These 
factions had an essentially kinship core, they insist, although 
people could be attached by affinal, friendship or other links.
It seems membership was not completely stable, and people did 
sometimes switch factions without suffering any very severe 
sanctions.
However, some informants speak of this period as if 
there was a good deal of stability to the factions. The earlier 
issue of the two water companies has been mentioned. Apart 
from the post of muktar, and the elections for the Legislative
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Assembly, there was the Church Committee, and occasional 
elections for the post of Archbishop which could have served 
as foci for factional conflict. Some informants say "We 
always had two parties in those days, and if I was against you 
in one thing I was against you in all." Once again, the 
situation was almost certainly not so simple, even though it 
sounds very attractive. Informants state very emphatically 
that A and B voted for a particular party or issue, yet when 
A and B are directly questioned, it turns out that the original 
informant was wrong. It seems more likely that the meaning 
of the statement that there were always two stabie parties 
is that the village frequently divided into opposed groups, 
and that there were always two - as opposed to three or more. 
Also, the statement suggests that if a man had a personal 
grudge against another, he was likely to oppose him just for 
the sake of so doing, and regardless of the issue^1^.
During this period people also remember that fights 
were common. They seem to have occurred after Church on 
Sundays, when men drank wine and got drunk, and when young 
men went to the swings (a form of very mild courtship game 
in which young men could see the young women of the village). 
The other common occasion for fights was at weddings. There 
were several groups of tough brothers who got into fights with 
other groups. These groups too are sometimes described by 
the word komma which is also used for political or electoral 
parties. "We were wild in those days" the old men say, and 
referring to the Andriadis brothers and their tendency both 
to control the post of muktar and to get tough with anyone
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they didn't like, they add "The Andriades terrorised the 
village at that time".
In 1929 there was a second election for the legislative 
Assembly in which HajiPavlou again stood, while a man called 
Triandafillides stood in place of Paskalis. At first 
Triandafillides was declared the winner but later electoral 
fraud was charged (not for the first time in Legislative 
Assembly elections) and after witnesses had been found who 
said they had been bribed, HajiPavIou was declared the winner.
In Kallo at least one informant who had voted against HajiPavlou 
in 1926 now voted for him. The reason he gave me was dis­
satisfaction with the recent village muktar elections in which 
his candidate had failed. He normally voted with the Andriadis 
group, of which he was a member, but now he voted against them. 
Other informants are equally sure that at the national elections 
there were other cases of close kin voting for different 
candidates, and some describe the principle of choice and 
alignment as "everybody did as he liked..Informants also 
remember being given sums of money to secure votes by agents 
of the candidates, and that large feasts were set up in the 
coffee-shops at which villagers caroused. They called out to 
the passers-by to join them, the clear implication being that 
to sit at the table meant to support the candidate. They add 
that different coffee-shops were, during the election period, 
the domains of the rival groups.
This period comes to a natural close in terms of the 
political issues under review when in 1931 there was something 
normally described as the 'Uprising* in the capital, during
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which the Governor's Mansion was burned. It does not seem to 
have been an organised attempt at insurrection on the part of 
the Greek community but more a demonstration which got out of 
hand (Storrs, 1939:53Cl). Kallo's contribution to the event 
was that several villagers went and cut the telegraph wire 
linking Market Town to the capital. Government troops shot 
a few people in nearby villages, and the government sent people 
to find out who had cut the wire. The muktar was removed, as 
were many muktars all over Cyprus, because the Government 
decided that many of them had been inadequately vigilant during 
the disturbances. The new muktar, Meletis, knew perfectly well 
who had cut the wire but when asked said he did not think it 
was anyone from the village. He always adopted the tactic of 
dealing with thefts and petty crimes himseif, without telling 
the police, because in this way his sources of information 
remained open and he avoided reprisals. His attitude exemplifies 
the ambiguity in the role of muktar 1^^ . A little later he 
resigned for personal reasons, and the government replaced him 
with a man called Akis who was said to have given the police 
the names of the wire-cutters. The police gave the wire-cutters 
a beating up, but Akis himself did not avoid reprisals from 
those he had informed on: for a number of years he suffered
repeated crop damage and stock theft.
After the Uprising the Legislative Assembly was 
suspended and the Governor ruled by decree; muktars remained 
appointees of the government, and this continues to be the case 
at time of writing. At one stroke, then, two issues were 
removed which had been a focus for village factions. The fact 
that muktars were no longer appointed meant that villagers
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no longer could compete for control of the roan who was roost 
likely to mediate their relations with the larger society.
The fact that urban politicians no longer made their periodic 
descents into the village arena meant that, on the formal 
political level, there was a pause in the incorporation of 
the village into the larger society.
(v) The Post-War Period: Left and Right
The 1930’s are remembered in the village as days of 
extreme hardship. The island was hit by the economic depression 
which affected the Eastern Mediterranean as well as Europe, 
and Kailo was no exception. Prices ox produce and land fell, 
there was much unemployment, and men travelled far from the 
village to get any work they could. The 1939-45 war, for 
which it was said earlier, some villagers volunteered, axso 
provided new work opportunities outside the village, building 
aerodromes; as the island’s economy picked up, there were 
other jobs Co be had in the towns, and in service capacities 
on the British bases. The new job opportunities were accompan­
ied by a more liberal political climate in which the organis­
ation of trade unions was again permitted. Hill noted tnat 
in 1948 there were thirty four Greek political parties, which 
included twenty right-wing ones, and twelve of the left.
This rash of parties was not; the first sign of 
organised politics in tae island. Since the early 1920's 
there had been a small left wing movement, which had attempted 
to organise miners in the Troodos mountains and the Xeros 
region. Agitation for Enosis by the clergy, teachers and other
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notables had been taking place since the British first arrived, 
and the legislative Assembly had been the scene of frequent 
boycotts, by Greek members. Nationalist organisations, usually 
of an elite nature, seem to have existed throughout the period. 
The 1920's saw the start of a left wing movement which attempted 
to organise miners in the Troodos mountains. The Communist 
Party, which started in 1924, was banned in j.93j after the 
Uprising. It re-emerged in 1941 as AKSI, and succeeded in 
winning the municipal elections in limassoi and Famagusta,
1943.
In Kailo the prosperous farmer Evgheniy had aieo 
declared himsexf a Communist before 1930 and had also drawn to 
his ideas a young Ivallo schoolteacher, who came into head-on 
conxjict with the Church authorities over his views, and was 
pressured into signing a document denying that he was an atheist. 
Cid men recaxi hov; puzzled they were that two of the best-read 
men in the village should be communists, and one man in his 
middle forties in 1968 recalled how he had travelled as a boy 
of about ten with his father to the capital in the mid 1930's. 
There they saw a man carrying a placard, and people throwing 
eggs at him and hissing him. He asked his father why people 
were attacking the man, and the reply was "Because he is a 
Communist". 'I thought to myself, what a terrible person one 
must be to be a communist, that people were so angry against 
him', said my informant, later himsejf to become a leading 
Kallo communist. There is no question that the older men 
found the notion as puzzling as did the youngster, and the key 
to the puzzle was the idea of atheism, which, I shall argue
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in a later chapter, clashed directly with the embyonic notions 
of Greek national identity which had reached some of the 
villagers.
By the early post-war period it appears that the left 
in Kallo had a good deaj. of support, and both leftists and 
rightists agree about this. The rightists recall that if they 
opened their mouths to argue in the coffee shops they were 
always outnumbered. In those days, 1945-50, the leftists had 
a strong soccer team, while the right were organised in a 
religious association linked to the Church^15 .^ Both of these 
associations primarily attracted men in their twenties.
The village now possessed the basis for political 
con!rontations in the existence of groups of men consciously 
opposed to each other on the same lines as groups operating 
at the town level. The national leaders were busily rejecting 
and boycotting the government's tentative offers of limited 
internal self-government. However, there were two rounds of 
archiepiscopal elections in 1947 and 1948 which gave the 
national parties a chance to test their organisations by backing 
opposed candidates for the job. Makarios n ^ 16  ^Was a strong 
anti-communist and wa3 to win. The left in Cyprus, and of 
course in Kallo, backed a candidate who was considered more 
'progressive'. Although he lost in Cyprus, in Kallo his 
supporters could have mobilised more votes than did those 
for Makarios II and this fact is taken by both right and left 
wing informants to prove that at that time the left was clearly 
stronger in sheer numbers. They also report that tempers ran 
higher in those days - "we were more fanatic then and we took
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it all seriously.”
The fanaticism took an interesting form which stopped 
the matter being proven by the actual result of the ballot: 
for ecclesiastical elections the electoral register was super­
vised by the village Church committee, which sent the register 
to the bishopric whence it returned with the names of certain 
villagers scored through in red ink, as communists, and thus 
atheists, and so ineligible to vote. It should be noted at 
this point that it was the son of the Church committee secretary 
who was leader of the left group: in his account it was the
committee members themselves who had supplied the information 
to the bishopric; however, the secretary says that this did 
not occur but readily agrees the information must have been 
supplied by someone in the village.
The actua-L voting was to take place in the Church.
'When the leftists arrived they found the door barred to them 
and the amended register produced as justification. "We are 
Christians too and entitled to vote" they insisted, but this 
appeal failed. In normal village usage the idea of being 
Greek and of being Christian is one and the same, and in telling 
the story the Secretary of the Church Committee did not find 
it odd that the leftists insisted they were Christians:
"Surely no man would deny he is a Christian?" he said. The 
priest came outside to collect the proxy votes of menstruating 
women (who were prohibited from entering the Church) and the 
leftists went away.
They decided to retaliate with a form of economic 
boycott. In the Orthodox Church a worshipper normally buys
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a thin wax taper on entrance for a few copper coins. Later in 
the service he lights it and. leaves it before an icon, whereupon 
after a few minutes a Church official extinguishes it. later 
the Church melts down the tapers, makes new ones and re-sells 
them. The purchase of a taper is thus in a sense analogous 
to a collection in some other Churches except it also involves 
an act of ritual participation by the worshipper. The Kallo 
leftists decided to buy their own tapers and bring them into 
Church when they went, thus depriving the Church of a form 
of revenue. In addition, they did not h0-^  a certain customary 
festival - yiorti tou spitlou - centring on the rituax blessing 
of the house at which it is customary for the priest and 
cantors to be feasted as well as paid a small fee for ritual 
services. This boycott was kept up for several years and only 
dropped when a local bishop was trying to muster possible 
support against the Archbishop and made peace with the left 
by suggesting they might like to put up a candidate for the 
Church Committee.
Kallo at this period had privately owned retail stores 
selling a wide range of essentials and run by villagers. 
Villagers felt that such shops overcharged for many commodities, 
and the shopkeepers were naturally forced to extend credit 
providing ample room for dispute in normal transactions, since 
among other things most villagers did not keep their own record 
of items purchased and were often frankly incredulous at the 
amount they might have run up over several months. When the 
Kallo leftists - following a trend that had already started 
as a result of initiatives by leftist organisations - started
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collecting subscriptions for a Cooperative Retail Shop, which 
would be non-profit and dividend-paying, they found a good 
deal of support in the village. The right, however, at first 
stayed out and tried to persuade the villagers it was a bad 
idea. When they realised that the idea was in fact quite 
popular they decided to cooperate and by an agreement with 
the left were allowed to put two representatives on the five 
man committee which supervised the running of the shop.
(vi) Conclusion
This chapter has used a number of different types
of material, mixing the recollections of old people, village
and government records, my own census material, and some
literary sources, to obtain a picture of Kallo village's 
(17)recent history' To build up such a picture there has
inevitably been much reliance on inference to bridge gaps in 
the material, and no claim can be made to completeness. Any 
account of changes in Cypriot society as a whole has been by 
implication only, and brought in only so far as was essential 
to describe gross changes in village life. Such an attempt 
is seriously ximited since it allows nothing to be said about 
how far Kallo has been typical of the development of rural 
Cyprus, but it is essential as an introduction to my main 
concern, the analysis of political processes in which Kallo 
villagers have been involved since I960.
The picture which emerges has certain features in 
common with the course of change in European and Mediterranean 
peasant communities in the last hundred years, as well as that 
in certain countries during the later phases of colonial rule.
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It involves rapid population growth, changes in agricultural 
technique, increase in persons living through wage labour 
facilitated by new roads, and motor transport; all this 
accompanied by increase in popular literacy, and increasing 
political activity by urban leaders.
10 characterise the traditional period, the notion of 
'mora^ . community* used by Pitt-Ri vers (1954^  30-3X) is usefux, 
but with the notable difference that whereas Aicala had a 
resident Cxass of senoritos. Kallo lacked such a class. There 
were differences of weaxth, but these were not strongly 
institutionalised. There was no landlord cj.ass, very few 
completely landless families, very few resident men distinguished 
by literacy. There was some occupational specialisation, and 
there is no reason to think that a landless labourer met a 
farmer with forty donums on terms of complete equality. Yet 
insofar as the main concerns of all villagers were land, 
marriage partners, honour and simply, economic survival, such 
social conflict as occurred between the Greeks of Kallo was 
within a common framework of values. The village was in this 
sense a moral community, and there are signs that it was in 
the political sense a solidary community as well. This does 
not suggest that social conflict did not take pxace, but that 
it was regulated by customary norms, which implied the wish 
to limit violent conflict between groups in the village.
It is not the suggestion that violent conflict did 
not take place in this period. The Andriaais family who 
terrorised the village* and controlled the post of muktar are 
proof enough that it did. The point here is that this was
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both within a common frame of values, and was regulated.
It did not lead to feud, to the expulsion of a kin group, 
or to the formation of politically corporate groups (Barth:
1959 ‘ 71-91),and in this sense it resembles the competition 
between festa partiti described by Boissevain (1965:55-96).
At the same time as such disputes over power, influence and 
personal prestige took place between Kallotes, they were 
abxe to settle other issues of direct economic importance 
to many of them, through the authority of the courts, 
themselves a consequence of British colonial rule. The two 
companies'dispute may in fact have cost the villagers so much 
money and pride, tiiat it predisposed them to more rapid 
settlements in the future. With the neighbouring village of 
Kammari, there were for a number of years cooperative relations 
in a water company, and violent disputes over river water, 
again finally settled through the courts. The traditional 
agriculture was modified, first by the increasing use of 
summer water, then by the extension of village cultivation.
The village gc-t larger, and occupations both changed 
and diversified. Lore villagers were farmers, but proportion­
ately, fewer of them. The role of government affected the 
lives of villages, in the control of agricultural credit, 
and the national economy provided in the 1930s and 1940s new 
opportunities for wage labour. The flow of transactions 
between villagers and the larger society was increasing, and 
one sign of this was the attempts of urban politicians to 
appeal to rural voters. The 1931 Uprising put a temporary 
curb on this, but then the colonial government ten years later
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relaxed its restraints, and by the end of the 1940’s Rallo 
possessed associations of young men using the political 
slogans of the left and the right to align themselves.
Behaviour which in the 1920’s had seemed startlingly new, 
now had an organisational basis in village life, and this is 
reason enough to say - anticipating the argument of later 
chapters - that the villagers no monger lived within a single 
framework of values* a political change had taken place, as 
well as those changes in the agricultural and economic sectors. 
To assess the consequences of such political change for the 
social organisation of the village is the main task in the 
pages that follow.
Footnotes to Chapter 1.
(a.) Report ana General Abstracts of the Census of 1931. 
Nicosia:Government Irinting Office.
(2) I have not enough information to decide if villagers 
when borrowing from other villagers received better 
terms than from townsmen, or were able to soften, later, 
the terms they received. Since certain Kallotes became 
owners of many donums by foreclosing on others, it is 
probable that constraints on foreclose existed only 
between close kin, and not between all co-villagers.
(3) Cohen (1965; 19 ) gives an account of the struggle
of Palestinian Arabs to secure the muna. subsistence 
needs for a family in a mixed cereal farming situation. 
Stirling (1965*44-97) gives a comparable account for
a Turkish village 1949-50 before the advent of tractors.
(4) The aotual technique, and the cooperation if involves, 
are ancient. Jenness (1962) describes how tfcie Market 
Town farmers started to dig a chain of wells but 
stopped when their funds ran out? in 1894, however, 
they received a loan from the Agricultural Board, and 
continued. Rallo villagers see themselves in rivalry 
with Market Town, and in two later chapters aspects
of this rivalry over the construction of a dam and the 
administration of a citrus retail cooperative will be 
analysed in detail.
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(5) I have tried unsuccessfully to examine court records 
on this ana several other cases,
(6) See (1); I aha-^ 1 by donum always mean a government 
donum, about one third of an acre; a 'village donum * 
was roughly twice this and based on the amount; of land 
a man with two oxen could plough in a working day.
It vsas inevitably, then, a rough measure.
(7) As both Christodoulou and Jenness make clear, local 
conditions of land fertility, water supply, crops 
grown and market conditions make island-wide estimates 
of jiand holdings needed for household viability 
extremely difficult, not to speak of the actual levei 
of household consumption, or other income sources.
I think it unlikely that in the traditional period,
before summer water was used, a holding of less than
eight acres could have kept a smaxl family alive.
(6) The agrophylakas. normally described as rural constable 
in English, is paid to perform a number of duties, one 
of which is keeping an up-to-date register of all land 
he^d within the village, and its tax status.
(9) Cyprus Gazette. CO 456 (188~) and (1883-4).
(10) Cyprus Blue Book, 1909-10.
(11) It is worth noting that Kammari village also had a
dispute between two water companies, similar to the 
one I have described for Kailo. I did not investigate 
it in any detail, but was told by a sophisticated 
Kammri informant that the dispute had been ’between 
the rich, in one company, and the poor, in the other’. 
The Kallotes do not describe their water company 
dispute this way, but they do so for the elections 
here described.
(12) Even though after the 1931 Uprising the government 
appointed muktars» a member of the Andriades was later 
appointed, 'i’he issue of the election or appointment 
of muktars is complicated. Informants said that until 
1931 there were elections for muktar in the village, 
and that after the Uprising, the Government appointed 
them. However, there is good evidence that the 
Government had already seriously modified the simple 
annual elections which they have taken over from the 
Ottomans in 1878, and which were Btia.1 flourishing 
when Orr (1918) criticised the system. Shenis points 
out that the series of Village Authority Laws (10 of 
1906, 10 of 1907, 18 of 1923, 38 of 1926, 22 of 1930 
and 19 of 1931) had as one aim the codification of 
muktar’b duties. Surridge, writing before the Uprising, 
describes a system in which villagers elected a number 
of possible representatives, from whom the Mejlis-i 
Idare nominated three, the Legislative Council Member 
for the District, two. From these five the Governor 
chnsa one to be muktar; the elections were to be
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every two years. This blend of election and of 
appointment was converted into simple appointment 
in 1931.
(13) Such behaviour is characteristic of factionalism 
everywhere, but it is well described and analysed 
by Frankenberg (1957:148-157) and Boissevain 
(1965) .
(14) G-luckman (1968a) has recently reviewed some of the 
literature on what he now terms 'inter-hierarchical 
roles’. Shenis (1962) has studied in detail the 
evolution of local government in Cyprus since 
early times.
(15) Many of the men who in thi3 period were calling 
themselves leftist no longer did so by the time of 
my fieldwork, and the membership of the leftist 
soccer team is one way in which the villages remember 
this. The right wing religious associations were to 
be used, throughout the island, by Grivas, to act as 
recruiting grounds for EOKA. Both these issues are 
examined later.
(16) The President of the Republic of Cyprus is 
His Beatitude Makarios III.
(17) For this introductory chapter I have employed a 
selection of the possible sources only: Hill (1952),
and Christodoulou (1955) in his thesis, both give 
very extensive bibliographies of works on Cyprus
in a number of languages. I have examined official 
publications for information relevant to Kallo and 
the Market Town district, but make no claim to 
have been exhaustive. In later chapters, only a 
selection of possible source material on the EOKA 
period and inter-communal conflicts since Independence 
have been employed. The main focus of this work 
is in the analysis of fieldwork data.
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CHAPTER 2 
LAMP, WORK AKD PRESTIGE
The size of a family's land-holding, and the types of 
work its members do together act as constraints in the village 
system of social prestige and differentiation. Economic and 
status factors together are partial determinants of political 
relations both within the village, and across its boundaries. 
In simplest terms, poor men are rarefy politica-L activists 
or leaders, but either act with great caution, or are the 
dependent clients of more powerful men. Those men who are 
full-time farmers dominate the competition for administrative 
office in the village, and also produce a majority of the 
political leaders. Their structural position allows them 
degrees of freedom not available to poorer men, or men whose 
work relies on the goodwill of others. The third feature of 
political life which can be partly attributed to the land 
holding and work patterns is the pre-eminence of teachers and 
civil servants as the natural brokers between the villagers, 
and men of power outside the village. There are, in addition, 
certain tensions in the relations between the farmers and the 
more educated men which become apparent in situations where 
leadership of the village involves confronting external 
authorities.
To discuss these structural constraints is also to 
clarify the nature of certain prizes for which the villagers 
compete in tne village arena, for it will become ciear in
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this and the following chapters that the villagers1 values 
focus on provision for their children, and this provision 
takes the form of land, houses, wealth, education, and 
appropriate marriage partners. Since most villagers still 
seek to marry their children to the children of co- 
villagers^'1^ , they have certain common interests which cast 
light on why they also va_ue a measure of peace in village 
politics.
(i) The Importance of Land
It might at first sight seem a truism to suggest 
that the distribution of land is essential to the understanding 
of the village. However, Kallo has certain features unusual 
in tae ethnography of the aiediterranean, at least. Chiefly, 
these are that land is still the "basis of prestige, it is 
valuable and valued and, relatively, it is evenly distributed; 
the3e facts taken together mean that hallo provides for most 
people born into it the chance of a reasonable living in 
comparison with poorer villages, and it has not been de­
populated in the ways commonly reported.
-here has been some continuity with the traditional 
period, when *and was more simply the basis for survival, 
in that the younger men in the village, acting on the advice 
of their fathers, still seek to obtain land, even when they 
have other sources of income. This is partly because in the 
current citrus boom, which »i*j. be described in the .ast 
section of this chapter, the returns on long-term investment 
in land are attractive. In living memory the va^ue of land
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has appreciated so dramatically that, at very least appearing 
as a safe investment in comparison with other things, it is 
the preferred method of investing surplus cash, men are 
fond of pointing this out, by saving "I "bought that field 
for £20 in 1940, and now they are offering me £500 for it 
and I'm not selling".
jior is the value of land eroded simply because in 
general villagers as a category rank below townsmen. Spec­
ulation in land is the major source of investment for the 
urban elite; not ail of this by any means is for building 
plots or tourist areas. Numbers of the urban elite are now 
armchair agriculturalists, and several MPs and senior civil 
servants and ministers have large citrus holdings in the 
Market Town area.
There are a number of ways the issue of land, work., 
and their consequences can be approached, and each method 
of analysis casts light on different aspects of the issue. 
First, it is worth considering five examples using qualit­
ative material, to make the later use of numerical data 
more meaningful. The cases that follow are selected as 
illustrative of five contrasting patterns of land tenure, 
occupation, and provision for dependents.
(a) MakriSt a poor labourer (Census no. 125)
Makrie is 64, his wife 58. They have five 
children, and some would say it is a good thing 
they don't have more, for Makris himself 
received from his own parents no land at 
marriage in 1936, his family being one of the 
poorest in Kallo, and his wife, who provided 
their home, had only three and a ha.tf donums 
of good, irrigated land, and five of poor, 
unwatered land.
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Makris has never bought any land; he has 
worked as an unskilled labourer all his life, he 
works as one today, and his income is irregular. 
His wife also works, either doing work in her 
home as a seamstress, when she was single, or in 
married life doing paid agricultural labour. He 
says ’what we get, we spend to eat1.
In spite of this, in 1965 he planted 180 
citrus trees, and by 1972 he can expect to take 
£90 from them; but the trees will in fact be a 
vital part of the dowries for his 25 and 23 
year old daughters, when grooms are found for 
them. The elder finished primary school only, 
and works as a wage labourer whenever she can, 
about the village. The younger finished secondary 
school and works in the Market Town office of a 
kallo merchant; Makris1 unmarried son is ill and 
cannot work.
Makris did manage to educate his oldest child, 
a son who now has a salaried white collar job 
in Market Town, for he managed to get a technical 
degree. Makris hopes this son will help a bit 
toward the marriages of the girls, but this will 
have to be done discreetly, lest his son's affines 
protest. By the standards of men in the poorer 
mountain or plains villages, Makris would not be 
considered really poor, although in Kallo he is 
described as poor by most villagers.
(b) Ps.ylos, a seml-3kllled wa£e worker (Census no. 88)
Psylos is 48; since his marriage in 1944 his 
wife has given him 7 children, of whom 5 are still 
unmarried. She aiso brought 10 donums of land 
to the marriage. He himself brought no land 
to the marriage, and has never managed to increase 
the landholding, he left school at 14, worked 
for two years as a kitchen boy in Nicosia, then 
for three years in the General Hospital as an 
Assistant Cook; later he had his own restaurant, 
but in 1944 joined the Army, and worked until 
1948 in the officers Mess. At present he is 
Cook in the Mining Hospital on the coast, and 
this brings him a steady salary of nearly £jl,G00 
a year. He gets a further income of £500 a year 
from 168 mature orange trees he planted in 1955, 
and from which in 1968-69 he cut 100,000 fruit.
His debts at the moment are: £j.,030 from expenses 
in marrying off his daughter; £200 to the 
Agricultural Credit Society for farming costs;
£25 to a villager for water; £16 to the truck 
cooperative in the village; £15 for fertiliser; 
plus a commitment of £10 a month school fees for
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Ills twelve year old daughter 1*210 is going to 2 
private commercia-L school.
Psylos has married off two daughters, one 
aged 22, tie Owher aged IS; he has given then 
a total of 6 donaas, and is still 'building the 
nouse for the second; at hose he has a 20 year 
old son, who finished technical School and ho tc z 
as a mechanic for the Mining Company; a 16 year 
old son, who also finished the technical, and 
narks as an electrician; a 14 jear old son, still 
at the Technical; the 12 jear old daughter 
already mentioned; and a 10 year old eon at the 
primary school. Since he only has 4 donums cf 
land left, which yields valuable income, he will 
not he in a position to give any land to the 
three oldest sons; it -sill probably go to the 
12 year old girl when she marries. The sons 
have their trades to help them find wives with 
a little land and at least are not unskilled 
labourers, fortunately, Technical School education 
is free; by most standards Psylos, thanks to 
his steady income from two sources, has been able 
to marry off his c'nixdren reasonably well. His 
daughters hare married young so his honour Is 
intact. ?or a man who started life with so little 
land, he has managed to escape the major pitfalls. 
He cannot be called, In Tillage terms, a very 
successful man; but nor can he be called a 
failure.
.cy i-ano:  ^S . .d full-time farmer (Census 10. JO)
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not in debt". The £2,500 he owes is split into 
£300 to the village Credit Society, for fertilisers; 
£500 to the import agent, he sold him the diesel 
pump that waters his land (and whose water he 
sexls to others); this debt is for repairs, since 
the pump was recently damaged; and £1,500 to the 
Cooperative Central Bank to float his recent land 
purchases. In 1955, when he started to drill for 
the underground water he now enjoys, the debt was 
£3,000.
He planted 300 orange trees in 1955, another 
300 in I960, 220 in 1963, and in 1965, a massive 
1,100. In 1968 he was receiving income from 600 
of these trees, but was still cuxtivating 1 ,300  
of them without income.
His land purchases have paralleled his citrus 
planting: 1955, 7 donums for £500; I960, 3 donums 
for £900; 1968, 4 donums for £1,300. In each 
case these new plots joined other pieces of land 
he already owned, making their cultivation 
economically more efficient.
As Kendis gets older, his household expenses 
will increase if he chooses to give his children 
education. But even as things stand, and assuming 
he makes no further expansion of his land holdings, 
each chixd stands to get 15 donums, and this puts 
them in the elite of the village. They wil^ be 
abxe to choose education, farming, or both. Kandis 
is a firm leftist, in spite of his success.
(d) Pattas, a civil servant with pood citrus holdings 
TCensus no. 143)
Pattas is 34; his wife brought 14 donums to 
their marriage, as well as the customary dowry 
house. Pattas, tall, well-built, personable 
and intelligent, himself received 7 donums at 
marriage, and his personal attributes more than 
make up for his smaller portion of land, for he 
has put all 21 donums under citrus, in four 
plantings: 400 trees in 1958; 220 in 1961;
420 in 1962; 140 in 1968. His current debt
stands at £2,500. But he grossed £2,000 from 
his citrus trees in 1963, so he is not concerned.
One reason he has done so well is that since 
1955 he has had regular work as a prison officer; 
his salary of £650^  in 1968 was about to rise to 
£850. This helped him finance the earlier 
planting of his land, and the situation is now 
economically self-propelled. He can, if he 
chooses, expand his holdings. He has four 
chi-Ldren, and plans not to have more.
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He drives a four-year old English saloon that 
he bought second hand. His house cost £3,000 in 
contract labour and materials, and in it he has a 
radio, a refrigerator, a modern gas stove and a 
washing machine.
In 196i he put down £500 towards a tractor, 
and his brother, a farmer, put £100. The brother 
then used the tractor to plough both their 
holdings, and aiso to plough those of other men, 
for profit. Pattas stated that the accounting 
system is informal: whenever the tractor needs
repairs, each brother pays a half.
He has just bought Two shares of £75 each in 
a new cooperative company which will sink a bore 
hole for underground water.
Pattas is typical of an emergent elite in the 
village, of those who have land which is profitable, 
and handsomely subsidises their other occupations. 
Other members tend to have more formaj. education 
than Pattas (to have finished the secondary school) 
but his wealth, life style, urban white-collar 
job and good political contacts make up for this 
deficit. His sister has married a veterinary 
doctor, he has a younger brother at university 
in Athens, and a younger sister who is finishing 
secondary school.
(e) Patris, a wealthy farmer (Census no. 148)
Patris is 47, and typical of the old elite, 
except that he made a most fortunate marriage.
He came from a well-off and respected family, 
and received 12 donums from his parents. The 
woman he married was the adopted daughter of a 
chi-ud^ ess man who, though a farmer, had become 
rich in land through money-lending to other 
villagers. The girl had five years elementary 
schooling, and was then engaged to a pharmacist 
in ilarket Town. This would have been a most 
prestigious match in the early 1940’s, when few 
daughters of the village had married men of 
such status. But the engagement was broken off 
by the man.
Patris was tall, handsome, strong, and had 
finished elementary school. The match was 
arranged, and the girl brought a massive 120 
donums of land to the marriage. From her 
family’s point of view, it was better to save 
face with a worthwhile young man from the village, 
than to wait for another high status outsider, 
and risk further humiliation. In 1946, when 
they married, tractors were rare in Cyprus, and 
the new family wou^d have more land than they 
couxd work anyway.
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Patris was one of the first men in the 
village to buy a tractor, which he did in 1947,
•by halves' with the brother of his wife's 
mother. later he bought another 12 donums of 
land which were particularly usefua, and he 
leases some land to relatives.
Today his 5,000 citrus trees keep him completely 
occupied as a full-time farmer, and he has 
reguxarly employed at least one man as a labourer 
since 1953. He does not do this in order not 
to work himself, but simply to be abie to get 
axl the pressing work done.
His current debts are between £5,000 and £6,000 
to several banks, and the Agricultural Credit 
Cooperative Society. In 1968 he received £4,000 
gross from citrus, carrots and potatoes, of 
which he estimates some £2,000 as profit. In 
1968 he was still increasing his citrus plantations, 
intending to pxant 20 donums with seedlings.
The one cloud on his horizon is the fact that 
his seven children are aj.1 girxs. The first one 
has married a young civil servant from the village, 
and Patris gave her 17 donums; her husband had 
no land. Patri3 was persuaded to take her away 
from secondary school to make the match, but 
plans to give the other girls more education.
Two are studying in Greece, at universities, 
and their expenses are £900 a year; the four 
girxs at secondary school need together a further 
£900 a year, he estimates.
Patris is one of the most prominent political 
figures in the village, being on several committees, 
and the local representative of PEK, the Nationalist 
Farmers Union. He appears frequently in later 
chapters.
Tabxe 5 shows that it is rare for Kallo households 
to start married life with no land at all, and that over 70% 
of them started with holdings ranging from 6 to 25 donums. 
That is, a factor of four separates the largest from the 
smallest of these lOfi,
There is obviously the possibility of acquiring 
land or losing it, through purchase or sale, as wexl as those 
alterations to a holding which arise from the developmental 
cycie of the domestic group. Table 6 shows a sample of men
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TA3L
UiD EEGSIY5S Al : 191 HOUSEHOLDS
L odusis Households Percentage
0 3 1*57
1 - 5  14 7.3|
6 - 1 0  41 21.46
11 - 15 45 23.56
16 - 25 46 25.13
26 - 50 33 17.27
51 or more 7 3*66
151 95.37$
Sote (1) The amount refers to usufruct, and not 
to legal title only.
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TABLE 6
CHANGE IM SIZE OF LASID HOLDING FOR 82 HOUSEHOLDERS 
WHO FIRST MARRIED 1931-50
Holding static. Holding Increased
or declining (l) after marriage 12)
1931-40 9 27
1941-50 16 30
Total 25 (30.5/0 57 (69.5/0
Note (I) Holdings which declined through normal
transfer of property to children at marriage 
are not included. Only cases where 
informants sold land in such a way as to 
make their holdings smaller are included.
(2) Gases included here are those in which the 
net result of an informant's sales and 
purchases was a larger holding than he and 
his wife had had at the start of their 
marriage. Gases where a person received 
title to land he had been working earlier 
are not included.
irarried between 1931 and 1950, most of whom by 1969 had 
completed the cyc^ e, and it is notabxe that more than two- 
thirds of them baa increased their hoiuings by purchase, 
from the amounts that were available to them at marriage.
These data by themselves cannot indicate the sort
of expectations children of such households may reasonably
have, for future portions of land, or access to education.
Some hint of these things was provided by the five cases just
given. To both must be aadeu Che villager's view of the
matter. They make four basic distinctions: there are
1 phtoschi, the poor; there are i metrii, middling people;
there are i kali, those who are all right; finally, there
are i plousii. the rich, or i archontes, those who run things.
Such terms do not have sharp boundaries, and the use of them
varies from speaker to speaker. They may be the subject of
disagreement, since by themsexves they do not include the
criticax issue of the number of dependents who expect to
extract shares from the combined property of Cne household.
The matrix in Table 7 is an attempt in forma a. terms to
illustrate this, and although the villagers do not need to
formalise their view of sociax differences, they make similar
calculations on an ad hoc basis, when trying to justify the
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use of terms like phtochos or plousios.
The matrix shows land holdings at maximum of 82 
families married between 1931-50, expressed against the number 
of children in each family who will draw shares from the 
family holding. The effect of looking at land holding data 
in this way is to estimate the future portion a child may
Table 7
I M D  AT MAXIMUM AND MUHBER OF 
CHILDREN OF S2 EnoioseCuoSds where  
f ir s t  marriage of hesds  occurred  
b etw een  1931 and 195®
Number  of children
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
51+ e 2 e 2 e 2 E L  1 e 3 M, M, M,
00
E 2 6 - 5 0 E L  2 E, m 3 M., M, M, P2ZDczo 16-25 E, E, EL  7 M, M, P 5 P, P P2 Pi P “ 2~a
cz 11-15 E, M, P2 P, P2 P, P2 P, P,
-a 6-10 ,e/ m Pi P, P, P, P, P,
t_i
CU _ 1 1-15 P, P, P,
0 Pi
E — Eli te,more th an  6)4 donums=27
/
M - M i d d l i n g ,  4 -6 )4d on u m s=1 6  
P - P o o r ,  under  4  donum s=39
This is a hypothet ica l  model and does not represent  
actual  shares  of land rece ived,  but rather,  
probabi l i t ies  of approximate  shares.
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expect to receive.
The matrix shows that some 27 families should be 
abxe to give each chixd more than 6g donums at marriage; 
another 18 families should give from 4 donums to 6& donums; 
and 37 families will have from 0 to 3 donums to give each 
child''.
Such tendencies depend on a number of assumptions - 
that each child receives roughly the same amount as its 
siblings, that both sexes receive equal amounts of land, and 
that the family does not lose its holding through some unfore­
seen disaster. In chapter three, when kinship and marriage 
are discussed, further data are introduced to modify these 
assumptions. The point here is to approximate, in formal terms, 
the villagers’ way of discussing wealth in land. In brief, 
and to avoid labouring the point further, they see it as 
relative to the number of dependents and future beneficiaries; 
and they see land holding in a context of time, rather than 
as a static fact: they are less concerned with or impressed
by what a family has, than what its children will have at 
marriage.
In the five cases trie fact that men both own land
and have non-agriculturai jobs was apparent. Table 8 gives
this a further perspective; it illustrates the tautology
that farmers must have land: over SOfo of those men with less
than 16 donums have some other occupation than working their
land holding. In this instance, the villager's own categories
have a close fit with sociological distinctions for, generally,
/
men only described tnemsexves as ghiorp;os, farmer, if they
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TABLE 8
LAND HOLDINGS AT MAXIMUM AKD Q THE It OCCUPATIONS
L°.n-P S 0-10 11-15 16-25 26-50 51 ormaximum (1; more
Full-time
farmers - 4 27 31 14 = 76
Mix© cL
occupations 30 32 33 18 3 = H5
191
Note (l) It must be remembered that this sample includes 
young men, who married since I960, and most of 
them have probably not reached their maximum 
holdings yet. Nor will the classification made* 
here necessarily remain stable over time.
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had a sizeable land holding, aad no other occupation. Ihere 
were a number of cases where this fit -was lesa gGCd, bat since 
iu is a matter of pride - for the older sen at least - to 3e 
wiaa; I here call full-time farmers, informants were usu2--L./ 
carefu_ no~ tc claim this status for tnemsexves unreasonably, 
for this wou_d have Invited, scorn from others who wou^d, they 
feared, nave pointed out to ie ,he facts.
Zhere is one further complication in any discussion 
of land ana ether work. -his is that many xen do not nave 
one job that they do a_l their lires. Zney show great flexib­
ility, and it was common when a man was first asked what he 
did, for hl-n to answer f 11 vs done every iind of job', A. man 
with a sizeab_e land holding is a farmer for a number of years: 
then he may buy a truck, which he drives when free from his 
agriculture- worx, and rents to another man when he is busy, 
later still, he might pay a man to dr ire the truck. -.nether 
typical process involves opening a coffee shop or tavern for 
a year or two, and 'hen stopping. Zhere are a^ so numb era 
of men who have served apprenticeships as builders, shoemakers, 
carpenters ana so forth but were not practising tneir trades 
or crafts in 1965-69. Such flexibility part_y exp_ains wny 
some men with sizeable holdings - of 26 donums or more — are 
c_assifled in Zable 5 as having mixed occupations.
iii; lenera- Status ?actors in g'orx
n^en the villagers are talking about differences 
in work, status or life style within the village they sre 
Hxely to ma^e indirect reference to one or severs- of the
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following factors: whether a man works entirely for himself
or for others; how much freedom in practical economic terms 
he nas to reiuse paid work; the same factors regarding the 
women of his household; whether or noc he has a regular 
income and to what extent he performs manuax work to get it; 
how mucn skij.1 or education he has; and the extent to which 
his work is rurax or urban.
It is generally accepted that a man with little 
iand and many children is under pressure to accept paid 
labouring work mosc of the time. This will be particularly 
so if he has many unmarried daughters, and no sons of age 
to earn wages. If a man with seven young children and only 
ten donums of land is asked to go and irrigate a field for 
a land-rich villager or white-collai worker and thus earn 
himsej.f £3 or £5 (or even more if the field is large) other 
men would be surprised if he answered curtly in the manner 
of a man with no economic burdens * en pao - "I'm not going".
If he is very sick, or has just worked many hours at a 3tretch 
or has a pressing crop of his own to tend he is likely to 
say so as an explanation to bystanders for his apparent 
unwillingness to earn good money In Kallo today very
few men under 35 live by agricultural labouring, still less 
by the totally unskilled Public Works labouring on roads.
The younger men who work manually have nearly all managed to 
become apprentices to builders, mechanics, carpenters and 
so on. The .Lowest occupation for most young Kallotes is 
labouring at either the Citcop Packing Plant at Market Town 
or the Box Factory. But older men who are land-poor do a
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variety oi labouring jobs in and out of the village which 
include irrigation of fields, maintenance of irrigation 
channels, well—digging and occasionally labour' on a house­
building sice.
'A or king for others is less menial if one uses a 
machine to do so. 1’here are at lease twenty tractors in the 
village - about one for every fifteen households - and as many 
heavy trucks. A new traccor costs ill,200 or more, and a new 
truck several thousand pounds, ken who buy such heavy machines 
may do so because they have enough land, or in the case of 
produce merchants, enough business to keep the machine fully 
used. But more often the machines are bought by men with 
moderate holdings only^  to avoid paying others for the services 
they provide, and with the hope that by selling the services 
of the machine with oneself as operator, enough money will be 
made to pay off the hire-purchase cost of the machine quickly; 
and when this is paid off, to make money. Such use of tractors 
and trucks is often described by the villages as yia epich.yrisin 
"for business". Consequently, although the owner-operator 
works for others, he is in no sense equated with a labourer.
For he has both a skill in the operation of the machine, and 
a capital investment, and thus his dependence on others for 
custom is tempered by his ability through skill, hard work 
and good management to turn his enterprise into profit.
The land-rich, however, often possess tractors or 
trucks which they do not in general use to work for others. 
People do not ask the land-rich to go and plough their fields 
for them because they are fairly sure that the answer will 
be "I'm too busy with my own land to do yours". In the village
if a man asks another to do something and is refused he may 
be said to have icst a point in the eyes of onlookers. If 
in addition he has been reminded that the other man is rich 
in land while he is not .rich enough to have his own tractor, 
tie has lost another point. It is not my suggestion that the 
phrase 'lose a point1 directly translates a Cypriot Greek 
expression, or even that the villagers would be immediately 
or usually conscious during such an exchange of the potential 
for profit and loss in terms of social credit. However, 
observation of many conversational exchanges and the informal 
comments of informants convince me that this view is correct. 
The land-rich not only avoid working for others both because 
the sise of their own holdings keep them busy and provide 
them with sufficient economic independence to make such activ­
ities unnecessary; but also they are likely to employ the 
labour of others. A man with many donums of land may be busy 
enough with one aspect of cultivation to need to regularly 
employ another man at some less skilled aspect. For instance, 
a man with 20 donums of citrus trees may reguxarly employ 
another to irrigate for him. Such arrangements are rarely 
formal, and are more often habituax, verbal, informal contracts 
In addition to the land-rich, the teachers and other white- 
collar workers are likely to enter into such informal arrange­
ments; but where a land-rich farmer would do his own ploughing 
planting, pruning and so forth and only employ extra labour 
for certain limited activities, the teacher is more likely 
to contract for a variety of different agricultural activities. 
He may or may not use a close kinsman in such work; in any
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case, whoever he asks to work for him will need to be paid 
the going rate for the job.
It is highly valued for men to be independent 
where possible in the sense of not having to work for others. 
This is even reflected in attitudes to people outside the 
village: for instance, it is widely assumed that government
doctors are medically inferior to those in private practise; 
why, the villagers ask, would a man who was any good be 
working for the government on a limited salary if he was good 
enough to open his own clinic and make a lot of money? However, 
it is accepted as a fact of life for which a man is not 
responsible that he may have started life with no land and 
no education, and that some form of dependence on others will 
be necessary for his survival. But the question of his women 
working for others has different implications.
(iii) Status Factors in Womens Aork
Village women do not like to be seen doing nothing; 
when a woman has finished her household tasks, if she sits 
down she is very likely to do some embroidering or something 
similar. A j_1 village women do their own housework, and in 
traditional times the wives and daughters of the largest 
landowners worked in their own fields alongside poorer women 
who were working for wages. Recently, though, the wives and 
daughters of larger farmers avoid work outside the house, as 
do those of civil servants and teachers. They add a new 
feature to social differentiation in the village.
At the lower end ox the social sos-e are unmarried 
6ir*s acd wires who do agricultural labour, or work in the 
nearby Cooperative factories for. iailv vages It is something 
a aaa wouxi such ramer his women did not have to do, and 
in his own eyes, as we_l as in those of his fallow villagers, 
reiiects poorly on his success as a jrcvider. It is a source 
oi pride for a ran oi limited xeaas chat his women do net vsor£ 
for pay. This view is also shared by women too, although
probably* from a slightly different viewpoint. A girl who does not
have to do p3id work nay say of others less fortunate "I*m sorry 
for thac poor iiaria. she's a good gir_ and she has to go cutting 
oranges all day for a few shillings..." The word "poor” here 
has the same double meaning that i*; does in English.
The problem about when a woman works and when she 
doesn't is not simple. There are many Cypriot proverbs nhich 
express the idea that there is no shame in work, that it is 
an offering to God, and so forth. Thus, for a woman to be 
working alongside her husband on their own land is perfectly 
acceptab_e and indeed natural. The reasons that the wives of
teachers and white-collar workers do not do such work are
partly to do with the fact that she husbands themselves no 
longer do such manuaj. work and thus it is appropriate for the 
wives to follow suit; and also because a white-collar worker 
usually has land under citrus cultivation only, and this leaves 
little else of a directly agricultural nature for his wife to 
do^^. TTny then should the question of women working for pay
be of such concern to villagers?
There are at least two reasons. One is the matter
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of the woman's role as a housekeeper and organiser of domestic 
life. If a woman must be out every day for eight or ten hours 
working for pay, she will by definition not be home running the 
house, ana when she is at home she will have less energy to 
spare for such duties; in addition, there is an obvious sense 
in which she usurps the husband's role of provider by herself 
providing in the same idiom of wage labour.
The other factor is somewhat different. There is 
a cultural value in rura± Cyprus which reflects the honour- 
ana-sharae complex of the Mediterranean in stressing that women 
should be virgins at marriage (nowadays this is sometimes 
stretched to mean at engagement) and that adultery by a woman 
is an act which creates the greatest social humiliation for 
her husband. This can be summed up by saying that with the 
exception of widows who remarry (ana there are today few in 
rurax Cyprus who do so) all women should know sexually one and 
only one man in their .Lives. Any social contact between a 
woman and unrelated men has implicit in it possible infringements 
of this value, since the villagers often speak as if they 
believe that to know a woman 'socially' leads very easily - 
given suitable time and place - to knowing her sexually; they 
also speak as if the powers of women to resist the advances 
of men are very limited. This belief is associated with the 
complex of beliefs about male sexual potency but this is not 
the place to discuss them. It is enough to say that in the 
context of work it is always better that one's women do not 
work away from the supervision of those who are directly 
concerned with their behaviour - kinsmen and kinswomen. Most
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men insist their own women are 'honourable'. It is other 
inhabitants of the community who are unwilling to allow a 
person the benefit of the doubt when there is a chance to 
cast aspersions. It is primarily to avoid giving occasion 
for malicious gossip that men are so concerned with the facts 
of where, how and for whom their womenfolk work.
The wife of a land-rich farmer does not labour for 
pay, but she is ready to give labour to kin and neighbours on 
an exchange basis, for the tending of certain crops. (The 
weeding of carrots, and the cutting of oranges being the most 
common situations where it is useful for a family to rally 
a large labour supply.) When a woman and her husband decide 
that their oranges are to be cut she goes to her neighbours 
and kinswomen and says to them 'Will you come and cut my oranges 
tomorrow? You help me and I'll help you.' The understanding 
here is that one day of labour picking oranges will later on 
be returned by another day's labour at the same work. The 
work should not be returned in another medium of exchange, 
such as cash, produce, or labour on another crop since this 
would lead to complications of accounting, the women say; 
particularly it would be insulting to offer cash in place of 
one's labour after the agreement had been made to exchange 
labour because the implication would be that the recipient 
is the sort of woman who needs to do wage-labour. Such working 
parties often contain both women performing exchange labour 
and others who are working for cash, from among the group in 
the village of poor families where the women are said to "go 
labouring" or be "labouring women". But in the minds of the
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actors the conditions of isori are very important 2nd sot to 
be confused.
va_ue3 impj_ieo in whether or net 2 wonan 
undertakes paio. work 2re i^ .^ .ii3ir3tisi in tie foilDwins- 022s« 
Antioalis, wife of Sklyrcs, has never in her eighteen years 
of marriage done paid work for anyone, except at the Carrot 
union, ohich is regarded as a special situation. One day 
sne was invit ec. to go on a working party, to her koummara1 s.
The understanding was that it was exchange labour, expressed 
in the idiom, ’I'll help you and you he_p He?1. A few days 
after the group had done their wori, Anthoulla was astonished 
when her kon^ara care to her house, placed 12/6 on the table 
and said RHere you are, koursara.3 An thou 11 a said BE^ jummara,
I don't want your money. We said, I1d help you and then you'd 
help me...' "Tes, but you take the money now, and if I get 
a chance I will help you, and then you can help me baci again...* 
Anthoulia was extremely angry, but because the woman was her 
koir^ rara (and should never be quarrelled with) she did not 
allow her anger to show but held it in. But the anger persisted, 
because she had been cheated, made a laughing-stock: of. Eer 
husband, who was listening to the story added '’It's a question 
of pride and se_f-respect. People could say, Arthoulla is 
doing wage-labour for Earpis.
There are, however, occasions and situations when 
tn.e distinctions become blurred: for instance, the village
has a Cooperative Packing House for the handling of the carrot
crop. The carrot harvest (from the end of April to early
June) is a rushed affair, since carrots spoil easily in the
fields, and everyone wants to get his carrots out, washed, 
packed and shipped as quickly as possible. It is a time of 
great labour scarcity in the village, and only the women of 
a few land-rich men are not to be found working away from the 
home at this time. When a woman has harvested her own carrots 
with the aid of exchange and paid labour groups she will 
probably go to work at the Packing House. Here there will 
be at the same time several hundred Kallo women all working
in large groups. The plant is onxy half a mile from the centre 
of the village, the work light and easy, and under cover. The 
women point this out, as weo.1 as the fact that they can chat 
and gossip together in much larger groups than usual and 'hear 
all the news of the village' . A further advantage is that 
the women can come and go as they like - doing perhaps only 
three or four hours before going home. All these factors 
combined mean that the women are keen to do the carrot handling 
and women who never do any other paid work turn out for this. 
From the point of view of the village labour pool this is an 
advantage although it is not suggested that any such consciously 
public-spirited motive affects the villagers. Indeed, the 
labour scarcity is such that it is still often necessary for 
the village committee to hire extra female labour from poorer 
villages. Girls arrive in buses after anything from half an 
hour to ten hours Journey. Gossip with such outsiders is an 
additional attraction to village women, who also express pity 
for these female labourers. For they must do the work under 
economic compulsion and must travel long hours to do it and 
put in a full day on arrival. The presence of these strangers
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of their own villages, there is a clear sense in which a girl 
at work in the factories is morally at risk, however slightly.
The importance of women's labour has been stressed 
and the extent to which the need for women to do paid work 
for others is seen as exposing them morally to danger or 
insult. It should be noted that even insult is dangerous, for 
a man whose woman has been insulted should avenge the insult 
by violence. This is dangerous to him physically - a fact no 
villager would acknowledge - and may well endanger his depend­
ents by leaving them without a provider and thus exposing them 
to further insuxt and danger. It has a-.so been cj.ear from 
this discussion that there is an obvious relation between the 
economic position of a family and the likelihood of such mcrai 
exposure. For this and other reasons, honour costs the poor 
more than the rich, ana in its most subtle forms is a luxury.
(ivj Status Implications of Regular Income and Skill
There are, however, other important dimensions of 
occupation and status in the village. One of these is the 
relative regularity of income. It is reasonable enough that 
in an agricultural community of unpredictably variable climate, 
dependent on outside market factors and with the recent memory 
of crippling debt and foreclosure the farmers should pay 
attention not onu.y to the size of a man's income but its 
regularity. Thus, when villagers taak about the teachers and 
certain other white-collar workers they stress several factors 
together but always that "the salary keeps coming". V.here 
the income of the farmer is not only unpredictable but seasonal,
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and is sandwiched between long periods when there is no money 
coming in, the white-collar worker is seen as a person enviably 
free from the pressures of the farmer's life. Prom tbe point 
of view of the farmers a steady income allows one to calculate, 
to plan for the future, to undertake certain debts of expansion 
secure in the knowledge that return payments are assured.
Obviousiy a regular wage is not found only with 
white-collar jobs. There are men in the village with a variety 
of regular skilled manual jobs, such as the men who drive
bulldozers for the Cyprus Mines Corporation, or those who
drive heavy tractors for the Agricultural Department. There 
•re a few men who are regular truck-drivers for the produce 
merchants. Another occupation in the regular category is 
toeing a cook. It is not necessary to mention every such 
occupation; the important point is that a wage of £10 a week 
is a most valuable supplement to a small holding of say 10 
donujgB. This does something to explain the popularity of jobs 
such as policeman and fireman with the villagers.
There is a point at which the regularity of 
employment and the size of a land-holding may come into conflict, 
and this often involves yet another dimension of occupation 
and status in the village; for it a man has a holding which
requires frequent work, and yet his salaried or wage-paying
job leaves him too little time to attend to his holding, he 
must get someone else to do the agricultural work for him.
If the man is in a job which requires some education (let us 
say the leaving-certificate of the gymnasium) then he is 
unlikely to be willing to perform heavy manuax work on his
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holding. A teacher or other white-collar worker will employ 
someone to plough and to irrigate his citrus trees. He may 
himself do such light work as pruning, or if the holding is 
small he may spread chemical fertilizer. However, the sort of 
man who drives a bulldozer sees no reason why he should not 
also irrigate his own land, if he has the energy. Irrigation 
requires standing for hours in water up to one's knees and 
working with a long-handled shovel to open and close mud dams. 
Since few men who own tractors are prepared to lend them to 
any but their closest kin or friends, ploughing is usually 
done by an owner-operator, and must be paid for. It is in 
any case a specialised activity, for an inexperienced driver 
may well strike the growing citrus trees with the plough 
causing damage. If a man needs some ploughing done he will 
usually see if he has a ciose friend or relative who wants work 
before considering a man who is compxetely unrelated to him.
But the job must ne done, ana rattier than leave it undone 
for too long, he will send any man who is willing to go. 
Tractor-ploughing i3 more a consequence of specialisation 
of labour than of status considerations.
Vixlagers consider not only the reguxarity of income, 
but whether work is skilled or not, and whether it is manual 
or not. white-collar jobs are valued simply because they do 
not involve hard manuax xabour. Young men who have finished 
gymnasium, and expect to get littxe xand, may seek a clerical 
job paying £25 or £30 a month; but the sons of larger farmers 
do not take such jobs, since farming with adequate land offers 
better money. The Greek word ypallilos literally means 'under
another', although it is translated, employee. The implied 
subordination can be detected when villagers add of someone 
mlkrl 1 thesis tou. his position is a small one.
Skill is acknowledged when a man who haa finished 
his apprenticeship is addressed as a maa toras, or in referred 
to as a tlechnltls, a man with a skill. Builders, carpenters, 
electricians, we.Ll-drillers, mechanics and a number of other 
Jobs carry such overtones.
These factors do not form neat clusters: a skilled
man may have an irregular income, because of (seasonal demands, 
a good wage when he works. A white-collar worker may have 
a low, steady income, In an unimportant Job. To those complic­
ations, the question of whother work is rural or urban must 
be added.
The Greek word polltlsmenoo which I translate an 
refined, suggests, as does the English word urbano, the 
iniluence of the city. Villagers often describe thomaoJvon 
as illiterate and uneducated, and add "Wo are not refined".
Since until the turn of the century few villages had schools, 
and literacy was rare, the association of village with 
uncouthness and town with refinement had some basis in fact. 
Although the situation today is more ooiriplex, villagers still 
speak as if the contrast were almost absolute.
(v) Education
Ail householders pay what is known as the School 
Tax, which in 1968 ranged from 10/- a year for the poorest 
household, to £8 for the rlchest^^. The tax is paid regardless
2/30
of whether the household has children at the vixlage Primary 
School (Bemotiko) or not. Secondary education was paid for 
until 1S7Q. It ranged from £18 a year fees for the first year, 
to £30 a year for the last of six years. On top of this there 
were books and tne xabour lost when a child goes to school.
It has been common since the 1930's for men to 3end their sons 
to gymnasium 'to see if they take to learning' and if they 
didn't, to remove them from the school after a year or two.
The gymnasium at Market Town is so close that there is little 
hardship in such experiments.
Often a boy may complete four or five years success­
fully and then fail the fina* examinations two or three times.
If a boy or giri obtains the certificate of completion with 
good marks they become eligible for a variety of white-collar 
jobs, including minor civil service grades. However, a 
popular choice at this point woulu be a further two years' 
study at the Pedagogics- Academy to qualify for being a teacher 
in the primary school system on a starting salary of about 
£40 a month. Ihia offers certain advantages since the teachers' 
trade union has a loan fund from which loans can be raised 
for buying houses, or for aiding younger siblings to complete 
their education.
ihou-ud the family decide to send a child to university
in Greece the cost moves up to a minimum of a month for
girls and a little more for boys since they often smoke
(7)cigarettes and go out a little . Most university courses 
in Greece take four or five years to complete, ana more if the 
student does poorly in examinations. However, on successful 
completion of a degree course the rewards are commensurate:
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a student with a B.A. degree from a Greek university may 
obtain employment as a Gymnasium teacher in Cyprus at a 
starting salary of £80 a month. Medical, legal or scientific 
qualifications obviously lead to a variety of career possib­
ilities. In addition, there are other educational pessibilities, 
such as a diploma or certificate in one of the trade skills, 
in agriculture, business, hotel management, and so forth.
Ail these choices have been taken in recent years by various 
villagers, and usually after a great deax of investigation 
in the form of questioning anyone who might know anything 
about the situation, plus continuous discussion within the 
family.
However, no amount of investigation has enabled 
the villagers to foresee certain changes in the national 
economy and their effects. One example will suffices until 
ten years ago a highly desirable career for a young person 
was to become a teacher of philology in Gymnasium, where over 
a third of the curriculum hours are normally devoted to some 
aspect of the Greek language and its literature. The prestige 
of philology was also high because of its traditional associ­
ation with Greek nationalism and with the transmission of 
Greek cultural ideais. Furthermore, in the minds of the older 
people full, fluent literacy was a great achievement. Thus, 
until the late 1950’s the role of teacher carried great status, 
and this was expressed in the custom whereby everyone, young 
and old alike, stood up when a teacher, even if a young man, 
entered the village coffee shop.
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But in the last fifteen years the statue of the 
teacher has been somewhat lowered. First, not all young people 
who are qualified teachers now find jobs as soon as they want 
them. At the time of my fieldwork, the daughter of a prosperous 
farmer had returned from five years university studies in 
Greece with a degree in Philology (Greek language and letters). 
But there were not enough vacancies in the schools, and she 
remained unemployed at home for a year, 'sitting' in the idiom 
of the village. This caused intense concern among villagers 
who had been thinking of Philology as a suitable career for 
their children. There were at least two other girls studying 
the subject in Athens at the time, both of poor families.
While my fieldwork was going on Domestic Science joined 
Philology as a subject for which there were few, if any, 
vacancies in the schools for teachers.
But the erosion of the teachers' status is not only 
a consequence of this limited unemployment. Children of the 
village at university in Athens said to me "It doesn't mean 
a thing to be a Gymnasium teacher in Cyprus today, let alone 
a primary school teacher.” A proverb, probably of recent 
vintage, was often quoted to me laughingly by farmers*.
"Bowadays there are more schoolteachers around than there are 
donkeys in Asschia village”. The fact that Asschia village 
Is famous for having donkeys is part of the joke} perhaps 
another part is the juxtaposition of teachers, who should be 
clever, with donkeys, who are not. The joke compresses a 
number of changes in the last seventy years: the vast increase
in popular education means that villages have ceased to be
2/33
places where illiteracy is the norm, to places where — for 
people under fifty at any rate - illiteracy is a more or less 
shameful deviation. At the time of my fieldwork there were 
more than fifteen assorted teachers who were children of the 
village, and normally lived there, though teaching nearby.
Before 1930 there seems only to have been one or two at a 
time. Inevitably, when nearly everyone can read and write, 
and when simultaneously the number of teachers has greatly 
increased, the individual teacher can no longer command as 
much respect as before. It is rare today for men of any age 
to rise in the coffee shop for a teacher, and it is usually 
an old, illiterate farmer who does so. With fifteen teachers 
in the village moving through the coffee shops, the villagers 
would be jumping to their feet every few minutes if the old 
custom prevailed.
These, then, are the factors which the villagers 
use to distinguish between different occupations; my intention 
has been to explore the complexities of occupational distinctions. 
When villagers are asked what they do, they answer with the 
names of occupational roles, which in fact may simplify rather 
complex activities. "I'm a farmer... a shepherd... a builder... 
a policeman... a clerk... a secondary school teacher." Such 
answers convey to other villagers relatively precise implic­
ations about security of income, skill, arduousness of work, 
level of formal educatioh and so forth, and it is these, rather 
than any absolute ranking between the roles, with which I 
have been concerned.
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(vi) Citrus Cultivation: Economic and Status Factors
Over the last fifteen years citrus cultivation 
has played a dominant part in the interests of the villagers.
The problems, imagery and benefits of citrus cultivation are 
constant topics of conversation. This is partly to be 
explained, as I shall show, by the potential for high profit 
which citrus trees afford; but axso, citrus cultivation 
differs in certain ways from other common agricultural 
activities. It seems likely, though this is difficult to 
show convincingly, that villagers over-estimate the profit 
to be had from citrus, and that owning trees has come to have 
a symbolic meaning in its own right, a meaning which suggests 
prosperity and success. Two possible signs of this are, 
first, that poor men for whom the ownership of a few trees is 
not obviously a wise use of scarce resources, often neverthe­
less put part of their tiny holdings under trees; and, secondly, 
that it is becoming almost a format element in a girl's dowry 
that she will have a smaj.1 piece of land planted with saplings, 
in addition to her house.
The symbolic and statu3 elements in citrus ownership 
are further suggested by the tendency for some men to reply 
to the question M*Vhat do you do?", "Ime pervolaris" "I am an 
orchard-owner". The Greek word literally suggests "someone 
associated with orchards", and does not specify actual owner­
ship; but it is now used to stress ownership, tiore important 
perhaps, it is used to differentiate the speaker from the 
more general category of farmer. In comparison with many 
other jobs, the care of trees is relatively unexacting
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physically, and relies more for success on skill and judgement 
than on the sheer drudgery of carrot or potato cultivation. 
Unlike many other crops, the standing trees are almost 
permanent, having a lifetime of thirty or forty years. The 
farmer is an all-rounder, trying crop after crop from season 
to season, and using his labour above all to make a profit.
The citrus cultivator can be seen as a specialist, handling 
a long-term investment.
Most of the citrus trees in Kallo fields have been 
planted since 1955. But a small number of men, not more 
than twenty, haa already planted citrus in the 1920’s and 
1930’s, following the example of the people of Market Town.
The first planting of citrus in Kallo for which I have data 
was in 1926, when one of the largest landowners in the village 
planted 300 trees. Seven years later he dug them up again 
because he was not abxe to sell fruit profitably. Other 
pioneer citrus growers found that their water supplies failed, 
or the depression in citrus prices during the 1939-45 war 
was enough to discourage them. Some dug up their trees, and 
others merely faixed to look after them and planted other 
crops among them. But in 1968 there were several, orchards 
over thirty years old, producing fruit and income. Those 
who had kept their trees have not had cause to regret it.
Prom my main census of 191 households, 16 householders 
had planted citrus before 1955. Of these, 6 had planted 
before 1940, another 3 in 1941 and 1950, 4 in 1952, one in 
1953 and 4 in 1954. It is instructive to examine their 
maximum land holdings, in Table 9.
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TABLE 9
LAND HOLDINGS AT MAXIMUM OF 16 PIONEER 
CITRUS GROWERS
Under 10 donums 0
11-15 1
xb - 25 3
26-50 S
50+ 4
16
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In addition, it is worth note that only 3 out of 
the 16 were not primarily full-time farmers. The pioneers 
were confinea, with few exceptions, to the largest land owners 
in the village. The reason is not far to seek, for citrus 
trees need a minimum of seven years cultivation and investment 
before yielding a profit. Only men with land to spare would 
have been prepared to risk scarce resources before the 
definite profitability of citrus as a cash crop had been 
clearly established.
Between 1955 and I960 a further 54 Kallotes from 
my main sample had planted citrus. If the 39 men in the main 
sample who married after I960 (and would not normally have 
been in possession of land to plant) are ignored, this means 
that by I960, a total of 70 men (54 + 16) had planted citrus 
from a possible 151 sampled. That is, by I960 about 45$ 
of the sampled men had gone into citrus cultivation.
The land-holding picture for the 'second wave1 of 
citrus growers - those who planted between 1955 and I960 
is shown in Table 10. The distribution in this Table suggests 
that the size of land holding was still one factor in several 
which made a man more or less likely to be among the second 
wave of citrus planters. ’land at marriage' has been used 
here because the greater likelihood that these groups contain 
numbers of men who have not yet reached the maximum of their 
land holdings, and who indeed will probably use the revenue 
from citrus cultivation to increase their holdings.
The choice of x955 or 1966 as markers for 'waves' is 
arbitrary. The object is to discover the pattern of planting.
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TABLE 10
SECOND WAVE (1955-60) CITRUS GROWERS M U  
NON-GROWERS, BY LAUD AT M\RRlAGE
Lonums Growers Non-Growers
No. fo No. f0
Under 10 9 lb.6 28 34.5
11 - 15 9 16.6 24 29.6
16 - 25 21 38.8 15 18.6
26 - 50 13 24.0 11 13.2
50+ 2 3.7 3 3.7
54 99.7 81 99.6
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is usually planted with 50 saplings, of a wild strain. After 
some 18 months, these wild saplings are grafted with cultivated 
stocks, obtained either from mature trees in the village, or, 
in the case of certain new strains, from commerciax growers of 
trees for saxe, or from government farms.
Saplings need irrigation during the rainless period, 
may to October. Boughly every 20 days, either the trees 
themselves must be sprinkled with water or, more commonly, 
the who±e field will be flooded for a short period. The water 
used is always from underground sources, brought to the surface 
by dieses pump, and conducted through concrete or earthern 
channels (avlatchi, plurax avlatchia) to particular fields.
Trees also need cultivation by tractor, both to keep 
down weeds which would otherwise compete with them for 
nourishment, and which inevitably grow rapidly in the irrigated 
fertilised soil; the breaking of the soil surface by tractor- 
ploughing also serves to conserve water, since it fills in 
the cracks and fissures in the soil through which, in summer, 
the irrigation water would otherwise rapidly run off. The 
newly ploughed earth keeps water near the surface of the soil 
for a longer period, and thus enables the tree roots to U3e it. 
Ideally, tractor-ploughing would benefit the trees before each 
watering, but for reasons of economy, and because they fear 
to damage the tree roots by excessive ploughing, most farmers 
only have their fields ploughed every six weeks or two months.
In addition to ploughing by tractor and irrigation, 
trees need fertilisers, regular pruning, spraying with various 
pesticides, and if the trees are not protected at the edges
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of the fields, some form of wind breaK, which is often of light 
cane, planted in stripe. Heavy winas, or haixstorms, can 
cause serious damage to crops, either at the flowering stage 
or when the flowers have dropped and the first tiny fruit 
have formed. At the time of my fieldwork no one in Kailo had 
yet taken out any form of insurance against such naturax 
hazards.
About the fourth year after planting, trees bear from
about a dozen to 50 or 60 fruit. These fruit are fuxly mature
and good to eat. Prom the fourth year to the tenth or twelfth,
depending on type of tree and other conditions, the number
of fruit produced increases. A Valencia strain (the commonest
tree in the area) wilx, when ten or twelve years old, produce
an average of 500 fruit. -Exceptionally high-yiexding trees
can produce over 1,000 fruit. Jaffa strains tend to produce
far fewer fruit, though they are normally much larger, have
a ailder, sweeter flavour and are much easier to peel. However,
the Valencia strain has dominated Kallo, for the chief reason
that fruit are normally sold by the thousand, and without
(8)regard either for weight or size . Even though the price 
for Jaffa per 1,000 is usually higher by several pounds sterling 
than that for Valencia, nevertheless the lower yields per tree 
■ake Valencia more profitable. Jaffa are axso more prone to 
a number of diseases, and to vary their yield from year to 
year, after maturity.
In 1968-69 the cost of cultivation was usually estimated 
in the village at 10/- per tree per year, after three years of 
age, and slightly more before then. But by late 1969 some
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farmers nad recalculated the costs and were working on a figar«
1—/— 3 tree. Uh.es e calculations were made by sea who needed 
to know precise figures, ox men who either because they were 
-white-collar workers, or because they lacked water, a tractor 
or soae otner essential, needed to work oat how such money they 
would need to hare for raising their trees, ilanj men, and in 
particular the full-tine farmers, do not need to calculate in 
this way, since they have all the things they need for cultiv­
ation. Ihese sen think such more in terms of ad hoc expenses, 
such as a bill of £40 for repair of a tractor, or of lump sum 
debts, that they owe a total to all sources, of £1,500.
different people will have to pay in cash different 
amounts towards the care of trees. A white-collar worker who 
is unwilling to do even the lightest manual work to his trees 
must pay labourers and specialists for all stages of cultivation. 
A full-time farmer will do a3 much as he can himself, and only 
employ someone else for some highly specialised lob, such a3 
the one-off task of grafting cultivated strains onto wild 
stocks. Between these extremes are a range of possibilities.
Xen who do not own tractors must pay men who do to plough their 
orchards. Xen with tractors but no water of their own must 
buy the water. Salaried men who do not mind spreading fertiliser, 
or driTing a relative’s tractor, may avoid cash payment for 
these services. She hardest Job, and that which educated men 
are least willing to do, is irrigation, for thi3 may involve 
many hours working up to the knees in water channels, handling 
a heavy, long-handled shovel (dialect, rthkiari) which opens 
and closes the water channels. But even in this attitudes
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change and individuals differ: at the time of my fieldwork,
a young man recently returned with a degree in Mathematics 
from Athens, positively delighted in irrigating his own fiexds. 
This was partly because he liked doing it and partly because 
his self-consciously progressive views suggested to him that 
it was a job worth doing.
In general, however, it is obvious the less a man 
does for himself in caring for his trees the less profitable 
to him will they be. But in spite of this, trees have still 
been attractive enough for a number of town-dwellers to go 
into citrus cultivation, including some high government offic­
ials, as well as sons of the village who have inherited land 
there. This economic interest in land within the confines 
of the village is one factor which adds to the sum of trans­
actions between village and town, and which maintains in an 
active state ties between kinsmen otherwise separated by 
distance.
The services I have described can all be had on credit 
although everyone in the village seeks cash payment if possible 
But since many men are seeking to increase their holdings, 
and since the whole village is possessed to some extent with 
a 'boom1 mentality, many services are supplied for credit, 
and a man may go several years without paying for water he 
has used, for tractor-ploughing or for fertiliser from the 
Credit Cooperative. Villagers who supplement their income 
through providing citrus-related services must therefore 
take a great interest in the creait-worthiness of their co- 
villagers. The passionate interest in the small change of
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daily life, gossip about tiny details of personal behaviour,
is not gratuitous, but meets certain needs in the village
(9)as a whole .
The widespread use of credit does not suggest that 
credit may readily be had by all, and the issue of granting, 
withholding or terminating credit is a lively source of disputes. 
In this as in many other things the poorer men are at a big 
disadvantage. A man with land, and growing trees, can be 
seen to have a possible future source of repayment. A man 
without these things has only his labour to use. The chief 
factor which stops the poorer men from increasing their 
holdings, or from getting on the citrus boom is the problem 
of credit, or capital formation. For since trees do not begin 
to cover their cumulative costs until they are six or seven 
years old, the poorer man has greater difficulty in carrying 
his debts over this period of time than the man for whom citrus 
is a profitable sidline, and not the main source of income.
When villagers talk about growing trees they say 
"After six years you just start getting your expenses back."
They do not mean getting back the full investment up to that 
point; they mean getting back that year's overheads. In 
any case, their statements usually take it for granted that 
a man has paid nothing to acquire his land.
(vii) Conclusion
Kallo as a community depends on profitable cash- 
cropping, supplemented by a number of other occupations.
Although land is not and never has been equally distributed
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among village families, it is clearly a coumranity in which 
distribution avoids the sharp contrasts described in many 
other Mediterranean and Latin American ethnographies. There 
are no latifundists in Kallo, no titled people who own land 
but do not work it. Nor is there a large proportion of 
villagers who are landless, perennially unemployed, or close 
to starvation. This does not mean the village is a community 
of economic equals, however, and the trend to more complex 
social differentiation has been suggested, as higher education 
and white-collar jobs become more common. The social tensions 
caused by this increasing complexity is the subject of 
political conflicts described in later chapters.
From the five case histories given at the start of 
this chapter, and from other material which will be discussed 
in the next one, it will be clear that most of the things 
which give a person high status - land, education, family 
honour - are partly provided by his family of birth and endorsed 
by his marriage. In contrast to some other Mediterranean comm­
unities Kallo also allows for individual mobility through 
successful marriages. There are enough cases of upward 
mobility both of men who worked hard and saved to buy land, 
and of poor men who svicceeded because of their personal qual­
ities of strength, good looks or good reputation, to suggest 
that the villagers should not see their lives as determined 
by birth, and birth alone. In the context of the constantly 
improving economic conditions of the post-war period, 
intensified by the cultivation of citrus, and the increasing 
provision of supplementary jobs by the larger society, the
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villagers would have to be exceedingly obtuse not to see the 
village as a place where at the very least they can exist, and 
where most of them can live better than they could elsewhere. 
This view of their community provides the material basis for 
village solidarity in matters political.
Footnotes to Chapter 2
(1) At least since 1930, my material suggests that about 
four out of five children born in Kallo have found 
marriage partners within the village. Calculation
of the pre-1930 situation is hazardous, but I estimate 
that even then at least three out of every five 
children born in the village married a co-villager.
(2) These divisions have been chosen because they make 
reasonable places to draw a line, and not because 
they correspond to any stated category used by 
villagers. Other divisions could have been drawn, 
and the matrix presentation allows the reader to do 
this for himself. However, the logical extension 
of this approach is not to make divisions such as 
j.6-25 donums at all, but to give each holding 
individually.
It may help the reader to know that in 1966-9 a 
donum of good irrigated land would fetch between 
£350 and £500. A child receiving 10 donums of land 
in Kallo at marriage today is considered to be very- 
lucky; and a 5 donum holding is respectable. The 
actual meaning of such a marriage portion depends, 
as I shall show in later sections, on what -che 
other marriage partner gets, vi/hat job is done by 
the man and, in some cases, by the woman too.
(3) Lison-Tolosana (1966: ) describes similar attitudes 
in Belmonte.
(4) These young women are ambivalent about their life 
styie, for their mothers all did agricultural work, 
yet they themselves live a life like that of 
townswomen, within the village. Such a fact is 
both mildly embarrassing in a tradition of ever- 
occupied women, while also conferring prestige.
iudi often commented that women heard villuge newu 
more quickly and arc often bettei' informed on certain 
matters becauno they tend to work in groupn, both 
.in tlio f io.ldu and around the I i o i u k h i, whereuu men more 
often work by thomaelvou. iioinuevniu (1 ) makes
this point for Maltese viilageu.
ihe assessment ol thin tax in the Job of the |unKtqr 
asoioted by the aaad^n. These off,loon are dinoucused 
in Chapter 5.
"Going out for enjoyment" sometimes carrion the 
implioatlon of visiting prostitutes, and in wldo.ly 
considered to be a normaj part of a young ninn'o 
oooaslona.1 expenses, by the younger men, at leant.
By 1970 there were moveo, particularly in the altrun 
cooperative, to utart selling fruit by weight, rather 
than aImply by numbers. More attention In likely 
to bo paid in the future to quu.llty of fruit, an 
International competition gets tougher.
Thin point in well made by Davie (iyb‘h74) and i 
am generally uympathotie to hin interpretation of 
honour nu a eyutem of establishing the credit­
worthiness of othorn in both the literal unci 
metaphorical senses.
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CHATTER 3 
KINSHIP AND AFFINITY
Kinship and affinity, as institutional frameworks, 
are critical constraints on individual behaviour; the nature 
and extent of their influence must be examined before any 
perspective can be given to the behaviour of villagers in 
politics. The bilateral, organisation of kinship, the particular 
character of the developmental cycie of the domestic group, 
which produces a system of property transfer at marriage, are 
critical factors influencing the behaviour of any villager. 
Certain kinship roles are more important than others in this 
respect, and those between parents and children, between 
siblings, between first cousins, and between second cousins, 
need to be examined in detail, for each type of relationship 
carries the expectations of different rights and duties, and 
thus has different costs and benefits for the individual.
Affinal relations are in many ways critical indices 
of the achievements of individuals and families in the village. 
Social prestige is the object of strong competition, which 
appears in the values and practices surrounding the arrangement 
of marriage. This is not a matter for Individual choice, 
but much more a corporate decision. Villagers are preoccupied 
with retaining land, wealth and marriage partners within the 
village, and this common interest underpins the fact of the 
village as an inward-looking solidary and moral community,
In spite of its demonstrated relations with the wider 
society.
The villagers are strongly committed to certain 
kinship and affinal obligations, but these do not exhaust 
or completely determine their choices. The sphere of 
economic relations makes clear that villagers have a range 
of options within their kindred and affinal relations, as 
well as with non-related persons. In both economic and 
political relations, then, the Kallotes represent a mixed, 
intermediate situation; and this can be better understood 
through detailed examination of data on cooperation and 
conflict within a range of social relations.
(i) Bilateral Kinship and the Domestic Group
The reckoning of kinship in the village is bilateral,
and the only exception to this is in the inheritance of names,
for children of both sexes take as their second name the 
genitive form of their father's first name, or patronymic.
The terminology may be described as Eskimo, for 
it stresses generational distinctions, and terms used for 
members of the nuclear family are not used for persons outside 
it. Here I am speaking of kinship terms used by villagers 
among themselves. Andromedas (1959) has noted the tendency 
of Greeks of all backgrounds to give 'correct' terms when 
asked. Cypriot Greeks tend to do the same, and here it is
worth stressing that there are at least three levels of
language which may be distinguished - first village dialect; 
second Derootlkl, the language of educated speech, and third
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iCatharevousa, a language used for varied purposes but not 
normally spoken, in daily conversation. To give but one 
example, villagers used the word anepsios to mean cousin - 
a classical usage - whereas the Demotiki word is exadelfos, 
and anepsios in Demotiki means sibling's child. For this 
last sense, Cypriot villagers use yet another term, 
anepsioteknon.
The word used for consanguinity is synghenia; 
villagers count the relationship between siblings as the 
first link, and count as consanguines all persons within 
five links of a given ego. Consanguines may not marry.
Beyond this they add the qualification exomakrysen i synghenia 
na.s 'our consanguinity has gone far out'. By this reckoning 
the first non-relative who is also marriageable is the child 
of a person's second cousin, and to describe such a marriage 
villagers say "Marriage was only just permitted". Third 
cousins are scarcely thought of as being related in any 
meaningful way, and people who wish to ridicule someone's 
claim to be related in this way may add "Third cousins?
Fourth, fifth, sixth cousins!" If they are being polite, 
they can say phtanoumen liin s.ynghe'nian, we have a distant 
consanguinity.
The word used to describe the nuclear family, which
is also normally the domestic group, is the Demotiki word
ikoghenia: which combines two roots, that for house, and
that for birth. But the villagers use two words for actual
/
living units - ta spitia (singular, to spiti) to describe 
the complex of dwelling units, and 1 avli, the courtyard in
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which they stand. Traditionally the courtyard needed to be 
large enough for small stock, several outhouses, agricultural 
implements, and so forth. In the last twenty years, the 
decline in mixed farming and small stock keeping, as well 
as the general scarcity of land near the centre of the village 
for plots, has led to much simpler arrangements - usually 
a single brick house is built, with a thin strip of land 
around it, and no walled courtyard at all.
Villagers feel strongly that at marriage a child 
should have its own dwelling unit - although this may be 
in the same courtyard as its parents, its own land to work 
if possible, and a separate domestic unit, in terms of use 
of cash, and decisions about work. Before 1930 it was 
more common for the family of the groom to provide a dwelling 
for the couple at marriage, and thereafter it became 
increasingly more common for the bride’s family to do so; 
this change is shown in Table 1 1 ^  .
To illustrate the numerical data, I take first the 
case of a man (G.l) who was born in 1898 in the village.
He was the third child, the first two being girls. He 
married in 1920, and his father gave him a house plot, and 
built a house on it for him. He also received about 6 donums 
of land. His wife came from the neighbouring village, and 
had 5 donums, which she later exchanged with a man from her 
own village who had land in Kallo. After him there were 
three younger brothers. The next youngest received the 
parental house and 5 donums, and at the age of 24 he married 
a Kallo woman. When this son took over his parents' house
TABLE 11
MARRIAGES IN KALLO BY RELATIVE CONTRIBUTION OF
BRIDE OR GROOM'S FAMILY TO THE COUPLE'S HOUSE
Period Total
Marriages
Groom built^ 
and mixed
Bride
Before 1930 20 15 5
1931 - 40 37 27 10
1941 - 50 45 19 26
1951 - 60 44 10 34
1961 - 69 44 10 34
190 ^ 81 109
Mote (1) The column 'groom built1 includes those cases 
where the groom's family contributed up to 
one third of the value of the house; the 
column 'bride built' includes all cases where 
the bride's family contributed more than two 
thirds of the value of the house. No account 
is taken of agricultural land transferred to 
either side.
(2) 5 cases where data were inadequate for
classification have been excluded.
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they and the two young sons went to live in the house of 
a woman whose husband had died, and who had remarried into 
a village some 10 miles away, by the sea. She had no
siblings in the village. The tv/o younger sons married in
1930 and 1938 respectively, and both received houses from 
their father. In 1968 the first son had his youngest 
daughter, married to an educated man from another village, 
living downstairs in his two storey house.
This case illustrates the range of solutions which 
can be adopted to residence at marriage, as well as showing 
the change in pattern. The situation typical at the time 
of my fieldwork is shown in the following example:
In 1944 Xanthos, a poor man from another village, 
was engaged to a Kallo woman, Agathi. Both were
aged 20 at the time. They had a full formal
engagement ceremony, and a property agreement 
was signed in which the girl's father promised 
to give the couple 3 donums of land, a courtyard 
with some old dwellings on it, and that he would 
fix these up to a reasonable standard. A penalty 
clause was included, that if either side wished 
to break the engagement they would pay the other 
£100, and that the marriage v/ould take place 
within a year. Xanthos himself brought no 
property to the marriage. His wife had already 
been engaged to a Kallo man in 1938, but she 
had insisted she did not want to marry him, and 
had broken off the engagement at the Ecclesiastical 
Court. Her family had paid a fine of £2. 10. 0., 
and she had then waited nearly 5 years before 
getting engaged to Xanthos. Her former fiance, 
incidentally, married a woman v/ith a house and 
9 donums in the village.
The fact that broken engagements took place in 
these examples should not be taken as by any means typical. 
They were, and still are, frowned on. But they bring out 
clearly the notions implicit in the arrangement of marriage
and provision of house and land in the village. Tradition­
ally, the ideal situation was to have enough land to give 
each child at marriage soce land, and to give sons a house 
as well. If land or house plots were scarce, the other 
solutions were to partition a courtyard; to vacate one's 
own house and live in a rented one (although there were 
normally very few houses available for rent); or to find 
a bride for one's son who for some reason, such as being 
an only child, a widow, or a woran with some social blemish 
such as a previous engagement, who would thus provide a 
house. 3y 1968 the whole issue centred on building houses 
for one's daughters. Sons were expected to marry girls 
who would have houses.
Rights to property in the village may properly
be regarded as held by adult married persons only; it is
extremely rare for property to be titled on a single person
or for such a person to have use of land independently
of his or her natal family, unmarried men, unless highly
educated, are not regarded as full social persons in the
village, and this is indicated by the use of the term
kooeloul 'kid', which is applied to a boy up until the time
he gets engaged; after this he will be teasingly reminded
that he is no longer a kid. For the purposes of village
taxation, election to committees, the general councils of
the village, drinking cliques and coffeehouse discussions,
men who are neither married nor engaged are virtually 
l o)ignored' , unless they are highly educated.
Thus, the acquisition of property, economic and
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domestic independence and full adulthood all occur through 
marriage, for children of both sexes. This must be 
considered in the light of practices concerning marriage 
order for siblings: these practices can be reduced to
three rules: i) all children should marry as young as
is practical; ii) children should marry in strict seniority; 
iii) but a younger girl takes precedence over her older 
brother. A person’s position in a sibling group by virtue 
of sex and birth order may profoundly affect his or her 
future ^  .
Informants make two different kinds of statement 
about the sort of share of property a child should expect. 
They sometimes say, and aspects of the inheritance laws of 
Cyprus support this, that each child should get equal shares 
of the parental estate; but it is also said that what a 
child gets is "whatever the parents choose to give it".
People making this second kind of remark often add "Is it 
possible that a parent would wish to do its child an 
injustice?" However, it can be argued that these two 
different sorts of statement properly refer to different 
situations. The 'equal shares’ view correctly applies to 
post mortem transfer, where any property belonging to a 
deceased parent must by law be equally divided among the 
children of the dead person, with a smaller share being set 
aside for the surviving spouse. However if, as is usually 
the case, property is being transferred in the lifetime of 
both parents, the rule that ’whatever the parent decides’ 
holds force for a complex of reasons, the most important
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of which is that it is quite impossible to calculate equal 
shares in such a way as fully and perroamently to satisfy 
the recipients.
At marriage each child of the sibling group expects 
to draw a share of its parents' estate, but the fortunes 
of a given nuclear family change over time. The property 
holding of the natal family is geared in certain ways to 
other aspects of the domestic cycle; it is not stable. Its 
productiveness and thus its hypothetical yield to its share­
holders and managers in strict economic terms are a function 
of the number of persons it must support for a given period, 
the amount of labour each member has put into the holding, 
and the different consumption or extraction demands of each 
individual.
When a married couple start life together they have 
property, but no dependents. The early years of childbearing 
are a period when it is possible for them by dint of hard 
work, restricted consumption and good luck to increase their 
land holdings. As the older children reach an age where 
their labour becomes useful to the domestic group (in the 
case of small-stock tending this might start when a boy is 
ten or twelve) the domestic group enters a phase where there 
is extra manpower without any appreciable rise in consumption 
needs. Indeed, unless a decision is taken to start educating 
the older children, there need be no drain on the joint 
resources of the domestic group until the marriage of the 
first child. If this is deliberately postponed, the domestic 
group may have enjoyed a period of fifteen or twenty years 
during which labour input was steadily increasing, and this
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will normally be the period when the land holding grows.
The marriage of the first child alters the picture, 
for it will normally be the first major property extraction; 
after this point the holding will normally continue to 
shrink until either all property has been transferred, or 
all children have been married; in some cases these two 
events coincide; in those cases where the parents have 
either had a large holding or have kept strictly to a pre­
arranged plan in transferring shares to their children, 
they may end up with a small holding on which to support 
themselves, known as the ysterina 'the later things'. If 
the parents reach a point at which they can no longer care 
for themselves, they may either decide to stay in the avli 
of each of their married children in turn, or they may decide 
to stay with one child until death. The distribution of 
'fche ysterina will either be between all the children or to 
the one child who had care of the parents in their last years. 
But since such agreements are usually verbal and hedged 
with qualifications, they are not as clear-cut as they might 
appear.
Even if parents plan at a given point in time to 
give each child a fixed share, they cannot foresee all 
probabilities. For instance, although they believe that 
they have finished childbearing, they may produce one or more 
unexpected children; they may have a serious and costly 
illness in the family which will bite into the land holding; 
there may be a cycle of drought years and consequent debt, 
so that they mortgage property; they may contract a 
prestigious but unexpectedly costly marriage; a rise in the
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expected standard of houses for daughters may force an extra 
outlay for a later child; the possibilities are not endless 
but they are sufficient to make perfect rationality in the 
advance planning of property shares extremely difficult.
Ihe situation is further complicated by the fact 
that above or below a certain sise land holding the profit­
ability of agriculture changes sharply, Twenty donuns is 
considerably more profitable than two holdings 01 ten dcnuns 
each. Certain economies of scale occur; a tractor is more 
economical on the larger holding; the yields from mature 
citrus trees may be enough to make the outright purchase ox 
additional land possible, whereas with a smaller Golding 
the gross cash may be enough to rake a downpayment cny - 
the additional money being borrowed at at least 9*-* per annum 
interest. If a child marries, and sc reduces the holding 
of its parental group by a sizeable share, the intact of
this extraction on the remaining children and the viability 
of the holding may be out of proportion to the actual snare 
extracted.
These then are some of the factors which make it 
likely the mature members of a sibling group will feel taey 
have received shares of different value, in a period oj. 
rapid change, dowry houses may oe a particular source 01 
friction between sisters. A woman married in 19>6« --er 
house co3t £400, and her family built it themselves with 
their own labour. _lt was mads oi mud oric.cs, piasaSiS^ 
There was a bare concrete floor, and running water; an 
outside pit lavatory and no bathroom, her sister marnea 
in 1959, also to a poor man from outside the village, cut
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her house (for which her father went into considerable debt) 
cost about £2,000, which in spite of changes in the cost 
of living provided a house built of solid bricks, tiled 
throughout, with flushing indoor lavatory, a bathroom with 
water heater, and a gas stove. It is finished throughout 
to a much higher standard than the elder sister's house.
Such differences can be forgotten if relations between the 
sisters are otherwise good; if they are not, then they can 
become the occasion of fierce disagreements.
I have been indirectly approaching the central 
issue in the lives of most parents - the wish to provide 
well for their children. In village values, the true social 
position a man achieves is decided when he has married off 
his last child, when all his children's marriages can be 
weighed up. This is shown in the way old men reply, when 
asked how many children they have, "I have married off seven" 
or "We have one child to marry and then we'll have a breather". 
Since the custom is also to give children at marriage the 
major part of the property they will get, the way in which 
marriage focuses, in a dramatic way, the aspirations of 
parents for status is clear.
Transfer of property at marriage is not always 
accompanied by transfer of title; indeed, in only a half 
of the cases I examined was the title transferred at marriage. 
In the remainder of the cases the transfer was often delayed 
for several years, and in a number of cases ten or fifteen 
years. When I asked men how they felt about not having title 
to land they were working, a number replied "I have complete 
confidence in my father, and he'll give me the title any time
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I ask for it". But such remarks often conceal real anxiety 
about the title; yet to ask for title in itself suggests 
a lack of trust, and this knowledge inhibits some children 
from pressing their parents.
In fact, the failure of parents to give children 
title often leads to disputes, not at the child’s marriage, 
but many years later, when the grandchildren of the original 
couple are reaching the age for marriage, and the middle 
generation start to press the old people to distribute the 
ysterina, for house plots. The claims and counter claims 
can become very complicated and strident, as individuals 
remember that they were promised extra pieces of land at 
marriage, which they have never received; or when one child 
points out that another was given an extra two donums twenty 
years ago, and thus has no right to a claim in what remains.
The depth interviews showed that 22.5$ of the 111 
disputes recalled were to do with property transfer at 
marriage or later. This was an average of one such dispute 
for each informant, and the following case was one of these:
Andris (Census 14-6) came from a poor family; 
he smoked cigarettes and gambled in his 'teens 
and this, with the fact of his mother’s serious 
illness and the family’s poverty, made it hard for 
him to find a bride. As part of the inducement 
his father offered to give him a house and three 
donums of land. His fiancee's father insisted 
that title to both house and lands be transferred 
during engagement, and this was done. The girl 
has nine donums.
Anthea, the second sister, got engaged in 1947, 
aged twenty, and married in 1949, to a poor man 
from another village. She got a house and five 
donums; he brought nothing to the marriage. She 
was rather plain. In the dowry agreement 
(prikosynfonon) another field of three donums 
was also promised, but although title was given 
at marriage to the house and five donums, the
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title to the extra three donums was not given.
When Andris’ father thought he was dying he 
called in his children and reminded them that a 
field of three donums had "been promised to Anthea 
and her husband and should go to them. But he 
spent his last years at the house of his oldest 
daughter, and while caring for him she persuaded 
him to give her title to the three donum field.
She also told various people in the village that 
the dowry agreement held by Anthea was a forgery.
The two sisters and their husbands are not on 
speaking terms, and all five siblings are 
constantly at odds and have been for years.
There are two issues: Andris got 'more' than
his sisters, and the older sister got Anthea!s 
field.
In 1969 Andris, then aged 54, was still pursuing 
a field which his mother had been promised by her 
father, but to which she had never received title. 
His mother's brother was refusing to recognise 
her ore mortem de facto share of a piece of land 
of six donums. Andris still hopes to obtain this 
piece of land. The same form of dispute is going 
on simultaneously in two generations.
If siblings are likely to have disagreements when 
their own children reach the age of marriage, when young 
and unmarried their relations are strongly supportive of 
each other. This is shown in the warmth, trust and genuine 
intimacy between them, and it is both expressed through and 
reinforced by the rules about who marries first, for the 
rules effectively limit competition for the resources of 
the household, and allow the domestic group to focus all 
its resources on the marriage of each child in turn.
Normally there is a three year interval between 
the birth of siblings - more if early death has intervened - 
and so a person in late adolescence knows that he will 
enjoy a period of several years when he can call on the 
cash, labour and other resources of parents and siblings.
The effect of the rule of marriage order is to reduce
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■uncertainty about which sibling is next in line for marriage, 
and thus to give all younger children a vested interest in 
helping the older ones to marry as quickly as possible. It 
also reduces the likelihood of a situation in which two 
children are competing at the same time for the same resources.
When a person has married, he is no longer free to 
help his unmarried brothers and sisters, for his wife's 
family will complain that his resources should be kept for 
the children of his marriage. There is some leeway - a 
wedding gift in cash is acceptable, but if a large sum is 
involved this will be done secretly, so that his affines 
do not hear of it, ’and become jealous*.
The ability of the domestic group to focus its 
resources is important in another aspect of the developmental 
cycle: the process of setting up or educating the children
when cash or land are scarce. Here the key factor is the 
willingness of the older children both to postpone their 
own marriages and to make continuous cash contributions to 
the education of the younger children. This may result in 
a situation when seen in the full perspective of time acts 
to the advantage of all concerned, but it nevertheless requires 
a good deal of self-discipline for the senior children, as 
is illustrated by the following case:
Paros and his wife had almost no land and their 
income was £20 a month from his salary as 
secretary to the village Cooperative Credit 
Society. They had six children - three sons 
followed by two daughters, and a fourth son.
The first son finished Gymnasium and got a 
clerical job in the land registry office. He 
did not in fact help his parents very much over 
the education of the younger children, but at
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the very least his academic success and his good 
fortune in landing a reasonable job encouraged 
the old people. The second son then completed 
Gymnasium and also got a civil service job. He 
turned over most of his salary for the education 
of the younger children, for since there were 
now always three at Gymnasium the school bills 
came to about £60 a year. The third son went 
from Gymnasium to the Teachers Training College, 
and after two years there received his Diploma 
and started work as a primary school teacher.
He too made over most of his salary towards the 
cost of educating the three younger children.
About this time the oldest son got married.
The family now had a clear strategy for the 
problem of the remaining children. The fourth 
child, a girl, was also sent to the Teachers 
Training College, and when she graduated and 
started teaching there were several requests 
for her hand from men in the village. In spite 
of strong family pressure she vetoed several 
candidates; it was understood that in order to 
build a dowry house she would need to take a 
loan of £3,000 from the Benevolent ?und of the 
Schoolteachers Trade Union, and that any man 
marrying her would accept the necessity of her 
working for a number of years to pay off this 
sum. During this period the second son also 
got married, to a rather wealthy girl in the 
village. Like his older brother he was soon 
in debt in an effort to increase the citrus 
plantation his wife received from her parents 
at marriage.
The third brother had now also taken out a 
large loan of £1,000 from the Teachers' Benevolent 
Pund, in order to keep pace with the mounting 
costs of the two younger children. For the fifth 
child, another girl, had been sent to university 
in Greece for a five year course in Philology.
This alone was costing more than £300 a year.
The girl teacher got engaged to a young 
clerical worker, and they started building the 
new house in the village. The girl was a little 
more prestige-conscious than was wise, and the 
house cost £3,500. Her sister finally completed 
the university course, and with some difficulty, 
which included important help from the husband 
of a first cousin, found a teaching job. She got 
engaged soon afterwards to a fellow teacher. Her 
unmarried older brother, at 28, was nearing the 
age when village opinion felt it was high time he 
married, when he met a girl - again a teacher - 
from a distant village and they got engaged. Now 
only the youngest child remains and the family 
have persuaded him after many councils to study
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medicine in Greece. He will have his fees met 
if the worst comes to the worst by each of the 
married children contributing about £5 a month, 
even though all of them have substantial debts 
to pay either on their houses or their citrus„
In this account it is important to note that the
younger children have tended to receive more education and
so qualification for the higher status occupations. The 
difference in age between the oldest and youngest children 
of this set is at least fifteen years, and the chances are 
that the oldest brother will be preparing to marry off his
daughter about the same time as the young doctor is ready
to marry; since in this case there is no property left it 
cannot be the cause of dispute. In any case the prestige 
for the sibling set of having both a Gymnasium teacher and 
a doctor in the family will act as a powerful sanction in 
maintaining cooperation. It cannot be said that many other 
families in the village have succeeded in elevating so many 
children from such an Inauspicious base; it is more common 
to find that several of the older children have taken up 
manual work of some kind; but the principal strategies are 
the same in such cases. The particular leverage the Fanos 
family obtained was in the ability of the children who took 
up teaching to obtain substantial loans through their trade 
union. In a later chapter this family is described as facing 
a serious crisis when the father was in danger of losing his 
job, which would have seriously disrupted the pattern 
described here.
So far the domestic group has been the focus of 
interest in this chapter, and it has been argued that it is 
a relationship with both high benefits and, at a later stage,
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a potential for high costs in terms of competition and 
disputes. Since the expression 'high' can only gain any 
precision from a comparative context, the beisis for 
comparison must now be made clear by examining the costs 
and benefits of two other types of relationship defined 
by the recognition of kinship ties in the village - that 
between first cousins, and later that between second c o t . sins.
Genealogical examination of a sample of marriages 
over some seventy years showed that of people resident in 
Kallo, four out of five marriages were between two Kalio 
born partners . One direct result of this is that a 
given person is likely to have very large numbers of kin 
living in the village. A group of informants questioned in 
detail on this subject had on average 32 first cousins, of 
whom on average 23 were living in the village. This would 
have meant that anything from 70 to 150 second cousins were 
also likely to be resident in the village, although I did 
not count them. These facts are important when considering 
the nature of the rights and duties between collateral 
kinsmen. (Table 13.)
The villagers say that the relationship between 
first cousins should be 'like brot h e r s ’, by which they mean 
a relationship of full trust, warmth, avoiding all conflict, 
and so forth. In general, the ideology of the relationship 
receives support in actual behaviour, bxit it is clear that 
no such categorical demands are made of first cousins as 
are made of siblings. They have a solidary relationship - 
particularly in the face of outsiders; and a request for 
help from one to another would always have to be seriously
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TABLE 13
THE FIRST COUSINS OF 24 SELECTED INFORMANTS
Informant Total Total in Village Total Outside
Cousins
1 40 35 5
2 59 Informant married into Kallo
3 7 Informant married into Kallo
4 25 16 9
5 30 20 10
6 34 27 7
7 46 43 3
8 55 25 30
9 26 17 9
10 16 12 4
11 30 22 8
12 11 10 1
13 27 21 6
14 19 14 5
15 21 16 5
16 35 30 5
17 26 23 3
18 35 23 12
19 57 41 16
20 36 19 17
21 36 31 5
22 11 5 6
23 43 38 5
24 50 20 30
775 508
Average per informant: 32.4 
Average in village: 23.09
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considered on the grounds that the person asking was the 
child of a sibling of one's parent. This would never be 
a free gift of money or land, since closer relations would 
not permit it even if the parties themselves were agreeable.
It could be a low-interest or interest-free loan, an 
unsecured loan, labour at a wedding, a job recommendation, 
or any suitable use of a personal network. The dividing 
line is between those forms of help which can obviously be 
said directly and permanently to deprive a person's closer 
kin, and those forms of help which are possible without 
anyone else losing anything. Clearly loans are in a grey 
area, since a finite sum of money can be loaned to only one 
person at a time; and people frequently complain that a 
kinsman has loaned money to someone else. Almost any form 
of aid can be interpreted as depriving someone else, when 
good will is lacking.
Unlike siblings, first cousins normally have no 
common interest in property. There is nothing in their 
relationship which would normally alter it over time; and 
since in any case, because a man has so many first cousins 
and cannot be expected to keep up sibling-like relationships 
with many of them, there is an optative quality to the 
exchanges between these relatives. Men use first cousinship 
as the base on which to build strong friendships. The 
potential in the relationship is activated by choice between 
the two parties rather than by categorical constraints.
Women in particular lead more circumscribed lives than men: 
their close relationships are more likely to be restricted 
to close kinswomen and neighbours for, unlike men, they lack
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the freedom of movement, to the coffee-shop in particular, 
which permits the formation of ties with people more remote 
than close kin and neighbours.
The relationship then does not have the divisive 
aspect of co-inheritance, while it does have an ideology 
of warmth and trust; it has a strong optative element if 
only for demographic reasons. In comparison with that 
between siblings it can be thought of as a relationship 
with a potential for high benefits but relatively low costs. 
The following case illustrates the kind of purposes to 
which the relationship can be put:
In 1968 Kounnis was charged by the police 
following a complaint by a woman neighbour that 
he had tried to assault her. The w o m a n ’s 
reputation had been damaged, and in the scuffle 
Kounnis had slightly injured a young kinsman 
of hers with a k n i f e ,
K o u n n i s * wife was sister to Sklyros, one of 
the leftist leaders in the village. He was very 
angry with Kounnis, but at the same time his 
sister's reputation was at stake, and if Kounnis 
went to prison, as seemed likely, she and her 
children would be in difficulties.
Sklyros and his half-brothers v/ent to a nearby 
village, and talked to a man who was their first 
cousin, and through his EOKA activities was 
locally influential. He agreed to help, and 
visited a friend of his, a senior policeman in 
Market Town, where the case was due to be heard.
On the day of the hearing he appeared in the 
courtroom, in his best clothes, although he would 
not normally have had cause to be there. During 
the hearing the police decided to alter the 
charge from one of indecent assault, to attempted 
Indecent assault. This charge does not technically 
exist in Cyprus lav/, but the judge made no comment. 
Kounnis, after some uncertainty, pleaded guilty 
and was fined £40. He was thought to have got off 
very lightly.
This example was considered by those concerned to
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have been a fairly important example of kin solidarity.
The woman who Kounnis had been charged with assaulting had 
a doubtful reputation in the village, and came from a weak, 
small family. Kounnis, on the other hand, though a man of 
no account himself, was related by marriage to influential 
men, who were ready to help less for his sake than for their 
sister’s. The half-brothers of Sklyros had long-standing 
EOKA connections with their first cousin, and with him were 
politically all clients of the same important urban politician. 
Their staunch support for this politician's party in the 
1970 Legislative Assembly elections was one way of repaying 
the favour which was thought to have occurred over the police 
charge.
Had this issue arisen between second cousins there 
would have been no suggestion of a strong normative claim 
to assistance. This is the essential difference between the 
two types of cousins: no one suggests that the relationship
between second cousins has any similarity to that between 
siblings, nor do second cousins readily make claims on each 
other. The expectations are minimal, and could perhaps be 
summed up in the statement that in recognition of ti eir common 
blood they should show each other general consideration and 
not take the sort of advantage of each other that unrelated 
men might do. Since a man may have more than a hundred 
second cousins (and in the case of certain families, several 
hundreds) any notion of more precise categorical relationships 
is most unlikely.
It is not an exaggeration to say that the expectations 
between second cousins are essentially a requirement that
Vi’4
one refrain frotu normal bnhavlour - exploiting orm'a 
advantage — towards a category ol people from whom one 
expects nothing oxoopt that they too will refrain from 
such normal behaviour. Thin must bo oonsldex'od In the 
light of the fact that the Institution of friend oh. 1 p lit
(tn
recognised In the villagev ' , and whereas a man might ask 
for and expect to receive the loan of £rj or £10 from a 
friend with money In hlo pocket, ho would have no suoh 
automatic expectation of a first countn unless they were 
already friends. Similarly, when one baptises a child, 
one invlteo siblings, friends and first cousins, hut thorn 
is by no means an automatic Invitation to second cousins, 
rather few of whom will bo Invited. At weddings the whole 
village In invited, and second cousins ooino a Ion// with 
everyone else.
Go far the omphasls has boon on the low benefits 
of the relationship. It oan bo seen also to entail high 
costs: since orio may not marry one's second cousin, this
means in a predominantly in-marrying village the number of 
young women automatically ruled out when a man Is thinking 
of a bride may bo rather largo. This ,1s not trivial in a 
situation whoro competition for suitable partners Is strong, 
and the penalty for failure Is to bo unable to remain in 
one's natal village, as I shall explain later.
(11) flarrlu/'o
I mentioned In the first chapter how traditionally 
mon. shook hands and declared that they had agreed to the
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marriage of their children, and to the amounts of property 
they would give them. Starting in the 1920's it became the 
custom to have a formal engagement ceremony, presided over 
by the priest, and known as Arrayones, betrothal. In those 
cases the parents, under the guidance of the village priest, 
drew up a orikosynfonon, dowry agreement, in which each 
family specified exactly what it would give its child, with 
mention of particular fields and their boundaries, and in 
the case of a new house how many floors it would have. In 
some cases, a clause is included which says how much one 
side will pay the other if it breaks off the engagement, 
and also stipulates that the marriage will take place within 
a certain period, usually two years. Both Arravones and 
prikosynfonon are optional, rather than essential. About 
half the families in the census did not bother with either; 
some because they were unwilling to pay for the accompanying 
feasting, others because the girl was less than the legal 
sixteen years of age for engagement. Villagers believe that 
Arravones and -prikosynf onon must go together, and the priest 
generally encourages them to think this, as he favours t e 
written agreement since he believes it reduces the risk of 
subsequent disagreement. But some villagers say "Honest 
men don't need to write these things down, and a cheat will 
cheat you whether it's written down or not".
After the agreement has been signed, the ecclesiast­
ical ceremony begins, and this starts with the priest asking 
the boy and the girl whether each wants ti'e other. This is 
done often with several hundred people looking on, and 
sometimes, though very rarely, produces surprises, when one
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of the two answers "Ho".
Before these ceremonial events occur, however, the 
more important aspects of the arrangement of marriage have 
already taken place - the search for a suitable partner, 
the collective discussion of the eligibles, the diplomatic 
approaches made to a family through intermediaries, 
bargaining over property, and the actual formal agreement 
between heads of families. Only when all these stages have 
taken place will the priest be called in, and invitations 
sent out.
Parents first, but indeed all close kin, wish to 
see a family member make a good marriage. The discussion 
of possible partners is carried on continuously, and all 
parties participate in a spirit of concern for the personal 
happiness and security of the person to be married. As long 
as everyone is applying the same criteria for selection, 
this situation is one of great solidarity; it is when a 
person tries to strike out for himself or herself, against 
the agreement of senior family members, that difficulties 
arise.
There is another important factor in the collective 
concern of the family. This is related to social differ­
entiation in the village which has been touched on in the 
discussion of statrs and occupation. The creation of 
affinal ties between families also creates a new statement 
about their respective statuses. Logically, any new position 
must be either the same as before, higher or lower. There 
will not be complete consensus among all villagers about the 
meaning of a particular marriage, but the community looks
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inwards on such issues, and there is a “broad area of shared 
values.
In the absence 01“ discrete strata in the village, 
how do the actors themselves make discriminations? They 
see both individuals and families as the centres of networks 
of varied ties in whicb cognatic and affinal ties are the 
most important. In addition to a man’s personal wealth, 
education, achievements and character, are those of the 
people with whom he is most closely linked.
It has been continually stressed that the village 
has experienced great change during this century. In 
particular, it has experienced an important expansion of 
available occupational roles for village members. At the 
same time the size of the village population has been 
increasing rapidly. Taken together, these facts suggest 
that the villagers' views of the standing of different 
persons are subjected to certain strains which produce a 
degree of uncertainty. This uncertainty about the status 
of others sharpens the interest in the arrangement of 
marriage.
Each new marriage slightly alters the status 
organisation of the village: since the villagers prefer
to find spouses within the village in most cases, each 
engagement takes a possibly desirable partner out of the 
range of those families directly competing, and redefines 
the relations of all participating families. Clearly, not 
all marriages are equally important in this way. Marriages 
between persons and families generally agreed to be ’equals' 
in all obvious respects cause less great interest. It is
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those marriages which make the villagers re-examine their 
views of status relations, of equivalence and difference, 
which are most important to them.
Further clues to the meaning of marriage arrangement 
in the village are provided by the actual circumstances 
surrounding offers. first there is a definite season in 
which nearly all village engagements take place. This is 
during December and January, with a few rare extensions 
into February. This is by no means universal in Cyprus.
This period is a slack time in the agricultural cycle, 
and in the religious cycle it is a period of permitted eating 
of all normal foods, immediately prior to the long fast 
which is the prelude to the Orthodox Easter. Since this 
period is perceived as the only proper time to negotiate 
engagements, and since nearly everyone sticks to the rule, 
the effect is analogous to the opening and closing of a 
Stock Exchange: because the period of time for trading is
finite and known, people have in practise much better 
information than they would if the period never ended. The 
market mechanisms can operate more perfectly.
To illustrate this, consider the case of a family 
which has received an. attractive offer, and yet feels it 
can do better, and is thinking in terms of two or three 
possible men who are ready to marry this year, and are not 
in status beyond its reach. On receiving the first 
offer, they answer with "We'll think about it for a while...". 
They can then wait a few days or weeks to see if any of 
the favoured men are interested. They can even drop very 
discreet hints through third parties, to let the men know
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that now is the time to move. If this fails they are free 
to take up the original offer. The fact that everyone is 
thinking in terms of a decision-making period lasting only 
a few weeks makes decision much easier.
There are complications: one may be waiting for
an answer from a family which is waiting in turn - a knock- 
on situation. Perhaps after having used the conventional 
oolite method of refusal "We are not really ready this year - 
we've got a lot of expenses" a family then gets a fine offer. 
If the family is tough-minded, secure and not afraid to make 
enemies, it will accept the new offer and take the consequent 
ill-feeling from the rejected family. If, however, there 
is a strong wish to remain on good terms with the rejected 
family, the new bidder will be told "Look, we just told 
the So-and-sos that we're waiting till next year. But we 
really do want the marriage with you. If you will agree 
to wait, we'll give our word now secretly, and we'll be 
the first engagement of next season".
Since refusal is taken so seriously, it is not 
surprising that a slighted man may often get himself engaged 
v/ithin a few days of a refusal, and sometimes to a girl 
slightly 'lower' in the market than he is thought to be 
himself. Villagers are quite av/are of the motives for such 
rapid moves, and explain that it is Zytlma poitrou 'a 
question of prestige'.
In 1956 when he was nineteen Pavlos wanted to get 
married and his father agreed. He had completed 
Gymnasium, but his family was poor - both his 
father and his father's brothers were all shepherds, 
although later his father became a truck driver. 
Pavlos' first cousin (a man who had become rich
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through his own efforts) tried to get him engaged 
to the daughter of a rich farmer. As it happened 
the girl had already set her heart on a young 
teacher, also from a fairly wealthy family, and 
she later married him. At this time, Pavlos was 
refused, and it was assumed that the reason was 
the family background. He came home and said 
"I'm going to get engaged - as soon as possible". 
V/ithin a few days an engagement was arranged with 
the daughter of a substantial farmer. She was 
given twelve donums of land by her parents and a 
house was built.
Pavlos1 sister, who told me the story, 
explained that his pride was hurt by the refusal, 
and he got engaged as quickly as possible to get 
over the slight. The same thing happened a few 
years later to his younger brother.
In addition to a season for offers, and conventions 
for making decisions and refusals, there is great emphasis 
on secrecy during the process, and the use of intermediaries. 
One reason for secrecy is to protect from insult those who 
may be refused, although details have a habit of leaking 
out. But the use of intermediaries coupled with the secrecy 
act as a safety valve, because a family which has been 
unsuccessful in an offer can deny that the offer was ever 
made. Normally formal offers only come from the man’s family 
to that of the girl; informally, and very secretly, a girl's 
family may drop an obscure hint towards a particular young 
man that if he seeks the girl's hand he will be welcome.
But should this fail to be taken up by the young man, the 
girl's family would totally deny that they had ever had such 
an intention, and dismiss the suggestion with the phrase 
phantasia tons 'Their imagination...'.
Data about who sought whose hand proved the most 
difficult to collect in the village, especially from men.
This is a Further indication of t; e importance for the status
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system of each bid. The biggest service a family can do 
for another is to Iceep the secret of a marriage-offer 
that it has rejected. However, since women talk more freely 
than men on sensitive subjects (possibly because they 
have less to fear from the dangers of a physical encounter 
with someone insulted by gossip) details may be given 
during the heat of a quarrel. Cne of the most serious 
women’s quarrels to occur in the village during my fieldwork 
period was brought to a heightened level of hostility 
because one family suggested that a second ’had been nice 
to’ a third family because they were hoping for a marriage- 
off er from the highly eligible son of the house.
Intermediaries are used for many different situations 
in Cyprus. They are used for buying and selling, for 
attempting to settle disputes, and nearly always for 
arranging marriages. It is preferable if they are close 
kin of both interested parties, but it is usually enough 
for them to be kin of the prospective groom, and men 
respected in the village as ’serious’. There is, however, 
some ambiguity in the role, for when the villagers are 
asked what makes a good mesitis they often laugh and say 
’You have to be a good fibber, have the gift of the gab..
In fact, a mesitis extols the virtues of the man he is 
representing, and can also return to him with a softer 
answer in the case of rejection than may have actually 
been given by an intemperate family. There is honour to 
be gained, and ties may be strengthened by successfully 
representing a man in marriage negotiations; out a me sit1^
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may be blamed if the marriage turns out badly, or if it 
fails to take place at all. A mesitis often tries very 
hard to bring a match off by persuasion of the more 
doubtful side.
The customs which direct the arrangement of 
marriages indicate that they are the object of great 
concern in the social organisation of the village, and 
reasons have been given for this. It should not be 
thought, however, that cooperation and solidarity between 
affines is therefore an automatic outcome. Many marriages 
represent a compromise for the contracting families - 
they may have hoped for something better but have settled 
for less. Engagement, with the attendant difficulty 
of house-building for tie bride's family, is a period of 
strain for many families, since both sides in their anxiety 
not to be taken advantage of economically may be vigilant 
to the point of conflict.
The crucial relations on which future affinal 
cooperation are likely to be based are between a man and 
M s  wife’s father, the man and his wife's brother, between 
the man's wife and his mother, between his sister and 
his wife. Some of these relationships are given a certain 
impetus by a custom which seems to have evolved relatively 
recently, but the foundations for which must always have 
been present: after engagement in the village the groom
is expected to dine as many nights as possible at the 
house of his fiancee’s parents. Since engagement commonly 
lasts two years, this provides ample time for the man to 
get to know his new relations well. The villagers give
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a number of reasons for this custom. It is a chance, 
they say, for the couple to get to know each other, in 
the right circumstances. Since the girl's father is 
expected to provide slightly better than usual food for 
these meals, some villagers add "The father must feed the 
groom, to keep him happy". Implicit in this comment is 
the danger that a young man might change his mind, an 
event which will hurt the girl's family more than his own.
This is especially delicate when the groom is from another 
village, and has been sleeping in the same house as his fiancee; 
it is then commonly assumed that he will have made love 
to her.
To show the different forms which cooperation 
between affines may take, as well as the t;,pe of difficulties 
which can occur, I now present in detail some cases^ .
Sklyros has been married to Ploutis' sister 
for twenty years, during which time Ploutis 
has become very wealthy. Sklyros uses his 
tractor to cultivate Ploutis* citrus groves, 
and Ploutis is content with this arrangement, 
for his trees get good attention, while the 
money he pays is of direct benefit to his 
sister's family.
Sklyros has debts of several thousand pounds; 
in 1969 he was thinking of starting a pig farm 
and went to the Market Town Bank for a loan.
The manager would not normally have been willing 
to consider this, because Sklyros has mortgaged 
all available land, and is financially over­
extended. But since Ploutis had agreed to 
guarantee the loan, the manager was ready to 
make it. If Sklyros fails to repay it, Ploutis 
will be liable.
This case shows the ambiguity at the heart of much 
affinal cooperation, that by helping a brother-in-law
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a man is also helping his sister. The villagers often point 
this out. However, in some cases it is possible to find 
help being given for more general notions of solidarity 
rather than simply 'to help the sister1.
Andreas had a younger brother, Yiannis. Yiannis' 
friend was involved in a serious court case, and 
to help him out Yiannis gave false evidence. This 
was discovered by the prosecution, who decided to 
proceed against Yiannis. This would have cost 
him his white-collar job and a gaol sentence.
Andreas heard of his brother's difficulties, 
and went to his wife's brother Petros, a profess­
ional man in a town. Petros is married to the 
daughter of a wealthy merchant, who regularly goes 
drinking with a high government official. This 
man was persuaded to use his influence to get the 
case dropped.
The links involved were friend/friend; brother/ 
brother; brother/wife's brother; son-in-law/ 
father-in-law; father-in-law/friend; friend/ 
friend; and a final unknown link.
(iii) Cooperation and Dispute Between Kin and Affines
I propose now to examine certain data which will 
put the notions about kinship and affinity so far discussed 
into better perspective.
I collected data from 24 informants on the share-
(7)cropping' and other partnership arrangements they had made 
at any time. Included were those situations regarded by 
informants as a form of 'going-halves1 in which one side 
put up land, labour, cash or seed, and the other side put 
in something as required. Some cases where trucks or 
tractors were jointly owned were included. Situations 
where an unmarried son was labouring on his father's land 
were not included. The 24 informants yielded 68 instances
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of share-cropping. Of these 15 v/ere between consanguines - 
particularly, a man's own siblings, his parents' siblings, 
and his cousins; 25 instances were between affines — a man 
with his wife's siblings, his wife's father, or some other 
affine. The remaining 30 instances were with people who 
v/ere either koumbari - 4; not in any way related - 24; or 
vague, distant kin - 2. These data are too few to do more 
than suggest that in share-cropping arrangements affines 
are chosen roughly as frequently as consanguines. My inter­
pretation of the fact that people share-crop with non-kin 
as often as with kin requires the qualification that my 
own estimates suggest that for an average man non-kin are
about five times more numerous in the village than close
(8)kin  ^ , and it makes sense to argue therefore that the true 
meaning of the numbers of kin involved is that kin are 
actively preferred over non-kin.
It is possible to compare these data with those 
provided by a survey of ten agricultural work groups called 
by particular women, to get work done in February and March 
1969, and involving a total of 80 woman-woman relationships.
23 of these relationships were between consanguines. 20 
were between close affines. The remainder included koummares, 
neighbours, and other persons in no way related to the caller 
of the working party, and included people who were working 
for cash, others who were working to be repaid by an equal 
amount of work at a later date, and a few who were helping 
'freely* out of close obligation. Again, affines v/ere called 
about as often as blood kin, although the figures are not
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large enough to be more than suggestive.
When discussing such situations informants were 
usually careful to say that economic cooperation with 
someone who was a second cousin, or related at a similar 
distance, was for reasons other than kinship. For instance, 
a woman was explaining why she had gone to a working party 
on the 28th February 1969, in which 17 women cut oranges. 
bhe was a second cousin of the caller, but the reason she 
went was that the women are neighbours, and thus knew each 
other. The point was the simple exchange of labour, in a 
mutually convenient manner, not the kinship tie.
Informants distinguish between reasonable economic 
cooperation with kin, and that which would be unreasonable, 
because counter to one’s own self-interest. As a norm, 
this would be phrased "Assist kin by economic cooperation 
whenever you can, without materially losing by it". Clearly, 
this sort of norm allows endless scope for disagreement 
about rights and duties. There were at various times in 
the village three, and sometimes four, butchers. These 
were ordinary villagers who, in addition to their land, did 
butchering one or two days a week. Each one wanted as much 
custom as he could get, and although serious disputes were 
rare, there were a number of minor disputes about why
individuals were going to one rather than another.
(9'IOne informant, Kandisv ', used to patronise Vounos, 
the butcher who was his wife’s mother’s brother 'because I 
support my relatives always'. But later another butcher, 
Charis, started to use water from Kandls' pump, and over 
time came to owe him money for this water. Kandis started
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to take his meat from Charis, thus avoiding paying cash 
out of his own pocket for meat, and at the same time insuring 
that he was getting paid by Charis, in kind if not in cash. 
"Why pay cash to Vounos when I can take it from Charis?" 
he told me. In due course, Vounos complained to Kandls
that he was no longer buying his meat from him, but Kandis 
(whose nickname means Wild man and who is appropriately 
tough, with a quick temper and aggressive way of speaking) 
gave his reasons in a forceful manner. Vounos said "There's 
no need to get angry - I was only joking". Kandis commented 
to me that Vounos was always 'like that', but added, "If I 
stopped my give-and-take situation with Charis, I'd go back 
to my relative Vounos, rather than to Kallis who is not 
related to me. Hot that I've anything against Kallis".
At the time he told me this Kandis had just bought 
a tractor in partnership with an unmarried brother of his 
wife's, which was causing one of her married brothers, who 
had wanted to be Kandis' partner, a little jealousy. Me had 
previously carried out the exchange of hi3 water supply, 
with the tractoring of his land, with several affine s. lie 
had done this with his sister's husband, Phillis, and with 
his wife's older married brother. Now he would not need 
to have other people tractor his land. I should point out - 
although Kandis did not - that his strategy of talcing the 
tractor in partnership with his wife's unmarried brother 
is a good strategy, because it will protect him from the 
charge of breaking his reciprocity with her older married 
brother, for he is still supporting his affinesu
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The system of exchanging water for tractor work, 
or water for meat which Kandis was using here, is a common 
one in the village. It has the mutual advantages mentioned: 
one man avoids using hard-to-get cash, the other at least 
can be sure that he is collecting on what he is owed. If 
both men start even, then both avoid the cash problem; 
the flexibility which is available by not letting one side 
build up too big a lead in the exchange situation is to 
the benefit of both sides. It can also lead to disputes, 
if one person thinks the other now owes too much, and tries 
to reduce the gap.
In the following case, the kinship relation is 
not very close, but close enough to allow the manipulation 
of norms:
Phillis is related to only one of the butchers - 
Vounos, who is his father's first cousin. They 
would normally use the general term 'relative'
(syfehenis) to each other. For five years Phillis 
bought his meat from Vounos. One day he bought 
from someone else. Vounos asked him why, and he 
replied "I've had a tractor now for two years; 
you've only asked me to work for you once, but 
I haven't got angry". "You owe me £17 for meat", 
said Vounos. "I'll pay you now", replied Phillis 
and did so, but hasn't bought meat from him since.
The two men don't agree about which one is 
cold, psychros. Phillis says he isn't cold with 
Vounos, but that since he has no need of contact 
with him, it is not deliberate avoidance on his 
part.
But from the butcher's point of view, it is 
Phillis who is cold, because he doesn't buy meat 
from his relative, and is thus deviating from 
what is 'natural'.
The villagers are in many cases so highly inter­
married that a man may have several conflicting claims on
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his custom^0  ^. In 1968 there were four villagers who acted 
as middlemen for the merchants buying oranges. Host villagers 
with oranges sold to one of these middlemen, rather than 
middlemen in other villages, or in Market Town. One informant 
was related to three of the middlemen. He was a second 
cousin of A’s wife - a negligible relationship. But his 
brother had married a sister of the middleman B. He had 
done business with B for thirty years, and got on well with 
him. He was used to take small loans from him. In 1963,
1964 and again in 1965 he sold his oranges to him. But in 
these years another middleman started buying oranges, his 
koumbaros 0. My informant had baptised C's second son some 
twenty years previously. Now, as he explained to me, he 
would have to share his oranges between the two men, and 
in 1966, 1967 and 1968 he sold his oranges to C. In 1968, 
when he needed money for the wedding of his daughter, G 
persuaded his employer, a Jamagusta merchant, to lend the 
man £3 0 0 1^1^.
There are, then, a range of situations in which 
kin may have an opportunity to cooperate. But these very 
opportunities, as well as the structural situations which 
arise in property transfer, provide many of the instances 
of conflict between kin or affines. In the depth interviews, 
the 24 informants were asked to describe any outstanding 
disputes, and any which had taken place in the last twenty 
y e a r s . The interviews gave a total of 111 cases of 
some substance , which gave an average
of some 4.5 per informant. I have information on a number
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of other disputes, but here my remarks are limited to 
these particular 111 cases. (Table 14.)
The 111 cases can immediately be broken down into 
those between kin and affines, on the one hand, about 
two-thirds, and one-third where there was no known kinship 
or affinal link. But the previous caveat on the ratio of 
kin to strangers in the village applies here too: if on
average a man recognises close relationships of kinship 
or affinity to about one-sixth of the adults in the 
village, then the actual rate of dispute should be thought 
of in the perspective of the probability of dispute with 
any person in the village. Thus, a ratio of two-thirds 
suggests, therefore, that the statistical probability of 
quarrelling with someone to whom one is closely related 
is about ten times greater than of quarrelling v/ith someone 
not closely related. This is, of course, only a heavy- 
handed way of saying what anthropologists have always 
known - that dispute is more likely between those who 
have close social relationships or common economic interests.
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TABLE 14
111 DISPUTES BETWEEN SELECTED INFORMANTS 
BY CAUSE OF DISPUTE AMD SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS
| i M S (1) 01;hers Total
Politics 2 c:
Land boundaries,
animal trespass 4 4 8
Property transfer
(dowry, inheritance) 24 0 24
Other economic,
debt 24 23 47
Insults, various 
and drinking
situations 16 20 36
120(2)
Note (1) Persons were classed as affines from the 
time of engagement.
(2) 9 cases have been classified by several
causes, since it was misleading to stress 
a single cause only.
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(iv) Solidarity and Political Alignment amonp; Kin
During the Emergency a shopkeeper in another 
village reported Tangos’ younger brother to 
the police for breaking into his shop. Since 
Tangos' brother was in EOKA, the matter could 
have exposed him. The police came to look 
for him, and he hid in the fields for three 
days. Tangos then went and beat up the shop­
keeper, and when the shopkeeper’s father 
tried to intervene, beat him too.
Villagers expect members of the domestic group to behave 
in a solidary manner in disputes. To insult a man is 
likely to bring his father or brothers into the issue, 
although it does not do so on small matters of debt or 
trespass. If there is a general rough-house, other close 
relatives may join in, but such events are rare, and 
bystanders usually try to separate men fighting in the 
coffee-shops or at weddings. This solidarity between 
brothers, whether married or unmarried, normally applies 
in any serious matter, and cuts across their individual 
political allegiances, as the following case suggests:
In 1963 Vakis, a leftist, was a committee member 
for the village Cooperative Store. The village 
militia, dominated by rightists, was collecting 
money to buy guns. Vakis gave them £20, as did 
his older brother Anemos. But the collectors 
also took from the Cooperative Store a box of 
shotgun cartridges, without asking. This 
annoyed Vakis, v/ho told a friend of his, a civil 
servant, about it, and later some official 
inquiries were made.
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The village militia leader was Moustachas.
He and Anemos are slp;hambri. men married to sisters, 
but their good relations had deteriorated because 
of an unsuccessful co-ownership of a tractor, 
however, both men were clients of right-wing 
urban politicians.
When Moiistachas heard that Vakis had complained 
about the cartridges he told Anemos ’Your brother 
needs shooting for doing a thing like that", by 
which he meant bringing the village militia into 
disrepute with powerful outsiders, and his anger 
was double because Vakis was a leftist.
Anemos shouted back at him "You better not lay 
a finger on my brother", and for four years after 
that the tv/o men were cold towards each other.
In public they concealed their coldness, and 
Anemos continued to behave normally to his wife’s 
sister and the children. Anemos' readiness to 
oppose Moustachas to begin with is the more 
impressive because the militia leader is consid­
ered a dangerous man to offend.
Although married brothers are expected to support 
each other in issues of serious danger, as in the case just 
described, at the same time they have the right to form 
whatever political alliances they wish. The pragmatic need 
to protect the interests of one's own dependents is clearly 
recognised; but at the same time, such alliances should not 
stand in the way of the norms of close kinship solidarity.
In later chapters material will be given in which these 
pragmatic and normative principles come into sharp conflict.
I examined the political loyalties of a number of 
sibling groups in the village, considering only the expressed 
loyalties of brothers to the major political parties which 
existed in 1969. Nine groups of brothers had roughly the 
same loyalties, four groups were too ambiguous to classify, 
and some ten sets of brothers had obviously diverse loyalties.
But if the loyalties of sisters' husbands in these groups
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were added, then the number of sets with diverse loyalties 
would increase. If, in addition, these brothel's' wives' 
brothers are added, normally loyalties become still more 
diverse. Some indication of this is given in Table 15.
The senior generation, whose ages range from about fifty 
to seventy, show a variety of ties. Most are simply Nation­
alists, but one woman married a Communist, and one of her 
brothers was once a Communist, but switched to the National­
ists about twenty years ago, probably under pressure from 
his elder brother. The second generation contain two 
sibling sets which are unified, two i/hich are diverse. Since 
the second generation are all first cousins, it is clear 
they span the political spectrum offered by the five parties.
Only full siblings share the same kindred; but 
each sibling has closer obligations to his spouse's siblings, 
than his own siblings have. This results in a situation 
where every adult has a unique set of loyalties derived 
from the marriage tie. Since a man may also choose from 
among his first cousins those with whom he wishes specially 
close relations, then it is clear that in the matter of 
economic cooperation and political alignment outside the 
nuclear family, each man has his own set of special ties, 
which need not closely overlap with those of his own close 
kin or affines.
(v) Conclusion
Kinship and affinity are, with land and work, 
critical constraints on villagers, for they set certain goals, 
and specify the rights and duties which go with these goals.
fable 15 political aligmen ts in two generations
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The bilateral nature of kinship, the cultural stress on 
the economic autonomy of the nuclear family, and the villager's 
attitudes to the marriage order of children produce a 
situation where unmarried siblings cooperate closely to marry 
o f f  successive members of their sibling group.
Because the domestic group’s resources change over 
time, the portion of family resources available to each child 
at marriage tends to differ from that received by its brothers 
and sisters, and since a general notion of 'eqiial shares' 
is current this makes for disputes later in life. The devel­
opmental cycle of the domestic group leads, in later life, 
to declining solidarity between married siblings.
The fact that the village is essentially an in- 
marrying community means that normally a man has a large 
number of consangulnes present in the same village. Expect­
ations are different between siblings, first cousins and
I
second cousins, and^suggested that although first cousins 
were highly valued, second cousins were almost a liability 
within the village.
The disadvantages of second cousin relationships 
lead naturally to a discussion of marriage. The increasing 
formality of the betrothal ceremony and property arrangements 
were mentioned; but more important, a man's social status 
is in question until the marriage of his last child has been 
arranged. The arrangement of marriage is thus the critical 
situation in which villagers receive some confirmation or 
denial of their own view of themselves. Families strive to 
make marriages for their children with those whose wealth,
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honour and general family status is the equal of or better 
than their own. Competition for likely partners is intense, 
with a great deal of attendant secrecy and formality.
While the successful marriage of a child is a key 
factor in the status of its parents, it is the nev/1 y married 
child who enters into important economic relations with 
affines. A man may cooperate with his wife's father or 
wife’s brother during engagement or the early years of 
marriage, and there is a tendency for the young man to shift 
his main energies from his natal domestic group to the family 
of his wife.
Relations of economic cooperation are common between 
both consanguines and affines, whether in the form of share- 
cropping, other forms of partnership, or types ox exchange 
of labour for goods in which both sides seek to avoid the 
use of scarce cash. But such cooperation also produces 
opportunity for dispute. The data examined made it clear 
that although both cooperation and dispute are more common 
between related persons, unrelated persons are also used 
for important types of cooperation. .''alio villagers use 
kinship and affinity in many ways, but they are perfectly 
ready to enter into cooperative relations with unrelated 
people.
This was further reflected in discussing solidarity 
and political alignments, for while kinship and affinity 
cause men to supocrt each other when threats, insults or 
serious difficulties occur, there is no general expectation 
that these institutions should prevent a mature individual
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from forming bis own political alignments. These alignments, 
as well as the general conditions of life, involTa men in 
relations and transactions outside the spheres of kinship 
and affinity.
■g-potnotes to Chanter 3
(1) I have dealt with the problem of why this change
took place elsewhere (Loisos and Langford,'unpublished paper) . 
Briefly, the argument is that houses ’switched* from 
"being a burden on grooms to being a burden on bridas 
as a consequence, among other things, of a change 
in number of men and women available at age of 
marriage. Other factors are also considered, such 
as the declining need for agricultural land as an 
essential factor for household viability.
(2) The government takes a different view, for it 
conscripts young men of eighteen, and treats them 
as adult in a number of other ways.
(3) Exceptions to these rules occur in two situations:
if a child is receiving higher education at university, 
it may marry 'later* than its position in the 
sibling group would normally require; also, when a 
family has no property at all, a boy sometimes gets 
engaged by himself, while his sisters are unmarried.
This is likely to cause a serious break in his 
relations with his parents.
(4) Genealogies were taken from the 30 oldest men and 
women in Kallo who were fairly lucid. They were 
asked about the marriages of their parents, brothers 
and sisters. To these data were added the results
of the main census. It is possible t'at the genealog­
ical data overstate the degree of marriage within the 
village, for elderly informants would be quite likely 
to forget those of their parents’ siblings who had 
married out of the village, and broken all contact; 
also, members cf small kin groups which have died 
out, or all of whose close members left the village 
would have been omitted.
(5) Friendship will be discussed in the next chapter.
(S)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
I have deliberately chose:: to use material about 
C"x — tito s jl n 'Si mur^ t?r o~ ~c 1.jiov5 s 1.1'  ^g<■>'**2.v x.%f' ^
since he features prominentIv in inter political
.'ping is not particularly con:-on in Sallo. 
Christodoulou (1959:217) aves data on a sasple of 
Tillages intensively surveyed, f rcr the entire range 
of Cypriot land-use areas. Xallo was included in 
this surrey, and ranked twentieth out of the 22 
Tillages for which data were giren on land leased 
and share-cropped as a percentage of land used.
Kallo had only ?: of its land in this category; the
range of the sarple i s t fros -i-i- to 6?< : the are rage
for ail Cyprus was 16<j
late the number of adult close kin and 
affines a ran should hare in an arerage faoily in the 
Tillage, assuming all people to be married, with 
liring spouses, was to allow the ran fire siblings, 
fire father's siblings, fire nother's siblings, and 
30 first cousins. To this 4" are added a further 45 
spouses, giring 90. To this figure are added 30 
close affines, for a total of IPO adults. There 
were 740 registered roters in the Tillage in 1970, 
so the ran should hare roughly fire times as many 
distant kin and unrelated persons as he has close kin.
This man was described in Chapter 2, page 2/5.
23 informants questioned in detail about their 
relations with the four Kallo middlemen who buy 
citrus fruit showed that six had no ties to any 
middleman; two had one tie only; fire had two ties; 
six had three ties; and four had four ties. These 
ties included consanguinity, up to and including 
second cousins, affinity, koumbarla, and, in three 
cases, friends or neighbours.
Thus, there were 46 recognised ties between 23 
persons, an arerage of two each. 17 of these ties 
were, howerer, between second cousins, and thus 
on the margins of importance.
The Famagusta merchant did not ask for the guarantee 
that the oranges of this man would be sold to him, 
but the man’s comment on this was "lie's very clever - 
it's a trick to get your oranges out of you".
The questions about disputes came after a number of 
less threatening topics had been discussed, and all 
informants had been interviewed before on other 
topics. Furthermore, in most cases I had already 
asked a very good informant for any material he knew 
of on disputes these people had been involved in.
If they denied ever having disputes, or failed to 
mention those I knew about, they were prompted. 
Situations likely to trigger memory, such as court- 
cases, debt, trespass, land boundaries and so forth 
were also used to aid their recall.
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CHAPTER 4
EXTRA-FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIPS 
AND VILLAGE SOLIDARITY
Work, land tenure, kinship and affinity all 
serve to constrain villagers, and in their different ways 
circumscribe many village social relations. But the 
villagers are involved in other relationships, both inside 
the village and outside it. Those relations which spring 
from wedding sponsorship or godparenthood (koumbaria) , 
village notions friendship, relations based in membership 
of the village itself, are all used by villagers to further 
their interests, both in regard to their family obligations 
and, less directly, in relation to the village political 
arena, and that of the nation. Extra-familial social 
relationships, and the notion of village solidarity, will 
both be essential for the understanding of political 
processes to be analysed in later chapters.
(i) Koumbaria
The marriage and baptismal sacraments of the 
Orthodox Church of Cyprus give rise to the relationship of 
koumbaria; while the institution has a complex history 
within the Church, the discussion here will be concerned 
chiefly with its social meaning in village life. Tradition­
ally, at the wedding ceremony the groom invited a man to 
be his wedding sponsor, koumbaros, and the bride a woman
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to be her sponsor, koummarg,. It was usual for these two 
sponsors to become the "baptismal sponsors for the children 
of the narriage, although it was permissible for a person 
to be a baptismal sponsor who had not been a wedding sponsor. 
Blit in the 1930's, without any impetus from the Church, a 
change in village custom occurred, and the numbers of wedding 
sponsors began slowly to increase. At first couples had two 
sponsors of each sex, later three, four and five, until at 
the time of my fieldwork many couples had fifteen or twenty, 
and some boasted a hundred. Accompanying this increase, but 
only at the level of village custom, arose the notion of a 
rank order of sponsors, such that the first koumbaros 
expected to baptise the first child born, the first koummara 
the second, the second koumbaros the third child, the second 
koummara the fourth, and so on. Since normally only the 
first three or four koumbari of either sex could reasonably 
expect to baptise children, there has been a tendency in 
the villagers* minds to stop thinking of the koumbari in 
ranked terms after about the fifth pair. There is also a 
tendency for the relationship to be relatively lighly regarded 
in the lower positions, and it is generally the case that 
today the relationship only has its full force in terms of 
expectations, rights and duties for the highest ranking 
koumbari and those who have baptised a child of the marriage.
In what follows I shall disregard the low-ranking and non­
baptising sponsors.
This change in the pattern of wedding sponsorship 
took place in different places at different rates, at different 
times. Villagers believe the change to have reached the
village from the towns; certain bishops haire tried to dis­
courage it, and highly educated townsmen tend nowadays to 
have few sponsors. Villagers explain the adoption of the 
change as "being a device "to help the couple with the rising 
costs of getting married”, and since each sponsor is expected 
to make a gift of cash to the couple, this at first sight 
seems plausible. But during the same period that the number 
of sponsors increased, the numbers of wedding guests also 
Increased, and they also make cash gifts. I cannot offer 
a satisfactory explanation for the change, beyond observing 
that the period in which it takes place is also a period 
when villagers are being increasingly drawn into contact with 
the larger society. This in itself does not explain the 
specifity of the change in custom.
The sponsorship of a marrying couple creates a number 
of new roles. A koumbaros is so addressed and regarded by 
both bride and groom, as is a koummara. Furthermoret the 
spouse of a sponsor becomes addressed by the term for sponsor, 
even when not technically a sponsor, A person may not marry 
anyone baptised by his or her godparent, nor the child of 
hi3 godparent, whom he addresses as kalledelfos, ‘spiritual 
sibling'.
A couple and their wedding sponsors always use the 
reciprocal term koumbaros in reference or address, and should 
show mutual trust, generosity and respect:. To a person who 
has baptised one’schild an additional respect is due, which 
in traditional times went" as far as the obligation to rise 
to one’s feet if one’s baptismal koumbaros approached.
Baptismal koumbari should strictly avoid quarrels or dissension
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of any kind, and systematic data which I collected on this 
problem suggest that indeed the rate of open dispute between 
baptismal koumbari is proportionately lower than that between 
eonsanguines, affines or friends. Only four out of lUcases 
of dispute reported were between koumbari, but some under­
reporting is likely since the shame involved is so strong.
My data on choice of godparents suggest that over 
half of all persons selected are kin or affines of one or 
the other spouse. But although nearly a half are not related 
by kinship or affinity to the parents of the child, they are 
still co-villagers. Less than 15$ of godparents were not 
residents of the village, and less than 10$ of godparents 
are persons of a markedly different status. By this I mean 
persons whose wealth or education would normally require the 
use of deference terms, such as the second person plural 
form of verbs by the lower status person.
Since the relationship of koumbaria may in some 
cases be used to establish or cement a patron-client relation­
ship^ , it is worth considering why so few villagers appear 
to put it to this use. The general explanation may be that 
the village is relatively prosperous, relatively near the 
capital, and relatively well served by the machinery of state. 
Thus, the gap between the villagers and those they may wish 
to contact is not as wide as in some societies. In addition, 
the fact that many villagers have kin employed in government 
and the professions somewhat reduces the need to use koumbaria 
in this way. But a further reason is suggested by the 
comments of one informant. Six of his seven children had 
godparents resident in the village, and of the same general
status as himself. The seventh was a physician, resident 
in the capital, who has land in the village which he waters 
from the informant's diesel pump. The villager, when 
questioned about the quality of relationship with the doctor, 
cursed him, saying "He never comes to see the child. Once 
he sent a piece of clothing, nothing since. Ky kid says 
'Who's my godfather?'. It would have been better to have a 
villager baptise him, then tie kid would have got to know 
him, and if he got a shilling or two now and then, it would 
have been fine. The godfather should be a second father to 
the child...". This informant, as a leftist, was less 
concerned with the theological than the social relationship 
which koumbaria should establish. His complaint was about 
the failure of the relationship to have any content at all. 
Yet he was well aware of the instrumental uses to which it 
could be put, for he suggested that a highly placed koumbaros 
could, and usually would, show preferential behaviour to a 
man whose child he had baptised. From the point of view 
of the villager, the problem is one of prediction. A friend 
or relative within the village is known, and the probable 
return on the relationship calculable. But to ask a high 
status person, resident outside the village, to baptise one's 
child is a gamble. At worst one risks wasting an institut­
ionalised relationship, and looking a fool; for villagers 
are quick to ridicule such a mistake. The relatively small 
numbers of markedly asymmetrical baptismal ties are then 
partly the result of a calculation on the lines of "A bird 
in the hand is worth two in the b u s h " .
The norms implicit in the baptismal relationship
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suggest why it is most commonly instituted between persons 
who are already friends, and may or may not he related. In 
general, it is the ambition of every adult to become a god­
parent, and very few fail to achieve this ambition: those
who do fail are often possessed of some strong social 
disability - severe mental or physical illness, alcoholism, 
and so forth. To be asked to baptise a child is an honour; 
to ask to baptise a child is a serious request which the 
child's parents will consider carefully, for it amounts to 
an overture of friendship and can only be refused through a 
face-saving excuse that the child has already been promised 
to someone else.
The godparent undertakes t.- e costs of the ceremony, 
both those incurred by the sacrament, and those incurred by 
the appropriate festivities afterwards. These involved in 
the village providing a substantial meal and alcohol for 
between fifteen and fifty persons. It would be impossible 
to agree to baptise a child without being ready for an outlay 
of £20, and since the rate for a day's unskilled labour 
is £1. 10. 0. for men and 12/- for women (depending on seasonal 
demands) the godparent deserves respect for material as well 
as spiritual reasons. Kany adults refuse requests to become 
godparents by openly admitting that they haven’t the money 
free.
'*Then koumbaria exists in a situation where people 
are already kin, are friends, or are people of unequal status, 
there is a sense in which it becomes the dominant relationship. 
For instance Pontikkos, a poor man, has had a child baptised 
by Vourros, a wealthy, educated landowner. Were they not
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kournbari Pontikkos would address Vourros as kyrie, mister 
(but with more deferential overtones); as it is he always 
addresses and refers to him as "My koumbaros V o u r r o s . . 
That this is only an idiora of equality, rather than creating 
actual equality, is inferred from the rareness with which 
Vourros seeks Pontikkos1 company, or refers to his existence, 
whereas the poor man often reminds people that the rich one 
is his koumbaros. But such an idiom, from the point of view 
of the poorer man, is better than no idiom at all.
Koumbaria. then, is the most strongly institution­
alised relationship formed by villagers, after affinity.
Like kinship and affinity, it is morally charged and subject 
to ceremonies and sanctions of the church. It lacks struct­
ural conflicts which arise through transfer of property in 
kinship and affinity, yet it enjoins cooperative relations 
between sets of persons in two related generations. Unlike 
kinship but like affinity it is for koumbarl themselves an 
achieved relationship, and calculation of possible gains or 
losses is made before a person enters into it. When entered 
into by people markedly unequal in wealth, power or status 
it may disguise or initiate patron-client relationships, 
but relatively few villagers use it in this way. The ones 
who do are often those most active in political relations 
with people outside the community, but this need not be the 
case. A similar potential either for affirming equality or 
bridging inequality is present in other relationships the 
villagers term 'friendship', to a discussion of which 1 now 
turn.
fha word phllogt friend, is used Just as loosely as
the word kousba.ro a, but it presents srach greater analytic
problems, as Paine (1969) has reminded us. She villagers use
the word to denote a relationship between two people of the
sa»e sex, usually of the sawe age, freely entered into but
having its roots in childhood or adolescence; as they use
the word it does not suggest an opposition or contrast to
kin, and close friends often turn out to be, on investigation,
close kin. In conversation, a roan would always refer to a
friend who was a close kinsman as a kinsman and, in this
sense, the kinship role is dominant} and when a man wishes
to describe the quality of his friendship with another, he
is likely to say, without any hint of irony, "We get along
like brothers". Implicit is the notion that friends should
help each other when possible, hut there are no precise
boundaries to this notion - it can only be explored in a
specific context. There is also present tie idea that the
basis of true friendship is a love of one person for another,
which is reciprocated} this love is thought to be the product
of two individual personalities, when genuine, and not to
result from a calculation of possible advantages. Hen say
freely in describing their close friends, "I love him as I
love my brother'1 - aglmpo ton opos ton alfon won« The other
words commonly used about a friend is ektlm^, 1 esteem, or
seVomal, 1 respect. But true friendship always has at its
coro the notion of aghape, the nan-sexual love which should
('3)exist between close kin' «
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At first sight it might appear that the expectations 
of true friendship are likely to create jealousies from among 
close kin, who will see in the relationship the diverting of 
resources and loyalties properly due to them. When I was 
conducting my census of household heads I was at first puzzled 
to note that, whereas men readily admitted to owing large sums 
of money, sometimes as much as £5,000, they were most reluctant 
to tell me the names of those who had loaned to them even sums 
as small as £20. They often gave as a reason for secrecy,
"His relatives might be angry and jealous if they found out...". 
Consistent with tnis attitude is the frequency with which kin 
warn a person of the danger of being exploited or cheated by 
an unrelated person.
This inherent tension in friendship is counteracted 
and contained in several ways. First, since villagers are 
highly conscious of the problem, they tend to conduct delicate 
matters with a degree of secrecy. Secondly, in general people 
avoid making requests of their friends which will obviously 
clash with prior kinship loyalties. They may ask friends 
for small, short-term loans, or for practical assistance 
which does not markedly diminish resources, such, as personal 
introductions, the use of a piece of machinery or an opinion 
on a course of action. But for large sums of money they 
prefer to approach a wealthy man with whom they are less 
friendly.
Giving advice is not the simple matter it might seem 
at first sight. One of the commonest reasons for not doing 
something in the village is "People will laugh", and this 
fear of ridicule means that a man will only discuss a difficult
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problem with someone he trusts. A close kinsman with the 
requisite expertise is useful hex-e, but the expertise is I'lot 
always to be had from close kin. On certain problems, 
involving one's kin, the advice of a friend may bo more 
valuable because disinterested. Many of my informants, when 
discussing friendship, described a true friend as "Someone 
I can tell my deepest secrets to, who won't repeat them...".
Friendship may develop from childhood or youth, but 
in older people it may arise from the simple fact of commen- 
sality. A common idiom used to describe or account for the 
development of a friendship is "We ate and drank together 
and became friends...". In the very simplicity of the 
expression can be seen a major problem of village friendship. 
For it suggests that all and any commensality should produce 
enduring ties: if you have given food to a man he should
recognise a special relationship with you from then on. A 
villager went into a shop in Nicosia to get the sights on 
his son's air-rifle repaired. The shop-keeper said that hio 
agency with the manufacturers had lapsed, and so Vie would not 
undertake the work. "And lie pretended he didn't know who I 
was, that he didn't recognise me. Now a few years ago when 
I was buying a diesel pump from him, that man sat and ate 
and drank with me. So now how can he pretend not to know me? 
Is it possible to forget someone you've eaten and drank with?"
The villager didn't consider that the urban shop­
keeper may meet a dozen new people each day, or that he 
himself had grown older and his appearance changed. A vill­
ager, inevitably meeting fewer people, sees commensality 
as memorable.
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Thia is partly because in the village eating and 
drinking outside the home are ritualised. I-'irst, a meal nay 
take several hours - one doe3 not simply eat and leave; nor 
does one eat quickly. Also, there will be a number of 
ceremonial invitations by the host in the form kaloa orlsate, 
"You are welcome'', to which the guest v/ill give the rhyming 
reply kalos car ivra:::e, "It is well we find you", with the 
double meaning of ’you are receiving us well’ and ’well for 
us that we have found you’. This formula may be repeated 
several times during the meal. Then, as I shall describe 
below, there is the tendency for all drinking to be the 
collective drinking of toasts. I'inally, there is the tendency 
for the conversational style of a meal - whether at home or 
in a tavern - to be relaxed, cooperative, compromising and 
non-competitive, in contrast to the aggressive, individualistic 
tone of coffee-house conversations.
If the circumstances of commen3ality produce friend­
ship they also serve to express it. A man from a distant 
village may be invited home by a friend, to eat and sleep.
They reach home late at night, the host wakes his wife and 
she prepares a meal. In the honour-and-shame values of the 
villagers, the elements of home, women, night and sleeping, 
all combined in one sequence and underlined by the giving of 
food, symbolically express trust, iriendship involves the 
display of trust, but paradoxically it can only develop to 
a point where trust is justified by the calculated risk of 
extending trust.
friendships are maintained through drinking sessions.
A man will meet a friend, and suggest to him that they 'go and
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have one * (panie na plouine kanena?) . They then sit down in 
a corner of one of the village coffee shops and drink a 
bottle of brandy, costing 6 / - ^ \  and eat small dishes of 
cheese, fruit, vegetables and meat. If they see other close 
friends passing by, they call out to them to join in. The 
drinking goes on for several hours, until everyone has had 
enough to drink, or every man has drunk a bottle of brandy, 
whichever comes first. The bill is then paid by one man, 
the man who suggested the evening, or by him and his first 
guest. It is more normal for one rr.an to pay, and 1 never saw 
an occasion where the bill v/as divided between several men.
There is prestige to be gained from being the man 
who pays, and this reflects the individualistic and compet­
itive aspect of village values. But this is concealed in 
layers of ambiguity. First, certain men have a reputation 
for stinginess, for never paying. These men are not called 
to join in drinking. This implies that in other situations, 
where the stated norms deny calculation, calculation must 
take place. Yet there is rarely, between friends, open 
discussion of the balance of reciprocities. The commonest 
mention takes the form of saying to the man who is attempting 
to pay the bill "V/hat - do you insist on paying every time?”, 
where the underlying suggestion is that the man seeking to 
pay is also seeking to pat himself above his friends; but 
such a remark can easily backfire, for the man seeking to 
pay may pretend to think that his actual generosity is in 
question, that he is trying merely to a p p e a r  a generous person 
(chouvartas). He can then redouble his efforts to pay and 
expect to succeed. It is quite normal in these situations
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for men to appear to be very angry, to insist that what they 
are doing is right, and for the whole conversation to be 
pitched at a level of total seriousness. Hospitality and 
generosity are not to be taken lightly.
Although I did not collect numerical data on village 
drinking groups, I observed a sufficient number to be sui’e 
that the reciprocity involved is not immediate and specific, 
but diffuse and delayed. Because the composition of the 
groups is fluid, and because the cost of a session varies 
both as a function of the number of men involved and the 
place involved (Market Town costs more than the villages, 
and the Capital costs more than Market Town), it is very 
unlikely that B can precisely reciprocate to A the same cash 
value as A gave to B previously. There are further complic­
ations. Any man in a group may call out to a close friend 
to join the group, even though (and perhaps sometimes 
precisely because) he knows he will not be paying himself.
This allows the creation of a double obligation on the part 
of the new guest - both to the man v/ho invited him and to 
the man who paid. The host, of course, has now doubled his 
hospitality to his original guest. If the new arrival is a 
friend of both host and first guest, the situation is a 
little different. In such situations, too scrupulous a system 
of accounting would not work. Instead, the participants hold 
somewhat general notions about the balance between them.
Villagers make a number of differentiations of
friendship, in which they are concerned to separate out the
/
motives of those involved. Genuine, or true, friends, gni3ii
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phili, have a relationship based on fellow-feeling, sympathla. 
Especially in youth, they speak of themselves as achoristl, 
inseparable. In later years a man describing this sort of 
friendship says nv/e v/ere alv/ays together. It was essential 
for Ee to be v/ith him all the tine, to see him every day to 
be happy'1. He may add !'He grew up in my house; we slept in
the same bed". Cther ways to describe this type of relation-
/ / / ' 
ship are phili polla, very great friends, or kardiaki ohili,
friends of the heart.
Other usages suggest a shading off towards mere 
acquaintanceship, and people say carefull;/ l!I cannot say we 
are friends - we know each other, that's all".
There is a way of describing that friendship which 
/ /
is not genuine. Pseftiki phili are persons whose apparent 
friendship really masks cold self-interest. 'This description 
is often given by third parties, to characterise a relation­
ship between persons of unequal power, or 3tatus. A number 
of people in the village boast of their ’friendships’ with 
government ministers, former SOZA fighters, wealthy merchants, 
doctors, lawyers or civil servants. Such claims may be 
described by others as ’lies’ or characterised as ’false 
friendship’. No other form of v/ords in the village mouth 
can better express the analytic notion of patron-client 
relations.
To the villagers it is obvious what distinguishes 
true friendship from the false friendship of the client and 
patron. True friends meet as equals, as often as they can, 
and take obvious pleasure in each other's company. A client 
may only rarely see his patron unless one or the other needs
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something, and when he does he will go on usin,~ resmect 
language, including the plural Tero fora, and the term *"yrie * 
to address his patron. lie will often present his patron with 
gifts of fruit or other village produce. The patron doss not 
make similar return gifts.
A certain ^an in the village, Yiannos, often speaks 
of himself as a great friend of a government minister who 
bought a citrus plantation with a water pump in the village. 
Yiannos, who first met the minister during the Emergency 
when he acted as a minor courier for SOSA, looks after his 
trees for a monthly wage. Inevitably this involves a limited 
amount of contact between the two men. Some people are 
impressed by Yiannos' claim to 'friendship' with the minister, 
but many others are scornful behind his back and add that the 
minister very rarely visits his 'friend1, and is dissatisfied 
with tne way his interests are looked after and would change 
Yiannos if he could. It is widely believed that Yiannos sees 
it as part of his job to carry tales to the minister about 
people in the village who may be hostile to him. Since during 
my fieldwork the minister resigned his post and became a 
leading figure in a political party, the value of Yiannos 
as a source of information to him did not lessen.
One reason who some people in the village were 
hostile to the minister was to do with his water pump. Yiannos 
was his representative in selling water in the village, and 
in collecting payment. The minister’s pump thus came directly 
into competition with those of various villagers; also, he 
did tend to press for payment rather quickly. Since ready 
cash is difficult to find when their trees are young, It is
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common for a man to owe for water used for several years.
There was also some resentment of the relish with which 
Y.iannos tried to carry out his debx-collecting duties for 
his master. At one point in these events certain pipes 
bearing water from the minister's machine were found to he 
damaged. There were at least three versions of how this 
came about. One was that the pipes broke 'by themselves’.
A second was that Yiannos himself had damaged the pipes, so 
that he could discover the damage, report it and his suspic­
ions to the minister and thus gain credit with him for 
vigilance. A third version suggested that certain man in 
the village who had been pressed for money were seeking to 
teach the minister a lesson about the need for delicacy in 
credit relations.
Yiannos' relation with the minister is often referred 
to in the village, and it makes hire, whether people like him 
or not, someone to take note of, as the following incident 
suggests: Yiannos quarrelled with his former friend, Gklyros,
over a share-cropping venture they had undertaken. Later, 
Sklyros' uncle, a poor man with many children, sought to get 
certain benefits from a ministry department in the capital.
But he found his application unsuccessful, and he told me 
that he believed this was because Yiannos, out of his wish 
to be avenged on Sklyros, had gone to his minister and pointed 
out that the uncle was not technically eligible for the 
benefits in question. While this interpretation may be some­
what fanciful, it is a very characteristic example of the way 
villagers talk about such relationships, and the uses to which
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they might be put. On a number of other occasions Yiannos 
introduced villagers who wanted some favour to tie minister, 
and such people are more ready to support his claim that the 
minister is his true friend.
Friendship then is less strongly institutionalised 
"than .koumbaria. but it is recognised by villagers as a viable 
and legitimate type of relationship. It is not necessarily 
opposed to kinship, although kin may be suspicioiis of a man 
with too many unrelated friends. True friendship between 
equals is a relationship freely entered into, which has an 
expectation of trust, but will be terminated in the event of 
real or imagined failures of reciprocity; but the very ease 
with which the term is used, and the relationship said to 
spring from such simple events as eating and drining together, 
suggest that it is liable to be unstable.
When there is a marked Inequality between friends, 
others are quick to suggest that they are guided by calcul­
ation of self-interest rather than personal liking.
(iii) Other Bases for Association
Koumbaria and true friendship are institutionalised 
relations though in different degrees. There are a number 
of other relations which the villagers are involved in, which 
must be distinguished sociologically. I shall now examine 
other bases for association, starting with the use of the 
village coffee-shops.
The social life of men is largely a public life, 
in the several coffee-shops at the centre of the village.
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ffhere wr<» never loss than four, centrally located, during 
my fieldwork and sometime®, depending on the whims of certain 
individuals, fire nr six, Men commonly visit a coffee-ehop 
At leAst once a day, And for many men, when not eAting, 
sleeping or in the fields, the coffee-shop is the n a turn! 
and proper place to ho, This is so much a port of the proper 
male role that s wan who doesn't put in enough time in this 
public world is lively to have said behind hie back "What 
sort of wan is ho? He prefers hanging about the house with 
the women!"
Prom 5 A.m. till about 8 a,m», and attain in the 
evening from 5 to n p.m., the coffeeshops Are An important 
clearing house for information, and men deliberately come 
to them to seek others, to find work or workers* to get a 
lift to Market Town or the Capital, to do any one of a number 
of things which need other people* Normally men prefer to 
find othero in the coffee—shop than to g<> to theI r housen - 
unless they live clone by it will be easier, and visits to 
houses may always give occasion for gossip^ **',
Men oome into the ooffee-shop area, where others 
are sitting at ease, and ask "Have you seen XtM HKe hasn't 
come yet.” "Tie’s over there at Y*s place," wtle*s already 
left for Nloosia," "He’s watering that big field of his 
down by the river." "He's sick at home." Any man will answer 
who knows; and the question in often asked of all who are 
seated in general, since the speaker In less interested in 
who answers than in getting a useful annwer. This need which 
each man has for a degree of civility and Information from 
others in complemented both by the public, common and open
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nature of the coffee-shops - they are open to all - and by 
a particular custom associated with them: put in its baldest
terms, this is that if a man B arrives and sits down near 
another man A, then A will normally order and pay for a coffee 
for the newcomer, without there being an especially close 
Relationship between them. Major differences of age, wealth 
or education may allow the second man B some scope for saying 
"It isn’t done...", but as a general rule common civility 
between co-villagers requires A at least to attempt to treat 
B to refreshment, and B can only refuse to accept by stressing 
a social difference between himself and A, since the grounds 
for the gesture is the common membership in the category, 
co-villager, chorianos. (The meaning of offering refreshment 
changes with the structural distance between the persons 
involved: it means something quite different when the
persons are strangers, for instance.)
Although coffee-shops support a minimal cooperation 
between co-villagers, there is no lack of dispute, tension, 
conflict or competition between villagers; nor in any sense 
are adult men 'randomly' undertaking social relationships.
Another basis for association in the village is 
through neighbourhood, both in the sense of those whose houses, 
and those whose fields, are close, "Mia porta11 - one door - 
is the way men describe having adjacent houses, and when 
they do so they rub the outside edges of their two index 
fingers along each other, in the same gesture they use to 
describe the relation between siblings. Since a man has his 
fields scattered in many places around the village, the idea 
of neighbourhood through fields is more diffuse, but suggests,
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as with the house situation, relations in which casual contact, 
the borrowing and lending of implements* help raising a heavy 
load, or the exchange of gossip or agricultural information
may all take place. Women make even more use of houoe-
neighbourhood than men. Men typically work alone most of the 
time. They also have access to coffee-shops, where they are 
free to select people to talk to. Women are generally 
working in the house area, both for reasons of domestic
duties and the honour-and-shame values already discussed. If
a woman needs to recruit a cooperative labour group for 
weeding, picking oranges, pulling carrots or lifting potatoes, 
she will often have neighbours along with her kinswomen.
Women also form neighbourhood-based informal associations, 
known as paroa, a company (in the sense of companions). A 
number of women who wish to produce the cheese known as 
hallouml agree that, on successive days, all women will bring 
so much milk to one woman in turn. Thus, each woman gets 
sufficient milk to make enough cheese on one day to last for 
several weeks.
Age is another basis for association, I was struck 
by the certainty with which old men stated each other's ages. 
"I’m 65, I’m one year older than him, so he’s about 62...".
The reason io simple enough. The old men have been at primary 
school together, many years ago; the school and progress 
through it make for awareness of age differences for those 
persons who were there at the same time. Through childhood 
these groups of children played together, in adolesoence 
they had adventures together, and In Inter life they retain 
a view of themselves as specially linked, yige-dlfferenoes
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are also made formal by terms of address: the proper form
of address to any man fifteen to twenty years one's senior 
is thkie. uncle (Demotiki: thios. vocative, thie). To men 
older than the speaker, but not old enough to be addressed as 
thkie, the appropriate mode is to use the speaker’s first 
name, in a mildly deferential tone. To those of one’s own 
age it is enough to call out ’Re, Yiannis..", 'Hey, Yiannis..’ 
if they are social equals. If they are of markedly greater 
education and not co-villagers, the ’re...' would be considered 
rude. Between co-villagers of unequal education the use of 
*re * depends entirely 011 the degree of intimacy between the 
men.
Being of the same age is an available basis for 
association on terms of equality, and can be used to override 
other differences agreeable to both parties. This flexibility 
in social distinction is particularly important because recent 
tendencies in secondary education are adding to the probability 
that men of the same age will have had different levels of 
education.
Common occupation is another basis for association, 
and is particularly striking among the teachers. Men with 
common activities and common skills have certain obvious 
reasons to seek each other out, for the exchange of relevant 
information. For example, farmers ask other farmers about 
problems of cultivation; they would not normally ask police­
men or white-collar workers, farmers are also likely to meet 
around the village at odd times of the day, when other men 
may be working away from the village. But the teachers are 
the only category in the village who show signs of developing
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a distinctive life-style. They make less use of the coffee- 
shops than other villagers, and tend to hold themselves back 
from what they see as the rougher side of coffee-shop 
behaviour: drimcing, spitting, swearing anu gambling. They 
axe oj. oen heard od complain about these habits, and to lament 
the 'dirtiness' ol the coffee—shops, the crudeness of village 
manners, and so forth. Their unwillingness to join in 
drinking groups is particularly important, since this aloof­
ness is not shared by most of tne civil servants, and nearly 
every visitor to tae village on official business can be 
persuaded to sit down and eat and drink in public with the 
farmers.
The ordinary villagers, and sometimes also the civil 
servants, complain behind their backs that the teachers are 
snobbish, lazy and take no interest in village affairs. They 
point out that teachers have good salaries, short hours, and 
this they see as the community paying for certain fortunate 
individuals to avoid the tribulations of manual work^ . 
Teachers, they argue, could improve the standard of village 
administration, help with the book-keeping, and even give 
improving talks to the villagers, bince the villagers them­
selves in other contexts defer to education, their complaints 
that the teachers "put themselves above the rest of us" appear 
paradoxical, however, the meaning of the complaint is that 
the institutionalisation of social differences is disruptive 
for the village. I shall have more to say about this in 
chapter eight, when village factionalism is analysed.
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(iv) Relationships Outaide the Village
Although till now the weight of my discussion has 
been concerned with relationships within the village, and 
much oi the data has emphasised the importance of the village 
as a basic unit oi analysis, this is by no means the whole 
story, and 1 now briefly mention some of the means by which 
villagers come into relationship with people and agencies
oi the larger society. It is clear that kinship, lcounibarla, 
friendship and common occupation are not logically or empiric­
ally restricted to the village Itself, although they tend to 
cluster within the village. Although there in little useful 
comparative data available to me from earlier periods, all 
the Indications are that the crude volume of transactions 
which draw villagers across the boundaries of the village 
have been increasing throughout this century. To take one 
of the more obvious examples, whore until the mid 1940's oxen 
were the main form of traction in agriculture, they have been 
gradually replaced by tractors. Today, no oxen arc used.
But the tractors are sold and serviced in Market Town; and 
most buyers of tractors need some contact with a bank in order 
to securc terms of purchase. Thus, the change to tractors 
Inevitably involved villagers in new and wider contacts. The 
use of buses, car;: and trucks complements and parallels the 
use of tractors, in terms of consequences for the villagers; 
increases in access to secondary education also take villagers 
outside the village, for the nearest secondary schools are 
in Market Town, and some of the better ones are in the Capital. 
Medical care, like education, is not to be had in the village 
(except in the marginal case of the government-licensed midwife)
4/24
the villagers use Market Town Tor emergency medical care or 
trivial problems, since there are several undistinguished 
physicians and a cheap government clinic there. But for 
anything in the least serious, for pre-natal care, specialists 
and operations, they go to the capital.
Links with the outside are also s.pparent from the 
occupational histories of village household heads. An analysis 
of the first 100 informants in my census shows that 72$ had 
some history of prolonged work outside the village. Only 28c/c 
had always xrorked only within the village. Of those who had 
worked outside at some time, over half were working regularly 
outside the village, or had done so until they stopped work 
altogether - 39$ of the whole category.
There are also links through specific relationships 
to people in power positions. In 1968 there were close 
relations between particular villagers to the Minister of the 
Interior, the Minister of Labour, the Minister of Agriculture, 
the Minister of Justice, the Commissioner of Cooperatives, 
the Cyprus Army Commander and the senior civil servants for 
Nicosia district. There were also links with well placed 
civil servants in the Land Registry Office, the forestry 
Service and the Ministry of Education. The village boasted 
of having produced two doctors and a dentist, all Nicosia 
residents, and a newly qualified young lawyer, who v/as to 
set up practise and live in Market Town. There were known 
to me ten primary school teachers and seven secondary school 
teachers who were usually village residents. A son of the 
village also held posts in the Cooperative Bank. This list 
is not exhaustive.
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TABLE 16
VILLAGE LINKS TO HIGHLY-I LA CEP 1-juilSOIIS 1968-69
Person/Office Main link to village
Minister of Interior 
(1960-68)
Minister of Labour
Minister of Justice
Public Irosecutor 
Minister of Agriculture
Army Commander
District Commissioner
Ministry of Education
Forestry Department
Commissioner of 
Cooperatives
2 doctors 
1 dentist 
1 lawyer
Political Party Leader A
Political Party Leader B 
AKEL (Communi st Party)
Patron/client ties, from EOKA 
relationships.
Mainly patron/cllent ties based 
on land owned by minister in the 
village, which his client cares for.
'Friendship' based on fact that 
a young villager works in a 
government legal office.
Koumbaria (baptismal)
Mixed ties: Minister from nearby
Market Town, and organised the 
district militia in 1963/4, thus 
coming into contact with village 
militia.
Mixed, but basically patron/client 
ties based on fact that one young 
villager is an Army Officer.
The previous muktar knew the 
commissioner well when he was a 
junior civil servant.
Kinship: one villager has a high 
post in the Ministry.
As above.
One villager works for the 
Commissioner's office, and is 
essentially his client.
Kinship; born in village.
Koumbaria, 'friendship* and 
clientage.
The same.
Formal membership by a few 
villagers over at least 20 years,
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These highly placed persons are not a free resoiirce, 
available on demand to all villagers. They are the patrons, 
friends, relatives or employers of particular villagers who 
therefore have the special power of access to them. This 
power is not to he diluted by over-generous use, for to do 
so would dilute both the value of that power, and strain the 
highly-placed persons. Moreover, jn many areas cf social 
relations the villagers are in competition with each other, 
and such links or contacts offer the o w n e r s  tactical 
advantages.
During the 1954-5S period, those young people who 
were active in EOKA were inevitably involved in relationships 
which ranged far beyond the village, even though EOKA units 
were organised on a local basis. After Independence, when 
there was not only no longer the need for secrecy about EOKA 
membership but also much to be gained from claiming to have 
been active, men came to know others from other areas who had 
served in the organisation, and siich knowledge was intensified 
by political meetings of ex-fighters in the capital. After 
Independence the introduction of military service insured that 
young men were brought out cf their villages and into contact 
with other young men from all over the island, whether they 
were educated or not.
The snail scale of the Island, as well as good .roads, 
cars and buses, make towns easy to visit; they are entertaining 
places, and townsmen as well as town life enjoy high prestige.
In spite of these facts, the village has not lost its importance 
to its residents, even though they are Involved in many relations 
with the town. The opinion of fellcw-villagers continues to
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be a critical point of reference for all who live there.
(v ) rerabershj-p of the Village
There is one important kind of relationship which
is of outstanding importance in any analysis of social and
political organisation of the village, and this is common
membership in the village itself, for the villagers are
constantly affirming the value of common membership, and
invoking it as a reason for doing or not doing certain things
in relation to others. It is, therefore, important to know
how membership is acquired and defined. The problem can
best be approached by saying that membership is elastic and
contextual. This is true for a number of persons. The vast
majority of Xallotes are members of the village in the fullest
sense and would be so acknowledged by all other full members.
They present no problem. They are all those residents of
the village who were born there of a Kallo-born parent. They
are recognised as members whether or not they have any property
The recognition of their membership would be shown in the
/
use of the word chorianos (which is .Demotic Greek and must 
be rendered as 'co-villager' or !fellow-villager') and in 
the consideration which this common membership would require.
However, other forms of membership can be said to 
exist in a number of contexts. These memberships would be 
available to any person married to a person born in the village 
whether resident or not; and in some cases to persons born 
to a Kallo-born parent outside the village, whether resident 
or not. And if such persons take up residence in the village 
and have property there, they can for almost all purposes be
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regarded as full members of the village, for example, they 
would be eligible to join the village Co-operative Retail 
u t ore, or the village branch of t:.e gricultural Credit Co­
operative. As landowners they would have to pay village taxes 
and would De eligible to vote for the committees of the two 
Co-ops ar.d the various other committees of the village - the 
Irrigation Committee, the Carrot Packing Plant (if regular 
carrot growers) and the Church Committee. These are the most 
important formal activities which define village membership. 
There are, however, other less formal activities and these 
are sometimes also open to persons with an effective claim 
but who are no longer residents. Por example, tiiere are 
occasional meetings in the coffee-shop of all adult men for 
the discussion of current village problems. There is no 
formal check on who is present or absent, but the presence of 
any person with no claim to be there would be immediately 
noticed. On one occasion at such a meeting a man who has not 
been resident in the village for at least twenty years was 
present and was invited to comment freely on the course of 
the discussion. The man who was chairing the meeting was 
neither a full-time resident in the village nor born there, 
although his wife is kallo-born. Both these men are highly 
educated and considered by the villagers to be influential 
men whose opinion was worth noting. Both are landowners in 
the village.
There are, however, ways in which some element of 
recognition may be withheld from such persons in other contexts. 
Por instance, the ethics of coffee-shop behaviour would demand 
that any full-time resident of the village should try to
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pay for the coffee of the two men just described. This would 
be at the same time a duty of the resident and an indication 
of the difference between the men. This payment could be 
resisted by the non-resident, and by resisting he would in a 
sense be claiming fullest membership. He could use the implic­
ations of this claim to prevent the other man paying, for it 
would be rude in such a situation to re-emphasise that his 
membership claim was limited.
The importance of common membership in the village
lies in the strong moral value on limiting the scope of
conflict between individuals and groups. This is shown most
dramatically by the fact that whenever fighting starts between
two men in a coffee-shop, bystanders whether related or not
to the participants, will separate them. It is also shown
in various cases where individuals have been considering violent
action against others and this has produced attempts to mediate
and dampen the hostility by third parties. It does not mean
that persons do not have disputes with co-villagers - they do.
But these disputes in the main exhibit certain regularities,
(n)
including conscious attempts to limit the scope of conflictv 1 .
There are many ways in which common membership of 
the village is stressed. One of the most common and effective 
is by comparing the behaviour of Kallotes collectively with 
that of other neighbouring villagers. The people of Kallo 
describe themselves as lovers of feasting, men who avoid 
strict accounting, who do not allow political fanaticism to 
separate them, and who in a crisis all help each other. A 
favourite example they give is the need of a villager for 
blood would send all the men of the village in cars to the
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hospital 'whether they were related or not, friends and
enemies, right and left... Kow in Kammari they a r e n ’t like
that'! The nearest neighbour is Zammari. The people of
tvaminaii are commonly described as proud, strict in their
accounts, stiff and formal, and prone to take politics too 
seriously.
Xammarites have of course their own view of the 
matter, and it differs in emphasis from that of the Kallotes. 
certain things which sound in ono village like virtues are 
seen as taken to extremes and therefore as vices. The r'.allo 
love of feasting and pleasure becomes a proneness to get drunk, 
quarrelsome and to go around bawling with one's shirt hanging 
out. The lack of formality the Kallotes pride themselves on 
becomes a lack of concern for social niceties. The lack of 
strict accounting which in Kallo. is supposed to mean trust 
betv/een good fellows is seen as a fiscal sloppiness which leads 
to broken agreements and quarrels*
The emphasis on differences is all the more striking 
because the villages are only half a mile from each other at 
their nearest points, and a mile from each other at their 
centres. Koreover, a numbor of people in each village have 
relatives in the other village. But this emphasis on differ­
ence has at least a tenuous basis in minor observable differ­
ences. For instance, on the occasions that I visited Kammari 
with or without committee members of Kallo I was struck by 
the fact that in the coffee-shops several people would tell 
the waiter to present us with small packets of turkish delight 
called l o ukoum. This is a gesture of hospitality. A man may 
have his coffee paid for by one member of the village and not
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wish to drink a second coffee in a short space of time; 
but, he can accept the sweetmeats and put them in his pocket 
to take away. This custom allows several different people 
to show both respect and hospitality to visitors at the same 
time. I have never seen it practised in Kallo. There are 
even a series of remarks which the Kammari people use to sum 
up differences, such as "Kammari people value relatives over 
friends, whilst Kallo people value friends over relaxives", 
and while I did not try to check this, Kallo people have told 
me that in Kammari there is a tendency to extend affinal terms 
laterally, and to use certain affinal terms in a formal way 
which is not found in Kallo.
Since Kammari is nearest to Kallo it is natural that 
the most detailed comparisons are made v/ith it. But other 
surrounding villages also have their characteristics. The 
men of one village, for example, are supposed by Kallotes to 
be free to the point of dishonour with their remarks about 
women. They will see a girl walking down the street who may 
be the cousin of the man standing next to them and still 
they»ll say "T,rhat a lovely bbouti (vagina)". They are also 
represented as being a pack of crooks and thieves. (Kammarites 
love to point cut that a number of men in Kallo have served 
prison sentences in recent years for theft.) I once asked 
an informant about a case of incest reported from another 
village, and his comment was "Yes, they go ir for that sort 
of thing there". Kallotes repeat to outsiders v/ith great 
readiness that one of the distinctions betv/een Kallo and other 
villages is that the women of Kallo are all virtuous and the 
men too, and that there are no cases of adultery. If anyone
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has the temerity to mention in hushed tones one of the 
examples known to everyone in the village over the age of 
fifteen which involve adultery, he will be told that this was 
truly the onlj_ case known and completely exceptional, whereas 
in other villages such things are almost a daily occurrence. 
This attitude was summed up by one elderly man who was 
reminiscing about the days before the police had cars and 
motor cycles, when it took an hour at least to get to the 
village. "I told the police sergeant in Market Town that if 
he heard a report from Kallo that there was a fight going on, 
he should send every man he has in the station; because it 
will be a terrible affair; but that if he hears a report 
that someone has done something (sexually) dishonourable, 
don't bother to send anyone at all because it will turn out 
to be a false report."
This attitude, which Loudon (1970:301) has aptly 
called an export-model of the speaker's values and behaviour, 
serves to stress the value of membership in the village. By 
denying to outsiders that certain kinds of events go on, 
villagers present a united front. Each is the guardian of 
the secrets of the others. It is clear that on one level 
villagers choose to forget or ignore memories of past disputes 
and do not wish to be reminded of them, particularly by 
outsiders. This is both because certain disputes have the 
potential for re-activating conflict, and because by continuing 
to ignore them one affirms and strengthens existing social 
relations. In fact, when two people start to quarrel bitterly 
they may reach (particularly if they are women) a point-of-no- 
return at which they say to each other 'things which should
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not be said and cannot be forgiven', which are usually items 
of gossip about the sexual. behaviour of the antagonist’s 
family. villagers deny to outsiders that certain kinds of 
things happen; and they also avoid mentioning these things 
among themselves. Both these actions, in their different 
ways, stress the solidarity of c o - v i l l a g e r s ^ .
If the village keeps its gossip to itself, this 
solidarity also implies the power of social control. One of 
the commonest reasons for not doing something is that if one 
does it 'they will laugh*. The word yelo means I laugh, or 
I cheat. She passive yelioumai means, I am taken in, 
deceived. Villagers are continually wary of doing things 
which might make people laugh at them, because they are un­
orthodox. This might include planting a new crop, wearing 
different clothes, going for a walk v/ith one's fiance, going 
sea-bathing. It is the very unpredictability of public 
response which makes people cautious. Yet often the thing 
which last year was the subject of mirth, this year or next 
year is the object of fashionable pursuit. Sexual transgress­
ions are the subject most likely to produce mockery; and one 
man told me how he had refused a large sum of money offered 
by a man he surprised with the wife of another rather than 
forego the pleasure of telling the story in the coffee-shops. 
But anything which causes another person to look a fool will 
be round the village in a few hours. The knowledge of 'how 
they will laugh' is one of the surest forms of social control, 
but it also implies that the actor cares for the opinions of 
the c o m m u n i t y ^  . When the matter is trivial, the idea of 
gossip as social control is elusive, when the matter is
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serious, gossip as a sanction must be considered as on the 
same scale with forms of violence, to which in fact it 
sometimes leads. V.ords, unlike other missiles, simply cannot 
be avoided.
Nicknames play a part in both solidarity and social
control. The patronymic system of naming children means that
many villagers have the same first name^1 0 '. For example,
there are at least 18 landowners called Andreas in Kallo;
there are at least 30 landowners called Yiorgios; 18 called
Yiannis; 8 called Dimitris; 21 called Charalambos; 14
called Christodoulos. Thus, if anyone calls out "Where’s
Yiannis?" the answer is almost always "Which Yiannis?", and
it is at this point that a nickname will be used. More
normally the nickname is used at first instance - Where's
The Bat? The Cheese-eater? The Fat Kan? The Russian? Gandi?
Blackis? The Deceased?. Now it would be possible to answer
when asked "Which Yiannis?" by giving the name of Yiannis'
father, and replying "Yiannis tou (of) Mikali" and indeed this
is sometimes done. The problem with using this as a standard
procedure is that there are several Mikalls, and several may
have sons called Yiannis, so yet another question and answer
would be needed if a nickname was not used. Furthermore, the
Mikalis in question is probably not thought of as Mikalis,
but by his ni ckname. Lio an answer using a father's name is
more likely to use the nickname or other distinctive name
rather than the 'correct' form which would be used in a legal
document. A patronymic system employing nicknames has a
logic of its own which, once in operation, continues to stress
(11)the need for nicknames .
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This analysis of the relation between patronymics 
and nicknames is supported by two other pieces of evidence, 
borne men do not have nicknames as such, but their first name 
is used in a variant form which is understood in the village 
to apply only to them. For example, the name Andreas is also 
used in the village in the form Andrakas, but this designates 
one man only. The name Pavlo 3 is also used in the form 
Pavlaras for one man, Pavlis for another. The name Kyriakos
/ ✓  
is used in the form Jirykos for one man, Jyrkos for another.
/  ' / ,
The name Yiannis appears as Yiannis, Yiannaras, Yannakos,
✓
Yiannakis; and the men who bear such variant first names in 
the village do not generally have n i c k n a m e s ^ ^  . Similarly, 
men with extremely distinctive first names often don't have 
nicknames: there are two Kallo men called Thomas, and
context usually suggests which one is being referred to. One 
of them has a little-used nickname, but the name of his father 
is also highly distinctive, as is that of the other Thomas. 
People's occupations often allow them to be distinctively 
named: Pavlos the Teacher and Pavlos the Lawyer being two
examples.
Nicknames sometimes refer to supposed moral qualities 
of persons. A hard-working man is called Satanas (Satan), 
because like the Devil he is everywhere at once. He is also 
called by a nickname dating from the time v/hen people thought
✓
of him as a tailor, Velonas, the Needleman. He is almost 
never referred to by his legal first name, although occasion­
ally by the genitive form of his father's distinctive second 
name. Rarely is a nickname so sharply defining that it is
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considered offensive to use it in the owner's presence. In 
the main nicknames are ireely used by status equals, by high 
status oeople to low ones, and if the name is thoroughly 
harmless by low to high status people. Many nicknames seem 
to mean nothing at all, to be almost nonsense words, and when 
asked why they are so called villagers often reply that their 
playmates give them the name in childhood sometimes because 
they mispronounced a word in a certain way.
In most situations in the village then people use 
the nicknames of their fellow villagers; this applies even 
to women who are often known by the feminine form of their 
h u s b a n d s ’ nicknames. However, if an outsider, especially 
an official, arrives in the village he will certainly ask for 
a villager by his formal name, since this will be the only 
name he has to go by. I have seen many instances where the 
people the official first met did not recognise the formal 
name: "Yiannis Mikail? M h o ' s  that?" they asked each other.
The same thing often happens when the telephone operator is 
asking for someone. Someone calls out from the kiosk: "They
want Yiannis Kikail. Who is it?" "The Rat", someone else 
shouts back. But when villagers are sitting down in formal 
committee on matters of some weight, or are debating an issue 
in the coffee-shop in front of strangers they are very prone 
to use fornal names and make no use at all of nicknames. This 
seems to be because committee discussions are situations with 
inherent tension - as will be argued later - and are thus 
treated with as much formality as possible to act as a buffer 
in the case of possible disputes. They are also situations 
in which a set of formal administrative roles are exercised.
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/ilia('err. tell a story which is a very good illustr­
ation of their ovm idea about one value of nicknames in defin­
ing villagers as against outsiders. I arc not at all sure that 
the story has any baois in actual events; but at the very 
least it suggests an event the villagers would have liked to 
occur, and is another useful indicator of their 'export model' 
of village solidarity. Luring the Emergency the British 
soldiers used to come to search the villages. Somehow the 
British had heard from somewhere that the head of the Kallo
Eoka unit v/as called tfoustachas, which means ’man with a
/
moustache' in Lemotiki. One day they surrounded the village, 
and sent in a unit to conduct a house-to-house search. In the 
coffee-shop they lined everyone up, and said "Where is 
Moustachas?” Everyone acted dumb; "Moustachas?" they said. 
"But tell us which Koustachas you mean, for we have many here. 
Look, there's one over there, and there's another...". And 
so, the story goes, the EGO. leader v/as not discovered. "For", 
people add "there were no traitors in Kallo".
If an outsider comes to the village and asks for 
someone by his nickname this suggests a degree of familiarity 
with that person which serves Immediately to break the ice. 
Knowledge of the nickname acts as a visa, giving the user a 
qualified protected status for a short time, In addition to 
that which he must inevitably have on entering the village 
a 3 a stranger; for the same word which is rendered guest in 
English is also used to render the meaning stranger - zenos.
c  <11 i « -
T h e r e is a sense In which common membership of the 
village comes to mean more on occasions outside the village 
than inside, and this is complemented by aspects of kinship
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behaviour. The issue is the relative soaroity of x'Qaoureea.
In the village, a man on good terras with married slaters who 
needed a meal would not feel free to eat in the house of a 
female first cousin. If he had no sisters his aunts would 
he next in order of natural preference, and the accepted 
rights and duties. In the unlikely event of his having no 
closer female relative he could eat in the house of a female 
second cousin, or female first cousin of his parents. However, 
away from the village close relatives may be scarce or distant. 
It therefore becomes reasonable to activate more distant 
relationships. In precisely the same way, if two persona 
from the same village come into contact away from the village 
their relationship takes on an additional moral quality, a 
limited obligation to mutual help in the face of whatever 
common problems a hostile ox* at best neutral environment 
provides. To put this in more concrete terms, all Kallotes 
know that in the town of Limassol, some two hours drive from 
the village, there is a man born in the village who is a 
police sergeant. Anyone from the village who found himself 
In difficulties in Limassol would, if he had no closer contact 
who would be likely to help him with his problem, turn to the 
sergeant for help. This holds for each major town in Cyprus, 
for Athens and for Salonlki where there are students from the 
village studying; and for London and the U.K. in general.
The existence of co-villagers does not assure help for any 
particular person at a partioular time. But a request for 
holp could not he totally ignored In good conscience, whereas 
the same request between the same persons in the village might 
be regarded as eccentric.
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The villagers frequently use certain Demotic Greek
words which suggest membership in a common category. One is
the word s.ynonomatos. meaning 'having the same name a s 1;
another is symmathitis. 'schoolfellow'; the dialect word
(13)
syflotcheros means 'the same age a s '; syntopothitls,
'coming from the same place as'; and synadelfos is the 
standard word for 'colleague'. I do not think it is fanciful 
to suggest that the villagers' fondness for such words 
expresses a wish to bridge the gaps between individual speakers, 
by stressing similarity.
(vi) The Practical Uses of Village Solidarity
The notion of loyalty to the village, the wish to
limit conflict between co— villagers, the stress on membership 
of the village, considered together, are analytically described 
as village solidarity. This solidarity is not a free-floating 
value: it is grounded in other values and interests of the
villagers. They believe that land, cash and their children 
should all be kept within the village, and they usually are.
To this extent, then, villagers look inwards, to each other, 
for the measure of their success and failure. That is to say, 
in spite of the dependence of the village on processes and 
institutions of the larger society, and in spite of the 
continual social change which reduces the isolation of the 
village, the concern of people/for cooperation with and the 
good opinion of their fellows continues, and is most sharply 
at issue in the arrangement of marriage.
I have stressed earlier that the village has continued
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to be a place in which most people horn also expect to find 
their marriage partnersj the worst social failure is to be 
unacceptable in the village as a marriage partner with those 
one regards as social equals. Since most land is transferred 
at marriage, and people avoid the sale of land as much as 
they can, most village land stays in village hands. Of 587 
holders or former holders of land in the village in 1968, 66 
were not village residents or children of the village. Out 
of these 6 6, 63 were from villages within a five mile radius 
of Kallo. Only three landowners were neither related to the 
village, nor from the adjacent villages I have listed. In the 
1969-70 tax list, this figure of 66 had dropped to 5 7; out 
of the 4 ,5 2 9 donums of irrigated land in the village confines, 
these outsiders held a total of 278 donums, of 6$.
When Sklyros sold land to a government minister (one 
of the three persons just mentioned) he was criticised in the 
village for selling land to an outsider, even though the 
village might arguably have been gaining a useful connection 
through the sale.
Marriage partners are sometimes talked of in the 
same way as land - as resources which while staying within 
the village are potentially available to all, but loot 
are lost forever. A Kallo boy tried to marry an attractive 
Kallo girl. He was one of at least six Kallo boys who asked 
for her that season, and since he was handsome, with a good 
white-collar job, he should have stood a good chance. But 
her father was in debt, and could not afford to build his 
daughter the normal dowry house. Thus ho gave his daughter 
to a Nicosia man who was wealthy and could afford to build
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the house himself. The Kallo suitor a few days latex* got 
engaged to a girl in Kammari, the next village, and the birth­
place of his toother.
The morning after his engagement I was talking with 
a respected Kallo man in the coffee-shop. He was very bitter. 
He swore hard about the engagement. The reason he gave was 
the loss to Kallo of a good young man. "And there is a 
shortage of men in our village, so now someone's daughter who 
could have married Karaolis will have to marry some penniless 
fellow from the mountains." Often when villagers are talking 
about such matters as not selling land to outsiders, they 
take the situation further several generations: "Suppose I
sell you a piece of land one day when I’m hard up. Then years 
later we become affines when my son marries your daughter.
Then the land comes back to my children and grandchildren."
Children and land are not the only resources which 
should be kept in the village - labour and cash and the 
potential for profit should also be kept in the village as 
much as possible. Thus, a man building a house finds it con­
venient to have another villager do some of the building work, 
and to use a third villager for trucking the materials. 
Obviously such relations can become subject to strain when 
one side feels it is being exploited, and in such situations 
people break off relations. However, there is a strong 
feeling that if a reliable village man is around and able to 
perform the service needed it is better to employ him than an 
outsider. Once again people use future marriage as a ration­
alisation for this: "IJven if he gets rich, perhaps one day
a child of mine will marry a child of his". This statement is
V-u?
made when villagers are prossod to explain why in the context 
oi their competitive individualism they choose to 'help1 
unrelated co—villagers, The other justification for the 
action is that greater trust exists between oo—villagers than 
between strangers and better chances of reciprocity. In the 
matter of selling their oranges most villagers choose one 
of the four Kallo middie-men to sell to, although they could 
use middle-men In Market Town or from one of the other nearby 
villages. Often they are dissatisfied with the bargain they 
strike, and complain that all the middle-men are crooks, but 
they do not seek outsiders next year. .Lf all middle—men are 
crooks, then outsiders are likely to be bigger crooks than 
those who have to go on living in the same village as the 
people they cheat. The coin that has solidarity on one face 
has social control upon the other.
The emphasis on keeping exchanges within the village 
can be seen in many situations to pay off handsomely. To take 
one example; during the carrot harvest Kallo imports poor 
women to work, who arrive from many miles away in buses.
During this period Kallo women work, but there is no time of 
the your when Kallo women travel in buses t;o work in the 
villages of others. The furthest a few of them over go is 
five miles away to the UiTdOf Packing Hunt, or the nearby 
Box Factory. The poorer women of the village are able to 
work In or near their own village partially because of the 
prosperity of others in the village. The,* manager of the box 
Factory was for a time a Kallo man and he was always careful 
to give as many of the available Jobs to Kallo men and women 
as he could, even though the factory was sited in another
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village whose people complained about his favouritism.
Another example: in poorer districts of Cyprus men and women
who have no land or skill work on the roads or other public 
works; this work is rough, poorly paid and requires travel, 
as well as being under the supervision of a foreman. In Kallo 
few people undertake such work because there is better paid, 
easier work available within the village, on the land of 
those white-collar villagers with citrus holdings.
Although the villagers do not think in terras of 
the cases just outlined, they are aware of their easier position 
in comparison with other villages. The poor do not enjoy 
being poor in Kallo, but they see that in certain ways it is 
better to be poor in Kallo than in the mountains^^ . To the 
observer it is clear that the village, while increasing in 
population, has also Increased in organisational complexity, 
and the villagers now experience greater economic interdepend­
ence than in the period of traditional agriculture. Although 
agricultural prosperity has produced by imported machines and 
products - tractors, cars, trucks, diesel pumps - fertilisers, 
for many other economic transactions the villagers still turn 
to each other. They buy meat from village butchers; have 
clothes made by village tailors; sell oranges to village 
middle-men; employ fellow villagers to work their land; buy 
and sell land among themselves, and finally expect to marry 
their children to those of their co-villagers.
(vii) Conclusion
Kinship and affinity, while undoubtedly the main 
constraints on the actions of individuals,by no means exhaust
4., 44
the bases .fox social relutionshtpa* Koumbaria, an achieved 
relationship, in which choice and calculation then loci to 
a strongly insti tutionalised situation, has marked similarities 
with aspects of both kinship and affinity, but lacked the 
divisive potential of competition for property. Koumbarj 
have a low rate ol dispute, While for moat villagers the 
relationship is formed between person a of equal, status it 
can lend itself also to bridging gaps in status relations, and 
was thus a form of patron-client relation; this is important 
because koumbarla links certain villagers active in politics 
to urban politicians or civil servants.
Friendship is not as strongly institutionalised as 
koumbarla, and it is not in any important way conceptually 
opposed to kinship, although kin sometimes become jealous or 
critical of favoured friends who are otherwise unrelated to 
a person. Vil lagers recognise and approve of friendship but 
the ease with which the term is used, loosely covering a wide 
range of relationships, some of which start from little more 
than a shared meal, suggest its instability. I.lke koumbarla, 
it can exist between equals, and have its basis in mutual 
trust and reciprocity of like for like5 or it can be between 
those who are not equal, in which case the.ro is thought to 
be less trust, more calculation, and the exchange of unlike 
things. Such a form of friendship is called by the villagers 
'false friendship', but as with koumbarla between unequals, the 
moral attitude to it is con textual. The accusation that a 
man keeps up a relationship not because of liking but in the 
hope of gain is easily rebutted by the man, who can sincerely 
say that he loves his friend because h.ls friend is a truly
generous and benevolent person.
The minimal but significant civility of meeting in 
the coffee—shop, being neighbours, being involved in a work 
groun, being of the same age, being in the same job, all 
have consequences, either because they bring villagers natur­
ally together or because they present a basis ready to hand 
for social selection.
The flow of transactions across the boundary of the 
village has been increasing since traditional times, and 
although the discussion has so far concentrated on the village, 
it is essential to recognise that just as kinship and affinity 
extend outside the village, and link villagers to the towns, 
so do some instances of koumbaria, friendship, and acquaint­
anceship from work, school and army service. The Emergency, 
and the success of EOICA, also added to contacts beyond the 
village.
From certain points of view - the right to vote, 
the duty to pay taxes, and generally as a unit of local govern­
ment - the village is a jural community. But it is also a 
solidary community: its members are concerned to limit
conflict within it, and oppose it conceptually to other 
communities and to towns. There is an idea that co-villagers 
have certain common characteristics, and that they are morally 
superior to people from other villages. This solidarity 
is both enhanced and exemplified by the use of nicknames in 
the village, which contrast with the dependence of an outsider 
on legal names when dealing with villagers.
Solidarity is for something - it has practical uses, 
and is linked to other values and interests. Villagers wish
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to retain land, cash and their children within tho village, 
and they do this quite consciously. The unpredj ctsbility o.f 
future social relations is often put by the phrase "Suppose 
I had a son and you had a daughter and we wanted to marry 
them.'". While parents go on being concerned with what other 
co-villagers think of them and their children, the community 
looks inwards, in spite of its evident integration with a 
larger society. Yet the villagers are neither autonomous 
nor self-sufficient. The resulting tonsil on between inwardness 
and solidarity on one hand, and dependence on external figures 
and forces on the other, is the strongest theme in villago 
politics.
Footnotes to Chapter 4
(1) The instrumental, or asymmetrical, use of koumbarla 
between villagers and townsmen, was noted by llagda 
Ohnefalisch Richtor (1 9 1 3:227) and she associates this 
with share-cropping. She further suggests that certain 
urban elite families with surnames (as opposed to simple 
patronymics) had traditional and continuing koumbarla 
relations with particular peasant families. T~came 
across no instances of this in my fieldwork, but tho 
institution would readily lend itself to such practices.
(2) Vourros, when necessary, also properly refers to 
Pontikkos as his koumbaros; but he doesn’t find it 
necessary very often. Wealthy or powerful persons who 
baptise the children of the poor simply say in 
explanation "1 like to help unfortunate people".
(3) Some village-born people with university education 
now use the word for friend about persons of the 
opposite sex, but this is still open to misunderstanding 
by villagers.
(4) In 1968 a labourer doing work on government road repair 
earned 25/- a day. For eight or ton hours irrigation 
labour in the village - semi-skilled work - ho earned 
.€2 or <L3.
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(5) A man forced to go to the house of another in an 
emergency will stand at the door and shout very loudly 
for him. This makes it clear that thei'e is nothing 
surreptitious about his visit.
(6) Manual work is seen by older men as different from other 
work, burdensome, distasteful and a mark of low status. 
Yet the fact that one does it is something to be proud 
of too: a man is not shamed by working with his hands 
fox* his family. A somewhat similar ambivalence is 
described by Cutileiro (1971:60-63) to the Portuguese 
word trabalho.
(7) Spiro (1968:418-420) has tried tc produce a formal 
scheme for discussing the nature of factional conflict, 
and one variable he uses is 'factional 3cope'.
(8) In I’rankenberg's (1957) account of a Welsh village, 
the refusal to share gossip with people defined as 
outsiders was one of the strongest signs of vlllo.ge 
solidarity.
(9) lor an extended examination of the moral community 
as an agent of social control, see .Bailey (1971).
(10) Greek cultural practices in the naming of children 
have been discussed, among others, by Tavuchis 
(unpublished paper) and Margaret Kenna (1971).
Briefly, in Kallo practices are similar: a couple
in turn try to name their children after each of 
their parents. Children may also bo named commonly 
after their grandparents' siblings; it is very 
rare to give a child the same first name as the 
first name of its parent.
(11) Boissevain (1969) gives a somewhat similar
interpretation to data from Malta.
(12) The aras ending to a name siiggests plumpnoss or
bigness; the akls ending suggests being small.
(13) This is not a dialect form of the word for a partner, 
synetalroa, to which villagers give the standard 
pronunciation. Rather, I suspect, it comes from 
kairos, time, year.
(14) When they ignore the positions of people outside, 
and compare themselves only with co-villagers, 
they feel the intense discontent that one would 
expect.
(15) In some small communities there is a misleading 
notion fostered by members of the community that 
they are in fact highly Independent of the larger 
society, in the face of all contrary facts. This 
is the theme of the study by Vldich and. Bensman 
(1958).
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CHAPTER 5 
POWER AND LEADERSHIP
(I) Introduction
To understand the nature of power and leadership 
in the village, the possibilities offered by formal offices 
must be examined, and the social characteristics of the men 
who hold office. Experience in administration of village 
affairs coincides with being a party political representative. 
Certain types of men - full-time farmers - tend to dominate 
village administration, but this does not mean that they 
monopolise all forms of power. A number of other men exercise 
power, and sometimes authority, both in the conduct of village 
affairs and in external matters, who do not hold formal office. 
One basis for such power and informal leadership is education, 
which equips a man with certain skills in relation to bureau­
cratic procedures and contact with government; another basis 
is through contact with powerful people outside the village - 
this can arise in any number of ways; a third is through the 
uses of wealth; and a fourth is through the control of force. 
Any particular individual may enjoy several such bases of 
personal power, one, or none. Power is diffused among many 
villagers. It is not highly concentrated in the hands of any 
particular kin group, faction, category or political grouping. 
But nor is it freely and equally available to all men 
indiscriminately^ .
Formal Offices
A number of administrative offices exist for the 
conduct of village affairs; their powers and duties are 
formally defined by a body of laws, and are thus part of the 
governmental framework. Some of the officers are elected, 
others appointed. There are a small number of paid posts, 
which are attractive for this reason, but rather more posts 
are unpaid, although travel expenses may in certain cases be 
recovered. The power resulting from the authority of office 
is in most cases highly specific and limited. Following 
M.G. Smith (1956:50) I use power to mean the ability to secure 
performance of social actions. Village office gives little 
opportunity in Kallo for direct personal advantage; in a 
community where gossip and criticism of third parties is 
always lively, there were few occasions where office holders 
were accused of furthering their o\m material ends; one of 
these is described in chapter 8 . Later in this chapter, 
when the social characteristics of committeemen are discussed, 
I shall explain the main reason why men take office is that 
it confers prestige, through the notion of giving service to 
the village.
The muktar is appointed by the Ministry of the 
Interior; he is a junior government officer, present in the 
village, and always a village resident. His main duties are 
the registration of births and deaths, and the collection with 
the help of the paid Rural Constable of a number of taxes, a 
land tax, irrigation tax, slaughter-house tax and school 
tax^ . His signature is needed on a number of documents
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required by villagers to certify that they are of a certain 
age, residential status, wealth category, that they have a 
certain number of dependents, and that they follow certain 
occupations. The muktar is sought out by visiting officials 
and dignitaries, and should normally be present if any matter 
oi communal interest is to be discussed. He is paid by a 
fixed percentage on the volume of cash he collects through 
legal taxes. It is clear that in a society where literacy 
and knowledge of civil rights are only now becoming widespread, 
sorne inuktars are able to use their powers in an arbitrary 
manner. This certainly occurs in many villages. The muktar 
of Kallo had held the post since 1958, having been assistant 
to the previous muktar. He is widely regarded as honest in 
his conduct oi affairs. But even were he not so, the presence 
of large numbers of villagers with secondary education would 
seriously limit his ability to abuse his office.
The muktar is assisted by a dimarcifos (village 
j-unctionary) , a paid post with specific duties regarding the 
cleaning of the village streets, the maintenance of lighting, 
and the supervision of the slaughterhouse used by the village 
butchers. The muktar is also assisted by four azades (singular, 
azas) and together muktar and azades are formally known as the 
horikeh archeh. the village authorities. The muktar has the 
right to choose his azades, but the government has the right 
to refuse a man so selected, though it rarely does so. The 
azades have a general duty to consult with and advise the 
muktar on matters of communal interest, and he may call them 
when he wishes. In Kallo this proved to be not more frequently 
than twice a year. The commonest reason for calling on the
,s. the occasion when the muktar must revise tax lists. 
Certain taxes, particularly the school tax, are assessed 
feata dynamin, according to a man's economic position. To 
reach their assessment, the village authorities take into 
account land owned, other sources of income, number and age 
of dependents, and may talce into account exceptional circum­
stances such as the costs of marrying a daughter or educating 
a child. The range of school tax payments was from 10/- to 
£8 , most household heads being assessed at about £3, and 
certain destitute old people being excused. It is obviously 
an advantage for t e muktar not to make these decisions alone, 
since there are always some complaints and requests for 
reassessment.
The office of muktar in most other villages I visited 
seemed to be held by the v/ealthier and more articulate 
villagers, and often they are shown a considerable degree of 
formal respect by other villagers. In Kallo, most villagers 
were polite to the muktar, and went so far as to address him 
as "Mr President", but he was not looked on as a powerful 
man or a particularly dynamic one (except by some of the 
poorest villagers for whom the smallest administrative act 
appears to be a major undertaking). He came from a poor 
family, and had never himself amassed money or land. His 
predecessor had been wealthy, articulate and widely known 
outside the village, and was held responsible for having 
brought certain benefits to the village and to have helped 
a number of villagers get government posts. This suggests 
that the qualities of the incumbent are at least as important 
as the rights and duties of the office.
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The Church Committee consisted of five men, elected 
at three-yearly intervals, who had charge of the small sums 
of money raised by the Church through the sale of wax tapers 
during services, and the sums payable to the priest for 
officiating at services. It was not the subject of any dis­
cernible interest araon;; the villagers, and one man had boon 
re-elected without interruption for forty years. There seems 
to have been no competition for office on this committee at 
the most recent elections, which took place after 1 left the 
village, but complaints reached me from committee members 
that only a handful of villagers had attended the elections. 
It would seem, particularly from the conflict over the voting 
rights of communists discussed in the opening chapter, that 
at earlier periods the Church committee had attracted more 
interest.
The Cooperative Store Committee runs the affairs of 
the store, which was set up In 1954. Householders became 
members, paying 10/- per share; at that time there were 223 
shareholders, who held 679 shares between them. This share 
capital formed the basis for the store, and the only other 
resource available to it is credit from merchants. In 1969 
the store employed three full—time sales staff, and a full­
time secretary responsible to the committee for the overall 
management of the store. It owned one large modern building, 
rented another space, and v/as handling a turnover of some 
£50,000 a year. Shareholders receive fluctuating dividends 
of between 2f and on their annual purchases, and elect
the committee members every three years.
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The store is then, by village standards, a ma;jor 
enterprise, and all but a handful of household heads are 
shareholders. Its activities are controlled by a special b.>dy 
of Cooperative laws, and there are regular audits carried out 
by employees of the Cooperative Commissioner1s office. The 
Secretary travels twice a week to Nicosia in the store's 
pick-up van to purchase stock, and the store carries gas stoves, 
refrigerators, diesel fuel, as well as all kinds of clothes 
and foodstuffs. She main activities of the committee in their 
weekly meetings are to carry villagers’ comments on stocks 
and prices to the Secretary, to oversee the general management, 
and to discuss and decide on new appointments, as well as the 
salaries of existing employees. She committee, acting on 
information supplied by the Secretary, also agrees on the 
annual dividend, and new investment.
The Credit Cooperative has a paid secretary, and a 
four man management committee. On page in the first chapter 
I discussed the rise in membership from its inception in 1923. 
ItB main functions are to act as a low-interest source of 
short-term loans for agricultural activities, and it also 
supplies bulk fertiliser to villagers at prices competitive 
with those of private merchants. Its third activity is to 
act as a local savings bank for villagers with spare cash, 
and village girls who take paid work, saving for their dowries, 
have started to use it for this purpose. They now receive 
6$ on deposits, although five years ago it was only 4
The main work of the committee is to meet, normally 
every week, to decide on applications for new loans, and to 
check on outstanding loans to see that they are being paid
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off in time. The limits on unsecured loans are set by the 
Cooperative Credit Bank, which is the higher administrative 
unit for the village branches. The Bank decides on a limit 
by estimating the return on agricultural production in a 
particular village. In 1968 in some poor villages the limit 
was £1 5 0, but at this time in Kallo it was £500, which in 
1970 rose to £7 5 0, which gives an idea of the relative economic 
standing of the village. The rate of interest on unsecured 
loans in 1968 was 7$>• In 1970 there were 465 members; the 
reason that there were half again as many members as household 
heads is that married women who legally own land may join, 
thus increasing the borrowing power of their hoiiseholds.
In making its decisions the committee tries to foresee 
the difficulties a man might have in repaying a loan. The 
rationale given by members for their activities is that they 
must protect individuals from themselves, and the organisation 
from exploitation. Since, they argue, in the village everyone 
knows a good deal about everyone else's business, they are in 
a good position to know what a man should and should not be 
able to take on. They argue that the problems faced by the 
head of a household are fairly similar, and that they all 
have experience of meeting them. Everyone is aware that 
occasionally a man seeks a loan ostensibly for agricultural 
purposes, which he intends to use for building a dowry house 
for his daughter. I saw such cases come up in meetings. The 
decision tended to go on whether the man involved would be 
able to keep out of financial difficulties. No one on the 
committee was bothered by the building of a dowry house, since 
it was a problem they could all imagine facing. In their work
the committee are in fact continually making assessments of 
their co-villagers, and this assessment differs from that made 
by the horlkeh archeh about tax ratings, for it involves some 
measure of prediction, whereas the tax rating is current or 
retrospective.
The Carrot and Potato Association was set up in I960 
as a producers' cooperative which organises the local washing, 
packing and, through its national administrative unit, the 
marketing of members’ produce. It is village-based, and in 
1964 the villagers built - at a cost of £3 ,0 0 0 - a packing 
house. The union has two committees of villagers, who are 
elected by members; one committee is the executive, and the 
other a supervisory committee which meets less frequently.
The task of the executive is to manage the packing house, which 
includes the fixing of hourly wage rates for those women who 
work there during the short but hectic period when carrots 
and potatoes are harvested (April - June), and the drawing up 
of schedules to determine the order in which members1 produce 
can be handled. This last item is the occasional cause of 
friction since members are extremely anxious about the speed 
with which carrots can deteriorate in the fields, and there 
is great pressure to get produce washed, packed and trucked 
to the port as quickly as possible. In such an atmosphere, 
charges of favouritism or minor injustice are sometimes made, 
and here the committee need a good deal of tact and authority 
to deal with such crises. As with the other committees 
mentioned, while the actual work calls for responsibility in 
decisions over one's fellow villagers' affairs, there seems 
relatively little scope for personal gain, and there were very
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few adverse comments made s.bout the way committee members 
handled their duties which survived the day of the particular 
occurence. In chapter eight I deal at length with events 
accompanying election to the committees of the Carrot Union, 
but here it is enough to not*3 that the elections were contested 
on party political grounds, rather than on previous performance 
in office or personal conduct.
The Irrigation Committee has been in existence since 
before 1940 and its main duty is the use of the tax money paid 
by the villagers at the rate in 1968 of 10/- per donum on the 
4,529 donums of irrigated land within the village area. This 
yields an annual budget of around >£2 ,500, which is currently 
spent in two ways. Existing irrigation channels must be cleaned 
out twice a year and this is done by paid labour from among 
the poorer or older men in the village. Secondly, under a 
system of matching grants from the government, new irrigation 
channels are being built, of concrete. Concrete channels save 
water loss by seepage and by evaporation, both serious problems 
with the slower earth channels. But the concrete channels are 
expensive and there is a large area of village land still 
without concrete channels. The Committee also has the duty 
of representing the village’s interest in any dispute over 
water use or rights with other villages, towns or the govern­
ment. Luring my fieldwork the Committee, and those of several 
neighbouring villages, became involved in some special activ­
ities regarding the representation of village interests to the 
central government, and these are the object of extended analysis 
in chapter nine.
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xhis description ox formal office in the village raises 
the question of why should men seek office at all. They stand 
to gciin little or nothing financially; the authority of 
office is limited, and does not ramify outwards into other 
affairs, except in the case of the few men who hold several 
offices, when a notion arises that they are good people to ask 
the opinions of on a range of subjects. The chief reason why 
men accept office - few show active signs of seeking it - is 
that it is a mark of general village approval. In a competitive, 
individualistic community, where it is standard practise to 
cast doubt on the motives of others, election to village office 
shows a qualified trust. I do not wish to make too much of 
this, because the low turn-out at the elections I saw weakens 
such an interpretation: it could equally well be argued that
men are elected through the apathy of the village at large, 
and the sycophancy of their particular cronies. I reject 
this explanation on the simple grounds that it goes against 
what I saw. Some honour can be had by holding office; that 
it can also be lost serves to dignify the holders who succeed.
(iii) The Characteristics of Office-Holders
In this section I shall consider the social character­
istics of the persons who hold office in village economic 
organisations. The simplest facts about them are that they 
do not include women, unmarried men or illiterates. Furthermore, 
Tables 17 and 18 suggest that men whose main occupation is 
farming dominate the committees and these have already been 
shown to be men with substantial land holdings. Since, among 
married household heads alone there are over 300 men who could
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TABLE 17
OVERLAPPING LEADERSHIP ROLES IK THE VILLAGE
Sklyros i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
Patris i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
vi)
Vourros i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
(f) ii]
iii)
(g) ii)
(h) iii
(i) iii
(3) iii
(k) 1)
ii)
Carrot Association Committee 
Secretary, Co-op Store 
Irrigation Committee (resigned 1968) 
Co-ordinating Committee
Village representative on 1964 School Committee,
Market Town 
AKEL village committee 
Credit Co-op Committee
Aaas (appointed)
Co-op Store Committee 
Carrot Association Committee 
Irrigation Committee 
PEK village representative 
Credit Co-op Committee
Attempted to organise Graduates Club, 1962 
Co-ordinating Committee (1964)
Co-op Store Committee (1969)
CITCOP Committee (1969)
Advisory Committee (1969
Church Committee 
Co-op Store Committee 
Credit Co-op Committee
Church Committee 
Irrigation Committee
Azas (appointed)
Co-op Store Committee
Azas (appointed)
Irrigation Committee
Irrigation Committee 
Carrot Association Committee
Irrigation Committee 
Credit Co-op Committee
U)/.L2
'PABLK 18
KALLO JOMMIl’TJiliMJJN 1968-1969
11 ~ 1 " *"* * '*—  I m  I ■■ |.— I.MI   A ll II !■». I A i m i a «
1)
2)
3)
4)
Irrigation
. .... 11 . .. ....... A,.,
Committee 1967/68 Irrigation Oommlttoo 1968/69
Old Sklyroa - farmer Patri a - farmer
Sklyroa - farmer Glykla - fanner
Tanp; o s - farmer Yirgioa - farmer
Klrlcoa - farmer Kirkos - l‘arnior
Kane11 oa - farmer MeX\\{n\ ivi:; - farmer
Cooperative Retail Shop 1968
Secretary: Slclyroa - farmer (paid)
Tsingourtto - farmer
Pa 1, ris - farmer
Kitiatia - farmer
Akis - bulldozer driver
Cooperative Credit Soc:tety 1.968
Secretary: (}. Fanoa - ex-ahoemakor (paid)
Patrie - farmer
Sklyroa - farmer
Eorria - farmer
Kirnoa - farmer
Akia - bulldozer driver
Ilorlkeh Arkeh (Village Leadership) 1968
azao: Glylcio - farmer
azaa: Patrla - farmer
azaa: Akroa - farmer
azaa: Tslngounlo - farmor
13) Carrot & Potato Union (re-elected unconteoted lor 3rd time,
1 9 6 9 )Executive Committee
Patria - farmer
I’olngounia - farmer
Kaneiloa - farmer
Tan/’os - farmer
Skivror - farrner
stand for office in most cases, the reasons why a few full­
time .tanners dominate the committees must be examined.
The landless men and those with little land do not 
obtain office for a number of reasons. They need all their 
time and energy to support their families. But, more important, 
they are inhibited by their own view of their status as low 
from seeking acceptance in the form of office which, they 
rightly suspect, will bo denied them. For in the values of 
the village, administrative competence begins at home, with 
the management of the affairs of the domestic group. If a 
man has not succeeded in securing his family's positions through 
the acquisition of land, or a well-paid job, then he is 
unlikely to be much use in the handling of village affairs.
Government teachers and civil servants might be 
expected to take office, but they do not. There are a number 
of reasons for this. First, the existence of laws which, while 
meant to apply to party politics, are widely interpreted to 
apply to village administration as well, wbioh appear to 
prohibit both these categories of people. Secondly, work on 
these committees, as currently composed, requires close contact 
and cooperation with farmers, which to some extent outs across 
the notions of superior status which man with secondary 
education hold. Thirdly, there is the possibility that farmers 
themselves will bo unwilling to trust management of those 
committees chiefly concerned with farming to non-farmers. In 
later chapters I discuss a number of situations in which the 
relation of a person’s education to his qualification for 
office became lively issues. More, I wish to do no more than 
stress the ambiguous social position of educated men in village
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affairs - they hold values which distance thorn from farmers, 
they often comment on the 'backwardness' of villagers, but; do 
not participate in the main in village administration.
A. third possible category of persons who might seek 
office are merchants and middle-men, of whom there are five 
full-time resident in the village. Wot one had served in 
recent years on village committees; they rarely attended 
elections, nor were they proposed for office. The only occasion 
on which a merchant was entrusted with village business - the 
purchase of arms for a village militia (see chapter eight) it 
turned out badly. To some extent the explanation for their 
not holding office must lie in the notion villagers have that 
all merchantb are klephtes 'crooks' (literally thieves), but 
another reason, which applies to the merchants, the white- 
collar workers and landless men and craftsmen is that all these 
categories tend to spend much of the day away from the village, 
whereas the full-time farmers, while often out in the fields, 
are available, and come in sometimes for meals. This is only 
a partial explanation since committee meetings take place often 
on Sunday mornings; but the activities of members are not 
confined to such meetings. The general availability of 
committee men to hear complaints, or merely to keep an eye on 
things, means that the full-time farmers are from this point of
view most suitable.
I have pointed out that full-time fanners hold most 
of the administrative offices in the village, and have given 
reasons why other categories do not do so 5 1 have not meant
to suggest that the farmers as a group seek either to monopolise 
these posts, or to run the aifairs oi the village after their
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own interests. It can be argued that in the traditional village 
land ownership was the chief concern 01 the village, and that 
prestige within the village still continues to go with those 
activities which are directly related to the central activity 
of the village. The farmers continue to see such offices as 
the appropriate forum lor achieving prestige. That the teachers 
and white-collar workers remain, for a number of reasons, aloof 
from these committees only serves to emphasise the extent to 
v/hich they face two ways - they are more involved in a system 
oi evaluation which has its roots in the larger society. But, 
as will be clear in later chapters, the values implicit in 
the attitudes of teachers to village administration were 
undergoing some change.
There are a number of other characteristics normally 
possessed by most committeemen. These include the ability to 
speak well in public, a reputation for honesty or responsibility 
and a proven ability to use physical force. Since these qual­
ities are also those normally associated with powerful or 
important men in general, and with political party leaders in 
the village in general, 1 shall consider them in a little more 
detail.
Speaking well has several aspects. One is speaking 
forcefully and persuasively. The villagers use the Demotiki 
word s.yzito which means 'I discuss' in a way v/hich means *1 
have an argument with'; they use the abstract noun svzitis to 
mean argument verging on serious disagreement. The ethos of 
debate in the village is well expressed in this assimilation 
of the moderate meaning to the more harsh one. Committeemen 
need to be able to argue forcefully in tie free-for-all exchanges
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of coffee-shop debate, to put across their point of view, 
and to silence others by persuasion or sheer energy.
However, another aspect to speaking well involves 
mastery of a more educated form of Greek than village dialect, 
horkadica (.Demotiki. horiadika), for this is considered 
appropriate when dealing with officials, even though the 
officials themselves know how to use village dialect. On this 
point it must be stressed that not all the words now needed 
to conduct village business exist in dialect, but this is not 
the whole problem - it is not simply a matter of knowing 
Demotiki words, but a whole speaking style which is at issue.
In addition, the ability to speak and understand Derootiki must 
be matched by some ability to read it, and to handle official 
documents.
The third side of speaking well involves the restraint
appropriate to behaviour in committee. Here, or with officials,
the bold, declamatory and aggressive way of coffee-shop debate
is not appropriate. A fellow committeeman should not be
interrupted or shouted down, but allowed to have his say. His
points should then be taken up politely and discussed. It is
not appropriate to use nicknames in committee, or to swear.
One does not even say Ma ise pellos, 'are you mad?’ to express 
(3")disagreementw / .
A reputation for honesty is hard to maintain. I 
mentioned in the last chapter that the village word for to 
cheat is synonymous with the word to laugh at - yelp. In the 
main, villagers seem to admire cunning and sharp practice, at 
a distance. Yet, as has been observed elsewhere (Davis: 1969),
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accompanying suspicion and admiration for the man without 
scruples is a readiness to make verbal agreements with reliable 
men to which resources are committed. Within the village, 
each adult has what is in effect a credit rating for reliability: 
if he gives his word, to what extent can he be relied on? Men 
who are reliable in this respect are known as timlos, honest;
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sovaros, serious; or varetos, weighty (as opposed to light­
weights) . No man is expected to be reliable to the point of 
being palavos, gullible; for there are circumstances in which 
any honest man may break his word. I shall try to give the 
measure of this problem with a single example: the secretary
of the Coop Store found at the end of the year that he was 
entitled to the highest dividend, since he had bought more 
at the store than anyone else; this was not surprising, since 
as founder of the store and a man ideologically committed to 
the Cooperative movement, he does all his buying there whenever 
possible. However, he explained to me that he would reduce 
the amount of dividend due to him "Because some people in the 
village are bound to say, without a doubt the secretary must 
be stealing from the till, or else how could he obtain such 
a high dividend?” In order to preserve his reputation for 
honesty, he was claiming less than his due, to give no grounds 
for gossip. In the face of the suspicion accompanying all 
acts in the public domain, and the opportunistic gossip of 
enemies, a man with an eye to his good name must keep his wits
about him.
The third characteristic of committeemen is confined 
to a few of them, the most prominent ones. This is that they 
have been seen to employ force effectively. It so happens
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that the two men who have been acknowledged as leaders of the 
right and left wing in the village over the last twenty years 
have both on several occasions beaten up other men. Patris 
has on three occasions beaten up men for having spoken to 
his wife and daughters, or otherwise annoyed them. Sklyros 
has had one similar episode, as well as several fights with 
men over personal Insults and economic disagreements. There 
is little doubt that since they are known to be ready to defend 
themselves, other men less willing or able to do so treat them 
with deference.
One Illustration will help to show the role of force 
in the administration of the village. During the Intercommunal 
disturbances of 1964 the village formed a militia to guard 
against a surprise attack by Turkish forces. One night a 
militia man fired a gun for no reason, and thus alarmed the 
village. He was called before the special Coordinating Committee 
which the village had formed to deal with problems arising from 
militia duty (discussed more fully in chapter 8). Vourros, 
a schoolteacher on t is committee, was lecturing the man who 
had fired, on his lack of responsibility, but he truculently 
questioned the teacher's right to criticise him at all. At 
thi3 point Tangos, another committeeman, one of the leading 
leftists and known to be of proven toughness (see page 42, 
chapter 3) leaned across and said to the unrepentant militia 
man "Do what he tells you and treat him with respect or I'll 
deal with you". This was enough to produce instant compliance. 
Vourros himself who W d  me this story deplored this aspect 
of village life, even though he was one of the few educated 
men in the village v/ho was respected by the villagers for
5/19
interest in public affairs. He believed for a long time - 
or claimed to believe - that the villagers respected physical 
toughness more than education.
(iv) Other Bases of Power
These, then, are the main opportunities provided by 
formal office for individuals to take positions of leadership 
in village affairs; such office in itself is the basis for 
only limited and specific power. There are other bases for 
power which do not depend on holding formal office. Each has 
already been introduced in preceding material, so here I shall 
briefly indicate the extent to which education, wealth, 
personal contacts with powerful people, and readiness to use 
force produce power in the village. Empirically, a person 
may possess several such bases together, but for the sake of 
clarity they will be discussed separately.
Education was discussed in chapter 2; its importance 
for the analysis of power is that highly educated men have 
automatic high status. Doctors, lawyers and senior civil 
servants enjoy the most prestige, and villagers assume them 
to be rich unless proved not to be. Such professional men 
have power because of their status, but also because of contacts 
they made at earlier stages of their education and careers.
These contacts with other high status and pwerful persons in 
the capital, as well as the command of bureaucratic skills 
which their advanced education gives are important in dealing 
with the urban elite on an equal footing, and for securing all 
kinds of favours through personal intervention in decision-* 
making. A doctor, for example, need show deference to very
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few people in Cyprus, and roost people defer to him. Because 
of this he can get many things done, and this means that 
villagers are prepared to become his clients or dependents.
A doctor or a lawyer can wave fees as a favour; a civil 
servant can waive ’red tape' or normal regulations. Among its 
sons the village currently boasts one doctor, one dentist, 
one lawyer, and two very senior civil servants, all urban 
residents but all with land and kin in the village.
Wealth also acts as a basis for power. Rich men can 
acquire friends and dependents in many ways: by gifts, personal
loans, the guarantee of a bank loan, or ostentatious use of 
their wealth in entertainment. In the village a common idiom 
used to describe how a man influences others is to say taizi 
tous ‘he is feeding them’. An old man described to me ho\v he 
thought the murderers of his brother had managed to escape 
punishment in the 1920’s. ’"They fed the policemen, who 
destroyed the evidence and covered up for them...". There is 
no need of a vulgar Freudianism to see how in traditional 
peasant societies the notion of feeding someone expressed the 
creating of dependence. Scarcity of food gave force to the 
image. Today most men are not hungry yet the word still has 
force for what is now at stake is not nourishment but luxury. 
Rich men today do not merely feed people, they feast them.
During my fieldwork the muktar of a neighbouring village invited 
a powerful minister to baptise his grandson. He gave a feast 
for over a hundred people at which his clients roasted the 
meat and served the food and drink, which included whisky.
This feast cost several hundred pounds, but the muktar is rich.
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He and the minister belong to the same political party, and 
the muktar's office depends 011 the will of the minister, who 
could not have helped noticing the numbers of people at the 
feast capable of voting. It is not that a meal buys a vote 
(votes where bought cost a good deal more than a meal) but 
rather that large feasts create, for those who give them, an 
atmosphere of power, generosity and the ability to patronise.
The rich are powerful for other reasons; economic 
independence is the goal of all household heads, and is firmly 
supported by the strong awareness of the difference between 
being one's own man, and being dependent on another. But 
wealth carries other overtones: the rich can behave unpredict-
ably, in a dangerous sense. For a man's death can be bought 
by paying £300 or £500 to someone ready to kill him. In one 
case which came to my attention from another village, a man's 
daughter was seduced and led into prostitution. The man wished 
to be revenged on her seducer and paid money to someone from 
Kallo who shot him. In general, villagers are very careful 
not to make enemies of the rich. For example, the richest 
man in Kallo made his money through selling vehicles. His 
father was a shepherd, and he himself when young had a flock.
He has had little education, no refinement, and swears heavily 
in normal conversation. He brings his little son to the 
coffee-shop, and the son calls adult men poushtis (passive 
homosexual), conduct which would get any other village child 
at least a boxed ear. But this child is tolerated, and his 
father often called kyrie (a title not usually accorded to 
men unless they have finished Gymnasium). Behind his back 
he is called less pleasant things, but few people are willing
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openly to antagonise him.
Contact with powerful people is in itself a basis of 
power, as the last example suggests. Villagers assume the 
ties between the rouktar and the minister give the muktar a 
certain power to achieve his goals. In an earlier example 
(see Ch. 3, page 22) I related how some villagers related to 
another mulct nr persuaded him to intervene on their behalf in 
a police prosecution. The range of contacts available to 
Kallo villagers by their known links to highly placed persons 
was discussed in the last chapter and need not be repeated 
here. The point of interest is that where a relation of 
kinship, friendship or clientage already exists or can be 
created a villager may get power from interaction with 
powerful men. Power is almost contagious. This does not 
depend on the villager's wealth or education, but more on 
his individual skill as a social entrepreneur, or simply 
on the opportunities afforded by his work. One powerful man 
in the village, a political activist, is a truck-driver but 
also an excellent conversationalist; this combination allows 
him to keep up an important relationship with a national 
political leader in the capital, who although not in the 
civil service or political office, intervened to help the 
driver get an import licence for a second-hand truck, when 
this request had already been Ignored by a powerful minister. 
Later the driver became t e district political agent for 
this politician, and I describe his vigorous activity on 
his patron's behalf during an electoral campaign in chaptei 11»
Lastly, readiness to use force is a basis for power, 
not only in the case of office-holders - who in a broad sense
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might be thought of as acting legitimately - but in tho case 
of any individual who chooses to do so and take the consequences. 
The example of the man who avenged his daughter is extreme, 
but it is such rare and dramatic events which are the keystone 
of the honour-and-shame values concerning female chastity.
Men known as ready to use force - fists, chairs, knives or 
guns - when opposed or insulted, are treated with considerable 
caution, and it is enough for a man to have violent friends to 
win him some measure of deference from his fellows.
Force, like contact with powerful men, is to some 
extent a free-floating basis of power, not specifically linked 
to positions, wealth or other attributes'^. This is partic­
ularly likely to be the case in a period when armed insurr­
ection has assumed the important propaganda position that it 
did in the Independence Struggle. Traditionally, when law 
was uncertain it was perhaps essential to be able to give a 
good account of oneself if rights were to be protected; now, 
the law is less uncertain but still not certain enough. 
Unpunished killings have occurred sufficiently frequently 
in recent memory to be a possible threat. On top of this,
villagers believe that a killer with good connections can
arrange matters with high police officials so that ho gets ofl .
In closing this section, I present a case which shows 
how power is availablo to those with good connections and the
wits to use them. The Interest in this situation is less in
what actually happened, but the way those involved went about 
getting what they wanted.
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D. Fanou graduated from Gymnasium and went to 
work for a business firm in the capital; later he 
changed jobs and went to work for the Department 
of Cooperatives. He travelled the island and met 
people, fie came to the attention of the editor of 
a pro-government newspaper, Koshis, who sav; in him 
a useful contact, and asked Fanou to arrange the 
distribution of his paper in the village. Fanou did 
this, by getting a poor man to sell the paper on 
commission.
^ome time later, Ploutis, a wealthy merchant 
in the village, came under police suspicion for 
blacky market with the Turks, in their enclaves. 
Ploutis became anxious at the line of inquiry and 
came to Fanou for help. Fanou duly went to see 
Koshis, who was a close friend of the Minister of 
the Interior, and told him that his friend Fanou 
had strongly supported EOKA in a number of ways, 
and that he was influential in the village, from 
a large family with many friends, and able to muster 
'fifty votes’. Koshis said he would speak to the 
Minister about the case. No further action was taken 
against Fanou. It is in the nature of such cases 
that I cannot be sure the case was dropped through 
Koshis’ intercession. Certainly that is what Fanou 
wished Ploutis to believe.
The behaviour here of Ploutis is thoroughly charact­
eristic of villagers in dealing with agents of the larger 
society. If faced with a probleip, their initial response is 
invariably to seek out someone known to have a personal 
relationship with a person relevant to solution of the problem.
(v) Summary
The formal leadership roles presented by a number 
of administrative committees present limited opportunities 
for the exercise of power and authority. Men who hold office 
through election have achieved a limited sign of trust from 
others in the community. They cannot normally turn office 
into wealth, or through it control the behaviour of others in 
areas unrelated to the office. However, a few men hold several
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offices either concurrently or serially. These men may develop 
a social reputation for being well-informed and influential 
and, through their contacts and knowledge, achieve greater 
general power and aiithority.
Office-holders are nearly all full-time farmers, or 
men with solid land holdings. Ho unskilled labourers or civil 
servants are office holders, only one (private) teacher, and 
no merchants or business men. Office-holders are also able 
to speak well, that is, persuasively, with some mastery of 
■Demotiki, and a measure of self-restraint; they should have 
a reputation for honesty and seriousness; and they have used 
force effectively (though whether this is consciously appreci­
ated by other villagers or not I do not know); however, in 
general men able to stand up for themselves physically are 
respected on this account.
Other bases of power in the village include education, 
wealth, personal links with powerful people, and readiness 
to use force may all be bases of the exercise of power independ­
ently of any formal office held. When several of these bases 
co-exist in the same person, power tends to Increase.
Although full-time farmers have a near monopoly of 
elective office in the village, this does not mean that they 
become any kind cf power elite. Power is held by other 
categories of people in the village, and influence and authority 
are similarly dispersed. Because of their access to powerful 
people in towns, white collar workers and others who work 
outside the village have a special role to play, in intervening 
in administrative or other actions on behalf of their fellow 
villagers.
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I have deliberately limited illustrations of the 
general points made here because some material has been 
cited in earlier chapters, and later chapters will contain 
ample illustrations»
Footnotes to Chapter 5
(1) Drooglegver Fortuijn (unpublished paper) comes 
to a somewhat similar conclusion about power in 
the village he studied near Thessaloniki, and I 
have benefitted from his analysis. He also 
concludes that aspirations for leadership are 
difficult to explain in terms of direct benefits, 
and that there was little misuse of community 
fund s.
(2) He should also report any illegal acts to the 
police, and call on them when needed to maintain 
law and order in the village.
(3) In a later chapter I describe the ironic situation 
in which the successful nationalist political 
leader Sampson, who gives speeches the villagers 
often find both moving and meaningful, is never­
theless said 'not to know how to speak'. !This 
seems to have two reasons. One is that he uses
a form of Demotiki which also includes Cypriot 
pronunciation and dialect words. This is 
considered ill-educated, and although he finished 
Gymnasium, and his mother was a poet, he is often 
called illiterate by villagers. The other point 
is that when speaking he gets emotional, sometimes 
weeps or falters, and speaks in an impromptu, 
unstructured way. This apparent lack of self- 
control - in sharp contrast to the marbled prose 
of the paper speeches hi3 rivals produce - is the 
other thing which causes villagers and townsmen 
alike to downgrade him. Populism cannot express 
itself in ordinary speech and succeed; but perhaps 
this is not only true for Cypriot villagers.
(4) It is perhaps for similar reasons that a pistol 
among members of the American underworld was 
sometimes called an ’equaliser1 - because its power 
is unrelated to any other social attribute than 
the will to use it, thus putting the rich or strong 
on the same level as the poor and weak.
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CHAPTER 6
THE SCOPE OF POLITICS IN THE VILLAGE
(1) Introduction
Having discussed the bases for leadership and power 
in the village in general, and indicated the nature of village 
administration, I wish now to consider the scope of politics 
in the village. This is a different matter from 'village 
politics', a phrase which begs precisely the questions I wish 
to raise here. One approach pioneered by F.G. Bailey (1963,
1969) identifies two different forms of political contest, a 
village contest and a national contest, with different prizes 
and rules but overlapping personnel. While this distinction 
is valuable, and corresponds to certain empirical situations, 
the relation between the two contests is one for empirical 
investigation and it is incorrect to assume a priori that they 
are analytically discrete.
The issue is best posed by the problem of how far are 
the labels 'left' and 'right' used by villagers linked to either 
national ideologies or institutions which can be seen to influence 
village behaviour? I shall not come to any very weighty con­
clusions about this, except to say that while the problem is 
not solved here, it is set out in such a way that it can be 
seen to be substantive, and not trivial. Holding values about 
politics, and about the way the world should be governed, need 
not analytically be opposed to seeking concrete benefits for 
oneself and one's dependents, for the two activities often go 
together. The problem can be made to disappear by using the
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neutral term 'alignment’ to describe those people in the village 
who seem to hold views about politics, and act by these views. 
But the disappearance is more apparent than real.
It will be helpful to distinguish at the outset between 
those villagers who are leaders, those who are followers, and 
those who most of the time are little more than spectators. 
Leaders tend to take dominant positions not only in the admin­
istrative committees but also in party politics. They are 
the men most likely to be active, outspoken, and to use devel­
oped arguments about government, politics and society in their 
arguments and justifications.
Followers sometimes take positions of loyalty to a 
leader, local or national, or to a party; but they may conceal 
their views. Followers are more likely to change positions 
over time and, among the nationalists, tend to express their 
loyalties more in terms of individuals than of ideas, parties 
or programmes. They are ready, on occasions, to act on the 
instructions of leaders.
Spectators are those who avoid participation and the 
expression of open views. They may be persuaded at certain 
times, such as elections, to declare themselves for someone, 
but they may prefer to keep this quiet. They tend to insist 
that they have no political views, or that they ’follow their 
self-interest1. They are thought of by leaders as 'indifferent* 
or ’backward’, but also they are thought of as people who can 
be brought politically into line by favours, by appeals to 
ties of kinship or friendship, or by the manipulation of greed 
or fear.
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(i3-) ghe Values of Right and Left
Those men who describe themselves as rightists, or 
nationalists, normally claim to he church-going Christians 
who believe in God, who are as Greeks ready to die for their 
fatherland, who are in some measure anti-communist, and who 
wish lino sis with Greece. A few have more developed ideas to 
do with the right to private property and individual initiative. 
They also have developed ideas about the left, whom they lump 
together fairly indiscriminately as communists. They charge 
the left with being atheists, with caring more for the USSR 
than for Greece, and being ready to put that country’s 
interests first. In debate the main resource that the right 
claim is to speak for the nation and for all nationalists, 
and to be the grouping of those v/ho truly love their country 
and have, through EOKA1s struggle, made sacrifices for it.
They go further and charge the left with being dishonest and, 
potentially or actually, traitors. Mo leftist, they argue, 
can be a good Greek nationalist. They are often able to give 
accounts of major crises in the history of the USSR, but in 
simplified form, to the discredit of communism.
The left claim to be the party of ordinary working 
people and use the word laos, people, and its derivatives to 
express this claim. They also claim to be progressive, in 
the sense of accepting new ideas in education, technology, 
agriculture. They rarely make any remarks about belief in 
God, but they are prone to criticise the Church for having 
much property, for using it to support the unproductive 
priesthood and for being against progress. In passing, it
is worth remarking that to my knowledge no leftists in the 
village, and very few in Cyprus, fail to perform the church 
ceremonies for baptism, marriage and burial. Leftists are 
heavily critical of the USA and strong verbal supporters of 
the USSR. They support the cooperative movement in its various 
manifestations, and some speak wistfully about agricultural 
collectives, but apart from a few experimental collectives 
started in the late 1940’s there have been no attempts by 
leftists to collectivise land in Cyprus.
The left attempt to monopolise the resoxirce of speaking 
for The Masses, in the same way that the right try to monopolise 
The Nation, to e t h n o s . Leftists often assert that they 
are as goon nationalists as the right, and rightists that they 
have the interests of ordinary people as much at heart as the 
left. Leftists try to rebut the charge of atheism by asserting 
that many rightists are insincere Christians. They explain 
many aspects of social life by broad concepts of the influence 
of the environment. For example, Sklyros, whose father 'taught 
him to gamble', and who in his youth was a keen gambler, was 
furious when his son started to gamble. Although such behaviour 
in the village is commonly explainod by reference to hereditary 
factors, Sklyros, while asking listeners if they thought this 
was possible, was firm in his own belief that an environment 
which tolerated gambling and even approved it was the main 
reason his own son gambled. He argued that heredity couldn't 
be a satisfactory explanation of why he himself had once 
gambled - for he had managed to overcome the habit! Leftists 
often speak of the 'backwardness' of the village and appear 
to think that as social development takes place their party
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will get stronger. This gives some of the point to the label 
they give the right of ’reactionary*. The other favourite 
pair of oppositions used by the left is to describe themselves 
as democrats, the rightists as fascists.
These basic values are expressed in coffee-shop debate, 
and reinforced through reading newspapers, Leaders and active 
supporters subscribe to newspapers and even take them home 
for their families' benefit; they are willing to weigh in 
during public discussion. Support can also be expressed by 
trade union membership, since both left and right have their 
own unions, by support for national sports teams, and even in 
consumption patterns and business relationships. Certain 
villages - though not Kallo - have two soccer teams, one left 
and one right, and coffee-shops at which only the supporters 
of one party are welcome, and the walls of which are festooned 
with the symbols of party loyalty.
Some examples of political preference in consumption 
are worth remarking. Keen leftists try to support leftist
cooperatives and buy their products. They will drink the
range of brandy produced by LOEL, trie left-wing cooperative 
in preference to HajiPavlou, Peristiany, or other private 
enterprise brands. The Co-op Store stocks a tinned pork from 1he 
Chinese People's Republic, as well as brands from non-communist 
European countries and the Commonwealth. Tinned pork is a 
favourite lunch dish in the village, and I have heard the 
leftist leader tell one of his children "Go to the Co-op and 
get a tin of pork - you know, the Chinese one". This sort 
of preference is not a very serious matter, nor is the .joking
which goes on when a group of men sit down to order brandy, and
one will suggest they drink 'a socialist’ one. Russian 'Lyto' 
brand condensed milk is bought by some leftists, although 
their wives insist that for young babies the Cypriot 'Gala Via- 
chas' is healthier, and they get their way. It is, after all, 
the same condensed milk their mothers used. Sklyros, in a 
spirit of fun, pointed out to me that analysis of the Russian 
brand, as shown on its label, gave higher values for sugar, 
fat and vitamins than the Cypriot brand. But at least he
had taken the trouble to look.
The first Kallo soccer team was started in the 1920's, 
and was not political in tone. It lapsed. In the late 1940's 
there was another team in the village, and this was leftist; 
this was the high-water mark of leftist influence in the 
village and in the island. The nationalist right tried to 
form a rival team, but found the left had got most of the good 
players, so that they couldn't field a good enough team, so 
they stopped. The leftist team seems to have lapsed about 
the time of the start of EOKA's campaign. In 1968 there v/as
another team in Kallo which seemed to be without political
complexion, and had young men of both persuasions in it. There 
was no left-wing youth club in evidence in the village at 
this time; the nationalist club, THOI, seemed to admit to 
its clubroom the sons of leftists quite readily, although on 
one occasion a strongly nationalist schoolteacher, on the 
club's supervisory committee, started rebuking the son of a 
leftist for smoking in it, and said 'If your father wasn't a 
communist you wouldn't behave so badly". But this did not 
start any general move to restrict the sons of leftists, and 
other young man laughed at the teacher behind his back.
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hy data are not adequate to decide if there is a 
statistically significant tendency for the firm rightists 
and leftists to prevent their children marrying. The problem 
of collecting and classification of such data is complicated 
by the following issues: some young men do not take a
political position until after marriage, if at all; others 
conceal their views (leftists particularly) for fear that 
their military service will be more unpleasant if they are 
known as very strong nationalists or leftists; yet others 
are in process of changing their positions. There is also 
the problem of the relation between a father's position, and 
that of his son. Many villagers speak as if families are 
politically solidary, and some indeed are, but just as many 
are not. The E01CA campaign in particular made the nationalist 
cause more attractive to young men, and leftists sometimes 
complain that their sons have 'gone over to the rightists 
because of EOKA*. Lastly in this list of complications, it 
is not entirely clear if the critical relationship would be 
father/son, or wife's father/daughter's husband, or even that 
between the two fathers.
The villagers themselves usually denied that politics 
would be decisive in arranging a match, except between 
'fanatics'. This view is supported by a few striking cases 
which came to my attention. During my fieldwork, a daughter 
of Old Tsingounis, for many years a leading right-wing nation­
alist, an azas, a Co-op Shop Committeeman, and linked by 
marriage to several important rightists, was engaged to a 
son of a neighbour who is considered one of the firm and 
'ideological' communists. The two fathers have in common
that they are anion." the largest landowners in the village.
No one seemed to think this match was remarkable.
Another example: Borris is a man who has represented
the left on several committees, and in 1969 was on the 
committee of the Credit Socloty. Loft leaders, of whom ho 
is virtually one, regard him as politically reliable, lie 
allowed his daughter, the second of seven children, to get 
engaged to a young farmer of strong nationalist views, and 
quite clearly associated with what at the national level is
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the anti-communist right wing'*.
A third example may show some of the complexities of 
the problem. The second most respected leftist in the village, 
Tangos, is married to another daughter of Old Tslngounis. 1 
asked him if his father-in-law had known at the time of his 
engagement what his son-in-law's political views wore? He 
thought for a while, and then said ho remembered clearly arguing 
with his father-in-law while still engaged. "But if you ask 
a number of the other older men in the village today it the 
son of Old Tangos is a communist, they'll tell you, no, it 
isn't possible. They just don't understand...".
In the absence of more substantial data, it is worth 
suggesting that a family or Individual's politics, if any, are 
for most people one more factor to bo taken into account, along 
with wealth, family honour, personal talents, education, 
connections and so forth, when planning a match. If an issue 
is in the balance, a political factor could be decisive. Other­
wise, it would simply be calculated along with the others. One 
old man in the 1940's after his army service abroad called 
himself a leftist; later he had been suspected of selling his
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vote in a critical election to the nationalists, and in the 
1960»s always declared himself a rightwinger. He had fivo 
daughters. Two are married to leftists, two to nationalists. 
His two sons are strong rightists. I do not know what his 
family knew or thought about the two young leftist grooms 
they acquired, or how far these men wero then knovm leftists. 
But the father who is poor and struggling hard to marry off 
the youngest girl said to me when I tried to get at this 
information, 'Mo you think that if a decent young man came 
and asked me if ho could marry Sophoulla I'd refuse him 
because he was a communist?" The same man, in another mood, 
used to curse the leftists as dishonourable atheists.
(Hi) The Costs and Benefits of Alignment
There are a number of tangible advantages and dis­
advantages to being an open supporter of the left or the 
nationalist right; to discuss them is not to suggest that
some form of ideology plays no part in village politics: a
personal commitment to a position does not exclude receiving 
benefits from it. It is also worth stressing that tangible 
benefits are In short supply, usually available only to those 
who have held leadership positions or have shown firm support 
for a long period, but the risks of open support are more 
evenly spread.
The possible benefits for leftists Include scholarship 
for t eir children to study in Eastern European countries.
One young man from the village went to study in Czechoslovakia
in 1969, and several other children of prominent leftists 
hope for similar scholarships. Occasionally, those countries
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also offer free or subsidised medical treatment for difficult 
cases which cannot be accommodated in Cyprus. Several Kallo 
leftists have been on visits to socialist countries in Eastern 
Europe with most of their expenses paid as delegates of the 
agricultural organisation of the left, EKA'"^  . EKA also 
organises cheap air charter flights to Britain at Christmas 
and Easter, through which students in the UK can visit thoir 
families, or relatives visit emigrants living in the UK. There 
are also the normal benefits of trade union membership for 
those villagers enrolled in PEO, the leftist federation of 
unions, which include the fruits of collective bargaining, 
subsidised medical attention and pension schemes. Finally, 
since the left organisations have a number of paid administr­
ative posts, there is the possibility of steady employment 
for a few individuals, although in the village during my 
fieldwork no one from Kallo held such a post.
There are serious disadvantages to being a known leftist. 
These include the difficulty of getting certain jobs, the 
police force being particularly opposed to taking leftists, 
and in teaching, a profession which discourages them. It is 
also said to be much harder for a known leftist to either 
enter or be promoted in many other branches of government 
service^. The sons of leftists are often said to get 
posted relatively far from home during military service, and 
to get more than their fair share of fatigues, punishments 
and hardship. It is even said, and widely believed, that they 
are sent to special camps for surveillance. Finally, inter­
mittently since 1954 there have been a number of acts of 
violence against leftists, which include beatings, occasional
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murders, and attacks on the buildings of left organisations 
withbombs which usually fail to find victims. Since the 
communists lost the civil war in Greece, and strongly anti­
communist governments have been in power there since 194-9 
culminating in a military dictatorship since April 21st 1967* 
as a known communist a Cypriot visiting Greece may feel at 
the very least less than officially welcome.
An example will make some of these points clearer.
In 1968 at a wedding in the village, a group of young villagers 
who were in Athens studying were strong in their support for
the military government. Later several villagers mentioned 
to me that one of them had previously been a strong leftist.
A leading leftist told me that the boy had wanted a scholarship 
to an !3astern European socialist country but had failed to get 
it, and out of pique had turned to a nationalist politician 
who had perhaps got him a scholarship. I told this man I'd 
heard t at the boy was still a leftist at heart but hiding it, 
because of the danger from the Greek government. "No. A 
leftist is always a leftist and never hides it." I said this 
v/as a little hard, given the difficulties for leftists in 
Greece. He agreed, but added that the boy had not been 'ideo­
logically committed'.
Later the boy himself gave the following account. He 
had once been ’a fanatic leftist'. In Greece, before the 
military coup, he had seen the extent oi political conflict, 
and the extent of political surveillance and favouritism, even 
by the Papandreou government. He v/as sure the Papandreou 
authorities had opened a file on him. Once the janta came to 
power he certainly wasn't going to stick his neck out after all
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his family's sacrifices. "Did you hear any boy from the 
village speak against the Junta? You do realise there are 
spies in the village?" He described his own position as 
centre left. He denied having a scholarship, but said he 
knew of a boy frcm the village who had got a scholarship 
through the support of a nationalist politician.
To be a strong nationalist has certain advantages, 
some of which complement those of the left. The right wing 
trade and farmer's unions, though much smaller, exercise 
similar functions to those of the left. They also organise 
visits to foreign countries, and charter flights to the UK. 
Since their organisations tend to be more weakly institution­
alised, there are fewer jobs available in this area, but this 
is more than matched by the much better prospects a moderate 
nationalist enjoys when seeking jobs in the police, teaching
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or any branch of the civil serviceK J . There are scholarships 
for study in Greece made available through nationalist channels, 
and for the lew opportunities to study in the USA, nationalists 
stand a much greater chance than leftists.
Perhaps the greatest single benefit to being a nation­
alist is the least tangible. It can be summed up by saying 
that the nationalist under normal circumstances appears in a 
completely legitimate light, as the upholder of Greek cultural 
values, which are strongly bound up with the profession of the 
Orthodox faith. In a society where traditionally under Turkish 
rule the Church was the political representative of the Greek 
people, and where an Archbishop is the popularly-elected head 
of state, the nationalist usually can place himself - in 
argument at least - in the mainstream of the society's values. 
The leftist is permanently upstaged, both by the ambiguity of
M s  position over religious belief, and the problem of the 
relationship 'between the communist party and the TFSSK. The 
exclusion of the left from 5Q3CA. was both symptomatic of this 
political weakness, and further contributed to it*
It makes good commonsense to suppose that for those 
leaders and active supporters of both left and right organis­
ations certain other benefits exist, harder to specify, but 
by no means negligible. I have stressed the extent to which 
the nuclear family is a basic structural unit in village society, 
and to what degree the notion of svnferon, self-interest 
covering the whole nuclear family, is the touchstone of morality. 
IDhe climate of competitive individualism which accompanies 
this type of family and value system is to some extent offset 
by strong commitment to left or nationalist positions. I am 
arguing that political alignment provides some additional 
identity for the actor, which both gives an extra degree of 
cognitive structure and emotional support to him in his social 
encounters.
Without wishing to pursue this notion of social identity 
any further, it is worth pointing out that the left offers a 
strong organisational framework for the individual, and tends 
to have a view of change as both having a direction and involv­
ing progress; the important difficulty in Greek culture is 
that of religious position. The nationalists are weaker in 
organisation and have a less developed set of answers to 
problems posed by social change, but are most closely linked 
to traditional Greek culture.
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(iv) Right and Left Cleavage In Millars Life
I now consider what importance is to be attached to 
the opposed political identities of leftist and nationalist 
as they arise in village affairs. The problem presents itself 
in two forms. First, the labels are in frequent use, and 
people in the village continually refer to each other, and 
address each other, through these identities. Secondly, the 
statements of national leaders and newspaper editorials are 
often so violent in tone (particularly those of the right) 
that the problem is raised, how can the use of such national 
labels exist in the village without producing greater conflict 
if only between the small numbers of leaders and active 
supporters?
Since 1955 the island's Greek leaders have been pre­
occupied first with the British rulers, then with the Turkish 
minority. The response of the left has been in the main to 
give firm support to Makario3 , to call for unity of all Greek
political groups, and generally to appear as a party of order.
is
Since Makarios^so generally popular, and since the left has 
much to lose from any taint of illegality, this tactic has 
served to protect it from harrassment from extreme anti­
communists. The right also supports the call for unity, while 
still keeping up a hostile tone towards the left. This, then, 
is the framework of Greek communal unit;y which surrounds any 
particular event.
In the village this general situation has been reprod­
uced by the avoidance of hard contests between the two main 
groups. The administrative committee elections, which take
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place every three years, have not been matters which mobilised 
all possible support in the village. A turn-out at these 
elections of between 30 and 50 people was typical in the 
elections I attended, and this seems to have been normal, from 
informants’ comments. The possible number of voters varied 
from 300 or more for the Co-on Store Committee, to 450 for 
the Credit Co-op. In fact, through the 1960»s there has been 
a long-standing implicit agreement among village leaders 
not fully to contest these committees, but to have agreement 
of rough parity between right and left representatives. This 
still leaves some scope for manoeuvre, as I shall describe 
in chapter 8; but such informal precedents have been contin­
ued, and the result is that most villagers - who are in any 
case more or less indifferent to these elections so long as 
their affairs are handled both reasonably fairly and effic­
iently - are not involved in them. A full-scale contest would 
mean that both sides would attempt to use all kinship, friend­
ship, ideological and other ties to line up their supporters, 
and the cro3s-cutting ties which involve most leaders, and 
indeed most villagers, would be strained and tested.
The fact that hard contest was avoided does not mean 
that right and left as political categories were irrelevant 
to, or not invoked in, these situations. It means instead 
that explicit recognition was given to their importance by 
agreeing parity of representation. The fact that there is 
something called 'the left’ which must be given two positions 
on any committee cannot be ignored. There is no need to give 
up two seats to something which doesn’t exist.
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However, this control of contest is made easier by 
another conscious activity oi village leaders: they define
these committees as "not political" in their purposes, but 
solely concerned with "village business". "We don't want to 
allow party politics to get mixed up in village business" was 
a statement made on many occasions, and specifically made to 
prevent political contest. The easiest way of doing this, 
since neither group of leaders will stand by and let the 
others dominate anything in the village, is to agree tacitly 
or openly on a division of committee jobs in advance^^.
If political identities of the left/right order were 
of no importance in village affairs, one would surely expect 
individuals regarded in other contexts as spokesmen for these 
positions to be able to stand as 'independents' on village 
committees, or to be able to show their ability to segregate 
their loyalties to an institution outside the village, from 
their conduct of village affairs, by reciting some suj.table 
formula. As it is, the efforts to control the extent of
political contest suggests that no simpler means is available,
and even the device of defining areas of activity as out of 
the scope of politics showed signs of a breakdown on a number 
of occasions. These incidents will be made the subject of 
extended discussion later.
A further factor which has limited the conflict between
left and right is again related to the national system. In
short, for the period 1960-70 the developing lines of most 
intense political cleavage in Cypriot society have been between 
two groupings in the nationalist camp, which became in 1969
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openly institutionalised when political parties were formed.
In their inception, these events are related to a struggle 
between certain national leaders. One result in Kallo was 
that the intensity of conflict between the leaders of left 
and right was modified, since the right were often too busy 
with their internal differences, and the left were careful 
not to unite them by obvious provocation. This was a village 
level counterpart of the AIvEL National Leadership's policy 
since I960. I shall have more to say about this in the next 
chapter.
(v) C-roups
No discussion of the scope of political action in the 
village can be complete without some consideration of omadhes 
(singular, oroas) groups, or, in a military context, units.
In one sense the formation of EOKA units was the start of such 
groups in Cypriot politics, but there is a long oral tradition 
in which politicians were accompanied by more or less violent 
and organised followers. EOKA units were special in that they 
were bound by oath, membership was secret, and the organisation 
was island-wide, and the aims insurrectionary^. But contact 
between units was apparently limited, later, in the 1963-4 
disturbances, the village formed a militia unit fairly openly, 
which was under the Market Town district command.
In its simplest form the group is merely a number of 
supporters of a political leader, with some minimum degree of 
organisational coherence, in that all members in one village 
or town district know who the other members are, who are ready 
to act on the orders of that leader. In the Cypriot press and
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Legislative Assembly these groups are referred to as ’private 
armies’. They are by their very nature invisible, uncountable 
and sometimes more talked about than real. They have been 
linked particularly to the names of three opposed nationalist 
leaders - the former Minister of the Interior, P. Yorgadjis;
V. Lyssarides, the leftist nationalist physician of the 
Piesident; and JT. Sampson, a former EOKA hero turned newspaper 
proprietor. Arguments continue about the relative legitimacy 
of these groups, but I shall not discuss these except to say 
that they were formed during the earljr period of inter-communal 
conflict, and that it is widely believed that President 
Makarios encouraged both Lyssarides and Sampson to form their 
groups not only as a defense measure against the Turks, but 
also as a counterweight to the growing power of Yorgadjis.
Other groups or illegal organisations have also existed 
between 1960-70, including the Sthnikon Metopon, National 
Front, which was responsible for a number of raids against 
government officials in 1969 and 1970 but ended v/ith the arrest 
of seventy men, and the trial of some twenty of these. The 
Greek Army was also suggested as the source of yet other 
groups, and this was explicitly linked to the Sthnikon Metopon. 
when General Yerakimis was sent back to Greece at the request 
of the Makarios Government. However, it is impossible to 
know for sure what was the relationship between the General 
and the Ethnikon Metopon.
The problem posed by groups for village solidarity 
is t at they represent an extreme form of commitment to 
individuals or institutions outside the village, and that
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they suggest a capacity for action considerably more powerful 
than that arising from ordinary ties between individual clients 
and their patrons. A basic distinction in Cyprus is between 
dhikos mas, our man, and xenos, the stranger, or unrelated man. 
In the context of groups, anthropos tou Yorgadji, Yorgadjis1 
man, implies a man who will do Yorgadjis1 bidding. Just what 
that bidding is depends on the leader's whims and the national 
situation. iiOKA units went on missions against the British, 
and suspected traitors. The village militia of 1963-64 
trained in the Penaedactylos Mountains, and fought against 
Turkish units near r.okkina, as we 11 as taking part in an 
assault on a Turkish village ten miles from Kallo. These are 
known activities of a concrete nature. But groups which have 
existed at other times have been involved perhaps merely in 
the notion of group membership carried about in members' heads, 
plus a certain amount of surveillance, alertness and general 
intelligence work.
National leaders, whether public politicians or more 
or less covert figures in army, civil service or private life 
wish to be kept informed about the movements of and support 
for their opponents. Village activists, linked to such leaders, 
wish to show their loyalty and vigilance. Thus, there appears 
to be a continual flow of traffic in information between village 
and urban leaders. Sometimes this has curious results, when 
the information is of low grade. A yoiing schoolteacher of 
cautious disposition and no known political position was 
surprised to find himself transferred to a distant village 
in a poor region; since he had done nothing that he knew of 
to displease his superiors, he asked a close kinsman with good
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government connections to find out why. His kinsman went to 
a trusted government, official high up in the security services. 
This man told him that his kinsman the teacher was a member 
of an illegal political group. The evidence was that he had 
been seen one night at a petrol station with a police uniform 
in his car. \/hen challenged with this 'evidence* the young 
man admitted to having had the uniform, not to impersonate a 
policeman but because he was taking part in a school play.
Another example from the EOKA period: the teacher
Vourros was told by a close kinsman that he was suspected of 
having contact with the British security forces, and thus being 
a traitor. lie was badly frightened, and asked his kinsman to 
find out what the evidence was against him. The answer came 
bac.' , that he had been seen going into an army building in 
Nicosia. The army building was in fact the Ministry of 
Education, which had British soldiers stationed outside it, 
as did all government offices during the Emergency. But the 
villager who had reported Vourros' ‘activities' did not know 
this.
An example of a more serious nature will show how 
villagers are inevitably unsure of the purpose and direction 
of some groups. Dhaskalos had been active in a village EOKA 
shotgun group, but had had some personal differences with its 
leader. Later, in 1964 he was working as a teacher in a 
village fifty miles from Kallo x/hen one night he heard in the 
dark the voice of a Greek mainlander giving weapons instruction. 
Next time he went to Kallo he made inquiries, and learned that 
a village group of about 35 men had been formed and was drilling 
He was angry because he had not, in spite of his EOKA experience
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been called, on to join this group. He went to see a powerful 
LOLA leader in a nearby village and a3ked what was going 
on. This man was hesitant, and said nothing. "Don’t take 
me for a fool" said Dhaskalos. He was then told that a group 
was being organised through the Nicosia MP, Koshis, a close 
friend of the Minister of the Interior, Yorgad,jis. Dhaskalos 
then went to Nikos Sampson, who was by this time a critic of 
Yorgadjis, and asked him if he knew about these activities. 
Sampson said that he did but had authorisation from the 
President to form groups of his own, and that if Dhaskalos 
wanted guns for such a group he could have them.
It is difficult to know what the status of such groups 
was in either lav/ or the eyes of government officials. In 
the village, the existence of such a group is seen as a centre 
of power and, whatever its ostensible purpose, it is potenti­
ally threatening to rival political supporters. In chapter 8 
I shall discuss the consequences of one such group being formed 
in the village. Here it is enough to say that the existence, 
real or imagined, of such groups seems to have produced a 
further degree of tension and sometimes sharpened cleavage 
in village relationships; and that whatever the combination 
of tangible benefits, personal loyalties or values bring 
villagers to join groups, the origin of the groups lies in 
political competition in the national arena. Groups are the 
stuff that coups are made of; some of the events in recent 
Cypriot politics involving assassination attempts, and rumours 
of planned coups, sent reactions through the villages where 
segments of supporters existed who saw themselves as directly 
affected. V/hen for example, during my fieldwork, a senior
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police official was shot a few miles from the village, a numbor 
of villagers were arrested because it was thought they belonged 
to a group hostile to the Minister of the Interior. Later, 
when the jjthnlkon Hotonon wan launched, the village was 
thought by some to bo a hotbed of supporters for this illegal 
organisation, and was again the scone of arrests and full- 
scale searches.
(v*) The Scopo of Politics; Favours and Obligations
The accounts given by old men of two national elections 
to the legislative Assembly, between 1920 and 1930, make it 
clear that vote-buying was common, although even then a few 
villagers actually had views of the candidates and their 
positions which wero apparently decisive. Accounts of municipal 
elections in the 1940’s told of men being abducted to prevent 
them voting. In 1970 there was to my knowlodge no vote buying 
in Kallo. But a numbor of people echoed the words of one 
informant "Don't look for ideology in the village. People 
are stubborn and oppose each other wilfully. I can bo left 
and you right, but I'll support capitalism, the opposite 
of my true beliefs, Just because you are opposing it. Pure 
personal stubbornness". The disappearance of vote-buying, 
and tho comments of this sophisticated villager, poso the 
problem, why and how do villagers use their votes in national 
elections? I have already emphasised tho scant experience of 
representative government that tho villagers have enjoyed.
But I have also, in this chapter, dwelt on factors which havo 
overtones of Ideology, even though it has been stressed that
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holding a political position strongly does not exclude 
simultaneously receiving benefits. These benefits are scarce, 
and leaders and strong supporters far more likely to get them 
than weaker supporters or the uncommitted.
The informant I have just quoted has two things to
say. One is that villagers have personal relationships which 
may dominate or swamp their other values; but he is also 
saying, quite clearly, that villagers (some, not all) have 
other beliefs. He in fact mentions the categories I have just 
discussed. His caution is against seeing village political 
behaviour as primarily ideological. Since my argument has 
been that village leaders are playing a quiet and restricted
game between themselves, and do not mind that most villagers
are merely spectators of this game, it is clear that I think 
his analysis correct. For the rest of this section I wish 
to stress the mixed, or intermediate, nature of the villagers’ 
response to the problem set them by elections. This mixed 
response was greatly aided by the electoral system used in 
1970. Each voter in Nicosia district could make twelve 
choices, since the district elected twelve Representatives 
to the House. But he could distribute twelve choices in any 
way he wished among the candidates of the various parties 
on the ballot slip. In the end, the ballot paper consisted 
of two parties each fielding twelve candidates, one party 
with ten, one with six, and one with two. A voter could 
vote all twelve candidates of one party, or cast one, two 
or more votes for any individual or party of his choice. In 
the event, a number of informants told me that they had voted 
for several candidates from the tickets of several parties.
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Sometimes this was because they liked individuals "but were 
less enthusiastic for their parties, or running mates; some­
times it was because they felt a party ’deserved1 some support 
although their main loyalty lay elsewhere. Sometimes it was 
because their party was under instructions to use some of its 
votes for another party.
An electoral canvass by active supporters of the 
Progressive Party in June 1970 worked through the 740 registered 
voters of the village and marked down some 400 as adiaphorl, 
indifferent. This did not simply represent women voters, since 
during the canvass a large number of women were assigned 
positions, due to the known positions of their husbands, or 
some other close relative. During this canvass, the principles 
which the activists used to reach their conclusions were these: 
old people, the very poor, the illiterate were assumed to 
be directly influenced by their closest kin, particularly 
their sons. If there were several sons with different loyalties, 
it was worth trying to persuade such voters to use a few of 
their votes for each of the parties their sons supported. 
Secondly, anyone holding a government job was thought likely 
to support the United Party, unless a powerful man of some 
other party had got him the job, or his department head or 
man responsible for his promotion was known to be aligned with 
some other party than United. Since the Government and Civil 
Service contain numbers of men who are not the political 
clients, friends or supporters of Yorgadjis and Clerides, 
there was always the chance that a person would be working 
for one such man, and thus have dual loyalties. Thirdly,
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party leaders, or those who were the close friends, koumbari, 
of powerful politicians, were assumed v/ould vote exclusively 
for their own party. During this canva,ss it was clear that 
certain individuals were regarded as totally committed to a 
party, others to be hiding their positions but secretly 
committed, others to be vacillating, others to be open to 
persuasion, oince most people I asked said they believed 
the ballot to be secret, there was clearly scope for people 
to say one thing and do another. But against this, the voting 
system made this almost unnecessary in man3>- cases, except 
where a man was promising all the votes of his kin to someone, 
when he knew that in fact he would vote otherwise.
Villagers told me that they felt an obligation to 
vote for a kinsman or co-villager who was a candidate, even 
if they did not particularly like his party. This was apparent 
in the 1970 election, where a candidate from the village 
polled 396 out of a possible 740 votes, which was 55 votes 
more than his own nationally-known party leader. This was 
also the case with two candidates in a neighbouring village.
One village candidate polled 426 votes, whereas his party 
leader (one of the best known politicians in Cyprus) polled 
280; another polled 472, his party leader 318. The Kammari 
candidate polled 124 votes in Kallo, which hardly differs 
from the performance of those of his running mates not supported 
by AKEL. The other Kammari candidate did no better in Kallo 
than other United candidates - with 205. The Kallo candidate, 
however, did well in Kammari , and this is explained in 
chapters 9 and 12; basically he had been active on an issue
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which affected Kammarri' s future water supply.
Village leaders complain that ideology doe3 not 
sufficiently guide how people vote, but from the perspective 
village values the notion of reciprocity explains the 
behaviour of many household heads, and their dependents. The 
village definition of friendship suggests mutual help; a 
failure to keep one’s part of this bargain justifies dissolving 
the relationship. Thus, a man who helped one's son get a 
job is a friend, and must be helped when he needs help in turn. 
The only constraint on this is a conflict of loyalties, which 
normally can be settled by intelligent compromise. This 
compromise was made easy in 1970 by the electoral system.
But reciprocity is not always hostile to ideology.
In the following example, a basic ideological view 
sets the background for choice, but the actual choice is 
finally made from mixed motives. Yannaros once had an Army 
job, but resigned. Later he wanted his old job again. His 
wife's brother was a police sergeant with a good record of 
EOKA service, and took him to the Minister of the Interior. 
Yannaros waited outside while his wife's brother went in to 
see the Minister. Nothing came of this meeting.
Later the muktar of Yannaros1 village went to see 
the Minister with him, and the Minister promised him that 
either he would get an Army job or some other government job. 
Nothing happened. A third time, Yannaros went alone to the 
Minister, and again was promised help. Nothing happened.
Two years later, in February 1969, organised parties 
began, and since he was anti-communist Yannaros thought about 
the several nationalist parties. He wondered about Sampson’s
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party, but when he remembered how Sampson in his newspaper 
had criticised the conduct of the Army unit in which Yannaros 
had fought against the Turks, in Omorphita, 1963/4, he couldn't 
bring himself to vote for Sampson's party. So he decided 
that although Yorgadjis had three times failed to help him, 
he would still vote for the United Party.
In this account, the informant explicitly sought a 
benefit, and it is implicit that had he received it, he would 
have been committed to the United Party. His anti-communism 
is a constraint which should be seen as ideological; but 
his reason for not supporting Sampson is, within Cypriot 
culture, almost equally ideological, for Sampson has tried to 
monopolise the political ground of speaking for 'true1 nation­
alists, and ex-EOKA fighters. Since Yannaros felt his 
commander and unit had fought well, he could not stomach 
Sampson's 'unjust' criticism.
(vii) Conclusion
Bailey's contribution to our understanding of differ­
ences between national and village politics has been consider­
able; here I have been at pains to suggest that the villagers 
do not all respond in the same manner to the symbols and 
institutions of national politics. The Kallo situation is 
not one of two discrete worlds, with sharply different values, 
mediated by a few professional brokers, who are hated and 
mistrusted by villagers. Many Kallo villagers have been 
aligned with various national political figures or parties 
ever since they can remember. While some villagers remain 
unaligned spectators, others are followers and a few are active
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leaders in relation to national political groupings, Shore 
are costs and benefits to alignment, and villagers seek to 
limit the extent of politioal competition by ruling certain 
village activities as ’not political1. Yet there is the 
constant threat posed by committed alignment through member­
ship in 'groups’, clandestine seta of followers loyal to a 
person or cause. In a situation where strong political 
competition is considered inimical to village interests, 
this element of seoreoy is perhaps enjoined or made structur­
ally Inevitable.
Most villagers expect that the rewards of political 
alignment will bo in favour®, Jobs, intercessions in external 
processes to the village, and other benefits. SJhis does not 
mean that for the leaders and activists alignment is unrelated 
to values about the way society should be ordered. But it 
serves to stress the intermediate nature of ICallo politics, 
and the extent of the villagers* Involvement with the larger 
society. Th.lu is particularly obvious when the reasons people 
vote for particular parties arc examined, for hers they can, 
through the peouliar form of the electoral system, at the 
same time express friendship, repay debts, discharge oblig­
ations, and make more expressive statements about the value 
implicit in parties or persons.
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Footnotes to Chant.nr- a
(1) But whereas ’masses* excludes a section of the 
population, ’nation* implicitly Includes everyone,
except perhaps those regarded as National Traitors (Leftists).
(2) Is or is the young farmer a quietist politically: 
in chapter 11 I shall describe how, during an 
election campaign, he took the bold step of harshly 
interrogating an inspector of education who was a 
candidate for a rival nationalist party,
(5) Throughout Cyprus, to have travelled abroad confers 
much prestige; to have travelled at someone else’s 
expense is even raore prestigious; the Russians also 
invited representatives of PEK, the right-wing 
nationalist farmers union, to join SKA"representatives 
in visiting the USSR, Patrie from Kailo went on such 
a visit,
(4) The extreme right frequently complain that there 
are in any ’hidden’ communists in the civil service,
To ray knowledge a number of now prominent Cypriot 
civil servants and politicians were once leftish
in their youth, but now take respectably nationalist 
positions, This would sees to be t*e objective 
situation which prompts the extreme right’s suspicions, 
and since they are prone to believe in the conspirat­
orial bent of the left, they find it easy to believe 
that ex-leftists are crypto-leftists,
(5) Fanatic nationalists, of the pro-Grivas Bnosis-at- 
any-price variety, complain that they are discriminated 
against by the more moderate nationalists, and that
if they get civil service jobs at all, their promotion 
is held back. I shall have raore to say about the 
relations between j- akarios* supporters and Grivas in 
the next chapter. The complaint is almost certainly 
justified,
(6) Boissevain (1965) has examined this issue in his 
monograph, for the Maltese situation. Lison-Tolosana 
(1966) has valuable material on the consequences of 
open political conflict for the village he studied.
(7) Bailey (1969:30) has pointed out that such an effort
to control the scope of politics is highly significant:
"Yet exclusion fro® politics can be a mark of 
objective importance: some roles are too
important to allow then to become fouled and 
confused by political competition.”
Not only do villagers seek to limit the costs of 
political competition in village administration, but 
this principle has been employed both in their 
attempts to persuade the government to build them a 
dam, and in the administration of the citrus
cooperative. These situations arc the subjects of 
extended description and analysis in chapters 9 and 
10 respectively.
It is not easy to decide if the EOKA campaign was 
a rebellion or a revolution. Insofar as it merely 
sought to replace British rule by Greek-Cypriot rule, 
it could be called a rebellion. But since its goal 
of Union with Greece would have Involved new structural 
relations for the island, it might be better regarded 
as revolutionary. It may still be argued that it was 
rebellious in seeking only to put Athens into the 
seat occupied by London. While there wan little in 
the way of social reform expressed in the .tiOKA 
campaign, there was a mlllenarian fervour about the 
demand for Gnosis. The militants must have believed 
that life would be different with Enosis, or why 
would they have bothered?
This is the same man who assisted (chapter 3, page2?)
In the case of iSklyros' sister's husband. He also 
takes some part in the election campgn (chapter 11, 
page 40) where ho showed the strength of his support 
for the United Party by coming to the rescue of a 
United candidate under heavy attack in Kallo from 
supporters of the Progressive party, a more militant 
and populist nationalist party.
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CHAPTER 7
AN OUTLINE OP GREEK CYPRIOT POLITICS,
1878-1970
(i) Introduction
Later chapters are concerned with the detailed 
discussion of politics in the village over the first decade 
of Cypriot independence, and it will therefore be necessary 
briefly to review the events and processes which led tip, in 
1959, to the granting of independence. Throughout the period 
of British rule the dominant symbol and issue for the Greek 
Cypriot political elite was the demand for Enosis (Union 
with Greece), and even those who might have wished to ignore 
it found it difficult to do so. Until 1954, the pursuit 
of Enosis relied in the main on traditional elite political 
methods - petitions, newspaper articles, speeches, abstention 
in and boycott of the Legislative Assembly; but 1931 was a 
notable exception which is remembered as The Uprising, in 
which a brief and apparently unplanned demonstration turned 
into a riot, quickly repressed by the government.
To these methods in 1954 armed insurrection was added 
under the military leadership of George Grivas, and, through 
his creation, EOKA. The early years of independence saw a 
power struggle between the Greek majority and the Turkish 
minority, which became violent in 1963, and resulted in a 
de facto patchwork partition of the island.
Independence ha3 been marked by a less dramatic power 
struggle within t ie ranks of Greek: Cypriot nationalist leaders. 
On the one hand, many persons have sought rewards for the part 
they played in the independence struggle; on the other hand, 
there has been a continual disagreement between Makarios and 
Grivas, as well as their respective followers, about the future 
of the island and the issue of Gnosis. Makarios seems to 
favour a unitary state, a negotiated settlement with the [Turkish 
minority and a policy of Enosis - Eventually. Grivas has 
favoured the tough-minded pursuit of Enosis - Soonest, the 
rejection of the unitary independent state, and a readiness 
to seek: encounters with the Turks. To civil war has been added 
the danger of international conflict, when Turkey twice came 
very close to invasion of the island.
In this chapter economic and social development, which 
have gone on in spite of the inter-communal disturbances, are 
ignored. The result is an emphasis on tension, crisis and 
conflict, which is slightly misleading. It is clear that 
while villagers have prospered economically, on the political 
level they have, since 1878, experienced a wide variety of 
political situations^ but have enjoyed a paucity of opport­
unities to express their political views through the key 
institutions of representative politics - elections to national 
office. Perhaps this discrepancy between political instability 
and economic^ social improvement partly explains why the 
political culture of the village rules so many things 'out of 
politics1o
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A Sketch of Cypriot History 1878-1959^
Cyprus was occupied by many rulers throughout her 
history. The Turks held the island from 1573 to 1878, where­
upon the British acquired it. At this time the ethnic 
composition was roughly 75$ Greek Cypriots and 25‘X- Turkish 
Cypriots, who had arrived on the island during Turkey's period 
of rule. Under the Turks the leaders of the autocephalous 
Greek Orthodox Church in the island were also the political 
spokesmen, and from the first days of British occupation until 
1931 made regular requests for the political union (.falnosi s) 
of Cyprus with Greece. Turkish community leaders with equal 
and complementary regularity voiced their opposition to this. 
The British Goverhment took no notice of requests for Enosis 
until the 1914-18 war, and Greece never pressed the point. 
Occasionally British politicians made sympathetic mention of 
the Greek Cypriots' claim, and the Greek Representatives in 
the Legislative Assembly continually tried to pressure the 
Governor in the 1910-1930 periods by threatened or actual non- 
co-operation over budgetary matters. Usually the British, in 
alliance with the Turkish Representatives, could get around 
these obstructions.
In 1931 there was a short and apparently spontaneous 
outbreak of violence by Greek Cypriots in favour of Enosla, 
which was firmly put down. From then on until 194-5 the 
Legislative Assembly was suspended, the Governor ruling by 
degree, and village headmen being appointed, not elected.
In 1924 a Communist Party was formed which attracted 
some teachers, and began trade union organisation. It seems 
to have played little part in the events of 1931, but was
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nevertheless banned In 1933. It reformed in 1941 when parties 
were again allowed, and in 1946 won municipal elections in 
lour out of the inland‘s six major towns. At the name time 
the Church and other right-wing nationalist elements began 
to back the formation of nationalist, anti-communist trade 
unions and farmers' associations. There were at this time a 
number o.( other national and Orthodox Christian political 
associations, such as OHEN, which were to prove an important 
focus for later militancy.
AKL'L, as the reformed communist party was named, wan 
in the early 1940’s probably at the height of its strength 
in the island. But when on the mainland of Greece a civil 
war raged in throe rounds between 194 • ’ and 1949, AKKh, unwilling 
to commit itself to J-lnosia while the future of the left in 
Greece was in the balance, produced instead a line demanding 
independence and aolf-government. There was a moment in May 
1940 when the British Government, through the proponed Winster 
Constitution, came close to getting the left representative a 
to cooperate in a limited measure of self-government, but the 
moment paused, the left switched from a lino demanding self- 
government to join with the right in demanding Hnosj n. However, 
this vacillation about Knosln did the Cypriot left a great 
deal of harm for it allowed the right to portray them as 
opportunists, and insincere in their stand on Knonln.
Grivas, fresh from organising an anti-communist militia 
in Greece, started to organise KOKA In the* early 19501s (from 
v/hioh he scrupulously excluded all leftists). On Apr.ll 1st 
1955 he opened the campaign for Knonln by terrorism; from 
then until 1959, with several, truces, Grivas waged a hit-und-
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run war against the British which culminated not in the desired 
but in the Zurich Agreements, whereby the island became 
an independent republic, guaranteed by Greece, Turkey and 
.Britain, with 70;. of civil service jobs going to the Greeks 
and 30/p to the Turks, in an overall federal structure. During 
the .Emergency of 1954-59 the Turks had been encouraged by 
British diplomacy to voice their opposition to Bnosis more and 
more energetically, and finally bloody clashes took place 
between the Greeks and Turks of the island; but leaders of 
both communities attempted to rally their followers to enter 
upon Independence in a spirit of restraint and compromise.
(iii) The Meaning of Enosis
Enosis literally means union in Greek; but in Cypriot 
politics it means the union of Cyprus with mainland ("mother") 
Greece. The usual implication is that this will be a form of 
total political integration. The 1954-59 EOKA struggle was 
fought not for national independence, but for Enosis. An anti­
colonial movement in which 1 8 of the population - the Turks - 
were corporately opposed to the stated goal, and 30fo (Greek 
Cypriot leftists) excluded from participation, is hard to 
classify. But when that goal involves a form of integration 
into a unit 500 miles away the problems of understanding are 
compounded. The Zurich-London Agreements (1959) specifically 
ruled out both Enosis and partition as solution to ethnic 
conflicts in the island.
In 1878, when the British arrived in Cyprus, they 
were greeted by Church leaders with requests for Enosis. How
long a section of Greek Cypriots had their eyes on this goal 
is not clear, hut at least since 1830. The vital information 
is missing: how did the people we now call 'Greelc Cypriots'
see themselves in, let us say, 1000? Of what identification 
weie they aware? To what identities were they committed? 
Village dialect was a mixture of French, Venetian, Turkish 
and Arabic loan words in a demotic Greek base. The result was 
apparently not understood straight away by mainland Greeks, 
although they recognised it as a form of Greek. The church 
services x^ ere in Byzantine Greek with a mainland pronunciation. 
Most villagers and many priests were illiterate. Pew had 
ever been outside the island. The townsmen had a greater 
consciousness of a relationship to Greece, greater literacy
and mobility. But the gap between town and country was huge.
(7)It has been suggestedv- ' that the intensity of the 
Church’s support for Knosis results partly from the threat to 
its power created by the arrival of the British. Under Turkish 
rule the Church had been both religious and political repres­
entative of all Greek Cypriots. Taxation and administration 
were partly organised through Church officials. After the 
British came, this relationship changed. The new government 
refused to allow its officials to help the church collect 
ecclesiastical taxes. It approved a Legislative Assembly 
with popularly elected secular representatives. It supported 
popular education and, after a trial period, relieved the 
Church of direct responsibility for the appointment of teachers. 
Finally, in the 1920's, the British allowed (but did not 
encourage) the rise of left-inspired trade unions.
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Paced with these threata to Its traditional monopoly 
of national leadership, the Church reacted with intensified 
support for a ’sacred1 cause - toosis, Support for Knoaja 
became a moral touchstone: all ’good Greeks1 were practising
Orthodox Christiana, who acknowledged the traditional authority 
of the Church and were passionately committed to Knoslta. So 
wont the syllogism, 'Bad Greeks' were those lacking in one 
or more of these qualities.
The second group with a strong Interest in Knosjs 
were the schoolteachers, for in the huge expansion of popular 
education 1870-1930 the teachers wore the gatekeepers of both 
social mobility and ethnio Identity. 1'he role of teachers 
in mobility needs little comment. To pass from village to 
town was possible by sweat alone. But to pass from villager 
to townsmen, polltlsmenos (civilised, olvla, polls, urbane, 
etc.), one had to pass through the gate kept by the school­
teacher. The same was true for ethnio Identity too: teachers
knew and propagated the atory of the glories of Greece, and 
particularly the Greek War of Independence, 1821. From 
teachers, Greek Cypriot villagers learned that they were part 
of a noble tradition, and no longar needed to see themselves 
aB Voob Kypralos, Cypriot Ox, for by learning to speak and 
write good mainland Greek, and by affirming their belief In 
Enosls, they could participate in a new and exciting identity. 
This opportunity was being held out in a period of rapid social 
and economic change - improved communication, booms and slumps 
in agriculture, and increased popular participation in politics.
JinofllQt then, was a slogan which asserted membership 
in a nation of Greeks, and it became a slogan for use against
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both colonial rulers and the Turkish minority^^. Since I 
have argued that some groups of Cypriots were more immediately 
concerned with achieving it than others, the question can he 
asked, what price did most individuals in the population feel 
was worth paying to turn this latent, long-term membership 
into an immediate, active membership? Such a rational question 
runs counter to the rhetoric of nationalism, which portrays 
Gnosis as an all-or-nothing affair, and insists it cannot bo 
bargained into compromise formulae; one cannot adopt the 
methods of industrial relations, and agree on a rJ°/» increase 
in jJnosis.
Here it must be noted that in many senses cultural 
integration of Cypriots with Greece and Turkey has been 
proceeding throughout this century. School curricula, rights 
to enter and work in the respective mainland countries, and 
a general heightened consciousness of the relationships between 
the islanders and the mainlanders all suggest that in many 
ways, significant steps have been taken. This argument cuts 
no ice with ardent nationalists, who see only total political 
integration as acceptable and worthwhile. When asked how
life will actually be altered by iinosis they are sometimes at
a loss for words, unless they repeat such sacred formulas as
"Whatever else, we will be at last reunited with Mother
Greece", but they give a strong impression that in some 
importart , if elusive, way life will be different.
(iv) The Importance of liOKA
Grivas organised EOKA by first distributing arms to 
members of two nationalist youth movements, 0HJ3N and PEON
7/9
Stephens, 1966:134). The first plans were worked out in
Octobei 1952. J-he organisation had several different kinds 
of smaller units. There were never more than 300 full-time 
guerillas, operating in the two mountain ranges of the island. 
There were execution squads in the towns, and in the villages 
there were what Grivas called shotgun commandos, who were in 
fact villagers by day, and minor, part-time guerillas at night. 
These groups appear to have acted in a limited way and, for 
obvious reasons, opportunistically. They recruited extremely 
cautiously, by approaching young men who were known to be 
tough, nationalists and anti—communist. The youth organisations 
tended to have a few members in any particular village which 
served as the springboard for recruitment. As far as I can 
ascertain, the village shotgun commandos did not aim to recruit 
large numbers of men. If they had half a dozen men, with arms, 
this was enough. The rest of the villagers, who could scarcely 
fail to learn something of the nocturnal comings and goings 
the activity demanded, were required to keep silence about 
what they knew, and occasionally to do things they didn’t 
entirely understand, without asking questions, because it was 
’for the organisation’.
One activity in which village groups proved useful 
was in hiding wanted men, those on whose heads the British 
had put a price. These men were sometimes from the urban 
groups, sometimes from the mountain guerillas. They were 
hidden In village houses, or out in the fields. In this way, 
particular villagers came to form close ties with men from 
other parts of the island, some of whom in the Independence 
period came to enjoy positions of power in which they did not
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forget those villagers who had risked their lives to protect 
-cheni. Internment camps threw men together in a similar way.
EOKA is important in the understanding of Cypriot 
politics at botn local and national levels, "because former 
membership in it is the basis for many relationships through 
which flow favour.: and political support. Also, in national 
politics factions between former EOKA leaders are reflected 
in village groupings. Finally, EOKA leaders still have a near 
monopoly on that inexhaustible resource in Greek Cypriot polit­
ical encounters - the claim to be the only true fighters for 
Enosis.
In its original organisation, EOKA had a military side, 
under Grivas, an experienced Army officer, and a political side, 
PEKA, which seems to have been more closely linked to Makarios 
and senior Churchmen*''^  . It is probable that the military/ 
political division also reflected to some extent certain 
cleavages in Cypriot society, between village and town, uneducat 
ed and educated, but there is to my knowledge no systematic 
material to decide this point. My own analysis of the back­
grounds of 86 official EOKA fighters killed in action or captiv­
ity shows only six of them to have been urban-born, and only 
a handful to have had characteristics which would have placed 
them in any plausible elite. There is a useful sense in which 
EOKA was an organisation for people who had never belonged to 
an organisation before, and perhaps the novelty and attraction 
of this experience contributed something to the persistence 
of the organisation after Independence, in the form of local 
and national 'ex-fighters' associations. (See Appendix 2.)
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But the importance after Independence of having been 
m  EOKA must he explained by several other factors. First, 
many members were recruited while still at school, where a 
large part of the curriculum had been glowing accounts of the 
deedo of the 1821 Greek war of Independence, and where there 
had been a continual and strident emphasis on the Greekness of 
Greek-Cypriots and the glory of the Enosis struggle. To enter 
EOKA involved a secret oath of dedication to the cause and of 
obedience to the leader. Membership also included an idea of 
blood-brotherhood, and in EOKA literature the moral solidarity 
of all Greeks was continually stressed. These factors, as well 
as danger, clandestine assignments and the experience of 
comradeship under arms, produced lasting loyalties and rivalries. 
In addition to these factors, hot1 during and after the Indep­
endence, membership in EOKA was the basis for the creation of 
many new relationships throughout the island. Members moved, 
if they wished, along a series of pathways introduced and 
recommended by members to members.
But the reason any EOKA man would himself give for the 
continued existence of the ex-fighters' associations would be 
quite different from all of these: it would be that since the
1 9 54-59 struggle had failed to achieve Eno3is, there could be 
no question of abandoning the struggle, even though it must 
at certain times take peaceful form within the constitution of 
a state whose pre-conditions rule it out.
I have suggested that many of the recruits to the active 
military side of EOKA were rural youngsters, far from the urban 
elite. But membership in EOKA is difficult to speak of precisely, 
since on paper at least it was a complex organisation, and
undoubtedly relied on support of many people in a very informal 
way. after Independence, for obvious reasons, many people 
said they had been members. On one level, the Ideology of 
the independence struggle was 'we were all in the Organisation', 
but since those families who suffered hardship could later 
claim important benefits - scholarships to Greece for their 
childieu, medical assistance, jobs, etc., it became necessary 
to differentiate between those who had offered more or less. 
Grivas himself handed out a number of certificates, which 
stated that individuals had in fact served in or helped the 
Organisation, and of course membership in the ex-fighters’ 
association became an important indicator. The fact that 
Kakarlos included in his first cabinet four young men under 5 0, 
who had all been prominent in one or another branch of EOICA, 
was a sign of its political importance in the new republic.
At lower levels of organisation, it appears that prominent 
EOKA men acted for the first two or three years of Independence 
as an informal duplicate civil service, overseeing and inter­
vening in many administrative decisions, especially those 
related to job appointments, import licences, building and 
development permissions, and scholarships. This was a kind 
of i'.OKA honeymoon, during which people sought for themselves 
and their dependents rewards to which they saw themselves as 
eminently entitled. If it was sometimes objected in certain 
quarters that the EOKA people lacked formal qualifications for 
some of the benefits they sought, there was an immediate and 
morally compelling defence - these men had endangered their 
lives during the struggle, while others had from positions of 
security and privilege been pursuing for their own self-interest
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those very qualifications.
Since 1959 an important cleavage in Greek-Cypriot 
ciety has been between categories (and sometimes groups) of 
persons in which the main moral resources have been references 
to dedication and self-sacrifice during the 1954-59 and 1963-4  
nationalist activities on the one hand, and the formal, legal­
istic, bureaucratic values of qualifications and technical 
competence on the other. To have served one's country in EOKA 
may, for a tough and courageous young village boy, have needed 
no academic ability, school fees, command of English or famili­
arity with city ways. However, as members of the urban elite 
never tire of pointing out, other qualities than the ability 
to use a gun are needed to run a modern state.
Inevitably, a reaction set in against the EOKA honey­
moon, but even if it had not done so, so many people stepped 
forward to claim the rewards of service to the nation that 
many were bound to have been disappointed. A wealthy country 
could have passed a GI Bill of Rights and socially enfranchised 
all comers. A poor country must pick and choose. To do this 
is to create dissatisfaction.
(v) 1960-1970 : Independence, Inter-Communal Conflict, and
stalemate
August 16, I960, marked the independence of the island, 
which had been preceded two weeks earlier by national elections 
to the House of Representatives, in which AKEL, the communist 
party tinder an electoral pact with Makario3, was returned 
unopposed in five out of the 35 Greek seats, the other 30 seats 
going to a loose nationalist coalition, called the Patriotic
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Fifteen seats, and the post of Vice-President of
the Pepublic with important veto powers, went to the Turkish 
National Party.
xhe nex: three years saw two important developments: 
first was open breach between Makarios and Grivas over the 
issue of ^noai^ and relations with the Turkish community, 
lhis inevitably involved their supporters. The second devel­
opment was a struggle between the Greeks and Turks over the 
implementation of the constitution. Many Greeks were dissatis­
fied with 'uhe notion that the Turkish 18°Jo of the island should 
be guaranteed of civil service jobs, to be applied in every 
grade, and other benefits. These tensions came to a head in 
a constitutional crisis over budget approvals, and in December
1963 the first fighting broke out between the two ethnic 
communities.
In 1964 sporadic fighting continued at different points 
in the island. Among the Greeks volunteer militias formed in 
many villages, often based on experienced EOKA members, including 
Kallo. It is not clear what was the legal status of these 
militias, or how much clandestine support from Greek political 
figures had prepared the way for their formation. Grivas, 
who, owing to his differences with Makarios, had •retired' to 
the Greek mainland, returned to Cyprus in June 1964, expressly 
to form a disciplined National Guard, to replace the volunteer 
militias. This step seems to have been most necessary, since 
irregular units, owing to problems of poor discipline and 
communication, had created serious political difficulties for 
the Makarios government.
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The return of Grivas, and the formation of the National 
Guaro, were not only moves by the Greek Cypriots to further 
their ends against the Turks. Several writers agree that 
they had implications both for the difficult relations between 
the Greek government and Makarios at this time, and also for 
Makarios* personal position. Campbell, for example (Campbell 
and Sherrard, 1968:270), suggests that the Americans persuaded 
the Greek government to allow Grivas to return to Cyprus in 
June 1964 as a move to control the increasingly independent 
policies of Makarios. Legg seems to confirm this, for he 
writes (Legg, 1969:223) of subsequent developments in 1965:
"Archbishop Makarios, who differed from General 
Grivas over the future course of Cyprus toward 
union with Greece, found that control of the 
Cypriot armed forces rested not with his government, 
but with Grivas. In an effort to counter this,
Makarios was attempting to build up the gendarmerie 
as an alternative force. Supposedly, the Aspida 
plot, at first intended only to undermine Grivas, 
began with a visit of Andreas lapandreou to 
Makarios."
This would appear to be the origins of the fierce disputes 
between Yorgaajis, Minister of the Interior and responsible 
for the police (which Legg calls the gendarmerie) and Grivas, 
as Commander of the newly-formed National Guard.
One consequence of this period of fighting and militia 
formation seems to have been that rivalries between Greek 
political leaders became more open. Since a number cf different 
individuals formed their own militias, small centres of power 
arose which also had different political colourings, ihere 
appear to have been at least the following groupings in the 
1964-5 period: i) a Grivas grouping, of strong right-wing
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anti-communists, also bent on fierce opposition to the [Turks; 
ii) a group following the former EOKA fighter Nikos Sampson, 
a man who had been somewhat fluid in his political opinions 
biit who regained nominally both a supporter of Makarios and 
a critic of the Zurich-London Agreements. He led a group in 
the 1'jicosia fighting of 1963-64; iii) Vassos Lyssarides, 
Makarios* personal physician, a nationalist, but far and away 
the most left-wing political leader in the nationalist camp.. 
lie also formed a volunteer militia group in this period, which 
so distinguished itself in an assault on St Hilarion that 
Lyssarides managed to disarm much nationalist mistrust of 
his left-wing views. He also acted as Makarios1 Hermes to the 
Third World, ana was the man responsible for bringing in weapons 
from various socialist countries, during the early part of 
the crisis, iv) The Makarios group, which included a number 
of ministers and politicians, but particularly Clerides, 
Yorgadjis andPapadopoullos; according to a series of articles 
published in April 1966 in the extreme nationalist PATRIS 
newspaper, these men had overall responsibility for a military 
organisation to be ready in the event of difficulties with 
the Turkish community, and which would carry out necessary 
measures to achieve Enosis.
The period of 1964-5 was one of continual unrest, 
rumours of planned coups against Makarios, and growing rivalry 
among nationalist politicians. The communists continued to 
support Makarios, and avoid provoking (and thus uniting) the 
nationalists. In March 1964 the first UN contingents came 
to Cyprus, and they are still there at time of writing. Since
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1964 there has been occasional limited fighting between the 
Greek and Turkish communities, with a period in winter 1967 
when the mainland Turkish army came very close to invading the 
island, .following the death of some Turkish Cypriots in 
Kophinnou village. During the last three years, Constitutional 
Talks have gone on between Glavkoa derides for the Greeks, 
and Raouf Denktash for the Turks. Thus, since December 1963* 
there has been virtual stalemate in interaommunal relations, 
with a do facto patchwork partition of the island.
In March 1968 Archbishop Malwrios was overwhelmingly 
re-elected President of the Republic by the Greek community. 
Since then the two most Important events wore the political 
impetus he gave to the formation of political parties among 
the Greeks, in February 1969, and the successful completion 
of elections in the Greek community, May-June 1970. Those 
elections for the legislative Assembly wore the first to bo 
held for ten years, but for the two years immediately preceding 
them, in the degree of unrest it sometimes looked doubtful 
if they would be held at all.
This was because of the birth of a new political 
organisation in the island, the Ethnikori Metopon. or National 
Front. This was an underground organisation, which apparently 
had units all over the island, which first made its presence 
felt by distributing leaflets attacking various government 
ministers for corruption, betrayal of the national interest, 
and a general failure more vigorously to prosecute the cause 
of Enosls. In 1969 and early 1970 there were a number of 
violent attacks on high officials, usually involving shootings, 
or the bombing of homes. There were also seizures of arms
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and explosives from polio© stations and wining oampa, There 
was a general atmosphere of tension, the newspapers were aguin 
full o.f stories of ooups being planned, and when 1 returned 
to the village for three weeks in December 1969, 1 was 
immediately warned by villagers not to ask questions about 
the jiitbniV.on Metopon.
In Maroh 1970 there was an assassination attempt on 
President Makarios, and a few days later former Interior 
Minister Yorgadjis was shot to death outside Wioooia by persons 
unknown. Yorgadjis had resigned his ministry a year earlier 
after rumour had Implicated him in an assassination attempt 
on Papadopoulos, the loader of the mainland (Jreelc ,Junta. At 
the time Yorgadjis and Makarios were said to have quarrelled 
bitterly, and Makarios to have forced YorgadjJls1 resignation. 
When Yorgadjis was killed, popular opinion was that he had 
been behind the attempt on Makarios’ life, and this was 
supported by the Identity of some of the men arrested for 
that attempt, and later tried and imprisoned,
In May 1970, the island had not recovered from these 
incidents when some seventy armed men took over the central 
polios station in Limassol, the second largest town of the 
island, held it for an hour, arid made off with a large haul 
of weapons. They were soon caught and identified as the 
leros Loohos. Holy Brigade, an offshoot of the Kthnlfrm M.etQPOlU 
They claimed to have expected their action to be supported all 
over the Island and the proclamation of Enos.Is to follow 
immediately. Their arrest was followed by major purges and 
reorganisations of the police foroe, and a lengthy public trial 
of some twenty of those caughtj many others were pardoned, 
others published declarations of loyalty to President Kakarios.
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Ihose tried were in the main artisans and Junior white- 
collar workers.
i’hese Incidents (particularly the assumed involvement 
of Yorgadjis in the attempt on Makarios' life) caused groat 
unease in the islanu, particularly since Yorgadjis, as 
minister over the police, had been responsible for giving 
to many people tie jobs they held. The man who had in February 
1969 lounded the United Party with Yorgadjis, Glavkos derides, 
was left with the unenviable political legacy of his associ­
ation with the dead man; his problem was effectively to 
dissociate himself and his party from the mud that was happily 
flung from all sides at Yorgadjls' name, but aimed also at 
the survivors.
Once again, Cypriot politics became the scene of 
universal attempts to monopolise the legitimacy of Archbishop 
Makarios, who was - if popular accounts are to be believed - 
giving tacit support to all parties from AKiiL through to the 
more respectable right-nationalist groups. Only Wvdokas and 
the Grivas faction failed to claim secret Presidential favour.
I have given this particular kind of material from 
the independence period because it supports and clarifies 
the material I shall now consider from the village fieldwork.
If I have appeared to dwell unduly on instability, rivalry, 
tension and the naked exercise of power, thin perhaps reflects 
the view of my predominantly village informants. Hut although 
the stridency of the Cypriot press often lend the magnifying 
and distorting qualities of an echo chamber to the smallest 
political messages, I believe that an impartial and well- 
informed observer in the capital would have produced similar
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observations and emphases. A full account of the government 
programmes of the period v/ould have to review the considerable 
social and economic progress made bjr the Greek community, and 
a number of achievements in the areas of social welfare and 
agricultural development. Such progress was not nearly so 
marked for the Turkish community, restricted by their own
Infertile land.
(vi) l-'olitical Change and Representation
ne of the more striking facts to emerge from this 
discussion has been the discontinuity of political represent­
ation over the last forty years. As I noted in the first 
chapter, before 1931 villagers were able to exercise some 
choice in the selection of village muktars, and there was 
an electoral system for the Members of the Legislative Assembly.
At time of writing, muktars continue to be appointed by govern­
ment. From 1931-1959 there were no elections to the Legis­
lative Assembly, and politically most of this period was marked 
by opposition to British rule, elections to the Assembly were 
held in 1959, postponed for 1964 due to the intercommunal
unrest, and only held again in 1970.
Two other t pes of national elections were open to 
villagers in this period - for Archbishop, and for President 
of the Republic since 1959. Since 1945 there have in fact 
been two elections for Archbishop and two for President. In 
all these cases there have been two candidates each time, and 
each time the organised left has been formally supporting one; 
however, it is worth noting too that Archbishop Kakarios III, 
the successful winner of the second Archiepiscopal election,
rebellion within enclaves and usually,/
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has also been the favourite and winner in both Presidential 
elections.
I have performed the prosaic task of counting these 
electoral opportunities, and hinting at the resti'ictions on 
representation implicit in them. Two archbishops, two presid­
ents, and two Legislative Assemblies (over forty years) do 
not amount to a great deal of political experience. Wien 
the predominance of Makarios in three of these elections, and 
the passivity of the left’s electoral tactics in two of them 
are also considered, as well as the recent rash of contingencies 
and crises surrounding the electoral process which are the 
legacy of intercommunal strife, then the poverty of electoral 
experience is underlined. This is in sharp contrast to the 
continuity and relative progress in the economic and social 
sectors.
There are two other tendencies which must be noted.
On' is the obvious fact of transition from British to Cypriot 
rale. This has turned out to be ridden with difficulties.
The second is a transition from an indigenous political 
process dominated entirely by elite leadership, trying to 
wrest benefits from a foreign government, to a situation 
whern universal suffrage must lead to a responsiveness on the 
part of elected representatives to mass demands. In chapter
11 I shall describe how during the 1970 elections politicians 
of all parties wooed ti-e wondering electorate with promises 
of social benefits - something of a novelty for their listeners. 
In this they were only carrying on the attempts of men like 
HajiPavlou, in the 1920's, to appeal on a populist platform 
to a suspicious peasantry. In this chapter the fact of a
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discontinuity between the days of HajiPavlou and the campaign 
speeches of May 1970 haa boon presented. This discontinuity 
meant bhat everything that waa done for villagers was done 
from abovo. The political Instability of the period, contrasted 
with. tho parallel economic development may explain the villag­
ers’ ambivalence to representative politics, which in oomparioon 
with the fruits of personal labour, offer benefits more 
doubtful than certain.
Footnotes to Chapter 7
1
(1) Davis (1969) points out that for somewhat different 
reaaona the Picticcoal have had a wide variety of 
political experienced In this century, and still enjoy 
a broad range of opportunities for alignment.
(2) My main sources for the background material In this 
chapter have been Ill'll (1952) , Stephens (1966) ,
Alaatoa (1955), Campbell & Shorrarcl (I960), Taoucalao 
(1969), Foley (1964), Harbottle (1970), Adams (1971). 
However, there was little more substantial than 
nowapapor articles to provide for the period from 
1968 onwards, for obvious reasons. 110 definitive 
study of Greek Cypriot political history since 1931 
exlata, and moat writers concentrate on lntercommunal 
relations.
(3) Kyriakoo Markldea, personal communication. At time 
of writing Markidea la preparing his doctoral thoala 
for publication* but 1 have not been able to read it.
(4) I do not think thoro had been a comparable movomont 
among the [Turkish minority. Anderson (1950) suggests 
that the spirit behind poet-war legislative reform of 
Ialamlc lav/ waa one of Intensified ethnic conaoiouonosa, 
In direct oppoaltion to the Croeka. Tho Turklah 
minority began, under British stimulation, to counter 
demands for Knoala with their matching demand for 
Taxim, partition,"In the late 1950's. More recently, 
the notion of Double Knosls has been widely discussed
in both communities, fry" th!a la meant, partition of 
the island, with one oectlon becoming part of the 
political community of Greece, and tho other of 'Turkoy.
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(5) In Grivas1 memoirs (ad. Foley) he states that PISKA 
reported directly to him, She issue of co-ordination 
between the military struggle and the political 
campaign headed by Makarios is a matter of factional 
dispute between the two principals and their supporters.
(6) Patriotilcon Metopon. Not to be confused with the 
i11egal organisation which first appeared dn 1969» 
the Kthnlkon Hotonon, or Kational Front*
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CHAPTER 8
yiM^gjL'.,ff°^lDARlTY AMD THE POLITICAL PROCESS
1963-70
Introducti on
In this chapter I present and analyse six cases of village 
politics during the first ten years of Independence, and assess 
their implications for the solidarity of the village, the rules, 
forrsial and informal of political competition in the village, 
and the differences in values of some major actors in the arena 
of the village. The first four cases are reconstructions of 
events, pieced toaether from accounts by several informants.
The last two cases took place during my fieldwork, and I 
observed much of what was involved.
This chapter also marks a turning point in both aims and 
methods. Up till now the concern has been to describe the main 
structural and Institutional facts necessary to understand the 
process of politics in the village. In effect, a number of 
building blocks have been assembled, and from here on, in 
changing the emphasis from structure to process, the concern is 
also to show the blocks as they appear in social situations, 
joined together. To do this I shall present in considerable 
narrative detail extended case histories which show a number 
of facets of politics in the village. It might be argued that 
the narrative detail is too great for the theoretical yield which 
is extracted. To this, my reply must be first, that the social 
anthropology o£ the Mediterranean area in particular, as well
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as of the political process in developing countries are in 
their infancy. Arguably, the political process has been the 
area of Mediterranean ethnography least well served by existing 
monographs. Secondly, I maintain that there is no reason to 
retreat from one of the classic tasks of social anthropology - 
the presentation of rich ethnographic data - simply because 
we are also concerned to advance existing theory. Thirdly, that 
in analysis of a society midway between traditional peasantry, 
and a modern state of literate citizens description of the 
political culture will be of considerable theoretical interest. 
Political culture is necessarily a somewhat general notion, and 
here I mean it to stand for whatever is distinctive about the 
style, values and character of Cypriot politics. To reveal such 
features requires detailed attention to the behaviour of 
Individuals in varied social situations. Prom here on I resort, 
then, to a focus on the behaviour of particular individuals, 
and do this at length.
The six cases of this chapter are all concerned with 
competition for prestige or power between villagers, and although 
outside resources are often employed, the main arena is the 
village, and the main protagonists the villagers themselves.
In chapter nine, the focus shifts to relations between villagers 
and the larger society. In this case the main therce is the 
struggle of Kallo and several surrounding villages to speed up 
government construction of a dam, and the opposition of Market 
Tovm to this dam. Chapter ten shows the cleavage between 
Market Tovm and its satellite villages again operating (in time 
it co-exists with the issue of the dam) but this time in the
8/3
cont„,.t of the administration of the citrus co-operative, in 
which man^ villaaers and Market Townsmen are shareholders.
Chapter eleven discusses the consequences for Kallo of the 
electoral campaigns of two wain parties in 1970, and how 
this campaign tested the solidarity of leading Kallotes. Thus, 
each chapter focuses on a different organisational level of 
Kallo politics. In real life several series of events were 
going on simultaneously, and with the same personnel. For 
analytic purposes I have treated them separately, both for 
the sake of clarity, and for the insight they give into the 
complex inter-relation of the several political, fields involved.
) The Case of the Graduates1 Club
Vourros was born in the neighbouring village of Kammari, 
married, the daughter of a Kallo mnktar, and together they live 
in a large house in the capital. They have very large land 
holdings in the village, and a house. They are often there. 
Vourros has a university degree from Britain, and teaches in 
a private school. His views on village life stress the need 
for thrift, hard work, strict accounting; he deplores the 
drinking, swearing and spitting of the coffee-shops, the respect 
for physical toughness. He has fairly strong views on the need 
to 1 dove lop' vi .1.1 age s.
In 1962 he proposed to several other educated men in the 
village that they do what his own and several other villages 
had done - start a club for gymnasium graduates, a syllogos 
apophyton, in which villagers with secondary education could 
come together to chat, read newspapers, play chess, drink coffee, 
end. perhaps occasionally discuss problems of the village.
They might even invite outside speakers to address them. The
8/4
club would, ho hastened to add, he non-political.
*lG ^ounr  ^those with whom he discussed the idea quite 
enthusiastic. He continued with the idea until he had sounded 
out most or the eligible men in the village. They got as 
far as agreeing a date for meeting, to discuss a constitution.
In the event, nothing happened. Several people who had 
previously expressed enthusiasm approached Vourros and said on 
thinking it over they had decided that really the village was 
all rignt as it was, and they did not really need a club for 
those with secondary education. At first Vourros was puzzled, 
and when he pressed people, they became uncomfortable. Finally
it came out that Moustaches, the leader of the village EOKA
group in the 1950's, a farmer with substantial land and a small 
supplementary government job, had heard about the scheme, and 
said in his view it would be a bad thing for the village,
because it would undoubtedly become political in tone. Having
expressed himself strongly against it, and suggested to other 
people that they should see it hi3 way, previous support for 
the scheme simply evaporated. Vourros tried a direct discussion 
with Moustachas on the subject, assuring him of the lack of 
political intention, but Moustachas, who had not enjoyed 
secondary education, would not change his view.
Privately Moustachas pointed out that several people 
interested in the club were leftists or left sympathisers, and 
he was sure they would try to take it over.
At this point Vourros might still have succeeded, because 
there was one man in the village who could have talked 
Moustachas round, or at least, acted as a counter-weight. This 
was the teacher Dhaskalos who was both a known right-wing
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nationalist, with a record of EOKA service in the village as 
well as being an educated man. Dhaskalos insists that Vourros, 
believing him to be hostile to the notion anvway, failed to 
approach him at the right time. Thus Dhaskalos simply stood 
back and watched. He believed a club would be good for the 
village; he thought Moustachas' view was wrong (he had in any 
case some personal differences with him which dated from the 
period of EOKA leadership) but he was not prepared to support 
Vourros. He took the simple step of not turning xip to the 
initial meeting that Vourros had tried to organise. He did 
nothing so direct as tell him either that he would not come, 
or why he would not come. Indeed he had told Vourros that 
he would come.
That was the end of the Graduate's Club, but Vourros 
continued to think about it, and built up a picture of the 
village as a place where education was rejected, and only the 
ability to use guns carried any weight.
Why should the proposed formation of the Graduates Club 
have produced Moustaches’ determined opposition, and why should 
the event be sregarded as in any way memorable by those involved? 
There are a number of reasons. First, Moustachas was 
undoubtedly sincere in his belief that the leftists might 
dominate such a club. For one thing it is part of the right’s 
picture of the left that it is constantly engaged in a secret 
move to increase its power; secondly the right sees the left 
as working among/things through literacy, book-learning. Sklyros, 
for example, is known to do a lot of reading in his spare time, 
and so did the village's first two Communists. "They read a lot, 
those cuckolds” was a remark I heard on many occasions. So to 
Moustachas the idea of a leftist take-over of the Graduates Club
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was plausible.
He also had something to gain by bin action. To have 
taken action which could be reported in anti-commxmist circles 
as viqilance was useful, and at the same tine, to have 
demonstrated his power in the village was part of a self- 
fulfilling prophesy. Since the days of the EOKA struggle 
there do not seem to have been many opportunities for 
Moustachas to have laid down the lav? in the village. Here was 
a chance and he took it.
The reasons given so far are to do with Moustachas' 
personal power and position, and make him sound extremely 
calculating. This by itself would be misleading. There are 
other aspects which must be considered which may have 
influenced him but of which he need not have been consciously 
aware. At this period Kallo was a hornogei^ous community in the 
sense that there were no strongly institutionalized arrange­
ments for social distinctions between members of the village. 
Although Vourros could not see it this way, his proposal to 
introduce a Graduates Club was a proposal to introduce emphatic 
and institutionalised inequality into the village. This is 
not to say that In a solidary community everyone mixes socially 
with everyone else on terms of absolute equality. I have 
already made it clear in my discussion of land, occupation, 
status, life styles and the arrangement of marriage that the 
villagers are well aware of social differences. This does not 
mean however that they are generally enthusiastic to have such 
differences institutionalised. Since the actual decision to 
oppose the Club came from a single man, who was quite widely 
feared in the village, it would be incorrect to take his views
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as simply representing those of the village nt largo. Also, 
in other villages, ouch clubs have been accepted for many 
years, oome are political, others are not. It is important 
to note howovoj., that whether or not the club would have 
become political In the way Moustachas said it would, it would 
have unambiguously symbolised a most important difference 
be tween vi11age r s.
I have argued in chapter seven that during the early years 
of independence, there was a structural conflict in Cypriot 
society, expressed by individuals’ statements that others 
were not entitled to benefits -• jobs, scholarships etc. The 
individuals in question were members of certain categories, Jn 
broadest terms on uneducated rural mass with aroused expectations, 
and an educated urban elite.
The episode in the village over the formation of a club 
for Graduates han, as one of its several causes, the way in 
which Vourros and Moustaches represent the opposed values and 
characteristics of these categories. In this sense the dispute* 
was a miniature version of a pervasive, general conflict within 
the larger society, which will become more sharply defined by 
the next case.
Before passing to it however, it is worth relating an 
interesting sequel to the events of 1963. In January 1970, a 
man in his middle twenties freshly returned from a university 
degree from Greece, and like Vourros n secondary school teacher 
from a wealthy farming family, tried to set up a Graduate's 
Club in the village. In a few words, his experiences turned out 
very much the same as Vourros’. Initially there was a lot of
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verbal support which however soon faded. He discovered that 
certain people were blocking the club, the supporters in the 
main of a ricrht-wing nationalist party. He himself was an 
open supporter of a left-wing nationalist party- The E'en who 
opposed hiri'1 were mostly uneducated farmers with solid land 
holdings; but they were supported by a few young men with 
secondary education, who now face the difficulties of finding 
appropriate jobs in a shrinking market.
In 1971 a right-wing nationalist club was formed in the 
village, which no-one had the temerity to oppose. But in 
these situations, nationalism is usually defined as non-political 
and the club in theory is open to all.
The chief reason that Moustachas was able to get his way 
in the first place was because Vourros and the other educated 
men were afraid that he would use force if they persisted with 
their plansf and that his EOKA connections, and urban patrons 
among former EOKA fighters would support him in anything he 
chose to do. Vourros had already had one scare during the 
EOKA period^and he was not prepared to take the matter further. 
It is very likely that Moustachas would not have resorted to 
force in this issue; the critical fact was that others thought 
he might. Later events will make clear why they thought so.
(ii.) The_ case of the Cretan guns
The fighting that broke out in December 1963 had its 
repercussions In the village. One of these was that in the 
first half of 1964 the EOKA group in Kallo decided to form a 
volunteer militia unit to protect the village in the event of 
a direct Turkish attack, and also to take part in fighting 
generally in defence of the Greek community in the island.
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It must be stressed that information on such topics is hard 
to obtain, but the evidence suggests that the volunteer 
militia groups were those already planned by Yorgadjis and 
Koshis prior to the Turkish r e b e l l i o n . However until the
return of General Grivas to Cyprus in June 1964, militia
groups and "private armies” acted with a high degree of local
autonoray. Several accounts agree that the Makarios government
had a serious problem in trying to control the behaviour of 
such groups during the fighting.
Although Moustachas was the senior EOKA man in the village 
involved with the volunteer militia he seems to have shared 
the command of the militia unit with his wife's sister’s son 
Vasilakis, who partly due to his uncle's intercession had been 
commissioned in the Cyprus Array. Several other prominent 
EOKA people were also in command positions in the unit, and 
some 50 or 60 village men volunteered as ’other ranks'. On 
this occasion, unlike the 1954-59 EOKA struggle, known leftists 
were admitted to the militia, the view being taken that the 
national threat from the Turks was such that even leftists could 
be relied on to fight wholeheartedly for their country.
The first job of the militia unit was to obtain guns.
The government was very short of weapons at this period, so the 
Kallo unit organised a house-to-house collection to raise money 
for the guns. They used a system, of assessment by the relative 
xvealth of the family, with a large landowner being assessed at 
about £20 and a poor man at a pound or two. Even those who felt 
that perhaps the purchase of arms at this point was ill-advised
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and that such matters should be loft to the central government, 
were not inclined to resist the assessed contributions, since 
this would have appeared unpatriotic, and no-one wanted to 
argue with the EOKA men in the village. In the end about 
£1,000 was collected, and three wen were sent to Crete via 
Athens to buy guns. In due course they returned with some guns. 
But some of the villagers felt that these guns were in poor 
condition, were few in number, and that even when the essential 
expenses of the trip were taken into account, there was rather 
little to show for the money. They also heard from peopln in 
other villages who had sent similar missions that the guns 
were given away free by the Cretans. There was therefore some 
ill-feeling about the Cretan guns, and years later people were 
saying quite openly in the coffee 3hops about the trip and the 
money epha’an ta 'they ate it’.
Faced with a loss of support, albeit probably of a muted 
nature, the EOKA group running the militia revived a device 
which had existed in the 1954-59 period, the formation of a 
special committee, the Co-ordinating Committee (Syntonlstlkl 
Bpitropia). It is possible that the initiative for the formation 
of this committee did not come directly from the leaders of the 
militia unit but from other members of the village. However, 
the militia leaders accepted the idea and even agreed to the 
presence of several leftists on the committee. It is agreed 
by all parties in Kallo that the Initiative for the committee 
did not come from the central government or any other official 
body, even though in some other villages similar committees 
emerged during these months.
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The minutes kept by the committee - which I examined - 
begin by specifying who are recognised as the leaders of the 
militia unit, and go on to specify the members of the Committee. 
Of the ten men named ^ ^  one is the muktar, two are the two most 
prominent leftists, Sklyros and Tangos, the brother of one of 
the three men to go on the Cretan trip. No-one suggested to me 
that he would not fees impartial, h fourth is Vourros. Patris 
and his brother were members and several other nationalists.
The aims of the Committee were listed as concerning (I quote);
(1) the agricultural and family problems of militia 
unit members
(2) political and economic problems, such as relations 
with the Kallo Turks
(3) general economic losses to the Turks
(4) control of military activities, by liaison between 
the militia unit and the Committee. The teacher 
Dhaskalos was selected as the militia leader 
responsible for liaison
(5) that militia unit members shall give 48 hours 
notice of agricultural work needed to be handled 
by the Committee
(6) the Committee to have the final say on the actual 
payments by unit members
(7) that good accounts are to be kept and audits allowed 
for all financial transactions
(8) the volunteer militia unit to give account for the 
outstanding previously collected money (the Athens- 
Crete trip)
(9) in the event of differences of opinion between the
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Committee and the militia unit, the local district
Legislative Assembly representative to be the
(4)arbitrator'
Informants explained that one of the outstanding problems 
of the volunteer militia was that during the absences of the 
men for training or fighting (and it must be stressed that the 
Kallo unit was involved in heavy fighting on several occasion.)) 
the agricultural work involved in their landholdings needed 
attention. In the case of crops like potatoes and carrots, 
a day or two's delay at critical harvesting times can lead to 
complete destruction of the crop. For the village to handle 
such administrative problems it was essential to obtain money 
to pay other people to do the work, by taxing the village yet 
again. Clauses (6) and (7) are thus to be seen as attempts 
to prevent the sort of dissatisfaction that occurred over the 
Cretan guns. Clause (8) one informant insisted was inserted 
through the efforts of Vourros.
It should be noted that one of the issues that Vourros 
and some of the leftists in the village, such as Sklyros, felt 
was in danger of being mishandled was the treatment of the 
Kallo Turks. It seems that a few of the more excitable and 
extreme persons connected with the militia were anxious that 
the Kallo Turks possibly with the help of other Turks from 
outside, would try to harm the Greek community. Since the 
Kallo Turks were outnumbered,J 20 to 1 and since Kallo is 
strategically rather far away from a major Turkish concentration 
as well as being surrounded by exclusively Greek villages, their 
fears may be seen to have been groundless, but in the atmosphere 
of alarm and vigilance of the period, sxich views undoubtedly had
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some effect. At one point a few persons were sneaking of 
driving the Kallo Turks out of the village, and over this 
issue Vourros spoke very hard and critically of such views. 
Sklyros also used his baptismal koumbaros relationship with 
Moustachas to persuade him to go with him one evening when 
the militia was preparing to go into action against a distant 
Turkish village, and reassure the Kallo Turks, who were 
terrified, that not only did the Kallo Greeks mean them no 
harm but that in the event of outsiders coming to harm them, 
the Kallo Greeks would defend their.. These episodes cast light 
on clauses (2), (3) and (4). However I am not able to say
definitely if the concern and discussion about the Kallo Turks 
happened before the formation of the Committee, and directly 
produced the relevant clauses, although the evidence suggests 
this. Informants are not certain about sequences of events here.
Also at roughly this period there were undoubtedly certain 
personal animosities between Vourros and Vasilakis, the army 
officer. On one occasion Vasilakis said to Vourros "What you 
need is a bullet: not actually in your head, but just close
enough to put some sense into it". In terms of the way most 
village people 3peak to Vourros, this was highly disrespectful, 
and confirmed all the resei'vations Vourros had about the tendency 
of the villagers to turn to violence or threats of violence at 
the least excuse.
In this period of approximately six months, January - June 
1964, Vourros had been engaged, using his professional skills 
in preparing hand-grenades for the use of the Greek militia in 
Nicosia. Vasilakis on several occasions asked him to bring some 
grenades for the use of the Eallo militia unit, but this he
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always refused to do on the grounds that he was acting under 
orders, and was accountable for all the grenades produced, and 
that these were under the direct control of the government.
I would have liked to place this series of events related 
to the Cretan guns trip and the formation of the Co-ordinating 
Committee in a precise time—seguence and to state the effect 
that each event had upon the others. This is not possible.
To do so would be to transmute impressions - both mine and my 
informants - into the more weighty metal of certainty. In 
spite of this weakness it is clear that during this period a 
number of incidents took place connected with the formation 
of the militia, involving some of the more influential people in 
the village, and that these incidents reflected real and divisive 
differences of opinion about how village affairs should be 
conducted.
The first recorded minute of the Co-ordinating Committee 
is entered by Vourros, and it thanks Vasilakis, as officer in 
charge of the militia for having co-operated in presenting the 
accounts of the Cretan trip, but asks if he could further 
provide the actual list of names of villagers and amounts 
collected because the amounts set down do not tally.
The Committee decided to meet every Saturday evening 
regularly, and to have special meetings if needed. The next 
meeting noted that a list of tax-payers wa3 being prepared, 
and that an association of tractor owners had put the money 
owed to it at the disposal of the committee. At the next 
meeting, among other things decided, were that one member 
should take responsibility for certain 'special losses' to the 
Turks of the village. These arose when some shepherds had turned
their flocks to graze in the Turks' croplands, and later, 
when another villager had taken 50 lorry loads of earth from 
a Turkish field without payment. Another item minuted was 
that the militia unit commander, Vasilakis, was requested to 
attend regular committee meetings as often as possible. The 
last item was a request that the accounts for the Cretan arms 
trip be presented "With the least delay possible, so that 
the rsnity of the village will not be broken”. At the next 
meeting, neither Vasilakis nor his uncle Moustachas were present. 
It was decided that the shepherds should pay the Turks £5 for 
damage to their carrots, and the man who had taken 50 lorry 
loads of earth to pay £5 for them, which was only slightly 
under the market rate. This ran was married to the half-sister 
of Sklyros the leftist leader, who is also at this point 
writing up the committee minutes.
At a later meeting, one committee man resigns in order to 
allow his place to be taken by * an educated man9. Four names 
are put forward, in order of preference. All four are school­
teachers .
In the end, Vourros signed the accounts for the Cretan 
trip, although he had great reservations about them. He saw 
himself as having no practical alternative. At one point, 
when a villager wa3 refusing to co-operate with the Committee, 
Vourros asked some of the tougher members to deal with him, 
knowing that this might involve force; another act of the 
committee was to resolve to help the Turkish muktar of the 
village to find his wife, who had gone off (in the last stages 
of pregnancy) with a Red Cross medical team. At the last 
meeting minuted, it states that the future of the committee
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was discussed, blit no details are given.
The committee in fact lasted from March to November, 1964. 
There are two quite different explanations given for why it 
stopped, Some of the leftists claim that it became an efficient 
instrument for conducting village affairs, and vras about to 
start looking into other matters of communal interest. They 
insist that x^ hen the rightists realised this they decided to 
have nothing more to do with it, and by continually staying 
away, effectively brought it to an end. Sklyros is a proponent 
of this view, and is particularly bitter about the issue, since 
he says that the right, by which he means the militia leaders, 
Moustachas and Vasilakis needed the leftists on the committee 
after the Cretan guns fiasco, to give it new legitimacy in 
the village. His theory is that the leftists had a reputation 
for honesty, and that this was the only way the militia could 
retain the confidence of the villagers. However, since they 
as rightists hated to see the left succeed in anything, when 
the committee became effective, they undermined it.
Moustachas' account is different. He stated that once 
Grivas returned to Cyprus, in June 1964, and set about organising 
through conscription a disciplined National Guard, the need 
for a volunteer militia acting on its own, diminished. The 
committee folded up because its work came to an end.
I have no way of deciding between these two versions.
There is no reason why both may not be substantially true, and 
complementary. The committee was, as far as I can see, an 
ad hoc measure, taken on local rather than governmental 
initiatives, and specifically designed to create a unified 
authority, representing all shades of political opinion among
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the Greeks of the village. The ir u k t a r  and azades could not 
do this because they were all non-leftists, and thought to be 
easily influenced by the more vocal nationalists. Once the 
national situation h?d become more normal, and a National 
Guard had been formed the specific purpose of the committee 
would have come to an end. It would be galling for the right- 
wing leaders to either admit that they had depended on left 
support, or to go on co-operating with the left, so they 
effectively withdrew. The remaining members could not act by 
themselves for the village, having neither any legal status, 
nor any legal authority to speak for the village, if the 
nationalists stayed away.
The Cretan guns episode, the formation of the committee, 
the matters undertaken by the committee have a certain con­
tinuity with the issue of the Graduates' Club: Vourros is
again involved. Moustachas is less prominent, but his nephew 
Vasilakis held very similar views politically. There are two 
sets of views and values, which I extrapolate from these events
Vourros represents the question, guls custodiet ipsos 
custodies - who will protect the rest of the village from the 
vagaries of its volunteer guardians? He represents a 
legalistic, bureaucratic position, like that of a rate-payer 
who wants to see his money properly spent. Through the minutes 
and the committee decisions, some control is exerted over the 
use of money, damage to Turkish property, the convenience of 
the militia. The notion that the committee needed more 
educated people on it underlines these issues.
The militia views are not recorded in the minutes, but 
from the way the events were described to me, there was a good
8/18
deal of resentment at the ’interference* of Vourros and other 
committee members, who were thought to be pre-occupied with 
trifling details, hampering those who due to their military 
experience, courage and patriotism were engaged in the serious 
issues of village and national defence.
Before leaving this case, it is worth noting some of the 
other consequences. Future collections for weapons were on a 
more genuinely voluntary basis. Vourros had enough of village 
politics for some time, and withdrew from them. He did not 
really take much further part in things until 1969. In 1968 
he was owed for two years' water by Moustachas and was not 
pressing for payment, although he would have liked the money.
The reason was that he was still nervous of Moustachas.
However, as I shall explain in the next chapter, in 1969 there 
was another opportunity for the village to throw up a special 
committee to meet a special crisis, and once again Vourros was 
prominent. Moustachas and Vasilakis however both stayed away 
from it.
(iii) The case of the Lyssarides gx~oup
Before discussing certain events which occurred in Kallo 
during 1665, a few words are needed about Dr Vassos Lyssarides. 
He is a medical doctor, trained in Athens, who for the last 
ten years at least has been Makarios* personal physician and
y
close confidant ). Lyssarides was in the 1940's a member of 
AKEL but withdrew. He seems to have had some connections with 
EGKA and certainly distinguished himself in the 1964 fighting by 
taking a group of men to storm a Turkish position on the 
Kyrenia range. lie is a socialist, takes an anti-NATO pro-third 
world stance, including strong support for the Arab countries.
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However he also strives to include himself within what is 
called "the nationalist ceimp" in Cyprus. Rightists who dis­
trust him for his leftism usually admit that by fighting he 
has proved himself an ardent nationalist. Lyssarides has 
also had two recurring themes in his political statements 
since 1964. One is that there are plots going on against 
Makarios, and the other is the theme of popular viqilance, 
suggesting that people's volunteer militias should be formed 
to protect the government and Makarios. Tn 1965 he was 
continually stressing both these themes and again in 1970.
He implied that a coup was being planned by extreme right elements 
in the Cyprus Army, the police force, and among the Greek Army 
contingent.
During this period two young Kallo brothers, both 
gymnasium graduates, D. and L. Fanou, had come to know the 
doctor, and to be influenced by him. Since they worked in 
Nicosia they could easily visit him in his office where he 
always welcomed political supporters. They decided to form 
a small group in Kallo in support of him, and started to 
meet in various houses in the village. Among others involved 
was Patris, the father-in-law of D. Fanou, and his brother,
Oligos, both of whom had been EOKA activists in the village.
There was also a schoolteacher, who had been at gymnasium with 
Lyssarldes and wan his koumbaros. There were between If) and 
20 people meeting regularly in this group, several of whom had 
been active in EOKA and the militia, and one of whom was a 
’spy* in that he was not there in good faith, but for the purpose 
of reporting what was going on to the teacher Dhaskalos.
Dhaskalos1 version of the situation is that Lyssarldes at 
this period was suggesting that he alone was truly pro-Makario3,
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and that his supporters in the village believed this, and 
for this reason failed to invite either Dhaskalos himself, 
or the EOKZv leader Moustachas to join the new group. They 
even suggested that Dhaskalos was not loyal to Makarios, which 
he regarded as a serious insult, and was angered. However, 
on hio own admission, he -- probably like many other thoughtful 
nationalists in the island ~ was in two minds over which to 
support - Makarios or Grivas. When asked by a friend at this 
time what he thought, he replied "t'e have to choose between a 
treasury and a pistol"; he meant that Makarios as controller 
of patronage, was the treasurer, and Grivas the pistol. lie was 
at the time attracted to the pistol, but claims he was acting 
independently of Moustachas and Vasilakis.
There was another background issue which played a part, 
although a part difficult to judge precisely. A year or two 
previously, the Fanos family had been very friendly with 
Moustachas. !Je had often eaten and drunk in their house.
They were undoubtedly hoping to obtain through, him some form 
of scholarship for one of the younger children in the family, 
a girl, so that she could study at university in Greece more 
cheaply. Such scholarships were sometimes made available to 
the families of persons who had been closely involved in the 
EOKA struggle, and Moustachas * word as the senior F.OKA man in 
the village might have carried a lot of weight. In the early 
years of the 1960's, Moustachas was consulted over the 
appointment of Kallo people to government jobs, especially on the 
all-important question of saying if they were communists or not. 
Eventually however it was his own daughter, a girl who, it wan 
said, had done much less well at Gymnasium than old Fanon' girl,
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who received a scholarship to Greece. After this relations 
between the Fanos family and Moustachas were colder.
There was another personal matter. When n. Fanon becane 
interested in supporting Lyssarides, he started arguing with 
various people in the village. Among these was Koustnchnr.1 
nephew Vasi lakis. They had a serious political argument some 
time befoi'e the events I am about to describe. My informant 
suggested that since D. Fanou was also in the militia and 
nominally under the command of Vasilakls as the officer, ho 
may have felt the need for a more powerful ally in a quarrel 
with a military superior and that this would have encouraged 
his stronger support for Lyssarides. The truth of such a 
view cannot be weighed? but the interpretation itself speaks 
powerfully of the political culture of the village.
Information on the alignments of individuals at this 
time is less reliable than most other data 1 present in this 
thesis, because since 1964 there have been major factional 
re-alignments both in the village and in the capital (which will 
be discussed more fully in chapter 11); because of thin my 
informants were undoubtedly concerned to put themselves in 
the best possible light.
The militia group which was the subject of the last ease 
was the creation of the Minister of the Interior, and the pro- 
Makarios group of politicians. However, when Grivas returned 
in mid-1964 a dispute broke out between him and the Minister, 
Yorgadjis, over control of the national Guard, and the armed 
forces generally. There was also growing hostility between 
Yorgadjis and another nationalist leader outside the government, 
liikos Sampson. On the left, Yorgadjis was continually attacked
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politically by Lyssarides. His power was feared, and he was 
believed to keep his rivals and their supporters under sur­
veillance .
These rivalries and animosities among national leaders 
were probably reflected in village militias, and groups of 
supporting clients- However, in Kallo they were kept under 
control and kept quiet, partly because some village leaders 
were trying to keep their options open, and avoided openly 
committing themselves. Moustachas for example had a government 
job/ which Yorgadjis, as Minister of the Interior, could have 
taken away from him, but he was also koumbaros of Sampson, 
who was becoming increasingly outspoken in his criticisms of 
Yorgadjis. Moustachas was also linked, through his wife's 
sister's son Vasilakis, to pro-Grivas elements in the Cyprus 
National Guard. In what follows I assume that the village 
militia leaders were reporting to the Ministry of the Interior; 
but there may also have been an active connection v/ith other 
factions in the National Guard.
This, then, was the background: a number of members of
the village militia were developing loyalties to different 
nationalist leaders and were watching each other, in an 
atmosphere of ruroured plots and planned coups in the capital.
One niljht the Lyssarides group called one of its secret 
meetings in the house of Patris. Members of the militia group 
claim that one of the subjects under discussion was of 
obtaining arms supplies, and that Patris1 brother Oligos was 
appointed as the man in charge. However, the Lyssarides group 
probably had no weapons at this time. At some point during the 
meeting they heard a noise and on opening the door found several
8/2 3
young men of the militia group oiitside, apparently listening 
to their meeting. Angry words were exchanged, and scuffles.
One of the Lyssarides group, the young teacher, L. Fanou, 
tugged at the coat of one of the militia group and saw a sten 
gun was concealed under it. During the scuffle someone 
shouted out "This is the last night you meet here".
The militia groups' version states firmly that no weapons 
were carried, and that the meaning or intention of the phrase 
"This is the last night ...” merely referred to the intention 
of the militia group to allow no more meetings of a furtive 
political nature in Kallo. The phrase is not supposed to 
contain any threat of violence. The Lyssarides' group version 
however is insistent that weapons were carried, and in one 
variant that the militia group were actually discussing throwing 
a grenade into the room.
The cluster of angry people finally dispersed from the 
house, but all the participants remained in a hioh state of 
tension. Among other things which had been said by the militia 
group was that the insults to Grivas must stop. This small 
detail perhaps explains some of what then occurred. The 
teacher L. Fanou went to Nicosia in the morning and reported 
the events of the previous night to Dr. Lyssarides, who was 
suitably angry at the way his supporters had been treated.
Later L. Fanou wrote a small description of the event which 
with the help of another Lyssarides supporter he managed to 
get printed on the front page in one of the newspapers owned 
by Uikos Sampson. It stated briefly that an attempt had been 
made to threaten a group of pro-Makarios people having a 
peaceful democratic discussion in the village of Kallo and gave
8/24
the distinct impression that the militia group were anti- 
Makar ios .
This move produced a very strong reaction from the militia 
group in the village. They were furious for several reasons. 
First, they were being described as anti-Makarios. This was 
both ideologically and practically undesirable: ideologically
because Makarios has always held centre stage in recent Cypriot 
politics, and those who have strongly opposed him have been in 
weak positions: practically because several of the militia
group held jobs which were within the government - Moustachas, 
his nephew Vasilakis, who had actually sent the militia group 
^embers to watch the house, and Dhaskalos the teacher. The 
possible threat of loss of job, loss of promotion or transfer 
to far-off places always hung over their heads.
Another reason for anger on the part of the militia group 
was that they and the villacre in general were being brought 
into disrepute with the outside world for high-handed methods. 
"An insult to the village"' was a common line of their protest. 
In any event, night after night Moustachas sat drinking in the 
coffee shops saying that when he found out who had written the 
piece he would shoot him. Dhaskalos went to see his friend 
Nikos Sampson and said "What the hell do you mean by printing 
a thing like that in your paper? We support your newspaper, 
and this is what you do. Is this what you mean by friendship?" 
He also asked Sampson to clarify the rumour which one of the 
leaders of the Lyssarides group was spreading - that Sampson 
was fonuing a group which would co-operate with Lyssarides' 
group. Sampson denied this categorically, and told Dhaskalos 
that if this had been the case, then as the chief Sampson
supporter in the village he would have been the first to 
hear about it: and that he had not known about the newspaper
story in advance, so was not directly to blame for it.
Because feeling was running so high in the village/ 
various people made efforts to reconcile the two groups.
Vourros was one of these. The District HP (who had been 
nominated as arbitrator in the relationship between the 
formal militia group and the Co-ordinating Committee) was 
approached. He was on good terms with leaders of both groups . 
There were a series of meetings involving different represen­
tatives of the two groups. One was in the house of the Kallo 
priest, at the suggestion of the MP. At this meeting two 
documents were produced. One written by Dhaskalos, described 
the newspaper report and the whole event as a 'misunderstanding1 
(parexygvsis) and asserted that no threat had taken place.
The other document, prepared by 1$, Fanou stuck to the original 
story in its main outlines, that is, that a threat had taken 
place. Since no agreement could be reached, both versions 
were taken to the MP to decide. Here once again versions
differ. The militia group claim that he decided in fav^bur of
their version, but that the Lyssarides group wotild not accept 
the verdict. They for their part claim he did not decide one 
way or the other. Debate dragged on in the coffee shops for 
weeks and even months, about who was 'really' pro-Makarios 
and who was not, who had been in the right and who in the wrong.
Some of those involved continued to be very angry and not
speak to others for nearly a year.
Most of the versions of this episode also stress that at 
the several mediatory meetings Moustachas continued to complain 
that the people of the Lyssarides* group had been going behind
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his back, and organising political actions without consulting 
him. The essence of his complaint was that his authority, 
rooted in his EOKA and militia activities, was beincr eroded. 
Insofar as he failed to get the newspaper item 'corrected' 
it could be said he failed to re-establish his position.
Indeed the very fact that an issue which a few years before 
he night have settled with a few words in a few right ears, 
had now been referred outside the village in several different 
directions (to Lyssarides, to the MP, possibly to Yorgadjls), 
was a clear indication that Moustachas no longer ’did what 
he liked' in the villaqe. At the same time there is some 
slight evidence that the main decisions in the episode were 
not taken by Moustachas, but by the younger and politically 
more sophisticated man, the teacher Dhaska los. There was 
also some tension between Phaskalos and Moustachas from 
earlier differences. There is a further complication: one
member of the militia unit who actually went to the house to 
spy on the meeting was the younger brother of Vasilakis, the 
Cyprus Army officer. He argued that if he did not give his 
older brother full details of the meeting and the action taken, 
Vasllakis might get into trouble with his military superiors 
for failing to do his job properly. Later, it was argued by 
some members of the militia group that the officer Vaeilakis 
had tried to take all the credit for the episode as if it 
were all his idea. This point makes it clear that in some 
circles at least there was an idea that something had occurred 
for which credit could be taken, a thought that might not 
immediately strike an outside observer.
Prom the point of view of the nationalist right, there
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was something to take credit for, so Moustachas did not 
come out of the episode without some gains; the Lyssarides 
group episode had several other consequences. First, the 
group as an active organisation ceased to exist. One by 
one members dropped out. Only three or four of the original 
fifteen or more remained open supporters of the doctor. Among 
the most dramatic defectors was the leader, D. Fanou. His 
father-in-law Patris, and Patris’ brother Oligos also dropped 
out, and are later in this story to be found as staunch 
supporters of other emergent and established political 
groupings of the nationalist ricrht. This seerr.s to have been 
the choice of most of the other members of the group. L. Fanou 
(the younger brother of D. Fanou) and the teacher who was 
Lyssarides classmate and koumbaros) both remained quietly loyal 
to the doctor, hampered by their roles as teachers from more 
active support. It ,i3 probably that they were only emboldened 
to support the Lyssarides crroup openly at the time because the 
action could have been defended as related to national defence 
and support for the government and thus not crudely "political5’. 
This was certainly the rhetoric of Lyssarides' position.
The case then was a turning point, in the career of 
Moustachas and in the life of the Lyssarides* group in Kallo; 
both lost by it. For D. Fanou it was also a turning point but 
perhaps a more profitable one. Ke decided in effect to take 
a less active part in politics. Several years later he was 
sent on a six months trip for special training to the USA by 
his civil service boss, who is also closely connected with 
PEK, the nationalist farmer’s party. It was for this party that 
D. Fanou, his wife's father Patris, and Patris' brother.
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Olicros, worked in the spring of 1070 (nee chapter 11).
In a more general way the episode, apart from affecting 
the positions of individuals and of factions, affected the 
whole village. It was an object lesson both to the activists 
and to the village at largo of the dangers' to village 
solidarity which arose from letting commitments to political 
leaders and values outside the village play too stroncr a role.
Looking back on this period villagers said to me 'We were 
more fanatic thon' (which is the same thing they say about 
the late 1940's, when right and loft had frequent confrontations 
both in the island and the village). The fact that villagers 
remember the incident at all, and remember it as a kind of 
failure, shows how a conscious Interest in keeping the peace 
of the village is a firm value.
Later in this account I shall describe how in June 1970 
political leaders in Kallo continually faced the possibility of 
new breaches in village solidarity due to the intensity of 
political activity, and by what methods they sought to 
restrain their followers. It may well be that one of the 
factors which told most strongly against Mouatachas in the 
Lyssarides' group affair was his open threat to use force 
against the writer of the newspaper piece. This wan regarded 
in the village subsequently as having been a thoroughly ill- 
considered action.
One Important point which emerges from the episode is the 
nature of the gap between events at the national and local levels . 
When Lyssarides wan making calls for vigilance against a possible 
right-wing coup, he undoubtedly did not intend that one direct 
result should be any loss of political support for himself.
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Yet this was the result in Kallo, and there could possiblv 
have been results even more detrimental to Lyssarides’ position 
such as the killing of some of his supporters. This suggests 
that leaders often have poor perceptions of the effects of 
their actions both on their followers and on those of their 
opponents. X shall have wore to say about this in other cases„ 
Cypriot politicians have been to some extent affected by 
British ideas of parliamentary democracyf and particularly 
enjoy the cut~and~thrust tradition of political debate.
They also indulge in violent personal attacks on each other,, 
and a standard manoeuvre consists of hinting at dark plots and 
evil designs by unnamed opponents. In the capital, in news­
print or in the Legislative Chamber the costs of such actions 
to the politicians are low, and roughly speaking they under­
stand the rules of this game. Xn the village however the 
same speeches and manoeuvres can have less predictable 
consequences. The costs of confrontation and encounter are 
potentially much higher and the rules of the game were 
designed to control indigenous home-made disputes, with home­
made norms. They do not easily control norms and manoeuvres 
favoured by the elite, who in turn are looking abroad for 
their models, to Athens, London, Moscow and elsewhere. The 
fact that both groups in Kallo turned so quickly to mediation, 
and used the mediatory process as the means of seeking further 
advantage is in itself most important. But to what extent 
this was a purely village decision and to what extent outside 
leaders influenced it I unforturf^ately cannot say.
(iv) Carrot and potato Union Elections
Xn 196 3 Kallo formed its branch of the Carrot and Potato
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Association. The regulations for the* adminiwl-j-fitlon
v\
Stipulatesd thn t th©ro v houId l»t» two commi ttees — one the 
a<hvii n i s t *• a tive committoo and the other the supervi non' 
council  ^, The committoos would tinw responsibility for 
nil administrative matters ar.Ud.nn out of tho wanhing nnd 
packing of tho vi 11 acre's carrot production.
At the elections* for those two committees tho lenders 
ol the right nnd loft no rood to share tho posts. It in worth 
noting that nt tho national level in thin period, nil 
notionalists wore still loosely allied nnd apart from a few 
supporters of General Grivas, nationalists were united In 
support of tho government. Leftists were also fully support Inq 
the government, The major cleavage among Greeks was between 
left and right; hut thin was heing kept to a minimum in tho 
interests of 'national solidarity' in the early years of tho 
Republic, Furthermore, the struggle between Greeks nnd Turks 
over the implementation of tho constitution was in full swing.
The agreement to share the committee posts in the village 
was then a reflection to nemo extent of national policies.
But when it came to tho actual nominations, the two italic 
groups could not agree over procedure. I'ntris asked Rk 1 vros 
as they sat in the village school preparing to vote,'will 
you lot us have the President of the Committee?', JSklyros 
said "We would like it"; I'ntris continued to ask for It, nnd 
finally, Bklyros decided to back down. At this point both 
groups thought that the President of the Committee, as opposed 
to the President of the Council, was the key post. Both units 
wore composed of n president and four ordinary members. The 
committee, the actual workhorse, ended up with Patris as 
resident, two other rightists nnd two leftists, one of when
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was Sklyros. The President of the Council was a rich leftist 
farmer, two more leftists, and two rightists. Things were in 
complete balance, except for the slicrht primacy of the 
President of the Committee.
Having settled this quietly, they turned to the matter of 
the secretary of the Association. This post carried a small 
salary, and demanded a certain amount of general administrative 
and bookkeeping experience. It was also a position of trust,
It was a non-voting position. Sklyros wanted it, partly for
*
the salary and partly because he thought he would do it better 
than any rightist, and partly because ideologically he favoured 
any form of agricultural co-operative organisation. However, 
it now turned out that the rightists and Patris in particular 
wanted to appoint Arklos, a first cousin of Patris. Arklos 
is one of the largest landowners in the village and is 
consequently usually very busy. So Sklyros commented "Charon 
cannot find Arklos ..." that, is, he is so busy that death 
(Charon) would not find him when his hour comes. The two sides 
were now in deadlock. Sklyros was not inclined to back down 
again. Patris would not change, so they decided to each stand, 
and put it to the vote. They each received five votes, and a 
new deadlock resulted. Finally they decided to toss a coin. 
Sklyros won, and they wrote to the Department of Co-operative 
Development describing the procedure and outcome. They received 
a letter back saying this was not the correct way to do things, 
and that they should try again.
To avoid further dispute Sklyros suggested as compromise 
that old Fanos be given the job. To Sklyros he is mother's 
sister's husband, and to Patris, daughter's husband's father,
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so the ties were close to both rivals. Old Fanos had many 
years practical experience as secretary of the Co-operative 
Credit Society in the village. Although thought of as a 
nationalist, he was regarded as politically Inactive, and an 
independent-minded roan whose appointment could not really be 
construed as a victory for one side or the other. The only 
problem was that he was elderly and probably therefore a bit 
slow. When Sklyros suggested him, the right were pleased to 
accept. They again wrote to the Department of Co-operative 
Development and this time received a letter saying that old 
Fanos was not suitable for the job and that they should try 
again. How they were again back in the deadlock position.
At this point versions of the case differ and details are 
confused. The rightists went off to see the Commissioner, 
since there seemed no way out of the deadlock. Sklyros looked 
up the rules of the Co-operative and discovered to his amazement 
that it was the Council, and not the Committee which had the 
casting vote in deadlock situations, and that therefore he 
could, if he wished, become secretary. Meanwhile, the 
Commissioner of Co-operatives had also come to this conclusion 
and told the rightists "The left have stolen a march on you 
The upshot of all this was that the Department changed its mind 
about old Fanos and accepted him for the post but at a lower 
salary than previously suggested. Sk^ros claims that instead 
of pressing his claim he said nothing 'to avoid conflict'.
Both sides remember the end of the affair as a small victory 
for the right.
Right and left were actively opposed to the extent that 
they were contesting the positions on the committee; but they
were co-operating In so far as they discussed in advance the 
allocation of positions between themselves. In this they 
were repeating, for example, the policy of the political 
leader's at the national level during the 1960 elections to the 
House of Representatives, Finally, they failed to aqree over 
the precise working-out of the agreement and both sides tried 
to secure what they considered to be the critical posts for 
their own nominees. They referred the issue on several 
occasions outside the village, to the department of government 
responsible, and their own compromises were twice rejected by 
that department. Finally the right sought special access to the 
department and a decision resulted which favoured the right.
This last point needs explanation: Azinas, the Commissioner
of Co-operatives, is a civil servant with very wide powers 
approaching those of a Minister, had earlier in his life been 
the General Secretary of PEK, the nationalist-rightist 
farmer’s union. PEK in turn, had been closely implicated with 
the early phase of the EOKA movement, and Azinas had been 
sent to Athens as political liaison officer between Makarios and 
EOICA on one side, and the Athens Government on the other.
Azinas is known to be strongly anti-communist ~ it is even 
said that a brother of his was killed by the communists in 
the Greek Cix^il War. It is common knowledge in Cyprus, though 
it never appears in print, that Azinas is still the guiding 
hand behind PEK. As a civil servant he may not openly take 
an interest in politics; he must have daily dealings with 
left-wing committeemen on a number of co-operatives in the 
island, and in general is believed to conduct his purely 
administrative work fairly, although he has been heard to
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lament the dominance of the left in the co-operative movement. 
Both rightists and leftists in Kallo believe thnt Arinas 
acted partially in the case just described. Thev see nothinq 
odd about this, rather it was a "natural" event, which the 
right insist the left would have duplicated given half a chance.
The remaining point to be made about this dispute is thnt
in a sense no resources were committed to or depended on its
outcome. I have never heard it said that there were any
IS)significant spoils attached to control of the committee .
Why then should the issue have been contested? There are 
several reasons: one is that all such contests are a trial
of strength. To give the other side a walk-over looks as If 
one side is weak. A political croup remains organisationally 
alert by continued contest, no matter how quietiot the policy 
on the national level.
Secondly, althounh nothing depends on the committee when 
it is shared, if it we re monopolised by one side, thnt side 
micht find opportunities to exploit the situation. For 
example, it would be possible to make sure that rightists got 
their carrots washed first; this would of course be a 
provocation, ijnd after a period of time (three years is the 
life-time of the committee) there would probably be nn attempt 
by the disadvantaqed side to rally support and change the 
entire committee. Durinc times of co-operation, a mixed 
committee prevents such practices wordlessly. The more presence 
of members of the other side prevents anyone trylnc anything 
blatantly partisan. In addition the atmosphere of co-operation 
prevents people wanting to do so.
Thirdly, as has been shown here, the basic agreement to 
co-operate over allocation of positions did not rule out a good
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deal of manoeuvre. However, the intensity of the dispute 
was kept within tolerable limits, and informants remembered 
it with a certain amount of humour. The incident did not 
seem to then to have involved a serious breach of any kind.
It was merely the normal cut-and~thrust of everyday opposition.
(v) Irrigation Committee Elections, 196 8
During the period of my fieldwork the national policy of 
the Greek Cypriot left was still full co-operation with the 
government, and a conciliatory posture towards the nationalists.
I do not have information about their instructions, if any, to 
village leaders on matters such as representation on Irrigation 
committees. In the case to be described, my concern is more 
with the style of a village administrative election, and the 
undercurrents in it, then with trying to fill the gap in my 
information about the relation between national party policy, 
and local decisions.
The Irrigation Committee is re-elected every three years, 
but several members had been in office for nearly ten years 
without change. Sklyro3 was on bad terms with his half- 
sister's husband, Mangaras, as I mentioned earlier in this 
chapter. Mangaras had been made to pay the Turk whose earth 
he had removed, and Sklyros had been on the committee which 
made the decision. Mangaras had later made suggestions that 
Sklyros had been dishonest in administering the Co-operative 
Store, and Sklyros had replied with the charge that Mangaras 
had been involved in a series of robberies of Co-operatives 
in the area. On another occasion Mangaras had criticised the 
Irrigation Committee for not having done some of their work 
properly, and in this view had found some support in the village.
8/36
A normally 3taunch leftist friend of Sklyros had been heard 
to complain publicly.
Sklyros in anger said to Mangaras in public "I fuck 
the whole thing; I fuck your family,, and I fuck your 
Irrigation Committee". In his own words, this was the same 
as resigning from the committee. There was another leftist 
leader on the committee, Tangos, an older brother of Mangaras, 
but he had already announ ced his intention to resign, and was 
in the USSR with a delegation of Cypriot farmers. He had 
served nine years on the committee. However, it was up to 
the left to replace these men if they decided to do so. The 
trouble was, their leaders were the men in difficulties, 
particularly Sklyros.
The first time the elections were due to take place, they 
had in fact to be postponed because of insufficient attendance.
An official of the District Commissioner's office arrived 
on 1 July 1968 to supervise the second attempt. He called 
the roll; of some 400 persons eligible to vote since they 
owned irrigated land by legal title, and paid taxes on it, 
only 49 were present. The official called for nominations, and 
13 people were proposed, and seconded. Two of these were 
leftists, the remainder either nationalists of various 
complexions. The results are set out below:
elected: Patris 46 votes
Glykis 46 votes
Yiorgios 49 votes
Kirkos 4 3 votes
Mangaras 44 votes
not elected: Old Sklyros 37
Kanellos 39
(a) 36 (left)
(b) 30
(c) 36
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not elected; (d) 32 (left)
(e) 34
(f) 38
The voting system allowed people to vote for more than five 
candidates, and this they clearly did, since 49 people cast 
510 votes. Each person seems to have voted for 10 people.
This is characteristic of village public behaviour, in that 
the main aira is to avoid antagonising people who expect one's 
vote i:or reasons of kinship, friendship and other ties.
The re-election of Kirkos and the relatively high 
vote for Kanellos and Old Sklyros would siiggest that there 
was no strong intention among those present to reject the 
previous committee as a whole. But it is possible that even 
in the event of strong hostility, the desire to avoid making 
enemies would have produced a similar result.
Perhaps more instructive than the voting itself t/ere 
the comments made about the election by some of the interested 
parties. Sklyros believed that his half-sister's husband, 
Mangaras had deliberately organised people to come to the 
election "to get out the leftists". Jokes were certainly 
made to this effect in the coffee shop. Sklyros was particularly 
bitter about this because his father Old Sklyros had not been 
re-elected. I?ow although Old Sklyros was an old man, and a 
strong rightist who had quarrelled with his son many times 
about politics, he was also an expert in irrigation matters, 
having for many years earned his living by digging underground 
chains of wells. Sklyros argued that Mangaras had nothing to 
offer the committee, and that to fail to elect his father-in- 
law was a piece of deliberate spite which would harm the village.
Two prominent village informal leaders - D. Fanou and
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Vourros deliberately avoided going to the elections. Both 
explained to me that they did not like n situation where an 
open show of hands in voting was needed, since this was 
ernb arras sing. Vourros recalled an election at which he had 
not voted for someone and the man next to hiro had shouted 
loudly at him "Come on - up with your hand. Vote for him".
"The Texans are not afraid of New Yorkers - they are only 
afraid of other Texans'* By this he meant/ it turnea out,
that the Kallo people were not in awe of him in any way - 
in spite of his education. He described himself as a "New 
Yorker" in one sense because he is from the neighbouring 
village; in another sense because his education,wealth and 
urban background set him apart. In any case he chose to stay 
away.
Patris denied to me that there was any 'organisation' or 
deliberate attempt to get out the leftists. Sklyros believed 
when he walked into the room and looked around that the people 
he saw there were evidence of organisation. He calculated 
that he would easily be out-voted. Both men were sure that 
they could remember who voted for particular individuals.
Sklyros, on seeing the odds against him, decided that he 
would not stand for office and would thus avoid giving the 
right, and particularly Mangaras, the pleasure of openly 
defeating him; he added however,that in view of the criticisms 
that had been made of the committee in the village, he had 
decided not to seek re-election. It is worth pointing out 
that in the 1962 Irrigation Committee elections, Patris had 
decided not to seek re-election, since he had been publicly 
criticised by a butcher that he had spent village money on
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irrigating his own land. It happens that the butcher's 
brother is married to a sister of Sklyros but I am. unable 
to say if this played any part. The butcher is knovm as 
an independent, not to say uncontrollable trouble-maker, as 
will appear in his remarks in another context (sec chapter 11). 
My point here is to note that leading personalities in village 
administration seem remarkably sensitive to public criticism, 
and may drop out of office for a few years, only to re-appear 
later in the same job or another one.
There are several other points to be made about this 
election. First, the left leaders seem to have taken no 
effective steps to try to retain their position? they did 
not bring supporters or brief people to seek nomination, if 
they did, they did so in a manner well below their actual 
capability. Secondly, there was the belief of Sklyros that 
his half-sister's husband had organised a move to unseat him. 
The bad feeling between these men has been mentioned.
Regardless of 'national policy' this election seems to have 
been conducted very much on personal lines for personal 
reasons, but the interest in getting an enemy out of office is 
all the sharper when he is also a 'natural1 political opponent- 
The point here is not to reduce national politics to personal 
antagonisms, for one does not exclude the other. If Sklyros 
had chosen to rally leftist supporters and seriously contest 
the election, he could probably have done so. hs has been 
earlier mentioned, this would have been the first step on a 
ladder of escalation which can end in a fully 'politicised* 
village, where left and right avoid each other.
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If the national policy of the left had been other than 
the quietist one followed since 1959, Sklyros might hove been 
called to task for his behaviour. Precisely because the 
national leadership adopt a 'low profile' over the issue of 
rights and representation, and continually accept less than 
their voting potential might suggest they deserve, Sklyros 
could afford to avoid a contest in the village, and still 
keep his prestige relatively intact. As it was, there were 
signs of mild dissatisfaction with his leadership during the 
period of my fieldwork. His increasing family responsibilities 
as his children approach the age of marriage, coupled with a 
heavy burden of debt, make it likely that younger, cooler- 
tempered men may step into his shoes in the near future.
(vi) 1969-70 Dispute over the Credit Co-operative Secretaryship 
The last case was an account of a non-contest in formal 
political terms, in which all the tension took place off-stage, 
in the margins of the situation. Thus we have seen cases 
where the right and the left opposed each other energetically, 
and later a case where they appeared to ignore each other. 
However this account of disputes in the village would be 
seriously incomplete if it did not include the following case: 
Old Fanos had for over thirty years been secretary of 
the Credit Co-operative. On its meagre wage he had success­
fully managed to educate his six children . Nov; at the 
age of 67 he was very slow, and over the recent years a 
number of complaints had been made to the committee about this. 
However, the committee were in a very embarrassing situation, 
Sklyros is Old Fanos wife's sister's son and has always been 
on very close teams with Old Fanos' children; lie is fully
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aware of the fact that with one last child at university in 
Athens, and one unmarried danqhter, Old Fanos needs every 
penny he can get. Patris is also a committeeman, but hin 
situation is if anything worse, for his oldest daughter is 
married to the second son of Old Fanos, and the two men use 
the close affinal term *sympetheros' to each other. Moreover,
Patris has never had a son of his own, and his relationship 
with his son-in-law D. Fanou has always been very warm.
Over several years on a number of occasions Patris has 
tactfully mentioned the problem of the old man's retirement 
to his son-in-law, but always the reply has been "Just let 
the old man keep his job for another year or two and then 
he’ll retire. Just until my sister gets married and my 
youngest brother finishes In Athens".
By December 1969 Sklyros was asking the advice of Vourros, 
as an educated man, on the problem. Tn July 1970 after 
repeated discussions the committee acted by calling in Old 
Fanos and tolling him that they were going to advertise his 
job. He seemed to take It quietly, but later his children 
said he was stunned. The announcement went up In the coffee 
shops the next day. Two sons of Fanos met Sklyros, and harsh 
words were exchanged. D. Fanou stopped talking to his wife's 
father, Patris. The whole Fanos family was united in fury 
against Sklyros and Patris. Another member of the committee,
Akis, married to another sister of Fanos' wife, went and told 
the family that he had been against the decision and tried to 
talk the Committee out of It. A fourth committee man did the name.
The bitterness continued for a number of weeks, and 
several people tried to mediate. The dispute was referred to
the Department of Co-or>eratives, which refused to take action, 
arcuing that it was for the villacre committee to decide.
In view of the close ties between P. Panou and the Commissioner 
this was an impartial decision. When I left the field a 
compromise was beincr negotiated within the village: Old
Fanos was to stay in his job, but was to take on an assistant, 
who was to be trained uo to take over full responsibility in 
a short time.
The most striking thing about this dispute was the extent 
to which it cut across existing lines of political cleavage. 
Sklvros and Patris, who have been shown continuous.lv opposed 
as left and rioht leaders, are here united, even at the cost 
of Patris' quarrel with his son-in-law D. Fanou. These two 
men had been very close both in politics and their personal 
relations for five years. Together they had moved from 
supporting Lvssarides to support Azinas; now they were 
seriously at odds. Akis, normally a staunch leftist who 
would support Sklvros, preferred to stress his kin ties to 
his wife's sister’s family.
Kosmos had for years been regarded as a firm leftist and 
a supporter of Sklvros. But ho is also the crodchild of Old 
Fanos. During the 1970 election he had worked openly not for 
the left, but for the United Party, since he has become the 
political client of the powerful muktar of a nearby village who 
regularly employs him as bulldozer driver. Kosmos came to the 
Fanos household and promised them that he would get his patron, 
the muktar, to work on the problem, and that this man was so 
powerful that he could tell the powerful Commissioner of 
Co-operatives what to do and he would do it 'like a child', 
lie said that if necessary he would bring the muktar to the
8/41
village the nest night. He .*said many hard thincn a.qrainnt 
both Gklyror, nnd Vatria, that they wore both very bad an 
committeamen, had no humanity, snd that he would r^ v^ onnlly 
work to soo them thrown out of the committee at the next- 
©lection. lie stressed his cion© connections with the finite*1 
Party, through the muktar. For him the disputa wen n chance 
both to deny his old leftist loyalties, and publicly to 
demonstrate his ncv; ones.
This case in important since it shown Sic.tyros and Patvi 
taking a stand over an admin i strativo principle. Clerrlv, 
the pay-off for them is that they get the villagers ’off 
their heads' and thus retain their position nr. committeemen.
This however is not their main motive, for the positions in 
themselves are not worth the cost of dispute. They take 
their duties as committeemen seriously, and have nn 
internalised set of values about how the Co-operative should 
bo run. It was quite clear to them that it would bo a very 
touchy issue ho alter Old Fanos, but they had counted on more 
sympathy from his educated children, at least two of whom 
were experienced civil servants, and that in spite of th^  
obvious conflict with the self-interest of the Fnnon family, 
some kind of technical objectivity would influence his sons.
In tliis they were bitterly disappointed. However, it was 
noticeable that in the course of the dispute the nons of 
F an oil very soon abandoned the claim that their father was 
still fully capable of doing the job, and instead sought: ho 
maintain that it was the method the committee had employed which 
was so deplorable and which had made them no antjry. "They 
called our father in without warning, and told him they would
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advertise hio job. They threw him into the atreefc 1 Ur a 
you'd throw ft dog. After the thirty yearn aervice he'd 
given for a aalary that wan ... nheer exploitation". Xn thin 
version they choae to ignore the many tactful overturn® by 
Patrit* over noveral yenra in which ho had triad to wot them to 
net by thomselven. Such in the rhetoric of diaputen, Panoa' 
children onw thoy could not defend the iaaue of their father'n 
technical ability, no thoy nought to turn it into ono of 
'common humanity' mid presented a picture of the committee 
oa ruthlono technocrats.
The clanh of norms here Lb instructive. One ml do in a 
united kin group, and ranch awpportera thoy can rally among 
othor kin and frienda. On tho other aide i\ro two men who 
rocoghinod political and administrative leadera of the village, 
although both of whom have oloae tien to their opponentn.
On© aide chargon n broach of kinahip aolidarity, but dtft'Mo* 
thio in tho language of 'common humanity'. The other aide 
inniotn that tho iaaue ia technical, that complninta In tho 
villago havo reached a pitch which In unacceptable, and that 
oven clone kin munt tako hood of thorn. Thorn can bn no 
lnStodiato reconciliation of theme two viewn. Bklyroh in tho 
middle of tho crTtfin naid ho would not attend tho nettt 
committoo mooting to negotiate with old Pahon and ponnibly with 
bin sonn, Mo wna undor tho influence of tho harnh wordn that 
A. Fanqp, had nnid to him, which included tho wordn 
'you oro without honour* j in addition lie announced bin 
intention of resigning from tho commit ter*. Patria who might 
under other oircumntancea hnve greeted bin resignation with 
pleanuro, aaid to him "If you do that, you are not up to much"
P/15
 ^ '^® insisted in ci foct thst he maintain
soliaaiity with tno icst. o.t the committee, and that no easy 
way out for him as an individual wan Acceptable. For .if 
Cklyros had resigned, it could have been interpreted as nn 
action criticising the committee. Patrin was afraid of bo inn 
loft as the apparent initiator of the novo. For once in him 
life he badly needed Sklyros' support.
Conclusi on
These six cases are not(in any rigorous sense) a sample 
of politics in the village. They are rather trouble cases, 
events which lay open salient features of political processes. 
Since during this same period the villagers have conducted 
numerous administrative meetings, elections, discussions and 
so forth without memorable dispute, the focus on these cases 
is slightly misleading, for it gives a picture of continuing 
strife. Anthropologists, like novelists, do not normally 
devote much space to describing or analysing calm and uneventful 
social life, and this is perhaps a serious criticism of their 
methods; *jut it might be argued with egual force that from 
the viewpoint of capital and nation, the events X have 
described are trivial, and scarcely worth mention. The fact 
that both these views can be put forward equally strongly 
against this approach, encourages me to think the approach 
may lie fruitful.
It is worth noting that the first three cases all took 
place during the early years of independence, when the former 
LOLA activists were still highly influential throughout the 
island and when the issues raised by intercommunnl violence 
were, a matter of daily concern. These three eases all involved 
the implicit sanction of violence. In the first case a wealthy
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educated city dweller is persuaded to give up hie perfectly 
legal plane for a club to 'imorove' the village, and lets 
the matter rest. In the second case the some nmn attempted 
to counter the autonomy of the self“appointed guardian of 
the village by bureaucratic control. They had felt the need 
of a brooder base of support, since their authority had been 
slicrhtly eroded. After the committee was formed the collection 
of money for arms was no longer sanctioned by the fear of 
force, nor did the vise of the money go unsupervised by vilingo 
representatives.
The third case, that of the Lyssarides group, again showed 
the threat of force as the final sanction. But this time, the
threat was overt. The ensuincr use of mediators, and the
continuing struggle of each side to maintain its position 
durino the mediation process show that the threat of force did
not settle the issue or, in the short run, bring the active
pursuit of political ctonls to a halt although the fact that the 
Lyssarldes group lost support after thin shows that most 
villagers set very definite limits to their participation.
The threat of force however contributed to the decline in 
Moustachas' authority. Both sides lost from this encounter.
The aap between the tactics of elite politicians and village 
supporters was clearly illustrated by this case, for Lyssaridos’ 
call for vigilance ended up by losing him supporters, which 
strongly suggests he did not understand what the consequences 
of his actions would be, in one village at leant.
The first three cases were all to do with extraordinary 
facets of politics in the village - institutional innovation, 
emeraencv defence measures, and the clandestine organisation
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of support for notional political loaders* the other throe 
cases arc more run-of-the-mill matters. Tho Carrot Association 
elections were, it is true, tho first, elections for a now 
administrative unit in village affairs, but there was no 
not'elty in the organisational principles involved. Tho 
critical feature of this cane was tho scope for manoeuvre within 
tho overall framework of repre son t at .1 on a 1 compromise between 
left and right. The case In nettled by tho selection oIf a 
compromise candidate, on one level, mid by tho introduction of 
now resources on the other. The now resources are both tho 
closer examination of the regulations laid down for committee 
roles, and the partisan apcenl to the Commissioner of Co-operativcsm.
The fifth oano is superficially similar/ but here X was 
able to show the extent to which private animosities between 
close nffines, were carried forward in their public political 
roles{ for the leftist leader this would have been costly, 
had not national policy justified an avoidance of confrontation.
The cnec also showed the extent to which villagers avoid 
making choices which will displease others, u^jthown by their 
voting behaviour, as well an by the deliberate avoidance of 
tho elections by two Interested parties.
The last case showed certain protagonists usually at 
odds, now in alliance, to defend an administrative principle.
The clash of norms - kinship obligations versus public 
service - produced an unusual dependence of rightist on leftist. 
Attempts to introduce powerful patrons did not succeed, and 
eventually, n compromise formula was found acceptable to all.
The Fanos family perhaps got a little more than their due, 
from the bureaucratic viewpoint; but what is more striking is
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that i.vio coitiiiiitteemen, {vvno coulu ha ve avoided sn v.nconfort 
confrontation by resigning from their unpaid jobs) should 
instead have chosen tc brave the wrath of close kin. Perhaps 
their commitment to norms of public service •/topped then 
from correctly predicting the storm they would raise. The 
children of Old Fan o s , all gymnasium graduates or better, 
behaved in the more particularistic, traditionalist fashion, 
while the two committee men, older and less educated, behaved 
more as rational bureaucrats.
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Footnotes to_ Chapter 8
(1) The way in which Vourros had been svipccted during the 
Emergency was described in chapter 6 opto 20.
(2) The ultra right-nationalist newspar-or PATRIS in April 
1966 carried a series of articles which revealed in 
detail (though not fully) the AKRITAS plan. This was 
a contingency plan worked out by the group of Greek 
Cypriot leaders then close to President Makarios 
(including particularly derides, Yorgadjis), for how 
to advance the cause of Enosis as well as to make the 
Greek Cypriot majority appear as the sole legitimate 
government in the event of intercommunal conflict. 
PA7RIS, a spokesman of the Grivas faction, seems to 
have published the plan to show how ill-prepared were 
Makarios' group, and how lacking in devotion to the 
Enosis ideal. The Turkish Cypriots have reprinted the
PATRIS articles, with a foreword claiming that the plan 
reveals the bad faith with which Makarios and his 
supporters entered the early years of the republic.
(3) The Committee consisted of the following people:
Sklyros; Tangos; the muktar, Vourros, Patris,
Patris! brother and four othei- men, of whom three 
are farmers, and one a truckdrlver. Thus the 
committee had two leftists, one educated man, and 
fulltime farmers are stronely represented, as was 
usual. Politically, it is a broad cross section of 
village opinion. It also represents mature married 
men. The average age was about 40.
(4) The same man was both EOKA district commander during 
the emergency, and militia commander in 1964. He 
comes from Market Town, is a professional man, and 
was also a Legislative Assembly Member for the 
electoral district. He later became a Minister in 
the Makarios government. He is personally familiar 
to many villagers.
(5) This is the same man cited in the Co-ordinating 
Committee rules, as the arbitrator in event of dispute.
(6) This gap has been discussed by many writers, particularly 
Bailey (196 3). For a good review of the issues and 
literature see Joan Vincent's paper "Anthropology and 
Political Development’ in (ed) Leys, C., Politics and 
Change in Developing Countries (1969).
(7) The composition of these committees was shown in 
table 1/8.', chapter r>^ page 12.
(B) The acti’.al post of Secretary of the Association was
valuable since it was noted, it carried a small salary. 
But the contest for this post came after the initial 
manoeuvres over the composition of the two committees.
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(9) Kallo is knov/n in the region, jokingly, as 'Little 
Texas' because its people supposedly have the same 
characteristics as Dig Texas ~ recent new wealth,
a certain rowdiness and proneness to carrv pistols, 
and a love of the flamboyant gesture. The rr.ore 
lively Kallotes seem to go out of their way to 
publicise both the nickname and the qualities that 
go with it.
(10) I have set out in chapter three the characteristic 
education and achievements of Old Fanos' children.
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CHAPTER 9
THE VILLAGE AND THE LARGER SOCIETY:
CAMPAIGN FOR A DAM
Introduction
The main theme of this chapter is the attempts of certain
Kallotes with men from the surrounding villages, to speed up
the construction of a dam, and the ensuing opposition from 
Market Tovners. The next chapter describes the attempts of 
some villagers to intervene in the administration of the 
citrus co-operative, which was dominated by Market Town. In 
both cases, then, villages and Market Town are in opposition, 
and in both cases, government representatives play important 
roles in the situations. Both chapters will be concerned with 
the style of elite leadership, the underlying reasons for the 
structural opposition between villages and town and a number 
of other issues. But the reason for anticipating the next 
chapter at this point is precisely because the two issues 
are not merely similar but each must lend Intensity to the 
other ^ . To make this clear, I shall sketch in the main
issues of the two chapters in turn.
Five villages, including Kallo would benefit from the 
building of a recharge dam at Avia. Kallo would pay the lion's 
share from among the villages, but government funds would pay 
two thirds of the total cost in any case. The dam has been 
discussed since the early years of independence. At the time 
of my fieldwork the issue was a lively one, and the problem 
hinged on the attempts of Market Towners through their Irrigation 
Committee, to block the dam, which they saw as threatening their
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own interests. During 1968 and 1969, the five villages 
through their own committees made a number of attcisots to 
prod the government into favourable action, and prominent in 
all this was a Kallo-born lawyer who has large land holdings 
in the village, although he lives in the capital. Later it 
emerged that his active campaigning over the dam was prelude 
to his attempts in 1970 to get elected to the Legislative 
Assembly, and certain astute villagers foresaw this during 
his activity over the dam, during which he organised a 
demonstration in the capital of men from the five villages.
This was a major political innovation, and was followed by the 
additional innovation in Kallo of a short-lived Advisory 
Committee, in which another urban elite man figured prominently. 
This material then, raises a number of problems - the nature 
and style of rivalry between the villages and Market Town; 
the methods used by villagers to put pressure on the 
government; the reasons for the willingness of villagers to 
allow individuals who have risen into the urban elite, to lead 
them in dealings with the government? the general question of 
relations between government and villagers, and how far these 
involve an awareness by villagers of their political rights.
To anticipate the material of chapter ten, Kallo is there 
again found in opposition to Market Town, over the affairs of 
CITCOP, the citrus marketing co-operative whose central 
committee was, at the time of my fieldwork, dominated by 
Market Towners, Kallo end Kamxnari, both parties to the dam 
issue {see diagram / . ) are again in alliance. Again elite
leaders are prominent in the conduct of village affairs and 
play on village fears of Market Town particularism, to get
DIAGRAM 1.
Common interests among the villages in two 
political issues with Market town
PostoKammari
Avia© ^  
Parali /KalloMarket
town
©MeneMastia
«
CITCOP allies 
AVLA dam allies
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themselves into positions of power. Por reasons which will 
become obvious it is not possible to say just how far the 
animosity over the dam issue enlivened the animosity of 
villagers in CITCOP to the Market Towners on the committee; 
but the fact that the two issues had been going on for seven 
years, involving the more sophisticated and active people in 
the villages and in Market Town, make it obvious that the 
two issues each fueled the other. Therefore, the material 
presented in chapter ten is not simply added to that in this 
chapter; it ought retrospectively to deepen the insights 
provided, and in my concluding analysis to that chapter I 
try to do this.
($■) The importance of water in the region
The success of cash cropping in the Market Town region 
depends, as we have seen, on the supplies of underground water, 
which have been exploited more and more intensively since the 
1920*s. The 1950*s saw the major development of water 
exploitation, and the concentration on citrus fruit, carrots, 
potatoes and melons. By sinking pump-shafts several hundred 
feet, ©nd bringing up water with diesel pumps, perennial 
irrigation became possible. Drilling and installing a pump 
costs from £2,000 to £3,000, although when several shafts 
were sunk without success, costs increased. The water is then 
sold for 10s an hour to people with adjacent fields, and if the 
supply continues an owner can recover his £3,000 investment 
from these sales in about five years while himself enjoying 
'free' water. Farmers need pumped water for six to eight 
months of the year. In recent years the government has stopped 
granting licences to individual owners, and encouraged villagers
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to form companies, in which 15 or 20 shareholders jointly 
own a pump. There were two in the village in 1968 and 
several in formation.
In the region underground water supplies have for some 
years been decreasing because of over-pumping. There is the 
added danger that salt water may seep into the underground 
supplies, ruining the citrus trees, as happened in the 
Famagusta district. The government therefore attempts to 
control the amount of water being extracted. One such 
attempt was to make it necessary to obtain a licence before 
sinking a diesel-powered well. However, the region’s farmers 
were so alive to the potential profits of irrigated cash- 
cropping, that many of them started •illegal" pumps, that is, 
they proceeded to drill without licences. They argued that the 
government was showing partiality in the granting of licences 
and that it was giving them to persons who were not professional 
farmers while denying them to men without other means of 
support. The government was slow to act when the first 
illegal pumps were put down, so other people followed suit.
Later the government took people to court, but often did not 
win its cases or the court imposed a modest penalty. However, 
slowly the sinking of illegal pumps stopped. In 1968 there 
were 27 pumps operating, of which at least 4 had been started 
illegally^ Kallo.
As part of the overall plan to conserve.water the government
also initiated a policy of encouraging villages to build
(2 )concrete water channels '. In the region government pays a 
half of the cost and the village pays a. half, which it raises 
by an irrigation tax of 10s per government donum of land
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irrigated. The other strand of the government’s attack on 
water conservation is the construction of re-charge dams, 
to trap the winter runoff waters from the mountains which 
otherwise rush down into the sea. The recharge dams hold the 
runoff water until it seeps down into the underground water 
table. Several dams had already been built by the government 
in the Market Town region by 1968, but none which favoured 
the villages close to Kallo. The dams in fact which were in 
existence directly benefited the Market Town farmers; and, 
some people pointed out, certain government officials who had 
bought land in the Market Town region. This point need not 
be stressed for there is little doubt that the Market Town 
farmers even without such support were politically in a better 
position to assert their interests between 1959-1968 than 
were the surrounding villagers.
Between 1963 and 1968 a number of proposals were made to
build a darn at a point on the Kari river near Avia village.
This would be primarily a recharge dam, but would also provide
some water for direct irrigation. Many of the proposals were
made verbally, and because there were difficulties from the
first stages, there were continual variations in what was
actually proposed. The original proposals included four 
f •r'*' 52-
villages and Market Town , all of which would contribute to the 
costs of the dam, and would benefit both by recharge of the 
underground water available to them, and direct irrigation.
By the middle of 1968 the villages were prepared to agree to 
a wording of this clause which allowed the,- Market Town dams 
to be filled once a year from the first water of the winter 
before any water went into the Avia dam, but after this first
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first filling, they insisted that the Avia dan should then 
be filled. The Market Town people replied that they wanted a 
wording in which their dams would always be filled first, at 
any time of the year regardless of the condition of the Avia 
dam. This was roughly the situation at the time my fieldwork 
started. The Market Town Irrigation Committee took a position 
which showed readiness to block the construction of the dam 
altogether. The five villages were considering what to do next.
In early October of 19GO I watched the Irrigation 
Committee of Kallo, Karomari and Posto meet to raise the problem.
A Kammari committee man, Varetos had recently been to the 
relevant civil servant,, Sterkos (a man known well to the 
inhabitants of the five villages since he had for many years 
been posted at the Market Town) who said the Market Town 
people had refused to sign the present form of agreement and 
the question was to be put into abeyance until the following 
March. The meeting of the three village committees was not 
satisfied with this position. They went over the ground 
agains that they had originally made a very important concession 
and a reasonable one by a1lowing Market Town to fill their own 
dam first, and now Market Town was trying to behave like the 
government of Cyprus. The money is ready, they said, and the 
government is supposed to be in favour of the dam, or why 
would they have found the money? Someone suggested they tell 
the government that they are ready to forego the Market Town 
contribution to the dam and find the extra money themselves.
This point received no support and was not taken up. There 
was talk of contacting all the representatives in the Assembly 
and particularly the PEK MP, Andreas Yangou. It was agreed
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that Patrls from Kallo and Varetos from Kammari would try to 
get the Nicosia newspapers interested in the story. Just as 
the meeting was about to break up the Kammari man, Yialyias, 
pointed out that the meeting had not resolved anything. "All 
right" said his fellow-villager Varetos "we agree on a 
statement that we demand from the government an explanation for 
the delay" by which he meant the proposed delay until March for 
further consideration of the case.
A few months prior to this meeting, the old Kallo 
Irrigation Committee, which had the leftists Sklyros and Tangos 
on i t ^  , had received a draft agreement from the government 
asking for their consent and Sklyros had dravm attention to 
the wording of Market Town's water rights, and whether their 
dams would always be filled before the Avia one, or simply once 
a year. Me had suggested an alternative wording. Then as the 
dam question continued to drag on a Five Village Committee 
had been formed, which comprised the Irrigation Committees of 
the five villages concerned, with the Kallo-bom lawyer,
Aglas, as chairman. There is some doubt as to how the Five 
Village Committee came to be formed. In light of subsequent 
events many people were inclined to believe that lawyer 
Aglas had taken the initiative. Certainly the conversion of 
existing Irrigation Committees into the larger committee 
required nothing more than an afternoon's drive through the 
villages, each of which is within fifteen minutes' drive of 
the others, and a quick word with the committees concerned. 
Whoever took the first initiative, the urgency of the issue 
in the eyes of the Irrigation Committees was sufficient to 
produce rapid support as subsequent events soon showed.
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About a week after this meeting, Varetos, Yialyian, 
from Kammari, with Patris and Aglas decided to see the 
Minister of Agriculture, a Market Town man' . The next 
morning they went to sec him without an appointment. When 
they arrived at his office his secretary said "lie is bury 
all day today and told mo not to let him be disturbed". They 
told her to tell him - and here the initiative camo from their
lawyer ~ that they were outside And that if he cannot see us, 
all right, we shall come back another day". Che gave this 
message to the minister who accordingly decided to see them.
He told them that even as a simple representative he hnd 
always been in favour of the building of this dam and that it 
would bo built. But the government could not <70 ahead without 
the agreement of the Market Town people, because Market Town 
could take the government to court and hold up the whole 
project at least for several years. Rather than waste every­
one's time and money, the government's policy was to try to 
open the eyes of Market Town to its own self-interest, which 
was to agree to the dam! He also said he knew some people 
were murmuring that because he was a Market Town man, ho was
holding up the dam, to help them fight off citrus competition
(5)from the villages. Everyone laughed. .
On October 13 several newspapers carried a simple nows
item which mentioned the visit of commltt.ee members to the
minister and in which Aglas on behalf of the committee thanked
the minister for his interest. When Patris heard of the
newspaper ploce, even though Aglas Is his first cousin, he was
most concerned that the wording should not imply that the
initiatives were all coming from Aqlas, but were a joint effort 
of the whole committee.
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During December 196 8 the heaviest winter rains for at 
least twenty years carried away a number of bridges over the 
Kari river, including those at Avia and Market Town. A lot 
of Kallo people who had trees planted along the river bank 
saw them uprooted and carried away. Most of the village men 
went to see the river in flood, and watched millions of 
gallons of potentially usable water flow away to the sea.
This flooding and the way the villagers felt about it 
provided a dramatic impetus to the next phase of the Avia dam 
episode.
(iii) The Demonstration
It was decided to organise a demonstration at the 
Presidential Palace about the dam issue. The lawyer, Aglas, 
was very active the evening before the demonstration, going 
around the villages giving people instructions on the wording 
of posters, and the time and place to assemble. He was 
repeatedly careful to prevent people lettering posters with 
direct comments against Market Town, for some people had 
suggested posters saying "Who governs Cyprus - Market Town?" 
and "Do only the Market Town farmers deserve water?". Those 
who were aware that the lawyer had ambitions to be adopted 
as a candidate for MP by PEK suggested his caution was closely 
related to his desire to keep the Market Town people friendly, 
for they are in the same electoral district as the five 
villages. They made very sarcastic comments about the doctor' 
motives for becoming involved in the dam problem. "Obviously" 
they said, "his large land holdings in Kallo would justify 
his interest, but if he really wanted to help his village, he 
would tell the truth about the Market Town people. He wants 
to be representative, that’s it".
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The. next morning buses from the five villages carried
men into the capital. There had been some mild discussion
of whether to bring women and children to make the event 
more dramatic but this idea had not been adopted although it 
might have been very effective. A column of farmers formed 
up near Metaxas Square; carrying posters which complained 
about the water flowing into the sea, and stating simply 
'‘Water is our life" started to march to the Presidential Palace. 
It is hard to say how many people went on to the march; my 
own estimate is about 300, but it could be low by 150. The 
column marched three abreast in a cheerful and orderly 
fashion, with a police escort, through the streets of Nicosia. 
The lawyer was in the front, and several representatives of
PEK were also there by his side. There were no official
representatives of EKA, the leftist farmer's association but 
a number of Kallo leftists took part. Retrospectively, some 
Kallo leftists argued that from the start it had been clear 
that the whole series of meetings about the dam were of an 
anti-government nature designed to further the candidacy of 
Aglas and to embarrass the government, and that since the left 
has a broad and steady policy of support for the government, 
it chose to overlook the demonstration. However, it seems 
equally likely that the left leadership in Nicosia did not know 
about the demonstration until it had practically finished, and 
that at the village level the left leaders saw that the 
initiative had come from the right and decided that rather 
than risk being snubbed if they made a formal offer to 
associate themselves with the march, they would ignore it 
officially, but participate quietly. Certainly for several
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days after the demonstration I heard discussion in the 
coffee shops between leftists and rightists about the situation, 
but it was mostly at the level of jokes which went "You 
deliberately didn't ask us to come because you don't want 
us". “No, yo\: deliberately stayed away because you were 
jealous that we had done something good". In any event the 
left were not formally represented on the demonstration and 
the right were, through PEK. As with many other political 
events in the villages, the most elusive facts were those 
concerned with where actions and policies originate.
When the column of march reached the Presidential Palace, 
it started to bunch up around the outer gate. The police 
guards shut the gates in an almost ceremonial way, leaving 
the marchers outside and the police inside. "All we'll get 
now is promises" someone grumbled. The lawyer and some of 
the committee men started to confer. An off-duty Kallo 
policeman wandered up to the gate, and was allowed Inside where 
he stood chatting to his fellow policemen. Presently a 
Kallo man called out to him., "Hey, Yiorkos, you come out here 
or we'll cut your trees down. They need water too". A few 
minutes later he came out, even though the remark appeared to 
be a joke. The general mood of the marchers was amused, but 
uncertain. People kept making suggestions abo\it what to do 
next. After a while, when a message had been sent up to the 
Presidential Palace, it was decided, to admit the muktars of 
each village, and the Irrigation Committee members. The whole 
purpose of the march was to lay the problem of the dam at the 
feet of President Makarios. Many people said throughout the 
march that it was the only thing to do. The implication was that
Makarios was the only man above the personal ambitions and 
interests of the rest of the society- even though people 
well aware - or believed that they knew - of many examples 
of Makarios' particularism^.
After a while the committee came out again, but not 
before some of the marchers had started to drift off. Aglas
"s
started to address the now somewhat dispersed crowd. To those 
who could hear him, which could only have been a small fraction, 
he said "Today we have won a great victory ..." The meat of 
his statement was that he had not succeeded in seeing Makarios 
but had then insisted on seeing the Minister of Agriculture 
who happened to be in the Falace on business. The Minister 
had made a statement to the effect that when a few minor 
technical problems had been solved the dam would go ahead 
very quickly. Aglas emphasised that he had confidence in 
the word of the Minister and that as far as he was concerned 
the demonstration had succeeded.
At one point a Kallotis called out "We've come to see
our father (priest) and not to see our cousin", which meant,
"We’ve come to see Makarios, and not the Minister^ f)^  The
A
r.!eeting now became rather confused, largely because there was 
no system of communication organised by the leaders of the 
march. People stood about in knots discussing what they had 
understood to have occxirred, while Aglas rushed about from 
group to group, giving instructions, changing his mind, 
contradicting himself, and so forth. He had the impression 
that all that had to be done now was for the Irrigation Committee 
members to go and sign some papers in the office of the 
District Commissioner and the dam would practically be under
9/14
way. Hg seeded to be in some doubt an to whnt to clo with 
the demonstrators. Finally, he decided to dismiss them, 
while the leaders would go and see about the papers. Hut one 
old Kanmari is - Yialyias - shouted to him. "All right, but
r
A
if you’ve been cheated this time, don't think we'll come 
with you again on a demonstration". Yialyias was one of those 
who had wanted the demonstrators to stay outside the Palace 
•hungry if necessary* until Makarios agreed to see them.
The demonstration marched back through the city to the buses 
in an orderly column, with the doctor standing on the opposite 
side of the road, a few hundred yards below the Presidential 
Palace making dismissive signs with his arms reminiscent of 
a traffic policeman but undoubtedly meant more to convey 
the impression of a general taking a march past. I do not 
think that most of the marchers regarded themselves as being 
formally under his orders, but then again they were not under 
anyone else’s, and no-one seemed seriously to be challenning 
the suggestion that they should disperse. On the way down 
the hill towards the centre of town, somebody had the bright 
idea of sticking the placard he was carrying in an empty house- 
site. As the other marchers passed his placard, they followed 
suit, so that further on the purpose of the returning march 
would have been quite invisible to any curious passer-by 
unless he took the trouble to ask. But on the empty house 
site, the marchers had left the details of their entire story.
On Sunday January 12 1960, Patris and X went to see 
Veretos in Kammari; it turned out that he had been several 
times since the demonstration to see Tambis, the senior civil
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servant to whom the villagers referred on guestions regarding 
the dam, when they were not dealing directly with ministers.
The last tine Varetos had been to see him, Tambis had told 
jiim that on Monday January 13 he would telephone the Minister 
of Agriculture and get the whole situation clarified, Patris 
and Varetos now decided that they would get together some 
other committee members and visit Tambis, in the morning.
They suggested arriving at 9.30. At this point I made the 
suggestion (an unfortunate one as it turned out) that since 
there was no formal appointment it might be better to go 
early, when the office opened, rather than later, when the 
secretary might be in a stronger position to say that the 
civil servants' diary was full and it would be impossible 
to see him^.
The next morning, a Monday, two Kallo committee men, three 
from Kainmari and myself arrived in Tambis' waiting room at 
8 a.m. A few moment after we arrived, Tambis himself came 
and on seeing the room filled with waiting people turned on 
one, the Kammari man Yialyias and shouted loudly and angrily, 
"f>o yon think you've come here early to check on me, to see 
if I’m doing my job ..." and disappeared into his office. The 
committee people were taken aback by this display and angry 
in turn. Patris suggested that it was completely improper 
for a civil servant to address village committee men in that 
way and that we should all leave the office and go either to 
the Minister of the Interior or the Minister of Agriculture. 
Patris, like many other people, believed that Tambis wa3 
against the dam being built and favoured the Market Town people
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over those of the villages. This view was even shared at 
times by people as sophisticated as Vourros who had had some 
recent dealings with Tambis and found Mr rude. However now 
the Kammari people told Patris we should not leave and that they 
knew the real reason for the outburst. At this point Bterkos, 
the assistant to Tambis came by having obvious.lv heard a 
version of the outburst. "It's very early" he said in a 
remonstrative tone.
The secretary came out and said that Tambis would see two 
men from the Kammari committee. Varetos and Ylalyias went in. 
Patris was a little put out by this, one reason being that 
Kallo often pays large sums of money for co-operative projects, 
and on the dam was certainly scheduled to pay the ]ion's share 
among the villages and should therefore be represented in any 
discussion of events. Now a uniformed porter arrived and 
offered us drinks. The remaining Kammari man and I ordered 
coffee. But Patris and the other Kallo committee man saJd 
firmly that they did not want anything. "You can't not have 
anything" said the porter, and then ran through a list of all 
the available drinks. When he got no response from, them he 
said he would bring them lemonades, and off he wont. When 
he wan away they discussed whether perhaps he had a private 
arrangement with the man running the canteen and was not 
actually offering them hospitality on behalf of Tambis. They 
were quite explicit that after the treatment they had received 
from the senior civil servant they did not accept his hospitality. 
Evidently they decided the porter was acting on his own 
Initiative for when he returned with the lemonade they drank it.
The two men were with Tambis for about forty minutes;
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when they came out all three were smiling and Tambis said 
in a jocular voice loud enough for the rest to hear “And don't 
you come checking on we at 8 ara again". An it turned out 
one of the two men had deliberately used the fact of an 
observer's presence to chide the civil servant, who was now 
making quite sure that the episode would appear in a new and 
wore favourable light. "There was an educated wan outside, 
who has been following vi11age affairs for some time, and It 
must certainly have made a poor impression on him” Varotos 
had said. He had not of course discussed this tactic with me.
We left the office and the Kawmari men explained what had 
happened. First they said, they had thrashed the whole thing 
out and had arranged another meeting with the civil servant 
for 11 a.m. Patris now complained that it was not right of 
Tambis to have seen only the Kawmari people, but he was 
persuaded that in view of the new meeting, and certain 
additional facts, no harm had been done. The additional facts 
were that Ylalylas had some months before sent him a letter 
which was probably libellous, about the running sore of the
(9)Kammari pump licence which the government continued to block 
In this letter he said among other things that Tambis viewed 
the villagers of Kammari san mavtrous which means 'as blacks' 
or "as slaves', people to whom he could do and say what he 
liked. In the eyes of the Kammari people this letter was the 
real explanation for the early-morning outburst. Patris was 
now somewhat mollified.
At 11 am all returned to the office, and once seated, 
some banter passed between Tambis and Yialyias. The civil
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servant said "Why did you people go to al] that trouble and 
expense to keep the pump issue qoing? You acted quite 
illegally into the bargain? ..." "0hf yes, that we adrit" 
said Yialyias "but we've had our water there for many years", 
xhe discussion continued, and durincr it/referred to the offer 
the Government had nsade of another licence in another site, 
and to the frequent charges made by the Fammari people that 
certain persons who shouldn’t have done so, had received 
their licences, and why should not Kammarl preserve its 
traditional water riqhts?
After these preliminaries, Tambis not down to business.
He put in a call to the Minister of Aoriculture. "We haven't 
yet spoken this year so allow me to wish you a Happy New 
Year, Minister. Wow I have here in my office some of those 
gentlemen who were carrying placards outside the Presidential 
Palace the other day, and I wish to get it entirely clear, frorr 
you yourself, what you did and did not promise them". He then 
took down a statement in writing during which he repeatedly 
sale* Yes ... I see ... ah, that's it ..." and as he wrote 
down the words of the statement he emphasised in repeating their 
out loud all the points which apparently the Minister now 
wished to stress. The statement stressed when when all the 
necessary technical obstacles had been removed, and when all 
other problems had been solved, then and only then would work 
begin on the dam. The statement sounded highly conditional. 
$hen he had finished takinq dovm the statement he thanked the 
Minister and said goodbye. He made no attenspt to keep the 
Minister on the telephone in case the committee people had 
anything to say. Both during the statement and after it the
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villagers looked somewhat stunned and when the telephone 
finally clicked back into place, Yialyias said "What he said 
now and what he said the other day are as different as day 
and night" and the room hummed with agreement to this. I 
was not able to obtain copies of either the statement made 
at the Presidential Palace or the one made over the telephone.
My impression was that the same words were used and that 
mere differences in spoken emphasis and tone were enough to 
change the perceived meaning from a highly optimistic 'the dam 
is practically under way ..." to the highly problematic 'as 
soon as the technical problems are solved the dam will be 
under way' .
Once the villagers had got over the initial shock, Tambis 
made a little speech. If they really wanted to argue with 
officials, then they must get things down in writing. In view 
of the .Minister’s statement, this was ironic, yet still 
practical advice. Perhaps Tambis was indirectly criticising 
the Minister. In contrast to the rather deferential tone ho 
used to the Minister, he used a paternal manner with the 
villagers, and often emphasised his own white hairs, age, 
experience, how much ho had seen of life. The problem was 
(i) the consent of Market Town (li) some minor technical 
problems related to siting, compensation and no forth,, Mow if 
Market Town wished to block the government in the courts they 
could do so. Someone asked, what about the now law that 
people had been making no much of, which would allow the 
government to go ahead without the consent of Market Town?
That lav/ was not as clear as it might be, said Tarnbis, and 
might well have to go to the Attorney General for interpretation*
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In the cane of either the court or the Attorney General 
being involved, he hoped the oentlernen present appreciated 
that the delay could be ye_ars. "And if we go to court, 
who gains? No-one except the lav/vers. I hope you are not 
studying law, not that I have any objection to lawyers, my 
own son is studying law, but in this case ... So the 
government1s policy has been to try to persuade the 
to win them over. This would cost less time and money in the 
long run".
At this point the committeemen said that they understood 
more or less, but that he should understand the kind,of things 
that were being said in the coffee-shops, and that just as he 
had them at his head over the qtiestion, so they had the men 
who had elected them in the villages at their heads. “And", 
added Varetos, "it's all very well telling us that if we 
clash with the government and are legally in the wrong, then 
we shall lose, but look at it this way: I am a father.
If my daughters ask me for a few grogchia to buy sweets and 
I refuse them, why naturally, they will turn to stealing.
And that's the way it is with us in the villages ..."
The meeting ended on what from the villager's point of 
view was an inconclusive note. The civil servants were to 
arrange a new meeting with the Market Town people in the very 
near future to see if they would change their position. However, 
they were not prepared to give any kind of a timetable on 
results of this and of a general meeting of those government 
officials involved (which he set up in front of the villagers) 
or even of new information on the project. He warned them 
that these things move slowly. He was gentle but firm about
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It and at this point no-one demurred.
It was clear the meetinn was at an end. As the 
villagers rose to go one man said "We’ve gone back ten 
steps today" while old Yialvias said quite loudlv enough for 
Tambis to hear "The word of a Market Towner ... " He left 
the sentence uncompleted but the implication was clear - 
the Minister was not to be relied on„ The expression "The 
word of a Market Towner has almost the status of a proverb 
in the surrounding villages. Tambis ignored this. Instead 
he turned to me and said in English "I do not get ancrry easily 
but this gentleman" nodding at Yialyias "found the way to 
do it".
Outside the office there was a brief discussion of what 
to do next among the villagers. Someone suggested using the 
newspapers to convey the results of the morning's meeting? 
Varetos was keen on the idea of sending a telegram to the 
government on the day of the administrative meeting. They 
decided to go and. see the lawyer, Aglas, and tell him what 
had happened. But when they got to his house he was out.
(iv) £Lnew Committee
A few days after this meeting, events took a new turn 
in Kallo. Fatris apparently suggested to a number of people, 
about twenty in all that some sort of a meeting on the various 
water problems would be in order. Now subsequently various 
people in the village, particularly Aglas, Sklyros and 
Vourros were all puzzled about where the real initiative for 
this meeting came from. Patris took the line that a meeting 
was advisable in the natural course of events, and that no 
outside person had suggested it to him. It is probable that
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there was in fact no more to it than that. My point here 
is that several of the more )politically alert people in the 
village were not willing to accept such a sirtple explanation, 
and were immediately looking for the hand of an organisation, 
outside instructions or long-term plans behind the simple 
suggestion of Patris that a meeting should he called.
Twenty of the raore substantial and respected farmers,, 
as well as several teachers, spanning all shades of political 
opinion, met for two hours, in the card-playing room of one 
of the coffee-shops. Several other people dropped in on 
realising that there was a meeting going on, and as is usual 
in such meetings v/here no formal committee is operating, 
virtually everyone who arrived was v/elcorned and sat down.
Young unmarried men do not usually try to come in. People 
spoke in an impromptu way about a number of issues related 
to water. The rural constable said that if MPs and doctors 
kept getting licences to plant citrus trees or sink water 
pumps, then he would go ahead and plant trees anyway and if 
the government moved against him he would take the case to the 
Constitutional Court and fight for his rights. People 
discussed the new regulations about plantina certain kinds of 
vegetables among citrus trees, and the rules about fitting 
meters to water pumps, and the number of hours one might 
water and the best methods of irrigation.
Patris gave a brief report to the meeting of how the 
meeting with Tambis had fared, and then suggested the possibility 
of a new demonstration on the date of the administrative 
meeting. This then opened up a general discussion of tactics 
regarding the dam problem and the need to put the problems
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to a rnore general village meeting was stressed. I am not 
sure exactly who opened up this issue, but traditionally it 
is something the left and centre people always tend to 
support as an inherently good practice. At various times 
various people, particularly D. Panou tried to qet the 
meeting to follow an orderly procedure, with one person 
speaking at a time, and so forth, but this did not happen. 
Village meetings without a strong chairman often tend to 
comprise several smaller sub-meetings, with several people 
talking at once to their own immediate group of listeners. 
Among the main speakers at this meeting were Kellis, a teacher, 
Tangos and Dhaskalos, who made the point that the Irrigation 
Committee had not had an appointment when they went to see 
Tambis. The meeting also discussed at some length the new 
water regulations and the general atmosphere was a cheerful 
consensus that the rules were not acceptable in their present 
form, and the government was not going to find the lav being 
obeyed. Some of the leftists, Tangos included, spoke clearly 
in support of the government's £enerjil policy of water control 
and conservation but emphasised that this particular plan was 
back• -10"front and impractical. Dy this he meant that the 
norms of water consumption had been laid down before any 
provision had been made for meeting them.
This meeting was followed a week later on January 24 1969 
by a much larger one to which in theory the whole village was 
invited. It was attended by between 150 and 200 men, which 
was a very large turn-out in village terms. There had been no 
formal programme except that a full village meeting would 
discuss the problems discussed by the smaller group In the
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previous meeting. When Vourros arrived someone, probably 
the teacher Kellis, suggested he should take the chair and 
there was general agreement for this. Vourros then 
announced that if he took the chair he would want the meeting 
to follow an efficient pattern, that is that people should 
only speak one at a time, and that what everyone wanted 
was new ideas, not that people endlessly repeat the same 
thing that others had said.
There seer,ted to be a sort of speaker's desk around 
Vourros — one side of him sat Dhaskalos and on the other 
Kellis. All three men are teachers and between them span 
a wide political spectrum. This was not any kind of official 
grouping but proved symbolically important in view of later 
events. Vourros soon ran into difficulty with the rule of 
one person speaking at a time, and when one particular man 
interrupted several times and would not heed the chair,
Vcurros got irritated and said "If you won11 keep order 
I shall leave the meeting". The farmer (who had been on 
several village committees because he is not identified strongly 
with either right or left and therefore gets elected not for 
his ability but for his moderation) was instantly repentant 
"Sorry, was I out of order in some way, Mr. Vourros?” "Wo, 
that's all right" Vourros replied.
This farmer went on to explain that in his view the 
relationship between the village and the government was like 
that between a child and its mother, "If the child doesn't 
cry, the mother doesn't feed it". This saying had been used 
by the lawyer Aglas in one of his meetings about the dam.
The meeting now settled down to a discussion of the new water
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regulations. The farmer continued! "The real mistake wars 
to put the water re tore on the pumps in the first place.
The Market Town people should never have started putting 
them on". At this point a series of speakers nil spoke in 
favour of putting on the meters, including Dhaskalos, Taneos 
and Vourros. They made points critical of the government's 
administration of the policy but stood by the point that this 
method of water control was both inevitable and necessary.
During this stage of the debate Vourros from the chair 
occasionally clarified a point for someone who had not 
understood. It. would be quite obvious that people had not 
understood something, for after a point had been made the 
very next question night ask the substance of the last point.
Ther'3 was a tendency for the more frequent speakers to speak 
a modified form of Demotiki while occasional speakers making minor 
points used village dialect.
It is worth noting that Vourros had been Invited to chair 
a meeting in Kallo although he was not either a full-time 
resident of the village or born in it. Another man who 
spoke on several occasions at the meeting was a senior civil 
servant. lie had been born in Kallo but his career had taken 
him. away from the village for many years and he was only rarely 
there. Nevertheless his presence at the meeting was regarded 
as both natural and desirable and no~one showed any sinn of 
thinking that as a senior civil servant ho minht be representing 
the government in his views, tie said at one point with 
reference to the Kawroarl dam that he firmly believed the 
government was sincere and wanted to see it built.
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Tho discussion of water problems began to turn into a 
discussion of tactics. Vourros said he hoped the village 
would decide to have regular monthly family meetings. He 
chose the phrase quite deliberately. So when a little later 
the meeting started to discuss the advisability of producing 
a new committee, called an Advisory Committee, the ground 
had to some extent already been prepared by his suggestion.
Those who thought the new committee a good idea argued that 
there were special problems facing the village at the moment, 
particularly to do with water, which the existing committees 
were probably too busy to handle by themselves. A teacher 
said he thought the committee was not a good idea because it 
would undoubtedly politicise the village. At this Vourros 
immediately called out from the chair "Is there likely to be 
a misunderstanding that this Advisory Committee would have 
a political colour?" at which a number of people said things 
like "Wo, we don't do things like that here". His point 
was carried.
Part of the debate became the question of whether the 
Advisory Committee would have any legal bedLs. The muktar, 
xtfhom some people said was asleep for most of the meeting was 
asked what he thought ho said he thought there was no need of 
such a committee even in a purely advisory capacity. He also 
was understood to express some anxiety about it producing tension
for such a committee. The civil servant then emphasised that 
there was no legal, problem about a purely <^vij3ory committee, 
toother man said if the village was going to be oraanised 
properly it was essential the opinions of everyone should be
Iso said he could see no needbetween left and right
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regularly heard, the opinion of the secondary school teacher, 
the primary school teacher, the shepherd and the camel- 
driver . a leftist called Spartos said that monthlyA
meetings like this would keep the other village committees 
on their toes.
S?hen it looked as if discussion of the need for the new 
committee would get bogged down, Vourros said that there was 
no reason why anything had to be decided today - it could all 
be put off for a month if need be. The civil servant said 
that while they could always elect a committee at the next 
meeting, it would be a pity not to take advantage of the 
present large turn-out to do something. There was some 
discussion of this. Some felt that the best thino was to 
call another meeting for the very next day but those who 
wanted the meeting called for a week’s time- a Saturday 
again, carried the day. They argued that it would be better 
attended because better advertised by word-of-mouth and 
possibly a notice. It was said that there were not really 
enough men present to take any major decisions, and this 
argument had some force since on a number of occasions during 
the meeting people had made the point that in future village 
committees should not take major decisions like signing 
agreements with the government without a meeting and discussion 
with the whole village. The two outgoing leftist members 
of the Irrigation Committee had some time before been complaining 
that although this was their policy, the new committee had 
ignored it and gone ahead and signed a form of agreement over 
the Avia dam without consulting the village. The new committee, 
they claimed, influenced by PatriLs, had asked a few prominent
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wen in the village and left it at that. During this meeting 
people repeatedly used an expression which inean3 "the whole 
village" (to horlo oloklyro) and the way in which it was used 
had a moral force, endorsing the desirability of full 
consultation.
Vourros now tried a new tactic. He said the test of the 
need for the Advisory Committee was whether or not the 
Irrigation Committee thought it needed advice to carry out 
its work. He would put it to them. He asked the five 
members by name, around the room. They each said 'yes’ and 
then Vourros said "So the Irrigation Committee itself agrees 
that an Advisory Committee would have some purpose.” This 
move effectively stopped further discussion of whether or not 
the new Committee was needed.
The discussion now turned to composition of the new 
committee. Dhaskalos said it should be ten people. The civil 
servant said five, and it should be temporary only.
Finally the meeting broke up after having lasted over 
two hours. The owner of the coffee-shop seemed quite annoyed, 
possibly at the amount of business he felt he had lost, and 
went around telling people "It's all over now". People went 
on sitting around talking quite excitedly over some of the 
matters that come up. A group of young unmarried boys said 
among themselves "Nothing happened, nothing will come of it" 
but this was not the general mood. Vourros in particular was 
very pleased with the way it had gone, and the promise it 
held for the future.
One week later the meeting took place. When Vourros 
arrived he found a certain vagueness about the programme.
and there seemed to be a certain hesitancy on the port of 
the people he asked to give him any details. Ho kept »nyin«T 
he would go if nothing wna going to happen. It is probable 
that this atmosphere was created on the one hand by his 
nervousness, and on the other by his fueling that the meeting 
might in some way hove been 'got at' in advance. However, 
people started to arrive until there were finally about 120 
present, fewer than the week before but still a fair turn-out. 
Vourros took the chair and said "Dear follow-villagwrsj 
lot us tall; about the dam first, and vote for the committee 
when more people get here". A right-wing teacher got up 
and said the Irrigation Committee wn« doing a good job but 
the issues of the dam and the metern required a separate 
committee. Vourros now stressed that an Independent committee 
would have no government recognition, it would merely be an 
advisory one, helping the existing legal ones. The right-wing 
teacher then s^ lid that surely since the new committee would 
represent the whole community it would have a legal basis? 
Tangos said that since the Irrigation Committee had formally 
accepted the need for advice from this committee perhaps It 
would have a legal basis. Dhaskalos then made a short speech 
which bridged the apparent gap produced by the last two 
speeches. Vourros now stx'essed that the Advisory Committee 
wus to bo entirely without political colour. He viuwod its 
functions os being to meet regularly and to seek and express 
the opinions of the villagers on current problems, ller«i 
Tangos added that it was in general a good thing to seek many 
opinions. Dhaskalos now said that the Advisory Committee
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should handle both large and small problems. Sklyros and 
Tangos both disagreed and said for large problems only, and 
the latter said it should ineet every three months, but more 
often if needed.
At this point Vourros emphasised that in doing business 
with the government it was quite essential to make written 
submissions and to seek written replies. He mentioned that 
one possible solution to the dam problem would be to by-pass 
Market Town by the villages themselves paying the share of 
costs that it would have paid for. He said that so far 
fourteen dams full of water had flowed into the sea. That 
he believed the government in the final analysis favoured the 
dam. Dhaskalos now said that there had been a number of 
committees, a number of meetings with the government and 
many conflicting answers and changes of policy. A farmer then 
said that ever since Aglas had been Chairman of the Five 
Villages Committee he had kept a written record of all the 
meetings, letters exchanged and so forth. Patris then pointed 
out that Aglas is chairman of the Five Villages Committee: 
Tangos said that the Advisory Committee should study Aglas* 
file and discuss it.
Vourros from the chair now asked what tactics should be 
adopted on the dam? A new demonstration? More telegrams?
He suggested that they write a letter which would necessitate 
an answer. He thought the government wanted to build the dam 
but at the same time wanted to avoid conflict. Someone said 
v\!e should go and see our Papas" by which he meant Makarios.
A discussion now started of a letter the government had sent 
to Aglas, in answer to his telegram, in which they made a
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reply that the dam would foe built, when conditions permitted.
There was some discussion about exactly when this letter 
arriveed, the day of the demonstration or before or after,
Vourros then said that in any case the letter was ambiquous.
How a leftist suggested amoncr other things an interview 
with Makarios should be requested. Vourros added that the 
record of the interview should be sought in writing. Sklyros 
said that they should get the representatives to raise these 
questions in the House- Tangos asked, one particular MI3?
Dhaskalos said, no all of them. There was then some discussion 
of what the role of the rnuktar should be in these matters.
He was in any case absent, which is often in the villages a 
sign of disapproval of an event. A leftist now said that both 
the left and right fanner's association MPs should be asked to 
take up the isstie.
Vourros now raised the question of the committee's size, 
and suggested also a written ballot, to ensure secrecy. The 
general feeling in the room was against this. One man said 
"If we take three from here and too from there, there will 
be trouble", which meant, the right-left cleavage would 
become active. Without any vote being taken, the rreeting bypassed 
the notion of a written ballot, and decided that five would be 
the right number of members. Vourros now made a major speech: 
he asked them to make some use of the educated men in the 
village. "You have plenty of educated men in the village.
I myself am willing to help at any time. But of course I do not 
mean by this that you should overlook and under-estimate the 
uneducated, men, for there are a lot of men here who have not 
had the chance to go to secondary school but still know how to
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nandle affairs ... but in the last analysis people who 
have hao. the chance of education should be ready to serve 
the community". He also stressed that the essential written 
work of such a committee needed at least one educated man to 
handle it.
Following on this speech, he was immediately nominated 
for the committee. He tried very hard to back out, but 
people quoted straight back to him the statements he had just 
been making. He then called out for D. Fanou to be nominated, 
who said "this will make a lot of trouble for me" because he 
was a civil servant, but Vourros went on urging him until he 
accepted. Then Vourros turned to a teacher and. said "Are 
you ready to serve your community?" - a question to which it 
would have been extremely hard to answer no. Someone then 
nominated another teacher, Kellis, who tried extremely hard 
to get out of the nomination on the grounds of being a civil 
servant. A farmer said to him "But you ought to be on the 
Advisory Committee - you have a lot of land". Another farmer 
said "We should not force people who don’t want to". Someone 
else said "The government doesn't check up on things like 
this" by which he meant that the Civil Service Law did not 
apply to things like the Advisory Committee.
At one point in this bout of nominations it seems that 
five names had been put forward: Vourros; P. Fanou; Tangos;
Patris' brother Oligos; and Kellis, the teacher. Other 
names had been shouted out but had apparently not got the 
mysterious support of the meeting. (It is possible that 
whoever decided to recite the list of names put in or left out
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those names they thought fit or unfit). However, when 
this list of five names was recitedf Tangos said "We have 
two uneducated men on this committee, myself and Oligos" 
and suggested that this was not right. In the ensuing 
confusion of discussion several teacher's names were put 
forward to replace one of the uneducated men. The result 
was that Oligos was replaced by a teacher.
The five names were accepted by the meetina in an
informal way. There was no show of hands and no-one 
suggested that any more formal method was needed. Once 
this was over the main meeting ended and the committee 
decided to meet. h member of the Irrigation Committee,
Mangaras, also came along, which it turned out was his 
privilege under the current interpretation of the relation 
between the two committees. Kellis and D. Fanou discussed 
whether they were allowed to participate or not, under the 
civil service law. Kellis said he was there 'practically by 
force', and that his trade union on top of everything else 
had laid down limits to the sort of extra-curricular activities 
teachers should have to take part in, and if any of the
meetings turned out to have a political aspect then he would
just not turn up.
Tangos said only an educated man could follow the paperwork. 
Vourros said that one of the things this committee could do 
would be to look into the problem of the students in the 
village gambling. At this point Vasllakis came in, and was 
welcomed and asked to sit down and join in, Vfhat did he 
think were the village's problems? In his view the community 
problem was the problem of our young people. Then someone said
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"What about people shooting off guns?" which referred to a
recent incident where a drunken man had fired a pistol in
one of the drinking 3hops. Vasilakis said this was undoubtedly
wrong. Then someone said, what about the problem of the
slaughter house. The next suggestion was for a club, but it
was then suggested that a club would inevitably get coloured
(politicised). Vourros said that a club such as they had
in Market Town of orchard-cultivators (kypouron) would be
all right bnt Vasilakis said that even this would get 
n
coloured too ' . Someone pointed out that Kommari has a
club and Mastia village has one in formation. Vasilakis now 
got up to go as a friend put his head in for him.
On this note the committee adjourned. Vourros said he 
would telephone the lawyer Aglas in the morning for a 
discussion. He went off to eat with Sklyros and myself.
Both men dismissed the possibility that the original initiative 
for the first pilot meeting had come from PEK, the right-wing 
farmer1s union, for which Patris is the Kallo representative. 
However they were unable to make up their minds one way or 
another. Sklyros was asked why last week he had joined the 
muktar in saying that he did not think the village needed an 
Advisory Committee and he said that at that point he had 
been fairly certain the whole impetus was coming from PEK 
and had therefore opposed it. Part of his reason for being 
suspicious that it was a PEK manoeuvre was that he had heard 
that the village of Mastia, which has no interest in the dam 
was forming such a committee, and this would have made it 
appear part of a larger scheme, and not a local initiative .
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The next day the lawyer Agios cnme to the vlllag© and 
sat in the coffee™shop and made a tap© recording of oomts 
of the villager's complaints and problems, and among other 
things said "Vourros should not think that I am less 
interested than him in the problems of the village". People 
said that he mode this remark with a good deal of heat and 
generally seemed both surprised and irritated by what ho heard 
of the previous day's meeting.
As far as I can ascertain the Advisory Committee never 
met again, A month after the meeting at which the Committee 
were chosen, no meeting had been called, and at that time 
Kellis said "We exist to advise the Irrigation Committee.
If they don't ask for our advice there is nothing we can d o 1. 
They never asked, so we did nothing". When I returned to 
the village both in December 19f>9 and again in June 1970 
I asked committee members if they had ever had another 
meeting and they said 'no'. When asked why, they said that 
the heat xvent out of the dam issue.
During my fieldwork there was one more piece of activity 
about the dam issue which is highly revealing. In late Marr-h 
1969 the Kallo mule tar told a member of the Kallo Irrigation 
Committee, to bo ready to go to Nicosia the next day. lie 
did not want to, but the muktar a A id it was essential he go. 
About twenty men from the five villages went, and he noticed 
that they were nearly all supporters of the man who hnd 
recently resigned as Minister of the Interior, Polykarpos 
Yorgadjls , The group reached Yorgndjls' house where they 
were given coffee. Yorgadjls then telephoned the Minister of 
Agriculture, and explained that he had been visited by a group
9/36
of men who were concerned about the dam issue, and could 
they come and see him. A district representative, both a 
close friend of Yorgadjis, and well known to the Minister, 
now took them to the minister's office, where he promised 
that the dam would be built whether the Market Town people 
agreed or not. My informant was very certain that this 
whole meeting had been conducted in order to create political 
support for Yorcradjis, who a month beforehand had, in 
harness with Glafkos Clerides announced the formation of the 
United Party, the first party off the mark once Makarios had 
given his formal approval to the idea of parties and elections. 
I asked the Kallo muktar why the group of men had gone to 
Yorgadjis about the dam since he after all was no lonner the 
Minister. The rural constable, who was sitting with the 
Muktar said "Well, he is and he isn’t ... really there's a 
sense in which he still is ..." and a number of other remarks 
which added up to the idea that Yorcradjls was still very 
powerful .
By June 1970 no work had been started on the dam, but 
some people in the village now believed it would be built in 
the next few years and that the aovernment would go ahead 
no matter how much the Market Town people were against it.
They also thought that the demonstration and the events which 
accompanied it were very closely related to the desire of 
lawyer Aglas to be adopted as a candidate by the PKK party. 
However, hindsight in such matters is always rather clearer 
than vision during the actual events. One must point out that 
Aglas'candidacy was a simple and satisfying explanation for
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villagers, but it also had an a logical consequence the 
shifting of the responsibility for the failure or success of the 
demonstration from their own shoulders to that of the laivyer,
Aglas. Furthermore, if they were correct then at the very 
least they accepted his leadership, and when a dev ice was 
created - the Advisory Committee -- which might have served as 
an alternative channel for the expression of their views, they 
did not make use of it.
By 1970 the government had decided to waive Market Town's 
contribution because of their objections, and the proposal became 
the followings the dam would cost £380,000 of which the govern­
ment would pay two thirds, and lend the four remaining villages 
the remaining third, to be paid back at 4% over 15-20 years.
The four villages were assessed according to the number of 
donums estimated to benefit from the dam, in the following wayt 
Kallo, £85,000; Posto, £28,000? Avia, £13,000, Kammari, £9,000. 
Posto was trying to get its assessment reduced to £18,000. Parali, 
which cannot irrigate (but will benefit from enrichment) was 
not assessed.
(v) Discussion
The prec eding material which has deliberately been 
presented in full, has been concerned with the behaviour of 
the villagers in relation to government. The villagers do 
not experience government agencies as impersonal institutions 
carrying out reasoned policies, nor do they in fact consciously 
see themselves as they are - an interest-group which can 
steadily and effectively exert pressure on the government.
However, once having said this, it must be stressed that both 
tendencies are emerging, and the last ten years have seen a 
greatly increased experience of government by villagers.
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The villagers cannot be expected to see the government
as impersonal, since they have had many years experience of
contact with some of the most prominent officials in the
dam issue - particularly Tarnbis and Sterkos. They know for 
JL-
example that Sterkos owns substantial citrus land in the 
Market Town area, and they often talk as if they think this 
explains his actions, which they Interpret as favouring the 
Market Town people. I believe they are often wrong in their 
assessments but they are also - in other situations - often 
right about the ways in which personal interests affect the 
impartiality of official decisions. The information which 
cannot ever be available to the villagers - and indeed which 
is extremely hard to obtain under the best of circumstances -- 
concerns exactly when a person or a policy is free of special 
considerations, and when not. The only evidence of 
impartiality which is at the present moment acceptable to 
villagers is in fact evidence of partiality towards and 
favouring policies desired by the village itself. That is, 
while government gives the village what it wants it may be
3.
seen as acting honestly,1 Impartial; when it fails to do so, 
the commonest explanation is that someone with powerful 
connections and self-interest opposed to the village is 
wielding Influence in the situation. Thus when during the 
floods the bridge at Avia was swept away by the waters, the 
explanation most villagers favoured was not a technical one, 
such as a poor design, a miscalculation about the possible 
force of flood water, a decision that it was cheaper to build 
a cheap bridge every so often than an expensive one once.
They chose as explanation the notion that the contractor
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responsible for the bridge put less of the appropriate 
materials into it than he had been paid to do. I heard no 
actual evidence for this, so cannot even have an opinion 
as to whether they were right or not. However, I know of 
similar cases where such an explanation would have been 
correct.
The tendency to see issues in terms of persons and 
partiality is also reflected in the way village committees 
approach the government officials. They very rarely write 
or telephone for an appointment. They decide to go, and 
simply turn up. If the man they wish to see is not there, 
they either see his assistant or go away. They do not take 
notes or keep records of discussions, nor do they ask officials 
to send them a written account of the discussions which take 
place. The more educated men of the village ~ the teachern 
and civil servants ~ often tell them that the approach is 
wrong, and I have cited a situation where a senior civil 
servant reminded them of the need to have things in writing 
after the Minister's statement had been so ill received.
It is significant in this context that one of the isnuen in 
the sotting up of the Advisory Committee was the place of 
educated men; the initiative for this came from an educated 
man, Vourros, but there was wide acceptance of the idea from 
the floor. I have already discussed the reasons why most 
educated men are reluctant to take on administrative respon­
sibilities but it. is clear that this reluctance only slows 
down any possible change in the relations between village and 
government. I assume this is an unintended consequence of 
the relevant Civil Service Laws.
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This last point is closely connected to the problem of 
the villager's need for and reliance onf leaders. The 
village puts its own best men forward for work on committees. 
But these men are usually substantial farmers, too busy and too 
unsophisticated to deal with government in anything but a 
frontal way. For more indirect approaches, the village 
committees call on those men who are born into or married into 
the village but are now resident in town. Vourrosf Aglas and 
the Kammari inspector of Education, Kefiros, have all been 
involved in village encounters with government this way.
The villagers co-opt such men for at least two distinct kinds 
of reasons: firstly their level of education makes them
able to see the legal complexities of government proposals, 
and suggest appropriate amendments. This is in fact 
something that a number of the villagers are quite capable 
of doing for themselves, but they feel happier when a more 
highly educated person has looked into it. Secondly, the men 
they co-opt are likely to have closer contact with members of 
the elite in normal city life, and who may thus obtain inside 
information about the governments' intentions, or may be able 
to exercise special pressure behind the scenes.
There is also a more hard-headed reason for the ordinary 
villagers to favour elite leadership. Quite simply, it is 
safer. To approach officials or politicians with requests or 
demands is regarded by many villagers as risky. Perhaps names 
will taken, files opened, future benefits withheld. It is 
always safer to keep one’s head down, to remain anonymous.
The whole situation has been succinctly expressed by Michael
Attalicies when he writes (unpublished paper)
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"In other words rights seem to bo rather an 
obscure and nrbitrnr.il.y granted phenomenon 
that are always linked to tho bostowor"
Ho explains that villagers and urban Cypriot's notions of 
citizenship rights nro scarcely developed, nnd nil rot at Ion-i 
with authority, suggest, tho need for personal propi tint ion. 
Such a view explains why in matters relating to external 
authorities, villagers are content to see educated men out 
in front, while they are loss willing to accord them 
recognition in matters within the village, which involve no 
threatening authorities.
To have said thnt villagers favour or permit elite leader­
ship in not to say that they are antis fled with it. but the 
choice is between doing little or nothing themselves, and 
allowing others to do something - however little - for thorn. 
The latter course is usually preferred.
Such reliance on urban elite leaders front their own 
village has certain consequences. It led for example to the 
situation in which Agios could create or capture tho Vive 
Village Committee;a number of people in the village bel1eved 
he was doing it for personal political reasons and were 
quietly hostile to him, but since there was no alternative 
person prepared to take action he won by a walk-over. When 
Vourro® accepted a prominent place in the Advisory Committee 
it immediately aroused Agios' antagonism, and revealed the 
extent to which tho dam campaign wan linked to his aspirationn 
to become a Representative.
If Aglas manipulated the Dam. Committee to suit his own 
ends, then this was at least obvious to a number of the 
villagers. However, when Vourros became Chairman of the
meeting to discuss formation of the Advisory Committee, M s  
forms of manipulation were more subtle. For example, when It 
looked as if the very question of the Committee's formation 
was likely to be shelved, he successfully re-opened it by 
putting the question to the Irrigation Committee - did they 
feel in need of additional advice? Had they answered ’no* 
to this, they would have laid themselves open to several 
chargeat one, that they thought they knew everything, which 
was obviously presumptuous since they had no educated men 
among them; two, that they had been too proud to put the 
welfare of the village first. There would in addition have 
been the implication that they were nb.1 o to solve the problem 
of the dam by themselves. None of the committee were rash 
enough to answer that they did not need advice, so Vourros 
was simultaneously able to re-open the issue, and to have 
appeared to marshall considerable support from the Irrigation 
Committee itself. The technique he used was a rather subtle 
one. He has for many years been active in committees in the 
capital so he has had ample opportunity to pick up special 
skills. The villager's reliance on educated leadership lays 
them open to certain forms of manipulation.
However, the leaders themselves face two ways. There 
are a number of important cleavacres in Cypriot society, the 
urban/rural, the educated/uneducated, the rich/poor? these 
may or may not overlap, and thus oive rise to a number of 
possibilities for differences of status. The feature 
completely absent from Cyprus is that of a traditional titled 
aristocracy, based on a feudal estate system. Loyalty to 
the village of birth and one's kin there, cut across achievements
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in education, wealth and urban residence. Cuch mobile 
people become special resources available to their natal 
village in encounters with government or the elite. The tie 
with the village is usually greatly reinforced \ry the likeli­
hood that a man will own property there. Vourros and Aglas 
both have substantial property in their villages. In order 
to have this property successfully managed it is essential 
for them to keep up good relations with at leant some villagers.
It would be unfortunate in the extreme if they became seen 
as men who wished only to take things out of the village and 
not to put anything back . Furthermore, their ties are 
reinforced by the fact that their property gives thorn - in certain 
situations - common interests with the villagers.
It was clear at a number of points during the dam 
campaign that the villagers were anxious about the possible 
politicisation of the issue. On a number of occasions they 
said things which suggested that they wished to treat the dam 
as a simple problem of administration, and that issues of 
political alignment should be kept, out, since they would 
inevitably break the solidarity of the villages. The villagers 
were only partly successful in this desire. For one thing, the 
left were not officially present on the demonstration to the 
Presidential Palace. While not sure of the reasons for this,
I can say it is entirely consistent with the attitude of the 
left national leadership to avoid any action which might, 
appear to be anti-governmental. The absence of the left, and 
the presence of the PEK leaders wore both signs that national
4
Politics could not be kept out.
During the formation of the Advisory Committee the matter
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of possible politicisation was again owrtly raised, nnd 
nearly nil those present rejected the Aden that the new 
committee would be thought to have a political flavour.
This expressed attitude, it will bo readily seen, in ,*i form 
0.1: social control: by saying that soinethinn will not happen,
one makes it less acceptable and less likely. Since the 
position (or lack of position) of all. village leaders in 
known, there is a sense in which it in impossible for the 
village to put up n committee which is without a political 
complexion. The only thing to be done Is to produce a 
committee and to put it on its honour to avoid behaving in a 
party political fashion. This, 1 suggest, was why the 
villagers were against Vourros* suggestion of the formal 
secret ballot for the committee.. For if, as eventually 
happened, the new committee was produced in a fairly confused 
fashion but by acclamation, it would be nearly impossible 
for any single group to control the course of events, without 
being seen to be so doing. However, in a secret ballot all 
sorts of things could go on which would result in a political 
committee: a group could secretly vote for several people
and afterwards deny that they had acted in nn organised 
fashion. The 'secret ballot* which in another culture or 
situation would, be a way of ensuring open selection, here 
had a quite different meaning, and Vourros did not show 
himself to be ful.lv in touch with village thinking when he 
tried to press for it.
However in spite of the expressed wishes of the villaqe 
to keep the dam issue non-political in the party sense, the 
ambitions of the lawyer, Aglas, were clear evidence that
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thin was impossible. Furthermore, the villagers saw 
thomaelves - realistically as it happened - as involved in 
r power struggle with tho cititsons of Market Town* They 
frequently asked each other "Do they think they are tho 
Government of Cyprus?" and their considerable wintrust of 
the Minister wan rooted in the thought that because of his 
origins ho would bo bound secretly to support the town. They 
announced their intention to make sure that at the next 
elections, he would bo rondo to fool their wrath. This 
Intention was thwarted since he did not stand for office 
in Juno 1970, having boon guaranteed further government 
office, by the President.
The anxiety about politicisation of the issue was 
displayed by the behaviour of Sklyros. When ho first attended 
a meeting to discuss the Advisory Committee he took the lino - 
along with tho rmktar ~ that such a committee was not necessary. 
This ho did because ho did not know who was behind tho idea, 
and was afraid it trail a right-wing initiative. Later when ho 
had convinced himself that there was no outside grouping 
behind tho idea, ho wan prepared to support: it.
Vourros was impressed by the atmosphere in the village 
at the time of the creation of the Advisory Committee, Ho 
then immediately re-opened one of his pot projects, the 
possibility of forming a club in the village. Tho man who 
opposed this, Vasilnkis, was n man who had already been 
involved in disputes with Vourros before as I described in 
the previous chapter, and whose undo had been instrumental 
in stopping hin onrlior attempts to start a club. Thus we 
soe a continuity in the alignments and oppositions among tho
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village leaders over nearly ten years, and the same reason 
being -used by the less educated to the more educated for 
rejecting a formal institution based on educational difference. 
"It would politicise the village". However, if there is 
continuity, there is also chance. For Dhaskalos who had 
remained neutral over the Graduate's Club five years earlier, 
now stands openly with Vourros and well as with leftists 
like Tangos over the need to control water use and to form 
a new corrcittee. This is in spite of the fact that he rerains 
a passionate nationalist.
The advisory Committee came to nothincr in the end. Since 
in fact the Committee had no formal le^ al existence, and thus 
no teeth, it is not surprising that without explicit requests 
from the Irrigation CorKn.ittee nothing came out of it. It is 
always possible that the Irrigation Committee deliberately 
avoided calling it. Sore of the people on the Irrigation 
Conr.iitt.ee - Patris for exanple ~ were supporting the candidacy 
of Aglas, They would thus have had a good reason tc avoid 
calling a committee which threatened to take some of the 
steam out of Aglas' role as champion of the dam. However, 
for this view I have no evidence. But the fact that at 
roughly the same time, a new move to launch a. Graduate's Club 
was again thwarted " to avoid politicising the village", throws 
the issue into sharper relief? for the Advisory Committee 
was once again a committee of educated men, and the Graduate's 
Club was also for the educated; their influence would have 
been considerable in internal village affairs, would have 
symbolically taken an institutional form, and would have 
threatened some of the prominent nationalists in the village.
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It is one thing to allow educated ror, t> take the lead in 
something as external, uncertain nnd hazardous as a demon­
stration; but it is quite another to allow them a permanent 
position of authority within the village itself.
Other reasons for the failure of the Advisory Committee 
must include the fact that such thorough-going participation 
seews to be the wrong style for village administration.
Inertia is inevitable, unless there is a continual crisis 
or clear danger. In this sense the early readiness of the 
villagers to attend the first meetings can be seen as 
expressing their anxiety, and the act of choosing a committee 
released their tension. Having selected a committee, many 
of them saw their affairs as in sale hands. The memory of 
the flood water and the demonstration passed, and with them, 
the will of individual villagers to pursue the matter.
These are not structural features of village life, but more 
cultural, and historical. One cannot ultimately explain the 
reluctance to make the committee work without mentioning 
the political culture of the village,. There is no need to 
invoke such notions as 'amoral fami1.ism' to explain this 
behaviour/ it is more parsimonious to say that the. villagers 
are not used to keeping up constant pressure on their 
representatives, and it requires efforts they are generally 
unwilling to make. They do things in the mood of a moment 
that they will not do on a day-to-day basis.
Yet another reason for the demise of the committee was 
the climate of incipient elections, rife with party manoeuvre, 
meant that the committee was inevitably overtaken by politico, 
even though I shall argue in the concluding chapter that it
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was also mi attempt by villagers to control possible 
divisions produced by politics. Tim forces of the larger 
society, in this instance proved too strong. Whrn a 
number of villagers, clients of powerful patrons, showed 
a readiness to work for the dam through these patrons the 
committee and such village-wide initiatives were doomed.
An historical note of some interest concerns the role 
of Moustaches. In none of the events described in this 
chapter did he appear to play any part at .nil. He did not 
turn up at Advisory Committee meetings, and no-one put forward 
his nan.e. The days when lie ’did what he liked in the village' 
had gone for good, although his nephew Vasilnkls was still 
able to put his weight against the proposed citrus grower's 
club.
In the next chapter I discuss a number of villagers in 
conflict with a number of Market Town people over the conduct 
of CITCOP, the citrus co-operative; by the end of the 
discussion it should be clear that this issue and the dam 
issue which covered the same period of time were mutually 
intensifying.
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Footnotes to Chapter 9
(1) Dahrendorf (1959 : 213) has described what ho calls the 
super-lraposltlon of conflicts, in industrial society. 
Although he is specifically concerned with class conflict, 
the distinction is a useful one, which deserves wider 
currency.
(2) The functions of irrigation committees in this respect: 
was discussed in chapter five.
(3) In the previous chapter I described how these two men 
came to lose their positions on this committee.
(4) This man has already appeared, in the previous chapter, 
as the district militia commander to whom village militia 
problems were to bo referred. As individuals advance 
through the structures of government, their value as 
people personally known to villagers Increases.
(5) Although they laughed, this was sheer politeness, and 
unease, for villagers had been savinq - and shoi'/ed 
every sign of believing - that the Minister was guilty 
of precisely this form of partiality.
(C) Davis (1969) has spoken of the willingness of the
Plsticcesi to become state clients. Something similar 
is qoing on when villagers claim that Mnkarlos is 'above' 
particular interests. They say in other situations that 
they know he looks after his kin and co-villagers. They 
really mean that they hope he will sliov; his impartiality 
by favourincr them. They express their readiness to 
become his clients by saying that he is 'above' such things.
(7) The statement has yet another level of meaning, or 
ambiguity: since the minister comes from Market Town, 
there is a real though improbable sense in which he 
literally is a cousin to some Kallotes. The sentence 
must then be rendered He1 vo come to see our priest 
(remote and inaccessible) and not our cousin (close, 
related and available).
(8) I was not usually in the habit of civing advice, for 
obvious reasons.
(9) This wa3 a case where the village of Kammari wished for 
a licence to turn a traditional well into n bore-hole*
The government refused this, and the Kammariten went 
ahead anyway. They were taken to court by the 
government on a number of occasions. On one occasion I 
accompanied them on a visit to President Makarios, in 
which they asked him to intervene in their favour,
„ claiming that others had been unjustly favoured, while
their traditional rights were being ignored. A Water 
Department official described their case to me as 
'a put-up job*.
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(10) Tho reador may care to trv oayine thin Inst nontmoe 
over to himself with differing emphanon.
(11) The reference to camel~dri\rorn In tho cane of Kallo 
i»j tin lUiflchronism, r>eon than a doston eamolfj oixiuted
Cyprus at the time of my fieldwork, none In Kallo.
(12) Tho resemblnnca of tho positions taken here by
Vourro:i and Vaoilakio to those taken by Vourrosi and 
Moustachas over the Graduate's Club (chapter ei«ht) 
ir, striking.
(13) Sklyroo* argument hero v/a.y not. nound, ninoe Martin 
had, like Kallo, alno got tho isnuo of meters for 
water pumps to deal with.
(14) La tor still In 1970 the dam became an openly party
jiolltical not tor, when the United and Progressive 
Portion bo tit tried to jnonopo.ll m o  tho high-ground of 
arjitatinq on tho farmer'n behalf for the dam. Thin 
exp la inn in part tho doleqution to Vorgad jln ’oarlior.
(15) A Water Department official, dencrlbing Kef iron’ 
efforts to help hia follow village.ro in their attempts 
to get their (illegal) pump licenced unid to me
"Kef iron, used to come into my office from tho 
Ministry "(Tf Education a hundred times n day about Li .
I always had him at my head". He did not nuegent 
Kefiron was doing hio duty to hia fellow vi lingers.
Kefiron alno managed to get elected to the Legislative 
Assembly In July 197'', »o his; efforts were amply Rewarded.
(1C) #n Chapter three r described how an outciider who bouoht 
a water pump in tho village, and tried to get villagers 
‘:0 PaV their debts, suffered damage to hio water pipes 
fiuch sanctions could equally easily be employed against 
a follow-villager who forgot to livo up to his obligations, 
vourros, at leant, in very careful to make not enemies 
in the village l.f he can ho.Ip it, and he refern to ‘Just 
ouch incidents an the reanon for him caution.
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CHAPTER 10
THE POLITICS OF ADMINISTRATION: THE
CITRUS COOPERATIVE
This chapter is mainly concerned with certain 
crises in the administration of CITCOP, the citrus wholesale 
cooperative whose plant is near Market Town. In 1968-70 
only about thirty Kallotes were members of CITCOP, so it 
is necessary to offer some justification for what might 
seem a digression at first sight. The affairs of CITCOP 
involve certain leading figures from the Kallo political 
arena, and involve other actors and issues in the village’s 
several political fields. The villagers are watching the 
progress of CITCOP closely. If in their eyes it seems to 
fail, they will feel they have been right not to join hastily; 
if it succeeds others will join it, or similar organisations. 
CITCOP will be a test case of the acceptance of future 
cooperative enterprises.
In terms of the more general arguments advanced 
here, there will be a further exploration of the prominence 
of elite personnel in village politics, revealing the nature 
of the political calculation which must be employed when 
conflict is muffled; it will show how individuals with 
conflicting loyalties attempt to avoid action which will 
antagonise friends, kin or allies.
In the last chapter it was argued that the CITCOP 
issues are to some extent superimposed on those of the dam
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campaign, and that each fuels and intensifies the other.
So here, the material presented should not only add new 
data, hut retrospectively clarify the importance of the dam 
campaign.
Most of the material here comes from my observations 
at two CITCOP Annual General Meetings, and one Extraordinary 
General Meeting. The period covered is from January 1969 
to June 1970. During this eighteen month period, I spent 
only eight months in Cyprus, which involved the end of my 
main fieldwork period, and two short later periods, each of 
which fortunately coincided with a major meeting of CITCOP.
A further characteristic of this material is that 
much of it follows the actions of Vourros; I had a large 
number of extremely detailed discussions with him about 
his behaviour at the CITCOP meetings. It would have been 
better if this material could be matched with equally rich 
material from other leading participants, particularly 
Azinas and some leading committee members. Since rightly 
or wrongly I interpreted the events described here as being 
of a sensitive nature, I held back from much direct contact 
with Azinas, in order not to jeopardise my continued access 
to the meeting of CITCOP. This is an obvious limitation, 
then, of these data. It suggests one other limitation: the
absence of a 'national-level1 view of the politics oi CITCOP. 
This would have been highly desirable. But since the politics 
of the Cooperative were only one element of my study, I 
was constrained by the need for circumscription in selecting 
data. A full study of CITCOP and its politics would have to
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include far fuller data both ’from above' and from the 
viewpoint of Market Town. My concern here was with themes 
more directly related to the village.
(i) Background Factors
CITCOP was founded in 1964, with 271 members. By 
1969 it had just over 900 members, and handled about 50$ 
of the district's citrus production. In 1969/70 CITCOP 
handled 150 million pieces of fruit worth £1,622,000. Three 
quarters of the members are from Market Town, and the rest 
from the surrounding villages - Kallo, Kammari, Mastia and 
Mene being the most important. Thus, in Kallo at least, a 
very large majority of those who had citrus trees producing 
fruit in 1969 were still selling through private merchants. 
Members of CITCOP had to put up £50 per donum share capital 
to enter the organisation. They were then bound by its 
rules to sell their entire citrus produce through the organ­
isation. All members received the same price per 1,000 
saleable fruit cut, and this was an average price, finally 
settled at the end of the season, based on an average price 
from all oranges sold throughout the season.
The features which attracted both Market Town and 
some village growers to join CITCOP were the safe and normally 
high average price; the ability to obtain loans in advance 
on their standing fruit; and the certainty that they would 
be paid on time. In contrast, those who sold through a 
private middleman could hold back their fruit until getting 
a favourable price, or could try to sell at the start of the
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season, when the price was also high, hut they were always 
gambling. Prices were unpredictable, and fluctuated widely 
during a season. If a man borrowed money from a merchant 
in advance, he would then be committed to selling his fruit 
to him, which made him feel vulnerable in a bargaining 
situation; finally, each season at least one of the five 
major merchants got into difficulties over payments, and 
farmers after signing a contract of sale were often kept 
waiting for their money for months, or even a year. Villagers 
with very small numbers of fruit to sell (either because 
they had little land, or because their trees were still very 
young) did not join CITCOP because the entry fee was simply 
too much to make it worth their while. Men heavily indebted 
also do not join, since they cannot raise the share capital.
There were of course other reasons for selling 
privately; those with close kin-ties to a middleman might 
be inclined to sell through him. My data are not adequate 
to decide these issues. Early in the course of fieldwork 
I collected some systematic data on the citrus sales of 23 
men. Of these, only 5 v/ere members of CITCOP, and three of 
these had joined with quantities of well under 100,000 fruit 
on their trees. There were also men with 200,000 fruit for 
sale who had not joined. I am unable therefore to say how 
far the villagers' practise is consistent with their state­
ments about the circumstances in which people join, or do 
not join the Cooperative, but my limited data suggest there 
must be a number of factors in a complex relation. It is 
possible that those persons who favour Cooperatives will
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tend to join while their produce is still relatively small, 
and those who do not greatly favour Cooperatives will remain 
outside even when their produce is large. But attitudes 
to Cooperatives are not a simple matter of party political 
views (which are in any case strongly held by relatively few 
villagers) hut seen as a separate issue. Ken who are strong 
right-wing nationalists, like the schoolteacher Dhaskalos, 
nevertheless favour Cooperatives. He joined in the 1966-67 
season and in 1967 sold 120,000 fruit through CITCOP at an 
average price of £5.750 per 1,000. But Tangos, a strong 
leftist, was still selling privately in 1968, when he cut 
160,000. He laughingly describes hitr,self as 'a crook, since 
as a leftist I should "believe in Cooperation hut I’m not 
practising what I preach. I'm waiting to see how CITCOP 
goes, and until I have more fruit... At the moment I can do 
better outside’. Finally, as I shall later show, there has 
been some agreement to define the Cooperatives as ’outside' 
party politics, at least temporarily. Joining or not joining 
is not currently interpreted by villagers as an indicator 
of expressive political action.
At the time of my fieldwork one thing which seemed 
to deter a number of people from joining CITCOP was the idea 
that it was dominated by Market Towners, in which the interests 
of villagers would tend to come a poor second. Villagers 
pointed out that nearly all the twelve committee members 
were from the town, and that the Market Town people were 
"all inter-related". Thus, they argued, over a number of 
issues they would support their own kin and friends. Among
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these issues was a grower's position in each of the schedules 
for first, second and third cutting of citrus during the 
season. This was important for two reasons. First, it is 
widely believed that if fruit stay late on the tree, they 
take from the tree nourishment needed for flowers and 
ultimately for the next year's crop of fruit^. Secondly, 
the longer that ripe fruit stayed on the tree the greater the 
chance of large numbers being spoiled by disease, over­
ripeness, weather damage, etc. Another issue which exercised 
the growers was the grading of fruit: if a man produced too
many fruit which were graded by CITCOP's checkers as skarta 
(reject class), and thus not up to export standard, he would 
lose money. It was said that how one's fruit were graded 
sometimes depended on how well one was connected in Market 
Town. There were a number of other minor complaints about 
the way the Cooperative was run, and often these were expressed 
by villagers in terms of Market Town people running the 
organisation to their own advantage.
I do not wish to overstate the degree of hostility 
between the villagers and the townspeople. There are only 
three miles between them. Many villagers have relatives in 
the town, make frequent trips there, have friends there and 
business contacts. The town and the CITGOP plant provide a 
small number of jobs for villagers, particularly young women 
who work at the CITCOP factory packing fruit.
But on the debit side there were issues of economic 
rivalry, independent of the dam or CITCOP as such. For 
example, the Kallo Truck Drivers Association in 1968 held
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the CITCOP contract to truck fruit to the coast port of 
Famagusta. But in 1969, under the competitive bidding system, 
Kallo drivers lost the contract, and it went to Mastia village 
drivers. A specific group of Kallotes were angry with the 
CITCOP officials over this.
There was no need for any articulate corporate policy 
in the village about CITCOP since relatively few villagers 
were members, on the one hand, and on the other, membership 
was a matter for private decision and in no way linked to 
other village memberships. But the general question of how 
CITCOP was running and whether or not it was worth joining 
was frequently debated in the coffee—shops, and since Kallotes 
inevitably come together more with each other, and are already 
prone to believe their interests are opposed to those of 
Market Towners, they tended to speak as if Kallotes ought 
to have a collective position on CITCOP.
Vourros had watched the proposals for the foundation 
of CITCOP, joined early in 1963, and his entry as one of the 
larger growers in the region as well as the second or third 
largest in Kallo was important, seen he is widely thought to 
be a progressive man. After the Committee’s first three—year 
term of office was over in 1966, Vourros, like a number of 
other people, was not altogether happy about the way they 
were behaving. At the AGM, however, he listened to the speech 
made by the Commissioner of Cooperative Development, Andreas 
Azinas, who appealed for the committee to be given a second 
three—year term of office unopposed, both to give their 
experience a chance to work for the new organisation, and
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since the general political climate of the island was unsettled 
and in the interests of keeping unity within the Greek commun­
ity, elections of all kinds were being avoided. Vourros 
complied with the Commissioner's request, hut by the end of 
1968 he was openly dissatisfied.
(ii) January 1969 - AGM
On January 18th 1969 the AGM of CITCOP took place. 
Before the meeting Vourros spoke to a number of the Kallo 
members in the village coffee-house, and suggested to them 
they they put specific questions about the running of the 
Cooperative at the AGM. Most of them agreed to do so. When 
the actual meeting took place, the Kallo people tended to 
sit in a group in the large Market Town cinema hired for 
the purpose.
The AGM took over five hours to get through its 
business. There were a very large number of issues raised, 
only some of which will be centioned here. Vourros played 
a prominent role, although it had been his intention to 
avoid this, and it was partly for this reason that he had 
tried to arrange for other people he knew to ask questions.
He was careful to preface his first questions with a statement 
about the need for unity in the organisation, the need for 
the committee to understand that points raised in criticism 
were not meant as personal criticism, but were meant as 
criticism of the running of the organisation. He pointed 
out that all his personal estate was committed to the organ­
isation so that in criticising its running he was not acting
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in a spiteful epix-it, but merely protecting his aalf-intereat.
One ieaue he raised was the loss of 600 boxes of 
fruit which had gone bad in a deep fr^ese unit. H'his loss 
had not appeared in the accounts, and he had only found out 
about it by accident. One of hie sources of information had 
been a Kallo truck driver, a member of the village Truckers 
Association, which had failed to pet its contract with 0ITUOP 
renewed.
Another insue he rained wan the Question of the 
construction of a ,-juice extraction plant. Vourroa waw highly 
critical of the committee for having asked for tenders from 
a number of Kuropean firms without having done proper back­
ground research on the desirability of the plant itself. 
Members of the committee had also been abroad on trips to 
inspect extraction plants. This, he implied, was not helpful, 
sinoe the men who had gone on these trips did not have the 
expertise to come to any useful conclusions.
Soon after the start of the meeting he asked whether 
minutes were being taken, and when it appeared they were not 
being taken, requested that they should bo, 'JJhlo was agreed 
by Afinas, but he said they would not be sent out to each 
member but would be available for inspection in the organis­
ation’s building^ •
A Kallo teacher, J)h°skalon, raised a question about 
the costs of boxing the members * fruit, wince he had heard 
that it could be done more cheaply privately. Were costs 
fully competitive? Prom the chair, Aminas said he would not 
release the actual figures in public, because there were
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guests present and it would be inhospitable to ask them to 
leave (a reference to myself and a journalist), but he added 
there were no secrets in the Cooperative movement and the 
details could be released to members. It would not be in 
the Cooperative's interest, however, for the private 
merchants to learn the costs.
At one point a man got up who had the same surname 
as Vourros, and when he gave his name Azinas asked him if he 
were a brother of Vourros. "No, no relation..." the man 
replied. It is highly likely that the simple fact that members 
were asked to stand up and state their names when asking 
questions was sufficient to put some people off.
Later in the meeting some suggestions of minor 
irregularities were made from the floor, particularly involving 
allegations that some people managed to get fruit cut ahead 
of their strict position In the queue. Whereas people were 
ready to shout out ' yes' to the question ’Do 3ome people 
put their own relatives first?1, there was far less readiness 
to name hames. For even though there were possibly seven 
or eight hundred people in the room, people would have been 
able to identify each other by means of only a few quick 
questions to their neighbours. If you can first locate the 
village a man is from, it is then an easy matter to find 
someone you know from that village and ask him "Who was it 
who asked the question about the bribes to the checkers from 
your village?’
The meeting continued and Vourros continued to play 
a prominent part in it. Since he had been thinking about the
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affairs of the Cooperative systematically for some time, he 
had come to the meeting with a number of questions to raise. 
Although he had tried to get people he knew to raise some of 
these questions, he saw that as the meeting went on they were
not speaking, so he raised some of them himself.
The teacher Dhaskalos was a man who during previous 
years in village affairs had often found himself on the
opposite side to Vourros (see, for example, chapter 8 - the
Case of the Graduates Club). Now he was one of the few 
villagers who consistently raised questions from the floor. 
For example, he asked whether the system of deciding cutting 
order could not be decentralised, and each village have a 
committee which would arrange the cutting order for its own 
members. In this way, since at the village level everyone 
knew the special needs and problems of the other, allowances 
could be made, and a watch could be kept on the just execution 
of the queue order. Prom the Chair, Azinas replied that he 
was against this proposal: "I cannot accept that - you’d all
quarrel among yourselves."
Dhaskalos replied spiritedly "No, we wouldn't".
"Not in your village, perhaps" Azinas conceded, but 
he did not alter his rejection of the proposal.
The idea of village-level control arose also in a 
suggestion from Vourros, that each village have an Advisory 
Committee, which would function to keep the main CITCOP 
Committee informed of village-level complaints and problems. 
Azinas, from the Chair, showed himself against this too.
Being a skilful chairman he was able to turn down certain
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suggestions by the simple expression of an authoritative
opinion. Since Vourros and Dhaskalos had not organised
support in the meeting for such specific suggestions, and
apparently had no appetite for turning them from the floor
into substantive issues, they v/ere forgotten as soon as
Azinas had spoken against them. It would have taken a far
greater investment of time and effort to bring such proposals
to the level of issues to be formally voted on by the members
of the Cooperative. Thus, the lack of conscious organisation
kept the criticisms of the CITGOP management on the level of
(3")a-d hoc ventilation of grievancesw/ .
The most difficult decision facing Vourros during 
the meeting was over the question of the accounts; the fact 
that 600 boxes of fruit had been lost, yet the loss not 
recorded in the accounts, troubled him. He at one point 
suggested that the meeting should not accept the accounts 
as rendered. Azinas quietly pointed out that never in the 
history of the Cooperative Movement had this happened, and 
it would create a very bad impression were it to happen now 
on the strangers (non-members) p r e s e n t . Vourros asked 
if the Commissioner would appoint a committee of inquiry 
to examine the accounts, composed of qualified members but 
picked from members not on the main committee. Azinas agreed 
to appoint an investigative audit committee, and said he would 
make a note of Vourros’ wishes on the composition of this 
committee, but did not promise to stand by them. Vourros 
felt, following Azinas’ appeal and his readiness to appoint 
a committee, that he should not press the non-acceptance of
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of the accounts. He also thought it unlikely he would obtain 
sufficient votes (51^ ) from among those present, since he 
believed the majority of members were from Market Town and 
would be inclined to vote against something they would inter­
pret as an attack on ’their’ committee. He had noticed that 
the several Market Town people he had asked to raise issues 
had refrained from doing so. In this way the accounts came 
to be approved.
The meeting, then, appeared to be dominated by Vourros 
and a number of other critics, most of whom were not from 
Market Town. The potentially critical issue - the approval 
of the accounts - did not produce cleavage. Commissioner 
Azinas in his summing-up speech took up a number of the points 
raised from the floor and discussed them, which gave members 
the impression that their comments and grievances were taken 
seriously. He particularly asked the members to make use of 
his office, which cost the tax payers a large sum of money, 
to make their complaints felt. That, he insisted, was what 
he and his staff were there for, but little or no use had 
previously been made of them. The AGM was not the place to 
raise such issues; it was better to raise them as they 
occurred. They should also take matters to the manager of 
the organisation.
At the end of the meeting Yourros deliberately rushed 
up to the rostrum and shook hands one by one with each member 
of the Committee, to show them that his criticisms were in 
the interests of technical efficiency and not in the nature 
of personal attacks. Later he visited the Market Town Orchard
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Owners Club and made a point of chatting with a number of 
prominent growers, to make the same point.
On some levels Vourros was disappointed with the way 
the meeting had gone. He had, for example, asked Patris to 
raise some questions, but although Patris had come to the 
meeting he had not opened his mouth. Vourros apparently did 
not understand this.
However, an analysis of some of the network relations 
between Patris and Azinas suggest why he failed to raise the 
issues. First, Patris1 son-in-law, D Fanou, is related to 
Azinas in several ways. He is an employee in the Department 
of Cooperatives. In recent years (see chapter 8 - the Case 
of the Lyssarides Group) he has moved from active national 
political support for Dr. Lyssarides, to support for Azinas. 
Azinas, as is well known throughout the island, is the 
unofficial leader of PEK, the Nationalist Farmers Union.
Thus, D. Fanou is both employee and political client of 
Commissioner Azinas.
But Patris is also linked to Azinas in ot er ways. 
First, he has for many years been a local representative of 
PEK, which although it has been somewhat quiescent in village 
affairs, was at the time of my fieldwork undergoing a revival. 
Secondly, Patris1 wife's brother v/as at university with Azinas, 
and with a third man, Orphanos, who holds an important position 
in PEK. The close friendship of these three men and their 
common political views are well known to Patris. He thus 
has two links to Azinas through affines as well as his own 
formal political link.
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Patris» relation to Vourros is one of relative 
warmth and friendship. But whereas Vourros is economically 
independent, Patris sees himself (in spite of his very large 
land holding) as a ran with a limited range of options. His 
seven daughters are an ever~present "burden; in his own view 
it would have been irresponsible of him to appear openly to 
criticise a man as powerful and well-disposed to him as 
Azinas.
To Yourros, criticism of the way CITCOP is run does 
not constitute either an attack on Azinas or disloyalty to 
him. Vourros’ view of the norms of bureaucratic efficiency 
demand the use of open criticism. But to Patris the criticism 
was likely to be interpreted by Azinas as ingratitude. To 
the extent that Vourros failed to foresee the view Patris 
would take, he had misread the situation.
(iii) 1969 - Vourros1 Campaign for Support
Three months after this meeting I left the island 
and did not return until December 1969. I was thus not able 
to 3ee how far the villagers continued to be interested in 
or critical of the running of the Cooperative. However, from 
my inquiries on returning it did not appear that the affairs 
of CITCOP had been in the forefront of the villagers' minds, 
and this is not surprising since, as I have said earlier, 
relatively few of them are directly affected by it. In 
addition, the competing attractions of the continuing national 
political campaigns added an interest to life usually lacking. 
However, towards the end of 1969 Vourros had been elected to
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the committee of the Kallo Cooperative Retail Shop, a respons­
ibility he was taking up with some enthusiasm. It became 
apparent that his appetite was increasing for involvement 
in the affairs of the community in which so much of his 
economic interests were tied up. The Cooperative Shop has 
an annual turnover of £50,000 (an annual average household 
expenditure on consumption of nearly £170 a year) and thus 
requires skilful management.
Shortly after my return I attended a meeting of this 
committee, which Vourros was chairing. Also present on the 
committee was Patris, and during the course of the meeting 
Patris* son-in-la\\r, D. Fanou, arrived and informally sat in 
on the meeting. This illustrates the extent to which in 
village affairs everyone is living in everyone else’s pockets. 
Vo^urros knows that D. Fanou is an employee of Azinas, and 
that there thus exists a possible flow of information back 
to the Commissioner on the relative efficiency of Vourros 
on the Co-op Shop Committee. D. Fanou has no formal right 
to attend these meetings but the world of the village is not 
a formal world, and since D. Fanou is closely related to 
nearly every member of the committee by kinship, affinity 
or friendship, and is also an influential person in village 
affairs in his own right, it was extremely unlikely that 
anyone would have suggested he leave.
There had been a number of events during 1969 which, 
while they had not attracted much attention in Kallo, had 
involved Vourros. The most important of these was his realis­
ation that in Market Town there was pronounced hostility
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on the part of a number of large growers in the Market Town 
Citrus Growers Club to the idea of a Citrus Marketing Board. 
There are successful marketing boards for both potatoes and 
carrots, and in the view of certain experts the greatest 
weakness in citrus marketing in Cyprus is its failure to 
produce one, in contrast to most other major citrus producing 
countries. Vourros was aware of these views, and felt that 
the issue was not getting a proper hearing. It was clear 
that one consequence of such a Board would be greatly to 
diminish the personal power of Commissioner Azinas, as well 
as a number of people who regard themselves aa his political 
clients. Vourros thought it likely that Azinas had organised 
or managed the criticisms of the Marketing Board proposal 
which were being voiced in Market Town.
Vourros tried to get the matter openly debated in 
an extraordinary general meeting; he easily obtained the 
25 signatures he needed to call siich a meeting, by visiting 
the villages, but only 150 people turned up to the meeting. 
Since constitutionally the meeting needed 25$ of the 900 
members to pass any resolutions binding on the members,
Vourros v/as at least 100 people 3hort of his target. The 
meeting did not even discuss the issue of a Marketing Board 
unofficially. Vourros* initiative was, then, a failure. It 
made it clear to Azinas that Vourros was likely to have strong 
views on the Marketing Board issue.
Of course the Issues behind a decision to set up 
or not to set up such a Board are not normally decided on 
the village level. It is reasonable to suppose that the major
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departments of government will have differing interests on 
such a proposal.
My information about higher levels of involvement 
is deficient on this issue. However, it is fairly obvious 
that the Eoard would have had far less chance of coming into 
existence if it could have been plausibly shown that a 
majority of citrus producers were themselves opposed to the 
idea.
The Minister of Commerce was certainly interested 
in the creation of such a Board. It was pointed out to him 
by Vourros in a chance meeting that a number of smaller 
producers had not understood the draft proposal for the Board 
that the Minister had tabled, and that they thought the Board 
was against small producers. It would thus be advisable for 
the Minister to send someone to explain the position. The 
Minister agreed with alacrity. He said he would send someone 
to the extraordinary general meeting called by Vourros.
However, no one appeared from his Ministry, and it is possible 
that Azinas took administrative steps to insure that he was 
unavailable to give permission to the Commerce Ministry 
official to attend the meeting. This, at any rate, is Vourros' 
belief. However, he did not openly suggest to the Minister 
of Commerce that he thought Azinas was deliberately obstructing 
the creation of the Marketing Board, since he thought it 
unwise openly to antagonise a man as clever and powerful as 
Azinas. In my view, although Vourros did not himself say 
this, the other reason for his discretion over this issue 
was that he was now clear in his own mind that he wished to 
become a CITCOP committeeman. This, in any case, is the
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position he had achieved by the end of 1970, and I shall 
discuss it in more detail later.
The oti er major issue in CITCOP during 1969 was the 
resignation from t’ne Cooperative of a number of major 
producers. Some of these men were very large businessmen 
who have diverse interests, and thus do not depend on citrus. 
Others were more specialised. But it was estimated that some 
ten producers, between them producing some 8,000,000 fruit 
a year, had withdrawn from the Cooperative, on the general 
grounds that it was not being efficiently enough run to suit 
their interests. There was some discussion among other 
members, particularly in the village of Mastia, whether oi' 
not to do the same. One proposal was to form a series of 
smaller cooperatives, perhaps based on villages. Vourros 
in some moods saw the issue as having implications for the 
actual survival of C1TC0P, for if enough people left the 
organisation would collapse. But at other times he saw it 
irore as a question of shaking up the Committee.
The week before the December 1969 AGM he visited 
Mastia village. The village, large and prosperous, in the 
main Market Town-l'Jicosia road, has a Gi’aduateo Club. Here 
he stopped, to discuss the forthcoming meeting with various 
friends and acquaintances who were members of the Cooperative. 
In this discussion two themes evolved. One was of the 
hostility to a Market Town-dominated administration; the 
other, which was closely linked with it, was that more 
competent educated men were needed on any future committee. 
Vourros and another teacher, a Mastia man called Chilos, who
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had been prominent on the floor in the previous AGM, were 
now fairly openly canvassing support. They agreed that it 
would be a good idea to divide up the key questions to be 
raised at the AGM, between the villages and between different 
individuals. The topics raised at this discussion included 
problems about sales; problems of favouritism and ineffic­
iency in the packing factory; the issue of whether in the 
future fruit should be sold by weight or by numbers; the 
problem of inadequate technical research on problems such 
as the creation of the juice extraction plant; the problem 
of the resignation of important members; and the feeling 
of Market Town domination. This meeting broke up having 
agreed to have separate village meetings to plan tactics in 
a few days.
This informal discussion made it clear to me that 
Vourros was not by any means a lone voice in being critical 
of the CITROP administration, although he was a particularly 
articulate one. A number of other educated villagers had 
criticisms to make and they were prepared to organise 
informally to put across their point of view.
During the next week he mentioned the importance 
of attending the AGM to a number of Kallotes, and was active 
in the region generally. He was able to discuss details of 
the CITCOP accounts informally with D. Fanou, v/ho had been 
promoted during 1969 in the Cooperative Development Department, 
and was one of the key persons to carry out the CITCOP audit 
on which the accounts were based.
Vourros had suggested a village meeting, and on the
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day agreed a mimber of key persons were waiting in the coffee- 
sliop for him to turn up. When he arrived, D. Fanou said to 
him jokingly, in his role as a CITCOP official, "You'll cut 
us into little bits, I’m afraid...". But no one suggested 
that i). Fanou might havo a conflict of interest, and should 
be asked to leave. Vourros started to go through a list of 
Kallo people who could be relied on to ask crucial questions. 
Someone mentioned The Lion, a tough and fairly independent- 
minded farmer with a solid land holding. But he waa ruled 
out, since he occasionally took temporary work ao a checker 
for CITCOP, 'and he'd have to think about his future'. The 
Lute-Player was suggested, one of a number of leftlsh 
brothers. Rut he was ruled out for the same reason - ho 
occasionally worked as a checker. Vourros started to get 
irritated. "1 don't want it to bo lllco last year, when 
several people said they would ask questions, and then 
didn't", he grumbled. 1). Fanou had already said it wan better 
for the questions to be apread, and not all to come from 
Vourros.
There were some 16 CITCOP members at this village 
meeting, moot of whom wore solid land holders. Vourros took 
the initiative, somewhat to the irritation of Bhaskalos, and 
started to bring up topics which should bo raised. Vourros 
mentioned that a man who was a brother of a Committee rriomber 
had managed to get all his fruit cut before April, and that 
this should be raised. P. Fanou mado a mollifying remark, 
and then Vourros said to him "Don't montion this to the 
Committee, will you?"
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D. Fanou said "Maybe I shouldn’t be here now?" A 
number of people all said "No, no", meaning that it was 
perfectly acceptable for him to be there. The implication 
was that he was thoroughly trusted. "Vie 11", D. Fanou added 
"I'll be at CITCOP tomorrow but I won't mention it...".
Vourros now made a little speech "We've got to break 
up the family alliances dov/n there at CITCOP. We've got to 
show them we know they're running it as a family business...".
At this point D. Panou got up and said "Look, I'm 
going for many reasons. You understand - I'm in a delicate 
position...". There v/ere murmurs of assent on all sides.
He left. The meeting went on. Vourros briefed people on a 
number of questions, but also on some issues, such as the 
desirability of adopting a shift system, instead of allowing 
women to work overtime up to a twelve hour stint, when their 
efficiency would be greatly reduced.
Then he started fishing for more ammunition to use 
against the committee. He himself cited the fact that when 
producers brought in quantities of reject fruit, to be sold 
very cheaply for juicing, they were not given receipts. This
meant that there was an opportunity for sharp practice. He
then turned to a man known to have done a lot of work for
CITCOP and asked him to give other examples. "I haven't
seen anything" he answered sheepishly. "Come off it", Vourros 
said. "Y/ell, then, there was the case of Andreas...", he 
mentioned the name of a senior civil servant. "Ah ha, now 
you're talking" said Vourros. "There are lots of cases, come 
to think of it", he said. Vourros now told the meeting that 
if at the AGM people v/ere asked to give examples of queue-
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jumping or other favours, they should name names. D. Fanou*;? 
brother, A. Fanou, who was still present at the meeting, said 
"But Vourros, that's a bit hard since if someone told you 
something in confidence and then you use it, he will know." 
Vourros agreed that this was tricky, but said they could 
get a third party to supply the details in such cases. He 
continued to press the man for more details.
He asked a youngish, unsophisticated farmer to ask 
about the builder on the Committee who had received the 
contract to build the main factory. He wanted the farmer 
to ask about the fact that the building contract stipulated 
£700 of iron which was missing from the building. When it 
was objected that on a question liko this source and evidence 
would certainly be asked for, Vourros said "Refer to me. 1 
know that the architect in question resigned from CITCOP 
over this and is ready to go to court about it".
Now Vourros had been in possession of this information 
for a long time, and had not seen fit to raise it himself.
Had it been raised, it would have caused a major uproar, and 
he was not unaware of this. The builder in fact had from 
the podium (whore ho sat with the other committeemen) blustered 
fiercely at Vourros at the last AGM, but later Azinas had 
made it clear to him that he had better control his tongue, 
since Vourros knew quite enough about tils affairs to make 
life hot for him. How far Vourros had now considered the 
wisdom of asking a young farmer to raise this issue is not 
clear. In the event, the farmer did not ask this question, 
and it is not surprising that he didn't. But nor did Vourros.
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(iv) 1_9?_0 AGM (Took place Do combor 1^6°’)
Before the AGM itself a number of small incidents 
took place which highlight the tension surrounding the 
administration o.f. the Cooperative, The members wore standing 
on the front steps outside the oineuia where the meeting 
was to take place. Vourros approached Asinas and shook his 
hand. The committee men started to arrive, and one of them 
remembered mo froiu the previous mooting. lie said, "This 
man should not bo allowed in to our meeting this year - last 
year he saw how we quarrelled among ourselves and must have 
left with had impressions of us". I made remarks to the 
effect that some measure of conflict is natural and inevitable 
in all organisations, and that I had not takon away bad 
impressions, but rather good ones. The Manager of the 
Cooperative then approached and discussed with me the 
conditions under which he thought it was acceptable for me 
to come in to the meeting'5^. His position was difficult 
since he knew of my close relationship with several key 
figures, in particular Vourros,
By the time the mooting had settled down I counted 
seventoen Kallo members present in the audience, nearly all 
of whom had boen present at Vourros• discussion the day before. 
In his opening speech Azinas stressed the unity and success 
of the Cooperative movement and of CITCOP itself, and said 
that although there were problems, these were always soluble 
by more cooperation. Be then mentioned a series of issues 
which were before the meeting - the question of going over to 
a shift system in the packing plant; the question of whether
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the region should have a juice extraction plant; the question 
of a Citrus Marketing Board; the question of whether to sell 
by weight or by numbers. He also mentioned some issues left 
over from the previous AGM - the oranges which had rotted 
in cold storage, and the problem of lemon prices in particular.
L'arly in the meeting Vourros was on his feet making 
a somewhat discursive speech in which he mentioned the late 
mailing of the accounts, the need for a more scientific basis 
for decisions, and the fact that the organisation needed to 
look both backwards and forwards since it had recently lost 
some important members. Azinas, from the chair, asked Vourros 
to come to the point. He said that he would. There was a 
brief further interchange between Azinas and Vourros, after 
which he sat down. He gave the impression of having got 
slightly harrassed and having decided to be quiet rather than 
to make a fool of himself.
However, other questions followed thick and fast 
from the floor; first, there were requests for further 
information about costs of selling, listed in the accounts, 
and detailed explanations were given. A colleague of Vourros, 
the Mastia teacher Chilos, asked what in connection with the 
proposed juice extraction plant had cost £801? 'Finish your 
private discussion" he laughingly said to the committee on 
the podium, amidst general mirth in the hall, for the 
question caused an immediate spate of whispered exchanges.
She answer was that the money had gone on travel expenses 
for a number of committee members to visit Sicily and see 
a plant in operation.
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There were further questions about packing costs, 
a topic which Azinas had refused to give out details on at 
the previous AGM. He now supplied some details, showing that 
packing costs were lower this year than previously. The 
Kallo teacher Dhaskalos now was on his feet asking, in effect, 
why if this information had been withheld at the last AGM 
in the name of protecting the interests of the Cooperative, 
was it now being given out? When Azinas tried to answer, at 
first Dhaskalos interrupted him, and there was a brief and 
bad-tempered exchange before Azinas was able to explain that 
the Co-op manager had taken his, Azinas', point that there 
should be no secrets in the Cooperative M o v e m e n t . Thus, 
he was making the point - though indirectly - that the 
administration was directly responsive to members' criticisms 
and comments.
A little later a teacher from Kammari village made 
the point triat it was an error for unqualified committee men 
to go off on the inspection of the juice plant. A committee 
man then answered that Azinas had told the committee to get 
on with the problem, and this had been their way of getting on. 
The teacher said he could not accept that reply, and Azinas 
then instructed that the question be minuted. This kind of 
point was directly relevant to Yourros and his professional 
training, a3 well as to the more general issues that the 
teachers value formal qualifications and feel CITCOP was 
being run by men of little technical knowledge.
The meeting proceeded to other issues, such as the 
problem of payment to members having been delayed. Azinas 
appeared to be surprised by the number of people on the floor
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who shouted out that delays were unsatisfactorily long.
One member on the floor suggested t!at members should be paid 
after each cutting. "Note that d o m " , Azinas said.
A question came up about difficulties of doing 
business with the USSR. There was some feeling on the floor 
because the USSR had 'fined' CITCOP for a supposed breach of 
contract when some fruit arrived in poor condition. Here 
was an issue v/hich would have allowed scope for party political 
cleavage, if the conditions had favoured it. Obviously, the 
behaviour of the Chairaan would be critical, especially as 
Azinas is widely known in his private views to be strongly 
anti-communist. He made a major speech on this issue. "If 
you don't understand a machine," he said, 'you're afraid of it. 
The problems of doing business with the USSR are immense.
They have their own methods and systems, and we have to 
learn them, and do business within their terms. I think it 
would be wrong to cut our ties with this country. Wrong 
both for Cyprus and for orange producers."
Here a committeeman explained that the committee had 
asked the Russians for permission to go to Russia to examine 
the fruit which had allegedly arrived in poor condition but 
that permission had been denied, on grounds of the presence 
of military secrets in the relevant area. At this point 
different persons of right and left persuasions started 
shouting out various things. A rightist shouted out that 
they should stop doing business with the Russians. A leftist 
that the rightists only wanted to hear one side of the picture. 
Azinas managed to regain control of the meeting, and said
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that there were methods to deal with the problem presented 
by the Russians, which would involve use of lawyers, visits 
to Moscow and so forth, and that the question of the Russian 
'fine' was still an open one. Why, he asked of a vociferous 
rightist, do you insist on seeing bad faith everywhere?
"We've had bad experiences of that country", was the 
reply. A little later someone whistled, in a way which, in 
Cypriot culture, suggests strong disapproval. Azinas pounced 
on this and condemned it, since he wished to stop any further 
'politicisation' of the issues.
Soon Vourros rose to his feet again. This time 
he was more in control of himself, and managed to joke with 
Azinas about whether or not he was on t e point. Azinas 
equally skilfully joked back that he was on the borderline.
The point Vourros finally wished to raise was that on a 
particular date in the U.K. in 1968 a British merchant was 
selling CITCOP fruit at well below the going price, at 4/— 
and 5/- a box below the market price, a very large difference 
which would have amounted to over £1 a 1,000 fruit. Vourros 
had very precise details on this issue, details he had managed 
to obtain (indeed gone out of his way to obtain) on a trip 
to the U.K. for other private purposes. After the manager 
had failed to give a very convincing answer Azinas took over, 
and frankly admitted that the organisation was baffled by 
the man's behaviour, and that he did, confusingly, appear 
to be selling at a loss on this occasion. He could not 
explain it. Vourros did not attempt to take the point further. 
It was, from any point of view, a superb demonstration of his
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master of detail in the Cooperative’s affairs. Merely to 
have raised such an anomaly would probably have been enough 
seriously to alarm anyone involved in sharp practice. But 
to have full names, dates, places and facts at his fingertips 
was overwhelming.
A little later Azinas asked if the meeting approved 
the accounts and got them through by acclamation. It was 
nearly 1.30 and people were starting to trail out. Vourros 
suggested a lunch break but Azinas vetoed this. The 
committee, however, were getting sandwiches up on the podium.
An attempt by lawyer Aglas to make a point on the 
running of the meeting drew from Azinas the jocular remark 
"Hey Lawyer^, I've got nine years experience in running 
this sort of meeting, let me get on with my job in my own 
way, will you?" At another point in the meeting the lawyer, 
while supposedly making a point about the running of the 
Co-op, made what most people present interpreted as a crude 
political speech, linked to his candidature in the 
Progressive party.
A discussion of selling citrus by weight 
proceeded. Azinas announced the results of a poll of 
members (52i> in favour of members selling by weight;
32?' against; 16c/> undecided) and suggested that one way 
of taking the matter further would be for members to 
come and see a demonstration of the two methods in operation, 
and the costs and benefits of each method. Vourros made 
a not very good speech on this issue, in which he seemed 
to have misjudged the level of awareness of the issue on the
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floor for people seemed restless with his discussion of detail.
Azinas, sensing this, asked the members why they 
were restless. "l/e're hungry", they answered. It was now 
2.35 and the meeting had been going on since 10. Many people 
there had not eaten since 7 or 8 in the morning; but the 
committee had had their sandwiches. Azinas said, only half 
jokingly, "I’m hungry too. I don't usually work on Sundays, 
and these are your oranges. Have patience for another 40 
minutes."
Chilos (Vourros' Mastia ally) raised the question 
of the Citrus Marketing Board. The extraordinary general 
meeting to discuss this at the level of the members had been 
called for 4 p.m., a time when most white collar workers 
were not able to attend. Did the Committee by any chance 
think that the Cooperative didn't need the Government’s help? 
Exactly why had the Committee taken this position on the 
Marketing Board?
A committee man answered that the matter had been 
very urgent because a meeting of the Council of Ministers was 
about to take place, at which a draft law to create a 
Marketing Board would have been put forward. The Committee 
felt that it was in the members' interests to stand out against 
the proposed Board, on which CITCOP v/ould have had a very 
small voice. No producer's group in Cyprus was in support 
of the proposals.
When Vourros said t .at the objection was that no 
room had been allowed for the government to modify its plans, 
Azinas said he was obliged to intervene in support of the
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Committee’s decision. ’The law would have gone through into 
the Legislative Assembly, and no one could have foreseen how 
it \\rould have emerged. The Committee had only three days 
in which to act. A committee ought to take initiatives.
There were ways in which members could, in the final analysis, 
control S. committee. A committee which never acts without 
instruction from the members would be a bad committee. He 
himself could not judge if the choice of time and day for 
the extraordinary meeting had been suitable...'
The meeting had now covered the formal business 
and went on to discuss individual m e mbers’ complaints. There 
were a number of sharp exchanges, in which members claimed 
they had complained in writing about things to the manager, 
and that there had been no response or an inappropriate one. 
Azinas tended to take the line that there should have been 
earlier complaints to his office, if no satisfaction had been 
obtained through the CITCOP officers themselves, and that 
an AGM was not the proper place for some of the .issues now 
being raised. His office would investigate issues, but they 
couldn’t do it on the spot at an AGM.
In his summing-up speech the Commissioner made a
/ o\
number of points' ; . He stressed that in general terms he 
thought the progress of the organisation was satisfactory; 
that some members were impatient, but that the members were 
still learning about the organisation; that there was a 
tendency for members to focus criticism on small issues, 
while being unaware of large ones - he stressed, for example, 
that the Israelis collect comparative information on ho\\r 
citrus is exported in other countries, and have many facts
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and figures at their fingertips, but this sort of knowledge 
is inadequate in CITCOP. He commented on several other 
issues. He understood that those members who had left had 
done so not because they were seriously dissatisfied but 
because they wished to try their luck elsewhere. CITCOP 
wished them luck. He saw people were liable to get upset 
over the exchanges of question and answer at the AGMs, but 
they were wrong, for criticism, self-criticism and the 
exchange of opinion were beneficial to the organisation. He 
stressed that his office had an obligation to investigate 
all complaints, whether those of a minority or of a majority. 
"What you hold inside yourselves for 360 days of the year 
you cannot expect to get adequately handled in a six hour 
AGM. Use my office - that's what it's there for...". He 
wished the members a happy new year, and hoped that 1970 would 
be a better year.
After the AGM finished, the committee, and a few 
notables, including Azinas, Vourros, Lawyer Aglas, went off 
to a meal in the CITCOP factory. I was also invited. The 
atmosphere was one of relief and relaxation, but with open 
joking about the AGM between Yourros and members of the 
committee. He told Azinas that he was sha.ytanis, the devil 
(very clever). He joked with the builder he believed to have 
cheated the organisation over the factory contract. He 
jokingly said to Lawyer Aglas, about his contribution to the 
AGM, "You probably picked up 20 votes there". The meal 
passed off in an apparently jocular mood, after the tensions 
of the AGM. Vourros who, at the previous AGM, had pointedly 
shaken hands with all the committee members, was still going
out of his way to reassure them that his criticisms were 
not ’personal', and that his real aim was the legitimate 
protection of his own economic interests and the well-being 
of the Cooperative.
After the meal, he expressed privately to me consid­
erable satisfaction with the development of the AGM. Most 
of the questions he wanted raised had been asked but not 
very much had been seen to come from him. People were now 
more ready to get up on their hind legs and say what they 
thought. He admitted that he had put a lot of energy into 
organising critical comment and was slightly disappointed 
with his own poor showing; but he was basically satisfied 
with the meeting, as a whole.
A general feeling seemed to be, among those present, 
that the atmosphere of the meeting had been better than that 
of the previous one. Tempers had not run so high, yet people 
had been willing to speak. People said that in the first 
years of the organisation members had been unwilling to speak 
up. It is impossible to be sure how far such impressions 
are correct. It is clear, however, from the activities of 
Vourros that members needed to be encouraged to participate 
more actively^and rely on elite persons to take the initiative. 
Certain remarks of the Commissioner suggest that the wish 
to see members participate more fully, and in a more bureau­
cratically sophisticated fashion, is not a monopoly of the 
village school-teachers. However, it is not clear that 
Vourros, Azinas and other educated people fully understand 
why villagers find participation difficult. Vourros claimed
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to be puzzled after this AGM that the question he had suggested 
to the young farmer about the builder had not been asked. lie 
had in the same way been puzzled over Pa t r i s • failure to ask 
a question. But whereas Pat r i s • failure could be explained 
not so much by the content of the question but by the act 
of questioning persons to whom he owes loyalty and support, 
in the case of the young farmer the content of the question 
in itself is reason enough. Villagers do not deliberately 
make enemies in such a public way. They do not separate the 
performance of a bureaucratic role from the person of the 
performer, and thus any attack is seen as a personal attack. 
Vourros himsell, although he makes such distinctions, is 
still sufficiently cautious to avoid a direct confrontation 
either with Azinas or the C1TG0P Committee over critical 
issues which privately, and on the verbal level, he feels 
very strongly about. He can be said to operate the same 
political culture from a position of greater personal security 
than the young farmer and with more subtlety. But it is still 
in its essence the same political culture and the same public 
cautiousness.
(v) Subsequent Developments: the Summer 1970 EGM and After
I was not in Cyprus from January to May, 1970. When 
I returned, it was to face a new development. An Extraordinary 
General Meeting had been called for June 27 to discuss serious 
losses which had taken place. Consignments of m e m b e r s ’ fruit 
had been sold in the U.K. at give-away prices, and an estim­
ated loss of £120,000 on one consignment had occurred. More
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members had withdrawn, feeling was running high, and once 
again Vourros was in doubt about what line he should take 
since he claimed to fear the imminent dissolution of the 
organisation.
Azinas opened the meeting by asking how many of those 
present were from the villages, as opposed to Market Town.
Cn my impressionistic count, about three-quarters of those 
present were villagers. Azinas then proceeded to a somewhat 
edited statement of the circumstances of the major loss.
These had been, in brief, that the sales representatives had 
taken a decision not to sell at 22/- a box, and thereafter 
the price had continued to fall. To gain time, the fruit 
already docked in London had been put at great expense into 
cold storage, where it had quickly rotted. It had then been 
sold at knock-down prices, and the bills for the cold storage 
had also had to be met. The result pleased no one.
Members started rapidly to fire questions at Azinas 
and the committee members. Yourros then rose to make a major 
speech in which he mentioned many themes from his speeches 
in previous meetings. He v/as interrupted a number of times 
by the committee from the platform, and in response he offered 
to give up the microphone. When he looked like being stopped 
there were shouts from all over the hall of as milisi (let 
him speak). Then a senior official said sarcastically from 
the podium "Perhaps Mr 'Vourros wishes to become an MP?", a 
remark which v/as thought by many people to be highly insulting. 
Vourros riposted and went on v/ith his speech. The gist of 
this was that many mistakes had been made through over­
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confidence, l a c  of attention to detail, to scientific and 
technical knowledge, and he included here an oblique reference 
to uhe lactc of iron in the factory, "but that now they were 
confronted with the seriousness of the mistakes it was the 
uime for unity, for critical analysis, and a new course.
Later in the EGM a member called for the resignation 
of the committee. Vourros, however, rose to say that nothing 
would be served by demanding their resignation now. They 
only had four months to go, and they should stay till then.
But later he pressed Azinas for the technical details of 
the elections for a new committee. Later still he strongly 
endorsed the idea that when the time came for new elections, 
some of the committee should remain since their experience 
v/ould be valuable. He stressed, however, that the committee 
badly needed new blood of specialists, economists and 
scientists. "When J. asked three years ago why we didn't 
have an economist on the committee and suggested that we 
get one, not one of these gentlemen" (here he indicated the 
committee above and behind him on the podium) "offered to 
resign in order to put in an economist. And I myself, a 
B .A . from London, would never have done what the committee 
did - start inviting bids for the juice extraction plant 
without having the relevant research done."
The four main speakers at the EGM were all teachers, 
including one from Market Town. A young man stated his own 
readiness as a trained economist to aid the committee in 
any way possible, and Commissioner Azinas made a note of 
his name. The leftists in the meeting were extremely
10/59
restrained in their criticism of the committee.
In the main the keynote of this meeting was the 
admission of serious errors, and the need for a change. The 
fact that the Manager was not present but still in the U.K. 
was taken by many people to rrean that he was unable to face 
the criticism, the brunt of which would inevitably have been 
laid to hit-i charge, and it appeared from his summing-up 
speech that Azinas took this view too. There was oven a 
question from the floor about the health of the Manager, 
since there were numerous rumours during 1969 that he had 
a heart condition. This was strongly denied from the 
platform ^ .
The final event which must put this protracted 
narrative in some perspective occurred in the winter of 1970„ 
Elections were held for the CITCOP committee, and after much 
behind-^the-scenes manoeuvring on all sides, both Vourros 
and the Kastia teacher Chilos wore elected to the important 
executivo committee of OITCOP. They are both village-born 
university graduates, who are, as yet, trusted by villagers 
to represent village interests as well as for their efficiency. 
They replaced two Market Town farmers, each of whom had 
had primary education only. The election did not go to a 
vote, but was more a 'feeling of the m e eting1 approach.
Azinas was heard to remark that now the teachers would 'eat* 
the organisation (meaning, would dominote i t ) . He was 
probably not entirely serious in saying this, but word of 
it got back to Vourros who then and there threatened to 
resign; diplomatic mediation by b. lanou, on Azinas'
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TABLE 19
CITCOP MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES 1963-70: ORIGIN.
EDUCATION. JOB
Old executive committee
1) from Market Town 
secondary education 
white-collar
2) from Market Town 
primary education 
farmer
3) from Market Town 
primary education 
farmer
4) from Market Town 
secondary education 
white collar
5) from Market Town 
secondary education 
white collar
Old supervisory committee
New members, 1970
3) Vourros, from Ivallo village 
university degree
farmer
4) from Market Town 
primary education 
builder
5) Chilos, from Mastia village 
university education 
teacher
6) from Market Town 
secondary education 
white collar
7) from Market Town 
primary education 
builder
8) from Market Town 
primary education 
farmer
9) from Nicosia 
secondary education 
farmer
10) from village 
? education 
white collar
6) from Market Town 
secondary education 
white collar
7) from Market Town 
secondary education plus 
retired teacher
8) from Market Town 
secondary education plus 
teacher
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instructions, brought /ourros bade into active cooperation; 
he had made his point at the start.
Before this election, Kallo opinion had been divided 
over the simple problem of whether or not Market Town people 
would be ready to vote an outsider man onto the committee, 
and whether they would support Vourros or not. Some people 
maintained that the townspeople would only vote for their 
own. Others said that after the mismanagement and losses 
in CITCOP, and after the public energy of Vourros on these 
matters, townspeople would vote him in just to get things run 
better. Although I was not present for the election and thus 
cannot be sure just what processes were at work, the outcome 
favours the view of those who thought that bureaucratic 
values and long-term self-interest would prevail over the 
more particularist ones and a shorter-term self-interest.
In each case the growers were interested in the good manage­
ment of their affairs. The issue was one of their perceptions 
and values about v/hich method of committee selection would 
best satisfy their needs. One Kallo teacher put it in simple 
terras when he said "When Vourros first started criticising 
the CITCOP committee the townspeople used to get angry with 
him. Now they've understood him a bit better."
(v i ) Conclusion
At the start of the previous chapter I looked 
forward to the GITGOP material, and suggested in a general 
way that the dam issue affected the cooperative issue, and 
vice versa, how that ample detailed case material has been
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presented on the persons and processes involved, it is time
to make more explicit the points of comparison and relation 
between them.
In both situations there is a basic cleavage between
Market Town and the interests of a number of villages. The
villages are not the same in both cases since, for example,
/
Mastia and Mene are not required to contribute to the proposed 
Dam, but t ey do provide a large number of CITCOP members.
But Avia and Posto have little citrus produce, and hardly 
figure in the Cooperative's affairs. But both Kammari and 
Kallo are prominent and have important economic interests 
in both situations. Both CITCOP and the Dam have been issues 
since the early 1960s. The traditional rivalry of the villages 
with the town received a particular impetus from the dramatic 
economic boom enjoyed by the town through its entry into 
citrus production earlier and more intensively than the 
villages. Little Market Town land is now used for anything 
else but citrus, whereas the villages still have substantial 
land in less profitable activities. Many Town houses are 
strikingly more luxurious than roost village houses. Market 
Town is not a village any longer, and has pretensions to 
urbanity. All these factors are present alongside the 
economic interests of CITCOP and the Dam, and they have been 
in continuous process for over seven years.
I have tried to make clear in both situations the 
extent to which ordinary villagers depend on more educated 
men to take initiatives and provide leadership in conflicts 
outside the village. For practical reasons this tends to 
have a basis in the superior abilities of men like Aglas
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and Vourros to handle the details of bureaucracy - the 
interpretation of laws, constitutions, minutes; all the 
paraphernalia ol literacy and administration in complex 
organisations. Hut. although higher education often confers 
advantage in such matters, it is neither a necessary nor 
sufficient condition for competence. A number of men of 
little iormal education, such as Sklyros (and many leftists, 
who in the words of D. Fanou, 'read a lot') have mastered 
such matters. Thr other reason then that villagers are on 
dependent on elite leaders stems from the status values of 
the society, and its tendency to equate high status with 
power. To be a villager, in most situations, is not only 
to be less able in administration but also to be lower status 
and weaker in terms oi power. Also, it is always sal'er for 
villagers if they are pushing educated men ahead of them, 
since this does not expose them as individuals to great risk.
The argument here is not entirely satisfactory. I 
did not hear villagers consciously discussing the desirability 
of themselves avoiding risk by sheltering behind educated, 
wealthy men, in their attempts to crack the nut of Market 
Town particularism. I have inferred their motives from a 
more general understanding of village values and behaviour.
It is not necessary for the argument that individuals or 
groups consciously carry out a policy on these lines. Tt is 
rather a consequence of the villager's political culture.
Material from some societies, such as Bailey's 
several accounts of Indian villagers, suggests a great 
distance between villagers and elite members, and that the
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way in which this gap is bridged (however ambiguously) is by 
brokers and middlemen; Bailey suggests that 'peasant 
conservatism' is directly related to this gap, to failure 
of modernising administrators to explain to peasants in 
comprehensible terms the advantages, real or supposed, of 
new policies.
Ivy data are somewhat different. Both Aglas and 
Vourros, although urban residents, are ’sons of the village'. 
However high their status they are essentially village boys 
made good. i’heir families were both large landowners, but 
their fathers were both peasant farmers and thus manual 
workers, their mothers illiterate. They both have important 
land holdings in the village, and thus realistically present 
themselves as politically active not from any desire to run 
other people's affairs or get to positions of power, but 
because they literally have a stake in the issues. The 
readiness with which most villagers accept their leadership 
stems from a reservoir of trust accorded to 'sons of the 
village' in the external affairs of the village, to which 
is added an additional trust based on the obvious and 
acceptable activism of able men with economic interests to 
defend. 1 have already spoken of the value of synferon, 
self-interest, with which almost all actions in Cyprus must 
be ultimately justified. It is acceptable to villagers that 
Aglas and Vourros work hard at certain village affairs out 
of synferon.
This situation suggests, perhaps, why notions such 
as Banfield's 'amoral familism1 add little to our understanding 
of peasant political behaviour. On the level of their
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statements about values, Cypriot villagers with their 
perpetual appeals to synferon are as amoral familists as 
any to be found. Yet they enter into cooperative organis­
ations, and take corporate action under the direction of 
their educated men, to further their interests. Self-interest 
may be pursued collectively, and leaders may be trusted, 
when self-interests are common to all. This will always be 
a matter of context and perceptions.
The fact that sons of the village start out with 
this much credit does not mean they are granted infinite 
licence. As soon as some of the sharp-eyed people in the 
village realised that Aglas was using the Dam Campaign as 
a political springboard, they withdrew some of their previous 
goodwill towards him. Also, when the CITCOP committee men 
interrupted Vourros' eloquence with the thought that perhaps 
he had his eye on the House of Representatives, this was a 
serious insult, and he in fact explicitly rejected it when 
he said "I am not trying to become an MP because I know I 
w o u l d n ’t be up to it". The substance of this charge is that 
of mixing oil and water, the national arena with local affairs, 
and hints at the possibility of the betrayal of primordial 
ties for 'outside' interests.
I have mentioned some of the similarities between 
the course of the Dam Campaign, and the course of CITCOP 
administration. But there are important differences. First, 
the issue of the Massari Dam is in an obvious way many-sided, 
to take even a narrow view. The parties are the villages, 
the town and the Civil Service Ministers, even the President.
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In the later stages, when the political parties took up the 
Dam-issue, the issue became more complex. Extraordinary 
political action, both the demonstration and the Advisory 
Committee, contributed elements of innovation in village 
politics, and even in national political life. The issue 
remained for many years outside the scope of national 
politics, but soon after the emergence of political parties 
the Dam became a party issue, and in my last visit to the 
area during the summer of 1970 two of the nationalist parties 
were competing to monopolise the issue: each tried to seem
pre-eminent in putting pressure on the government.
-o achieve their goal the villages must have 
specialist opinion of government experts on their side (or 
force their hand politically) and must also deal with problems 
of constitutional law if Market Town continues its obstruction. 
The Constitution thus becomes a resource which is more useful 
to one side than the other. But, in this case, it is balanced 
by the opinions of government experts, a resource which 
favours the villagers over the townspeople.
Aglas was unable to achieve his goal, since his 
electoral success was tied to the regional performance of 
his party. His election results in the immediate villages 
were excellent. But his aggregate results in the; region were 
not strong enough to overcome the regional defeat of his 
party (although in theory he could have been elected however 
badly his party did). The rewards of being an MP are consid­
erable - a salary of c€200 a month; this is a vast gilt-edged 
security for even a professional man like the lawyer, as well 
as carrying high national status.
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.The Kallo Cli’GOF members had no more clearly defined 
corporate interest than their wish not to come second-best 
to the Town. This is a diffuse goal, which could be satisfied 
in a number of ways. On one level it was satisfied by getting 
up at CITCOP meetings and expressing general or particular 
dissatisfactions. In this they were following a cultural 
rule which suggests a man must not be taken advantage of by 
another without reacting. To accuse the committee of 
partiality is to show that one is alive to one's rights, and 
to shame and slightly dishonour those who seek to erode or 
trample on those rights. I do not mean to imply that the 
villagers have no interest in the material improvement of 
their situation, but to point to the similarity with the 
formation in the heat of the moment, of the Advisory Committee, 
which was then allowed to lapse, and the voicing of criticisms 
at the AGMs, while leaving the hard thinking and organising 
in each case to the educated. The meaning of voicing 
criticisms for ordinary villagers may be expressive of their 
view that Karket Towners are no better than they themselves, 
and are nothing but jumped-up villagers whose impudence must 
be challenged or riposted. To men like Vourros, the same 
action is seen as an instrumental attack on an organisational 
problem. Fe is shrewd enough and at home enough in the 
village actively to employ the villagers feelings that the 
townspeople must not be allowed to "do what they like", but 
implicitly, the villagers are shrewd enough to let him take 
the major risks. There is some suggestion in my material 
that villagers are getting more inclined to stand up for
10/47
their rights; perhaps what started as a directed response 
may, in time with practise and self-confidence, become a 
habit and a reflex.
Footnotes to Chapter 10
(1) Citrus fruit can re-rain on the trees while flowers 
bloom for the next season's crop. Old fruit may 
stay on a tree alongside new fruit.
(2) Later when Vourros went to C1TC0P offices and asked 
to see the minutes the manager said he would have 
to get special permission from the Commissioner.
(3) At the end of the last chapter 1 suggested that 
this was one of the things the Kallo Advisory 
Committee had done; and that this release of 
tension may have served to insure that the Committee 
itself would do nothing, for in its formation was 
its true purpose.
(4) I have already described in the last chapter how 
my presence with a village committee in the office 
of a civil servant was used by both sides in their 
manoeuvres against the other.' This illustrates 
the conventional difficulty when the simple fact 
of the observer's presence modifies the situation 
he wishes to observe, but it also underlines the 
self-conscious political culture of Cypriot society 
and perhaps suggests why I have often adopted an 
oblique approach to dealings with higher officials 
and politicians.
(5) These were basically that I would not use real names 
for any people discussed.
(6) It is obvious that an organisation which discloses 
details of all its transactions to outsiders is at
a disadvantage when competing with private enterprise, 
especially if prices and costs are involved.
(7) In Cypriot society to use the expression 're1 (hey) to 
anyone means you regard them as equals or inferiors. 
Only very powerful people call out to a lawyer or 
doctor 're’.
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Under the cooperative law, the Commissioner has 
important powers of intervention, veto or final 
decision in the running of any cooperative. In 
the meetings described here, the CITGOP manager 
and the committee constantly deferred to the 
Commissioner, and he constantly interrupted them 
if he thought they were handling issues improperly 
or incompetently. In each meeting I attended he 
always ended with a summing-up speech, given with 
great clarity and authority.
Re constantly put people right on points of 
cooperative law, and just what they could and 
could not do in a meeting.
The manager died of a heart attack six months 
after this meeting.
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CHAPTER 11
THE LIMITS OF VILLAGE SOLIDARITY: 
the 1970 Electlon
Introdu c t ion
In July 1970 there took place the first, elections for ten 
years to the Legislative Assembly. In Nicosia district the 
United Party (UP) polled on average three times more votes than 
its rival the Progressive Front (PF) but in Kallo village this 
result was reversed. During the final period before the 
elections a number of minor disputes occurred in the village 
triggered by the events of the elections. These disputes 
eventually passed off without doing more than seriously ruffle 
the calm of ordinary life, but at times the solidarity of the 
village in the face of intrusive party politics was stretched to 
the limit.
It is important to explain the difference between the local 
and district electoral results, and to see how both results can 
be explained. But my intention goes a little further than this 
limited aim, for I hope that in concentrating on the campaigns 
of two nationalist parties, and elucidating the appeals their 
speakers made, the symbols and issues they invoked, and the 
response of their listeners, some small progress will be made 
both in the analysis of Greek-Cypriot politics and of politics 
in the peasant communities of developing nations. The particular 
theme which is central to this chapter, and which should be of 
wide general interest, is a universal political theme, and 
involves the problem of how political appeals can be made which
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are simultaneously in a r.orrt 1 idiom, yet con corned with 
material benefits? The concern, then, is to understand the 
context and implications of specific ideological appeals to 
an electorate, to see what an election campaign means in a 
prosperous village whose earlier political history has by 
now been explored in some detail.
(i) The Levendl3 affair ami its role in support for
N. Sampson
+ 22
The success of the PF in Kallo (see Tables/21) as opposed
r
to its relative failure in the district as a whole, has two 
main causes. One is that a villager, lawyer Ag.l.as, was one 
of its candidates, and his close kin worked hard for him and 
his party. The other is in the political resource available 
to one of the PF leaders, Nikos Sampson through the life and 
death of a Kallo villager, Levendis. In Sampson's handling 
of this issue, and the way the issue changed through its 
amplification in the arena of national politics, there is a 
measure of the clone relation between village and nation.
It is not the argument that this is a typical situation, for 
reasons which will be obvious? b\zt it does require some re­
consideration of the accepted notion that a wide gap necessarily 
exists between these two levels of politics.
During the EOKA struggle of 1954-59 one of several wanted 
men to be hidden in Kallo village with a price on his head was 
Nikos Sampson, a key man in Famagusta district EOKA. From 
this stay he came to know some of the villagers and later 
became a regular visitor to village weddings. He baptised 
several children in the village. One belonging to Moustaches, 
the EOKA leader, and one belonging to a nationalist prison
10/2%
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officer ; he also became friendly with several of the younger 
fiahters, including Pavlos and Tangos' brother, nicknamed 
Levendis - The Handsoire. This was a natural development from 
his gratitude at having been protected by the village. The 
younger men used £0 go into the capital and visit him in his 
newspaper office; sometimes they went drinking with Sampson 
and other EOKA leaders.
On May 20 1963 Levendis was shot and killed outside a
night-club in Famagusta. A man was arrested and charged with
two offences but later released after trial in the criminal
court. When Levendis1 family and friends first heard of his
death they wanted to go into the capital with placards and
banners, to hold a demonstration demanding that the killer of
their brother be brought to justice. As the story is now told,
they wished even then to bring certain accusations against the
Minister of the Interior, Yorgadjis, who in also said to have
heard of this and had the roads blocked by police units.
In any case, Moustachas persuaded them not to do it, saying
(2)he was against it .
There are now at least two conflicting accounts of the 
life and death of Levendis, current in the village; thsse 
accounts tend to reflect among other things the relationships 
of the speaker to the dead man, and/or to either Yorgadjis, his 
friends and the UP on one hand, or Sampson and the PF on the other.
The anti-Levendis version, which friends of Yorgadjio favour, 
i3 that although he was a courageous EOKA, fighter, he was so 
praised that it tended to go to his head. His reputation 
attracted bad characters to him, and he became involved in 
robberies, and even killings for gain. lie kept company with
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bar~girls, from v/hor ho tool: money. He was feared, rather
than loved. He crot too bin for his bootn, threw his weioht
about just once too often and got killed in a sordid row over 
a woman.
The p^o-Levendis version, which his close kin and other 
supporters of Sampson and the PF tend to mdntain is that he 
was a courageous fighter, who was loved and admired by all.
He was a high-spirited, fun-lovina young man, who in his 
friendship with other distinguished EOKA fighters enjoyed a 
drink or two. He was attractive to women, but never took 
money from them. Any part he played in robberies was not 
for gain but either for EOKA funds or to help his friends.
If he was involved in killings, then it was the killing of 
scoundrels, and money was not involved.
The pro-Levendis version then describes his killing as an 
act of politics which arose in the following way. Not only was 
he friends with Sampson, but also with Yorgadjis. At first 
these two men were themselves on good terms, but with the 
growth of rivalries between the former EOKA l e a d e r s t h e y  
grew increasingly hostile. Lovendis tried to remain on good 
terms with both but it became impossible. The simplest version 
of this is almost a morality play, on the impossibility of 
serving two masters, or having friends at loggerheads. The 
more subtle version, told by close relations of the dead man 
is that Sampson was arrested for a killing in Kyrenia on the 
orders of Yorgadjis. At the time of the killing however he 
had been drinking in the village with Levendis, who immediately 
went to Yorgadjis and demanded the release of his innocent 
friend. Later he fired a pistol outside the home of Yorgadjis
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and threatened him. This challenge was not ignored, and when 
an opportunity arose, a client of Yorgadjis took it.
There are many variants of these two versions. In one 
a pamphlet war went on between Sampson and Yoxgadjis. In 
another the killer of Levendis acted for private reasons, but 
Yorgadjis was his friend, and so he got off because YorcjsdjSis 
was not displeased with the result. The story in its various 
forms is well known throughout the island.
There are s o w  facts, however. Sampson, for example, gave 
the killing, the funeral, and the trial very full coverage in 
his tabloid newspaper, Niki. Ke attended the funeral himself, 
as the photographs in NIKI showed, weeping openly and calling 
the dead man 'my brother*. He ran an editorial in his paper 
demanding that the 'political killings* should stop, and 
calling for the trial and execution of the killer. On May 22 
he printed a statement by the Minister of the Interior which 
criticised the paper for the assumption that the killing was 
political, when the matter was sub judlce, to which Sampson 
replied. Whatever Sampton himself believed, he was far too 
aware of the laws of libel and other dangers to make any 
accusations against the Minister himself, and confined himself 
to calls for action by the police and justice departments.
Sampson's support in his paper for the dead man and his 
subsequent election speeches - which will be discussed later - 
Bade it a matter of honour for Levendis* close kin and friends 
to support Sampson in politics. Since 1963 this has meant that 
numbers of villagers who otherwise would have become or ^remained 
clients of Yorgadjis and hi3 associates have either avoided open 
commitment, or have come over to Sampson. I canDot give numbers,
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since in many cases positions in 19 6 3 were unclear, and 
people are also concerned to cover their tracks. At the very 
least it has made it difficult for people who night out of 
inertia have supported the United Party (originally headed 
jointly by Yorgacij.is and Clerides) to do so in a casual spirit? 
and has forced their either to keep their opinions quiet, or 
to take the line that Sampson's supporters arc in the main 
youngsters, would-be tough guys, whose heads have been turned 
by stories about Le\endis, HOKA and so forth. However, when 
the content of Sampson's election speeches is discussed, it 
will appear that there was a most convenient fit between hi? 
attacks on the United Party as monopolisers of patronage, and 
as betrayers of E'OKA goals and Hellenic aspirations. Uie 
appeal was to those who felt themselves to be relatively power­
less in the society, and so effective was this appeal that by 
the end of the campaign his followers believed they would win 
because their cause was just; the death of Levendis, the 
sins of the United Party and the moral rightness of the PV 
cause became interwoven symbols of intoxicating potency
(ii) Disturbances beforo the elections
I have already described how the two years preceding the 
1970 elections were marked by instability, some terrorism, 
attempted coups and murders. These events had their counter­
parts in the village and the surrounding distdrrt, which must 
be briefly mentioned.
On March 1st 196.9 a senior police official was shot and 
seriously hurt in an orange grove near Market Tovm. A number
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of villagers were arrested and subsequerf^tly released without 
being charged. They were, it was asserted, all either 
supporters of Sampson, enemies of Yorgadjis, strong nationalists 
or some combination of these.
Later in 1969 two village boys were arrested for having 
been seen distributing leaflets in a nearby village for the 
Ethnlkon Metopen (EM) the illegal organisation which had just 
appeared pledged to the speedy achievement of Enosls. I was 
told that some of the witnesses were intimidated, that a 
prominent mainland Greek Army officer interceded for the 
arrested youths, and after a few days in prison they were 
released.
A third incident involved the villagers. Still later in 
1969, a group of masked men carrying sub-machine guns walked 
into a coffee shop in a nearby village and told everyone to put 
their hands up. They then gave the muktar of the village, an 
ex-EOKA fighter who had come out strongly for the United Party, 
a rather close haircut. Six men from Kallo village were 
arrested for this, some of whom had also been arrested at the 
time of shooting of the policeman. The police then virtually 
occupied the village for three days, and searched a large 
number of houses™ ^nce again, after some days in prison, the 
six men were released. They denied that they had cut the 
nuktar's hair; but it was widely believed in the village that 
they had done so. Once again, their common characteristics were 
that they were rlght~wing nationalists, hostile to ^.orgadjiis 
and the UF.
Shortly after the haircut episode, came the dramatic 
national events mentioned earlier ~ an attempt to capture
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Lirrassol police station by offshoots of the EM? many arrests 
and arms searches; then in March 1970 the attempted killing of 
President Makarios; a few days later the murder of former 
Interior Minister Yorgadjis. During this period there were 
also continued rumours of threatened coups, and most people 
doubted that elections would be held at all.
X cannot say what the links were between these three 
village-based incidents, and the disturbances in the capital 
and Limassol. It is widely believed in the village that 
there was a strong EM cell there. One villaaer - an extreme 
right-wing nationalist closely linked to Greek array officers 
of similar views - was said to have been called to the 
Presidential Palace, and personally reprimanded by Makarios.
My own view is that the village harboured a strong EM unit, 
which may have acted more or less autonomously. There is no 
point in guessing at other connections. Since the failure of 
the Limassol raid, people with EM connections have had good 
reason to be extremely cautious? at time of writing (December 
1971) the village is again apparently daubed with pro-Grivas 
slogans.
It is worth noting in passing that Cypriot politics have 
two distinct levels. One is the formal level of public debate, 
newspaper articles speeches in the House of Representatives and 
so forth; the other is the underground level of groups, stores 
of weapons, leaflets dropped in the street. Individuals may 
be active at both levels, and pursue different goals, with 
different alliances. A man might have loyalties to several 
national leaders, which are logically in conflict. Added to 
this is the fact that certain groups or following are penetrated
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by people In fact loyal to other croups, playincr the double 
game of espionage. Or so they pay pretend when arrested, 
wishing to turn state’s evidence and secure a pardon. Such 
factors leave more doubts than certainties in the minds of 
observers, simply summed up in the common remark men make 
when discussing motives and loyalties ' nios bori na to xerl?5 
'VTho can tsossibly know?'
(iii) The emergence of_p olit ic a 1 j^ artiejs
I shall now return in time to the emergence of political 
parties, give brief sketches of the parties and leaders, and 
how their formation affected the village.
Throughout 196G there was discussion in the press as to 
whether or not there would be organised party life and elections 
Those x^apers which were against the government wanted elections 
because they hoped to gain ground; those which supported the 
government hoped that elections would strengthen the 
government's mandate. Under the Cypriot system, the President 
is elected, and then appoints his ministers who need not be 
Representatives, or be approved by the Legislative Assembly.
The Assembly itself has as its main power the voting of 
ministerial budgets. Under certain conditions it can also 
initiate legislation. So the legitimacy of the government 
does not depend directly on the existence of parties or on the 
composition of the Assembly. However, under normal circumstance 
the Assembly would have played a more sharply critical role 
in its relation to the government. The exceptional inter- 
communal issues of 1963 onwards made it possible for the 
Assembly to avoid this responsibility in the name of national 
solidarity and support for the President. The other factor
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which contributed to this was the personal prestige of 
Makarios himself, coupled with his not inconsiderable personal 
powers of patronage. Thus there was a sense in which the 
Assembly was so closely identified with the government that 
the feeling was widespread that elections would clarify the 
support for it, in spite of the care Ilakarios took to remain 
•above1 party.
When Makarios finally gave his formal approval for the
formation of political parties, in February 1969, the first-
men off the mark were the Knqlish-trained barrister Glafkos
Clerides and Polykarpos Yorcadjis, who forced the United Party.
I have already sketched the events which led to the resignation
(5)of Yorgadjis . There was fairly widespread surprise therefore 
at the alliance between these two men, since it might have been 
thought that the area of Clerides' solid support, the urban 
bourgoisie, v/ould be precisely the area of greatest antipathy 
to Yorgadjis. It looked like an alliance in which Clerides 
would have to lose more than he gained. But Yorgadjis* rural 
organisation of village groups was strong enough to provide a 
skeletal electoral machine, something which Clerides lacked 
completely. Three fifths of the islands electorate are village 
residents; Clerides could not afford to neglect this.
Yorgadjis in turn stood to gain increased respectability, 
and a share of the otherwise disaffected urban bourgeois v^ ~ofce* 
People who v/ould never have voted for him by himself, since they 
regarded him as a semi-literate upstart, could not avoid votina 
for Clerides. Whatever their personal antipathy to Yor<r?adjis, 
they could not support Clerides without also supporting Yorgadji 
In terms of policy UP claimed to be a nationalist party, to be
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open to all nationalists to support the tactic of inter- 
communal talks, to represent the interests of all classes as 
opposed to those of a single class; to support private 
enterprise, but also to favour improvements in subsidised 
education, medical care and other benefits.
Very soon after the formation of the United Party. Dr.
Vassos Lyssarides announced the formation of his own partty,
EDKK. This was also a nationalist party, but of a more 
democratic-socialist and populist cast. Then Nikos Sampson 
announced the formation of his own Progressive Party. Takis 
BV'-'dokas, the only public opponent of Makarios was already 
at the head of DEK, a party which had first been formed by 
John Clerides(the father of Glavkos derides) in 1959 and 
always a nodal point for the most fanatic Enosists. The taro 
right-nationalist associations, PEIC and SEK, were both 
vertically split, since some members wanted to support the 
UP, and others did not. They were not political parties, but 
rather politicised interest groups, representing right- 
nationalist farmers and workers respectively. Furthermore, 
it was not clear how strong they were in organisational terms ^  . 
AKEL’s primacy in party political experience can be judged by 
the fact that its main election slogan was to be "15 years in 
the service of the people" whereas its closest competitor in 
organised party terms, DEK, was just coming up to its tenth 
disorganised year.
From February to April 1969 the first organised party 
initiatives started to affect the village. The activists in 
the village started to discuss what sort of electoral alliances 
might take place between the parties which had so far officially
formed. Even at this tire it was clear that two possible kinds 
of alliance were favoured and likely; either that all the self- 
styled nationalist parties woxtld form some sort of grouping 
against Ar»EL; or that several nationalist parties would 
combine against the United Party. In the early spring of 1969 
both Lyssarides and Sampson made formal political speeches in 
Kallo, x/hich was certainly one of the first villages in the 
island to attract the attention of party leaders. Both speakers 
drew large audiences and both meetings passed without serious 
incident. Lyssarides seemed to get the bigger audience, 
including a number of women who watched from a distance. But 
Samspon was carried into the villages on the shoulders of a 
group of young unmarried men, chantinrr his name. There was a 
certain amount of tension between the supporters of the two 
parties ovor the hanging of banners and use of coffee-shop 
facilities: the best coffee shop for speeches and for hanging
banners happened to belong to a firm Sampson supporter, and 
for some time it seemed that the Lyssarides people i^ ere to be 
denied this facility. In the end the .Sampson supporters 
relented. This tension was undoubtedly aggravated, by the fact 
that some of the present Sampson supporters had been involved 
in the episode in 1965 when the Lyssarides group meeting was 
harassed as I described in chapter eight.
I returned to Cyprus in June 1970 to follow the last three 
weeks of the election carrr'paign. Some of the events both in 
Kallo and nationally which took place during my absence have 
been described above. From now on the concern is with the final 
stages of the campaign. On arrival in Kallo I decided to 
concentrate on the PF campaign since it seemed likely that the
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dominant political cleavacte in the vi 11 acre would bo between 
the PF and UP supporters. This may have led it1© to under™ 
estimate or overlook other important aspects of the pre­
election period, so what follows cannot pretend to be a 
complete account but I believne it is accurate both In detail 
and emphasis.
(iv) The PF Campainn in the district
The most important development at the nation val level was 
the announcement on June 25th that the Progressive Front f headed 
by the mayor of Nicosia,, Odysseus Xoannides had. merged with 
the Progressive Party of Nikos Sampson. The new grouping was 
to be called the Progressive Front of Change and Power and 
Sampson was now called the General Organiser of the new party. 
Some of his Kallo supporters were concerned that in the merger 
his slate of candidates had been too greatly reduced in favour 
of the other partner, and indeed the next day bitter articles 
appeared in AGON the UP newspaper by some of the men Sampson 
left behind, i.e. who had failed to be adopted as candidates 
in the new party, calling him 'Judas' and other choice roaMes. 
The general effect of the merger in Kallo was to hearten the 
members of both former parties, since obviously neither had 
stood much chance alone, under the prevailing electoral system. 
Both parties appealed to those strong nationalists who felt 
the Makarios government had been too soft in prosecuting 
Enosis with Greece, and in both parties were to be found a 
number of people who felt that they were excluded from the 
monopoly of power and privilege enjoyed by some United Party 
supporters, and who were suspicious that the main impetus of 
Greek Cypriot society was towards Britain and away from Greece.
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The other important event which was announced on the same 
day though in much smaller print war, that the illegal Ethnikon
- —
Meto]>or^Paphos had sent a letter to Makarios announcing its 
dissolution and pledging support to him. A few days later the 
Limassol branch and its dissident offshoot the Roly Brigade 
(which between then had been responsible for the daring raid 
on the Limassol Central Police Station) r.ade similar announce­
ments. Their rove was less effective since many of their wore 
already prisoners of the government, but these announcements 
had the effect of telling the electorate that whatever the 
alarms and tribulations of the previous eighteen months there 
was unlikely to be an important armed disruption of the 
electoral process, unless from outside the island.
On June 26th Nikos Sampson was due to speak in Kammari. 
According to Pavlos, who had been chosen as one of Sampson's 
35 district organisers, his presence in the district, a district 
in which he was not himself standing, was a personal favour 
stemming from his concern for the deceased Levendia and his 
desire to help his friends. For several days before the 2Ct.Ii 
Pavlos worked hard in the surrounding villages to organirce 
attendance by PF supporters at the meeting. One of Sampson's 
staunchest supporters in Kallo owns a bus and a taxi, and he 
himself states that his commercial "T" licence was due to a 
personal Intervention by Sampson in the administrative process, 
v/hen others including Yorgadjis had failed to do anything.
This man was to be seen throughout the pre-election period 
continually putting his vehicles to work in support of PF 
meetings around the district, and loudly telling the world why 
he was doing so.
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An hour before the arrival of Sampson buses nnd cars 
started to arrive in Kammari; there was on excited atmosphere 
as old friends, and particularly old EOKA associates recognised 
each other and their common purpose in arriving. The excite­
ment was Intensified by Sampson's brothers every few minutes 
he would bellow through the highly effective amplification 
system some of the slogans that Sampson had been hammering 
homo in his newspapers, his speeches and his postersj Axiokrntia; 
flALqsM* lL«^i_f^vlo^ates; Rule by the Worthy; Change;
Down with the Corrupt. He would also nay "In a few minutes 
will arrive the General Organiser of the Progressive Front of 
Power and Change; will arrive the renowned EOKA Tighter, the 
man who brings us the Wind of Change and the Message of Victory, 
NIKOb SAMPSON" Then the amplification system would play stirring 
martial music until the next announcement. Such tactics were 
calculated to excite the faithful; but to the UP supporters 
sitting at another coffee shop hut still within earshot of 
the amplifier, they seemed like precisely the crude demagogic 
techniques wMch they always associated with Sampson. They 
were also depressed by the very large crowd which was gathering 
to hear him nnd by the obvious signs of his party’s energetic 
organisation.
Finally Sampson himself arrived. A number of candidates 
for PF were introduced to the crowd. They were all standing for 
the Nicosia District and each felt constrained to make a short 
Epeech. Among then was the Kallo lawyer, Acrlas^. Then 
Sampson himself started to speak. He spoke in a markedly 
more simple, direct and emotional style to any of the previous 
speakers, all of whom were concerned to show their Master'/, as
ll/ll'
educated won of the hloher levels of (:11o Clreek 1 niKniflnp, wh or** 
Deinotiki turnn towardn Knthnrovouwa ? r-ampaon it In often said 
even by hin own supporters Moonn' t know how to apeak" by 
which they mo.m two thincis: onp 1 a that when he speaks bin
own emotions come acronn in on uninhibited way, and ho ran 
bo close to weeping when he speaks or dead friendn or sooi.nl 
injustice; the no con <1 in that Irina style in olmple, onrhown 
the classical structures of formal rhetoric, and relien on 
such techniques as repeating "And wn ask . . , they do not 
answer . . . "And wo have noon ... Who are tho men who? . . . 
we are not the men who ... In spite of the comment that he 
does not know how to apeak, .largo crowdn listen to his speer-lma 
with clone attention and show no plan of boredom ovon after 
an hour and a half of anecdoteo. Anecdotes are a potent weapon 
in his speeches and he wan to >mn a good many on thin evening.
He began with memories of the F.OKA struggle, names of 
those who had fallen, reminding the audience of the naiiae, and 
the heroinn of the dead fighters. Then he went on to a lint 
of names of those fighters who had died after the end of the 
struggle, and whose killers had not been brought to luntlo*3.
Me mentioned the man from Kallo, a vl 1 lage where he himself 
had been in hiding an a wanted man, a man whone nam« they all 
knew, the hero Levondin, For ten whole years such murders had 
gone on, an they all knew, and men were walklmt around in the 
streets who should at leant have been in prison.
he moved on to other theme a, to corruption In high and 
secret places, the arrogance of the rich and their Indifference 
to the poor. He spoke of government officials ’’with their fat 
salaries" and their harsh treatment of poor farmers with no
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rseular income at nil. Ho told n number of storie# About 
how many snon had given their life or limbs at various phft(|@0 
of the national struggle in the last 15 yoayH, avnt how when 
they or their famil .tea hod tufnod to the government for oowa 
sort of compensation they had boon shabbily treated*1**, m  
told a story of a widow with four childron whose husband had 
died fighting the Turks and who wan rowdy to start begging In 
the streets to food hor family; when she had asked « 
govominont official what, she should do ho had anowereod "marry 
acrain" - a patent absurdity in contemporary Cyprus, and one 
which drew an angry, incredulous gasp from the crowd.
Ho told a story about their childron in the army b®ing 
entitled to thrf)© quarters of a loaf of bread a day and tax 
money joiner to pay for this amount of bread, and the lads 
actually getting only a guartsr of a loaf, beonimo of corruption.
By the vine of nimplcs rhetorical devices ho attacked the
United Party an If .tt wore responsible for the mistakes of the
government ovor the laat ten years. Thiu wan a favourite
ci
line of all PF speakers throughout the campaign and needs# no 
comment. As I have already pointed out, the Presidential 
system of government means that there need be no connection 
between the government ministers and any political party. 
Furthermore, MakarJos had persuaded the representatives both in 
1960 and subsequently that national unity was the most Important 
Insue of the hour, so that the House hod rarely made use of its 
powers either of budget veto, or of outspoken criticism of 
government policies, fto that when PF speakers attacked the 
* government nnd/or the Representatives for Inaction, there was 
a real sense In which they could be sold to be attacking the
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President. But this they were careful never to do ^ ^  „ All 
other speakers and parties, while hitting out at their rivals, 
contrived to imply that they themselves were closer to the 
President and enjoyed more of his support than anyone else, 
and that people in other parties were only pretending to be 
pro-Makarios and pretending to enjoy his confidence and favour. 
Since GlarKos derides, as leader of the United Party, also 
enjoyed Makarios1 confidence to the point of being in charge 
of the intercommunal talks with his Turkish counterpart Raouf 
Denktash, the PF speakers had somehow to imply that Clerides 
was pulling the wool over Makarios' eyes, seeming to obey 
him, while pursuing other plans*l0). Their supporters in 
private conversations took this sort of point much further, and 
since the other leader of the United Party, the deceased 
Yorgadjis, had been deeply implicated in the assassination 
attempt on the President before himself being assassinated, 
they had plenty of ammunition. In their mouths the UP wan a 
party of thieves, liars, murderers and plotters. Although it 
had only been in existence for a year, they claimed it was also 
responsible for everything wrong with Cyprus since 1960. The 
evidence for this was that 'the same old clique' who had 
organised the Patriotic Front in 1960 and later taken ministerial 
jobs were now running the United Party.
The major flaw in this chain of reasoning should have been 
the apparent gullibility of President Makarios. Since nearly 
everyone clained to believe that Makarios was the wisest man 
on the island, the man who still really controlled everything 
and everyone, who knew all about whatever was happening, and so 
forth, this would have clashed with any notion of his gullibility.
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The only way to save th© argument logically was to inoint 
on tho natanic brilliance In deception of tho UP leaders and 
this of couroo pp people did whenever thoy could, Logic 
onide, at vnrioun timon it: auited their oaa© to blur 
distinction*! botwoen government minintern, th© Uaprewentativan, 
and tho Unitod Party. They could point to throe living pernonn 
and ono dead, one (Yorgadjin) in tho United Party who had boon 
either minintorfj or ftoprotiontativo» and thin wan enough to 
juntify tho charge of "the ciaina old clique nnd tholr f.ttondn" > 
that thoir own party containod several men who through P£K 
or other moana had boon representatives they chose to ignore, 
Thoy numbered no ox-miniators in thoir rank o'.
In his a pooch fiarnpoon introduced many of his charges by 
indiroct methodn, speaking of "those who for ton whole yoaro 
havo fooled tho people, cheated tho pooplo, betrayed the 
pcoplo". An n practining journalist who has also successfully 
brought libol actions against novoral newspapers, ho was far 
too astute to make crude oonnectionn between 'those who , 
and tho United Party. But it wan bin plain Intention. It 
wan further evidence that both as a speakor and a politician 
ho ban far morn wit than hio opponents like to protend, lie 
now turned bin attentions to nationalism, genuine and falsa. 
True Grookn wonted Enooiq with Mother Greece and he was sure 
ovoryono in bin audience agreed with him about that, lie would 
e«plain what he meant by true Grookness. Oreeknooa did not 
Include leaving one’s daughter unbnptioad, or worshipping 
Buddha, nor did it include saying he wan ashamed to be Creek 
or that Greek Army officers in Cyprus wore illegal, II© had on 
numerous occasions asked Clerideo publicly whether or not hi»
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daughter was baptised and he had an yet received no answer.
How could derides say he stood for the family and the Church, 
when this meant having unbaptised daughters? How dare 
Cleridea go around giving speeches with the Greek flag in 
front of him singing the Greek National Anthem when everyone 
knew what sort of man he really was?
The men who were responsible for the Green Line, the 
Zurich Agreements which had led to the Green Line, and who 
were now carrying the island towards Partition ... everyone 
knew what sort of men they were. IIow could Clerides claim 
to stand for law and order when he failed to collect the guns 
which had shot down former EOKA fighters like Levendis, had 
failed to collect the thousand odd guns recently discovered 
in a stoxehouse in Nicosia, which had belonged to the man who 
had organised an assassination attempt on President Makarios?
He could not say that the United Party were completely without 
ability ~ they were cunning enough to see that when Lellos 
Dimitriades had had the gall to say "Cyprus for the Cypriots" 
they could no longer afford to have him as a candidate in 
their party, because they wished to fool the people into believing 
that as a party they stood for Enosls, and they realised that 
people would not bo taken in by this. There was however only 
one party.that really wanted Enosls with Mother Greece, that 
was a truly Greek party, a party concerned with rule by the 
worthy, with change, with an Improvement in life for the poor, 
with cleaning lip corruption, and that was the Progressive 
Front ... He brought his speech to a close.
I have reported here the substance of Sampson’s speech 
because it raised a number of issues which most of the PF
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speakers were to stress*- , it cclso was to be repeated back
to me by Sampson’s supporters fervently and with great 
conviction for throe weeks, with the very examples he had 
produced and the anecdotes he had recounted with the exact 
choice of words being repeated by young men as if they 
themselves had beer eyewitnesses to the events, and the events 
themselves recorded and established by the nost impartial 
tribunals in the world. The nost striking fact both about 
Sampson's speech, the repetitions of his supporters, and the 
conduct of the whole election in and around Kallo was the 
intensity of opposition between the UP and the PPr while rost 
of the current flowed from the latter to the former, there was 
a reciprocal flow which is hardly surprising in view of the 
PF attacks. For all practical purposes the Communists and the 
EDEK party of Lyesarides need not have existed, for all the 
attention that PF speakers paid to them. There was in fact 
a bitter electoral struggle being conducted between Lyssarides 
and derides but in the main PF supporters took the position 
that "the. enemy of my enemy is my friend” and were vastly more 
sympathetic to Lyssarides than to Clerides. This raises the 
issue of the dimensions of party cleavage; whereas in 
conventional European terms, Lyssarides as some sort of 
democratic socialist should have been further away from PF 
than the more centrist United Party, PF supporters believed 
that in spite, of his leftism Lyssarides was a more genuine 
nationalist, and more gemiinely pro-Makarios than the leaders 
of the United Party. But the PF supporters believed that 
they had most to fear from the UP, given the political patronage 
system. UP leaders had command of patronage, and could buy off
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potential PF supporters. PF, like EDEK, was a party of ’outs' -
of people out in the cold. In addition, if EDEK took votes
from anywhere, the PF people argued, it would be from AXEL, 
and not fron U P ^ ^ .
There were few questions after Sampson's speech, and he
noon went off with some of the other PF candidates to supper
at the house of one of his leading supporters in the village.
This he had done the year before after his Kallo speech,
and the house he had been to had been that of the wealthiest
of Levenciis brothers. This man and Pavlos now joined the
Sampson supper in Kammari. The atmosphere was relatively
relaxed, but the tension soon mounted: Sampson, like other
PF people, believed that a 'landslide' had begun, of former
UP supporters coming over to the PF. He suddenly turned on
one young man, a former EOKA stalwart who was sitting at the
long table. "Look at him" said Sampson, loud enough for all
to ear, "When the UP was formed he joined straight away;
he became one of their top activists and organisers in this
district. And look at him now - now he's come over to us ...
because he knows we will win". The young man hung his head
and. said nothing in reply. A little later and possibly to
take the sting out of Sampson's treatment of this man, Pavlos
explained to me in front of Sampson that when the UP got
organised they sent people out all over the island to get
ii
villagers to register as members. Pachulos, the nuktar of 
Therno, you know is a koumbaros of my father. My father doesn't 
know much about politics so when Pachulos asked him to sign 
up in the UP, he signed. Wow do you think I’d let my father 
vote for the UP. There are lots of cases like that, and they
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must have seriously overestimated their strength if they 
take seriously all those bits of paper
Sampson had however a moderating influence on some of his 
supporters. When for example someone at the table asserted 
that Clerides and the Turkish leaders were affines because 
their wives were cousins, Sampson said this was wrong. (The 
logic behind this astonishing notion was that Clerides' wife 
was a foreign woman, and assumed not to be a Christinn.
From there it is still a rather large jump to making her a 
kinswoman of Dentash* wife).
Later Pavlos said he had been pleased with the turn-out, 
it had been a good meeting. Sampson leaped on this, harshly.
"Oh no, it wasn't a good meeting - I'm not at all satisfied. 
There should have been a much bigger crowd. You must all work 
much harder" he told them. They looked suitably chastened.
Next day Pavlos was repeating Sampson's words to his Kallo 
team, with similar inflections and similar results.
J^hen nearly everyone had left an amusing incident took 
place which wan also both highly characteristic of politics in 
the villages. Our host, with two Kallo men and myself were 
at the table, as we11 as an uncle of the host's wife. He was 
a staunch leftist and very much the worse for drink. He had 
been jolly before, but now was approaching a sort of privileged, 
challenging belligerence. He got to his feet and said "I'll 
tell you about Enosis. Vie don’t want Enos is of a poushtlsslma  ^
sort. We want real Enosis ..." The effect of the way he spoke 
was to leave the whole issue delightfully vague. But what he 
was continuously doing, which was an embarrassment to the others 
present, was to shout out the beginning of the sentence "We
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don’t want Enosis What he meant by "genuine Enosis”
I cannot say, but it would probably involve union with a 
democratic Greeco. Now for half an hour everyone in the 
room went on drinking and trying to humour him and he went 
on trvinc to cet a rise out of them. At one point Pavlos 
said ‘Uncle, I can see only nuns will make yon change your 
views". "Gunn? Never ..." replied the old man rolling his 
eyes. Someone else said "Tie* re goincr to have to take you for 
a long ride in the mountains on election day and tie you up 
among the pines — ” The point of this anecdote is that 
kinship norms nnd those restraining political conflict within 
the village meant that no-one was allowed to get anc^ ry with the 
very provocative old ran. However since all had been drinking, 
the sort of jokes which were made about violence between right 
and left shows the kind of anxiety in the village over the 
problems continuing solidarity presents.
Sampson's Kammari speech took place on the first day of 
the merger of his party with that of Ioannides. From this point 
on in Kallo this produced close co-operation between the 
activitists of the two former groupings. A number of planning 
meetings were held in which Patris as the representative of 
the PEK-Azinas-Ioannides group worked with Pavlos, the Sampson 
representative, in going through the electoral list, marking down 
those among the 740 Kallo voters whom it was thought worth 
attempting to win over. After two long evenings work the first 
canvass reached a rough verdict of 50 sure votes ror AKBL;
20 for EDEK? 50 for UP; 200 for PF and 400 adiaphorl 
{indifferent; uncommitted). In calculating the number of 
uncommitted voters the usual rule was anyone who was not known
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to be a staunch supporter of a party was marked as uncommitted. 
In the case o^ a wife or sister, it was assumed that she 
could be approached if there existed a strong tie with someone 
in the PF camp. Old peonle wors very often marked down as 
uncommitted. It was clear to all that the voting system would 
allow many peonle who felt themselves to be under cross- 
pressures to give a few votes to a p?<rty merely to satisfy an 
importunate friend or kinsman, and that therefore it was worth 
trying to cadge the odd vote or two from any but the most 
intransigent activists.
The first rreF>tinrr of the new party in the village 
numbered about 25 men and boys; the atmosphere was excited, 
and a number of hirhly partisan remarks were made by some of 
the more hot-headed supporters. For example, while the lists 
v/ere being checked, on several occasions a voter was revealed 
to be a UP supporter,, whereas some people present had imagined 
he was with them. There was some swearing, then the man who 
had read the welcoming speech to Sampson when he came to
Kalio to speak said "I always said we should stop the sale of
AGOIJ in this villarre" - Agon being the mouthpiece of the United 
Party.
Such remarks as this became a regular feature of the talk
of the younger PF supporters. It was noticeable that PF
attracted far more boys in their late teens and early twenties 
to participate than did other groupings. These boys would sit 
around the main PF coffee shop ready in hold forth to any 
listener on the crovemment and the tTP's sins over '’ten whole 
years". I heard several discussions about the need for them 
to give anyone looking for trouble as rrood as they got, to
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prevent the UPs meeting taking place in Kallo, or at the 
very least to disrupt it. Whenever Pavlos heard such remarks 
he swiftly clamper? down on ther.’, and said that thev did not 
want that sort of trouble, and they were to do nothing of 
the sort without consulting him. He was continually cooling 
then down. Much that the younger men said can be seen as 
the typical tough talk1 of young men anywhere, but there was 
none to be heard from the other parties. Indeed, whenever 
the other party activists wished to denicrrate Samnson and 
his following they said "Ivho supports Sampson? Just a bunch 
of kids tryinc to be tough, and if you look around you'll find 
that in every village in Cyprus, the kids who like him are the 
bad ones, the ones who don't work, who fight, gamble, carrv 
guns. So much for his supporters ..."
It was clear during the examination of the electoral 
lists that although the villagers insist that thev know 
'ev^ervone' in the village they cannot always identify them 
from the formal names written down for official purposes.
There were lon<-r discussions of what person was designated 
by a particular name; there is no doubt that most adult 
persons in the village could identify all other adults on 
sight, but they would not be able to do this formally. The 
time spent over the lists and the difficulties they produced 
. were stressina the gap between the official world of electoral 
lists and the face-to-face village world.
Since later in the campaign many village PF supporters 
were to feel and to suggest that the government officials 
conducting the elections were biased in favour of the UP, it 
is important that at the earlier stage they took the electoral
11/27
lists seriously, as valid, rind made little attempt to 
check them systematically. I did hear people discuss ways in 
which one could fraudulently get oneself onto two lists and 
thus vote twice, but there whs no TTP collusion suggested in 
this, rather an individual initiative eauallv open to 
supporters of all narties. However PF supporters did discuss, 
with a degree of seriousness, the power of muktars to help 
the UP get extra votes but they did not sucgest it would 
happen in Kallof where the muktar is weak.
It should not be thought that the PF village teders 
looked on their slate of twelve candidates in the Nicosia 
district as men of hinh calibre for whom it was morally 
essential to work. Two of the most prominent Kallo PF 
activists expressed themselves quite differently. One said 
sometimes he not thoroughly sick of politics, and disillusioned 
and wanted no part of it. I asked him. why. "When X think that 
Aglas the lawyer, who is a fool, is a candidate and may become 
an FTP, and I know how much better I am than he i3. But when 
Azinas was looking for good men to be candidates for the party, 
he vent after them with a candle ~ there were none ..." The 
speaker suffered under the additional handicap of not being 
Ideologically committed to the PF groun but being unable for 
career reasons to follow any other course. Put even men 
heavily committed to PF told me " The men we have as candidates 
this 6'.lection don't impress me. Most of them are sxmply 
ambitious and would stand for any party. They are after a 
steady £200 a month and the prestige and opportunities to make 
a bit on the side. To build a party organisation and get 
experience we must use them in this election. But in five
11/27
lists seriously, an valid, and made little attempt to 
check them systematical^. r did hear pf!Cple dlset38B vmys in
which one could fraudulently ret oneself onto two lists and 
thus vote twice, but there was no TTP collusion Bucrcrested in 
this, rather an individual Initiative equally open to 
supporters of all narties. However PF supporters did discuss, 
with a degree of seriousness, the power of nuktars to help 
the UP get extra votes but they did not suggest it would 
happen in Kallo, where the muktar is weak.
It should not he thought that the PF village teders 
looked on th^ir sl^te of twelve candidates in the Nicosia 
district as men of hirrh calibre for whom it was morally 
essential to work. Two of the most prominent Kallo PF 
activists expressed themselves quite differently. One said 
sometimes he not thorouahly sick of politics, and disillusioned 
and wanted no part of it. I asked him why. "When I think that 
Anlas the lawyer, who is a fool, is a candidate and may become 
an I!P, and I know how much better I am than he is. But when 
Azinas was looking for crood men to be candidates for the party, 
he went after them with a candle - there were none ..." The 
speaker suffered under the additional handicap of not being 
Ideologically committed to the PF grour> but being unable for 
career reasons to follow any other course. Pnt even men 
heavily committed to PF told me " The men we have as candidates 
this election don't impress me. Most of them are simply 
ambitious and. would stand for any party. They are after a 
steady £200 a month and the prestige and opportunities to make 
a bit on the side. To build a party organisation and get 
experience we must use them in this election. But in five
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years time we’ll have better men”. Such impressions were
confirmed from other sources. One candidate standing for
the EDEK party admitted to an informant that he would have
stood in any party except the communists. E. H. Hammonds,
who studied the EPEK party during the pre-election period,
concluded that ideologically the EDEK candidates spanned
a very wide range; some of them would not accept the words
'democratic socialist1 to describe the party, while others
(13)
would accept no other title. In such a small party this is 
suggestive.
Villagers often showed a developed sophistication on such 
issues. Their frecment comment "They're all out to line their 
pockets" was not as wildly inaccurate as it might at first 
sight have appeared. For many of the candidates £200 a month 
is a very useful sum. When I commented to one vi1lacer that 
some of the election photographs of the candidates seemed 
to have been taken a lone? time ago when the men were younger*, 
he said "Oh they do that to make themselves appear fresh", 
using a word that is usually applied to the condition of meat 
or vegetables.
This detachment was even present in comments on Sampson 
by his own close supporters. Many of them in addition to saying 
that he did not speak well although he spoke strongly and said 
things which ought to be said, maintained, he did not have the 
capabilities to be say, President of the Republic. Further 
that his behaviour was sometimes unpredictable, in a damaging way.
Such views did not stop Pavion, as Sampson's district 
agent, working very hard for him. He made sure that every 
night a bus-load of Kallo PF supporters went off to wherever
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a PF speaker was having a meeting. Some of these trips 
were not uneventful. On Juno 2 8th, the lawyer Agios went 
to nearby There village to speak. The Theme rnuktar, rich 
and powerful, 3.3 a strong UP supporters. That year one of 
his grandchildren had been baptised by Yorcradjis, and he 
himself had thrown a huge party for the occasion. Aglas, 
in his speech attacked Clerides, and sore Tip supporters in 
the audience heckled him. He replied that he was not attackin 
Clerides as a ran, but on the record of his party. A little 
later a fiaht broke out between UP and PF neople, from which 
the Kallo PF contingent remained aloof. In the melee, the 
lawyer’s car tyres got slashed.
The same evening in Kallo there was a fight, on the same 
lines. Yorgadjic had a koumbaros, I<. Karas from Kallo, with 
certain canteen concessions in the government offices in the 
capital^ ^. It was often said to me that this nan was kept
near the Minister so he could inform him of any possible 
moves by the kin o^ the murdered Levendis, against the 
Minister. Karas' younger brother, P. Karas, is one of the 
most active UP supporters in Kallo. He is also, as it happens 
a first cousin of the dead Levendis. Levendis' brother Katio, 
and P. Karas got into a fight about whether or not a UP
election poster could be hung up. Katis threatened to tear it
up if P. Karas stuck it on the wall. At one point P. Karas 
said the words 'your poove of a boss is better?* (o poushtis
o fiiaatros sou en kallltera? and the two young men had come to
blows. The fact that first cousins were fighting, though
deplorable, soon worsened, for now another tough young man, 
Pyrgos, joined in against P. Karas, enraged by the slight on
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his friend Sampson. Pyrgos is married to P. Karas' sister*15*
and so their relations are crar.hros/kquny 1 ados ? this fight
then involved three young men closely related by kinship and
affinity, xt wan to lead to further repercussions a few days 
later.
(v) The UP cannaim and PFcs
lhe neict important incident to take place surrounded the 
speech by United Party leader Clerides in Market Town. On 
this evening a busload of young Kallo PF supporters went 
there. Before the bus - driven by Katis the youngest brother 
of the deceased Levendis -• set out, Pavlos murmured something 
to him. Katis told the young men in the bus ”I don't want any 
fooling about, and mind those things in the back'1. I saw a 
few pieces of cardboard piled one on the other and thinking it 
was something to do with the busdriver thought no more of it. 
The bus drove down into the town which was full of people, and 
went below the main square where Clerides was to speak. The 
boys in the bus were in a state of considerable excitement, 
but I still did not know why and finding their company 
exhausting decided to go and listen to the speech with some 
older people from Kallo X had seen in the crowd.
Clerides arrived and. was clapped and started his speech.
He was about seven minutes in, facing the packed square in 
the artificial light when there was a faint disturbance from 
the far side. Something was clearly happening, and in a few 
moments everyone could see what it was: slowly across the
square like carnival floats moved a line of posters, held high 
in the air by eight young Kallo PF supporters. The lettering 
was crude and cramped, which made what then happened all the
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wore pointed. a very larcre number of the no op I n  In the crowd 
who were facincr Clerides to listen to his speech turned round 
to read the posters. Clerides was confronted with several 
hundred clearly inattentive backs. Once the crowd had 
managed to decipher the posters which took sore tire they 
then had time to ponder their messages:
1. The president of mother Greece condemned the moral 
instigator of the assassination attempt against him.
What party did the insticrator belong to?
2. One party leader has in the study of his home a picture 
of the Oueen of England. Do you know who he is?
3. Were the guns which killed the fighters handed over 
to the police?
4. Who broke the fifth commandment ~ that is, who swore 
at his own father from the balcony in public?
5. Who said the Greek officers were illegal?
6. Makarios condemned the moral instigator of the 
assassination attempt on him. What party did he 
belong to?
7. One party leader from earliest days has benn a spy 
for the Intelligence Service. Do yoii know who?
8. In the centre of Nicosia a warehouse was discovered 
with a thousand illegal weapons. To what party did 
they belong and what was the purpose of that party?
I shall not here explain the background to each poster; it is 
enough to say that in each case they referred (obliquely enough 
to escape libel action) to certain charges and events which 
Sampson in his newspaper Machl lias continuously used as 
ammunition against Clerides and the United Party. Some of
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them refer in particular to the role thouqht to have been 
played by the deceased Yoroadjis in two unsuccessful 
assassination attempts on heads of state.
Clerides lost no time in facincr up to the challenge of 
the posters. He badly needed to regain his position as the 
focal point of the meeting. He said he could see placards 
be.-ore him (shouts of ’shame to them' from the crowd) and 
did not propose to answer such questions except to say that 
the Greek Government and Archbishop Makarios clearly had full 
confidence in him which was why he was entrusted with the 
conduct of the intercommunal talks; that he did not worship 
Buddha and that his daughter was baptised at nine months of 
age. That he was not however a POLITICAL WINDMILL, a quick 
jab at Sampson's many ideological shifts which brought 
applause from UP supporters ... "and that he believed ..."
But at this point a man in the crowd shouted out "You believe 
only in money”. This man was not from. Kailo or standing near 
the placard-bearers, and he shouted loudly enouah for most 
people in the crowd not to find out what it was Clerides 
believed in. A number of people started to move down in a 
threatening way towards the man who had shouted,, and the police 
moved down too and Clerides said from the rostrum "Don't do 
anything to them ..." For some minutes there was a continual 
mild disturbance in the crowd, and it seemed as if a brawl 
would take place, but the moment passed.
Clerides spoke for a much shorter period than when I heard 
him speak two weeks before in the village of Klirou. Also he 
did not accept any questions, which was also a departure from 
his usual practice. But since eight fairly difficult questions
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were staring him in the face through most of his speech, 
this is hardly surprising. He departed and the crowd started 
to disperse, derides then In fact went, to Parali village 
anc is reported as having spoken for n long time and taken on 
questions including some like those on the placards. Since 
there had been a strong and rather tense PF election speech 
in Parali a few days previously, where a young man apparently 
representing the United Party had persistently questioned the 
main speaker, derides* move was not without tactical value.
The Kallo PF supporters got back Into their bus and set 
out for the village three miles away. They were jubilant.
They felt they had really defeated derides, that his failure 
to answer the questions was a clear moral defeat. Since they 
had not seen him speak elsewhere they were actually unaware 
of the real scope of their 'victory'. Afterwards it was 
reported to me that derides had feared there might be a 
disturbance and had. deliberately curtailed his sneech. Rut 
the young PF supporters did not have the same perspective as 
the President of the United Party: where his concern was to
avoid violent disruption of the meeting, theirs was to draw 
public attention to their opposition to him and all he. stood 
for. One of the boys in the bus started to swear excitedly.
"I knew it. When he sang the national anthem at the end, did 
you notice, he got it wrong, he got the words wrong, he put 
sword where sight should have been". This remark was greeted on 
all sides with the comment that this was just the sort of thing 
they expected from such a man. The other lively topic on the 
way back to the village was the Kallotes' reputation for 
toughness. One boy told how someone in the crowd had suggested
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doing something about the placards and his neighbour had
replied "Don't do anything to their., they're Kallotes -• they 
pull pistols on you".
Later I asked the Kallo PF leader where the initiative 
for the demonstration had cone front and he said from Katis, 
Levendis' brother. lie added that Katis probably telephoned 
Sampson to discuss it, but that was all(16). The next day 
Sampson's newspaper Hachi carried a description of the 
incident with an accurate wording of the eight posters.
Clerides newspaper Agon also carried a version of the 
incident, which managed to imply that the head of the United 
Party had in some way routed the placard bearers. It also 
sho'wed a big crowd listening to Clerides without the eight 
men carrying posters. As a photograph this was a considerable 
technical achievement; editorials masquerading as nev/s 
coverage are commonplace in Cypriot newspapers.
It was clear from the comments a number of people made that 
they regarded the behaviour of the demonstrators as an insult 
to Clerides and a thoroughly wrong-headed approach to politics.
I went to a number of election speeches in Cyprus and the one 
sentence in Market Town "You believe only in money" was the only
instance of heckling I heard. Otherw'ise all speakers were
heard in complete silence. At a number of meetings when the 
speaker called for questions there v/ere none at all from the
audiences. It was also noticeable that most of the questions
that were asked were asked by men in their late teens or early 
twenties, who v/ere probably unmarried, and a 'new generation' 
in politics. Informants when asked to comment on this said 
that married men with family obligations might be unwilling to
n/3r>
expose themselves to possible haaards by asking questions in 
public. Thus from several points of view the demonstration 
by the PF supporters wan an Innovation, and a daring one at 
that, for although the young men carrying placards were not 
family men they were fairly deliberately exposing themselves 
as enemies of the UP whom they believe have a near-rvonopoly 
of power in the island.
The next incident of the campaign was the speech by the 
United Party candidate Keflros in Kallo on July 2, three days 
before the election is from Kammari, a retired civil
servant who is generally regarded as kindly, honest, and 
worthy of respect.
Like Vourros and Aglas ho is a Nicosia resident, but also 
like them has citrus orchards in Kammari, nnd is a regular 
visitor to the district. Ho has been extremely active on behalf 
of his village, pnrticulnrly over a long struggle with the 
government about 7wator rights.
Among the people who assembled before the speech in a 
show of support for the United Party was the muktnr of Mantis, 
and the muktar of Parali. Xt was the latter who had received 
the involuntary haircut a few months previously, and when a 
week ago a PF group had visited his village with some Kallo 
supporters, the Kallo people had reported with some amusement 
that the muktar 'had not shown himself' during the meeting.
Ilia presence in Kallo was therefore overlaid with several 
additional meanings. His coffee was ordered by a man who 
had privately to me expressed the harshest condemnation of 
the UP'o opportunism. The man who brought the coffee wan one 
of the six men arrested for the haircut offence. The Maotia
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muktar was one of several who at the time of the incident 
had sent a telegram to the government asking them to take 
firm steps to deal with such lawlessness.
There was a good crowd, and Kefiron, like derides, had 
his table draped with a Greek flag. He spoke quietly and 
briefly. UP was open to and representing all Greek Cypriot 
nationalists. He stressed the trust the G*-eek Government 
and Makarios had in Clerides and his conduct of the talks.
He clarified the position of the party on the Co-operative 
Movement - it was not true that they were against it - they 
were strongly with it but they did want to see it use its 
capital more efficiently, and its administration to bo more 
democratic. After his short and conventional speech which I 
do not repeat here, he asked for questions.
The man who was to ask most of the questions was Lepini, 
the roan who had formally welcomed Sampson to Kallo. He is a 
heavy, slow-speaking fanner who spent several years in England. 
His first question essentially identified the UP with the 
Legislative Assembly, and asked why they had done so little 
in their ten years. Xefiros answered that the United Party 
was a new party and could not be held responsible. The 
questions continued, and at one point Kefiros said he did not 
know the answer to something, to which Lepini said "But 
Mr. Kefiros you don't seen to know anything" which in view of 
the educational and status differences between the two men 
would normally be seen as an extremely rude remark. Lepini 
then asked the question about Clerides saying the Greek 
officers in Cyprus were illegal and that he was ashamed to be 
Greek. Kefiros tried to answer this by filling out the context:
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Clerides had said he wets ash aired to be Greek when he had 
heard that officers from mainland Greece were punishing 
Cypriot soldiers extremely harshly, in spite of a mainland 
Greek law which forbade Greek soldiers to take part in the 
political affairs of a foreign country. As soon as the word 
xenos left his mouth (foreign) Lepini pounced on it to make 
the point that Kefiros did not regard Cyprus as Greek.
Kefiros tried to develop his defence against the personal 
attacks on Clerides. He said that such attacks could not 
always be answered because otherwise the newspaper would be 
taken up with nothing else except derides' defence of himself, 
but more to the point the attacks were often baseleas and 
absurd. For example was it conceivable that the Greek 
Government (which everybody knew to be an extremely strong 
supporter of the Orthodox Christian faith) would permit a 
Buddhist to conduct delicate negotiations with the Turks on 
the national guestion?
Lepini now turned his attack to the deceased Yorgadjis, 
by woodenlv asking the question from the Market Town demon­
stration, in exactly the same words: "Makarios criticised the 
moral instigator of the assassination attempt on him. To 
what party did he belong?"
Kefiros now switched from defence to attack. Was the 
questioner holding the UP responsible for the assassination 
attempt? This slightly alarmed Lepini who said well never 
mind that, and started to recite a list of names of fighters 
who had been killed after the end of the Struggle, and whose 
deaths were, popularly attributed to the deceased Yorgadjis. 
Zampas said he would not speak of the dead man who, whatever
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they wight any, had been in hio time « great fighter for the 
Oreek-Cypriofc cause? It would b© disrespect to hio memory*
Some of the cases referred to we*:e in legal process and should 
not bo prejudiced by public discussion. Besides, as ho had 
said before ho was not proaont an an apologist for the much- 
denounced "ton years" but as tho representative of a now party, 
I*epini tried again to link Yorgadjis and hio reputation to 
the UP and again Kofiroa parried. So Lepini asked "All righb, 
why didn't Makarios attend the funoral of Yorgadjis? Doesn't 
that prove that Makarios himaolf believed Yorgadjis to be 
the moral instigator of tho attack againnt him?" Kefiros said 
ho had not understood tho guootion. Lepini then naid in a 
forthrieht way "Wo believe that Yorgadjis' friends deliberately 
cloned hin mouth to atop him saying what ho knew". Now Kef iron 
coimtored "It's all very well saying 'we believe' - but those 
matters ore under invontigation and speculation of thin kind 
is simply irresponsible'’.
It became increasingly clear an the debate went on that 
Lepini and Kefiros were not communicating with each other,
Tho discussion was in two quite different idioms. That of 
Kefiron used tho idoas of legal process, evidence# and the 
fact of Clorldos' continued occupancy of the role of 
negotiator with the Turks, to justify his pity's position, 
and never came near to giving an answer to the fundamental 
but unexpressed question - how could Clorldes and the UP 
have teamed up with a man like Yorgadjis? Lopinl used the 
facts of known associations, assumed motives, personal 
ambitions to suggest a picture of intrigue and corruption.
After the mooting the young PF supporters in the village
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insisted that Kefiros "hod not answered” any of Lepini's 
questions. This reant in fact that he had failed to dissociate 
the UP from the moral stigma of Yorgadjis, from its close 
association with the corruption of the elite, from its 
ambiguous position on Enosis. But the educated supporters of 
the ur afterwards complained that Lepini's questions were 
either illiterate, or meaningless, or both, and a serious 
insult to the age and position of a man like Kefiros. The two 
sides were shooting right past each other, and with very 
different kinds of weapons.
Kefiros pointed out that as soon as there v/as the slightest 
rumour connecting Yorgadjis with the attempt on Makarios, he 
had resigned from the UP. Lepini did not take this point up 
but later others explained to me why it was 'no answer’.
Since it had been Clerides who had passed the recent special 
Emergency Lav; in the absence of Makarios, and since in the 
event of the death of Makarios^Clerides as President of the 
Vouli automatically became the President of the Republic, and 
since Yorgadjis' men in the police force could be relied on 
under the Emergency Lav; to round up all opponents, then 
Clerides so obviously stood to gain by the assassination 
attempt that they insisted he must have been involved in it.
The logic of the situation, and the respective self-interest 
of the parties involved, as well as the pov/er structures they 
commanded, dictated the conclusion that Yorgadjis* resignation 
was just a blind, and meant nothing.
Lepini's next question v/as "When did Clerides ever speak 
for Enosis?” Kefiros either pretended to be or genuinely was, 
taken aback by this question. Perhaps he suddenly realised the
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gulf between his way of thinking and that of Lepini. Ue 
replieu "How c.'in you ask hov; the man who was the* chief defence 
lawyer of captured EOKA fighters during the Kmereency over 
spoko for LNOSIvS? Vfhat do you think the whole strucyglo wnn 
about?"
Another young I’P supporter in the crowd triad to argue that 
derides had not defended the fighters because he believed in 
the cause. "Well why did he do it then?" "Maybe he was trying 
to build up customers?" the hoy answered. KefiroB now attacked 
strongly, by asking the boy had he ever been a fighter? The 
question wan rhetorical for the boy wan much too young to 
have been active in the period 1954-59. But even while 
Kefiros wan attempting to deliver the coup do grace, one of 
the Kallo buffoons, a butcher whose nickname is 'Chickenshit' 
with a loud very hiqh-pitched ranping voice, renowned for 
the outrageous and slightly off-colour thinns ho says, tried 
to get into the act. He started to nay in a somewhat, incoherent 
way that during the struggle the EOKA fiqbters had never gone 
around shouting for Enosls, at least he had not heard them ... 
'Everyone agreed afterwards that whatever the man's faults 
he had been t r y i r r r  to make some othor point and It had. simply 
come out wrongly. But this was not to help him. The Mostia 
muktar, an impressive man with a very large fighter’s 
moustache, and the reputation for havino been one of the main 
EOKA leaders in the district, made a sign to Kefi.ros that he 
wished to use the microphone. lie agreed find the muktar, dark- 
suited. and with lowering brows stood at the microphone. "The 
fighters are insulted, by such remarks, both the living and the 
dead. I remind you all *• since there nre strangers here who
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night easily oct the wrona impression from some of the things 
being said - that from start to finish our one and only purpose 
as fighters was Enosis ... This and his other similar 
remarks brought a strono round of applause, and rallied rip 
supporters. It switched the tone from defence to attack.
In a sense Kefiros had been about to do something similar when 
ne asked his last Questioner if he had been a fighter. The 
point was for the UP to identify itself directly with the 
EOKA struggle, .and this was what the muktar had not'/ managed 
to do. The moral was not lost on Kefiros who now pulled out 
some of the remaining stops. He made the brief point that 
George Grivas in his first pamphlet had made it absolutely 
clear that the purpose of the struggle was Enosis. Both the 
words Grivas and Enosis drew substantial applause.
r>ut the PF group were not put off balance. Why had 
Clerides not answered the questions during the demonstration?
Zampas replied: He had answered them - in Parali, and when
had the UP ever indulged in carrying placards attacking others?
Now the butcher jumped in again. "Perhaps the other parties 
don't have anythinc against them that United could carry 
posters about ..." Another PF man said "Clerides tried to 
fool vis when he said he'd answer our questions at Market Town 
and then didn't". Kefiros now repeated that the UP pursued 
peaceful, civilised methods of campaigning and did not c?o around 
carrying posters against people. A PF man said: "But if we
had been doinn anything illecal the police would haV'e stopped 
us." Kefiros now said he would accept any questions in good 
faith, but that he felt that many of the questions which had 
been asked so far were more .in the spirit of provocation than
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anything else. He was all for civilised discussion, and 
so forth.
fcut it was r,ot to end yet; why had derides asked for 
a salary Increase to carry on the inter-communal talks, if 
he really cared about the future of Cyprus? Kefiros answered 
that Clerides v;as not a rich ran, and that by taking on the 
additional burden of the inter 'conrrunal talks he was completely 
ruling' out any chcmcc of earning any money by the private 
practice of law. He sacrificed this to the national interest, 
and like most other people, he waits at the end of the month 
for his pay-cheque.
All right then, if he was so keen on the good of his 
country why did he publicly speak against his father? The 
relation between one point and another xvas tenuous. A little 
later Kefiros remembered the muktar's lesson. "I didn't 
want to speak about myself, but perhaps I ought to mention 
that there was an earlier phase of the Cyprus Struggle, that 
which ended in the uprising of .19 31 and for my part in that 
I wont to prison.” This brought very loud applause.
The questions seemed to go on for a very long time.
The issue of the baptism of derides' daughter was again 
raised. Kefiros tried always to keep his voice low, and to 
avoid heavy bombast, but he could not silence his questioners.
His main tormentor, Leplni, chose one reply as an excuse to 
give a shrug which said "It's pointless going on with this" 
and turned his back on the speaker and walked slowly away 
from the meeting towards the PF coffeeshop. As finally the 
meeting started to break up, a man arrested for the Parali 
haircut, went over to the Parali muktar and gave him a handshake.
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Elsewhere groups of people went on talking politics for 
several hours. The Kollo political client of the deceased 
Yorgadjis, K. Karan had arrived from the capital, and was 
chatting quietly with bent known of the deceased Le vendin' 
brothers. The two men had had a ficrht within the last year 
when K. Karas had accused hin of trying to exploit the 
memory of his dead brother and had made reference to the 
Cretan armr> trip and the accountn p r o b l e m . However not: 
they were talking on apparently friendly to m o . The 
elections were only three days away, and one of the major 
opportunities for opr*n conflict, the UP1 s reeting in Kallo, 
had passed without serious incident. But not without tension, 
or novelty.
It is worth commenting on some of the factors iv-bich are 
behind the theme ef Hellenism, In one election speech by 
a PF speaker, much attention was devoted to a comparison of 
the quality of Creek education with that of Britain. The PF 
man insisted, that many British universities were third, 
fourth and fifth rate, while Greek ones were internationally 
known to be first class. He complained, as did Sampson, 
of graduates from Creek universities returning to Cyprus and 
foiliricr to get. jobs, while those from the United Kingdom or 
America were preferred. He interpreted this as a lack of 
devotion to Hellenic ideals, and once again, tried to lay 
it to the charge of the UP.
It is in fact true, that British graduates are favoured 
by the Civil Serv"lce. Creek education is much less costly 
than that in Britain, especially since British universities 
started making foreign students pay higher fees. The children
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of the urban elite ~ such as derides* daughter - normally 
go to England rather than Greece. Village children can 
only rarely afford to follow suit. The better civil serv-ice 
jobs - and much of its work - require fluent English, This 
is not to be had in the island’s schools, and here again 
village children educated in Greece are at a disadvantage.
Once again, economic factors become overlaid with the 
facts of language and education which are basic to the 
nationalist case. The 'wrong* education in economic and 
career terns is the 'right' education in terms of loyalty 
to hellenism. So, to go on with the syllogism, the wrong 
(wealthy, English—educated and English speaking) people are 
in power, pretending that they went Enosis, which they clearly 
do not, while the right people who have preferred Greece, and 
a Greek education, and who are the deserving ooor, are kept 
out of jobs because of their devotion to Greek ideals. I 
do not argue that such reasoning, and such social facts exist 
in all or even the majority of cases where men choose to 
support PF or United. But I am sure from observation that 
they are present often enough to justify the amount of attention 
I have given, no far, to the election speeches of the two 
party 1e ade r s.
(vi) Tensions in the last days s village solidarity tested
One of the things which helped reduce tension on the 
evening of the UP speech in Kallo was the unexpected arrival 
later on in the village of a man called Mammas, an EDEK 
candidate who was known to many of the villagers since he sells 
trucks and spares. He gave an informal and extremely humorous 
analysis of the elections, and soon had a crowd of fifty men
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around him all in a very good mood. Some of the nationalists 
wore saying that ED12K was about to make a secret electoral 
pact with AI\LL, to cross-vote. Both parties denied this in 
the village, and AKLL argued convincingly that a "secret 
instruction' to its members could not remain secret for long. 
Mammas, in his speech took it for granted that the only 
issue was to belabour the AKEL supporters for not being with 
EDEK. So tlie bulk of the discussion was between him and the 
Akolistes. Decause he is naturally a funny man, the '/hole 
temper of this episode was light-hearted, and must have 
helped reduce tension. Later a similar episode occurred 
when an Independent candidate arrived in the village whose 
main plank was to lend money without Interest. In his case 
the meeting was sheer buffoonery and the villagers enjoyed 
themselves wholeheartedly.
In the last few days before the elections certain of the 
activists started to predict eleventh hour alliances. ?>. Fanou 
for example told me he had heard from reliable quarters that 
there v/ould be co-operation of several parties against the 
United Party. The final event of importance for the PF 
supporters in the region was the speech in Market Town on 
Friday July 3 of odysseus loannides, now the head of their 
party since the merger. Most of them had certainly never 
heard him speak in person before although they had seen him 
on television in the coffeeshop. There was also a good deal 
of interest to see whether he would have a bigger crowd than 
Clerides had done. Throughout the election the villagers put 
great weight on the size of crowds speakers drew, and although 
people kept saying "Of course you can't be sure, and maybe it
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doesn't mean anythinc." t-hov ,9 Tcnoy uout.n)U0c. vo show crjrcfxt interest
in estimates. I’eonle got angry v;ith low estimates of their 
ovm party's turn-out at meetings. To the villager the strongest 
image of political organisation in that which would be expressed 
by an aerial photograph of a ran on a low rostrum, surrounded 
on all sides by followers. A man's following .in politics is 
a concrete and finite number of person'?, who can be called out 
to attend one of his meetings. "Organisation" in politics 
suggests the ability to turn out these crowds.
Ioannides1 meeting was held in a different part of Market 
Town, so it was hard for anyone to judge objectively the size 
of his crowd. But PF supporters were jubilant, for they were 
sure it was ruch bigger than that of Clerides and that this 
was a sure sign that thoy would defeat the UP in the district. 
After the meeting thoy said to me "Did you see what a fine 
boss we've got?" Another said, more poetically, "loannides 
seems to me to be a pure man". lie used the word agnos which 
in modem Greek moans pure or chaste, and is the word used 
for the Lamb of god. Someone else commented "Lt the very 
least he isn't a killer".
The evening was not to pass without tension however,
After the Ioannides meeting people went back to Kallo and cat 
around the coffeeshops of the main square. Suddenly there 
were raised voices. Pavlos, the PF leader who for days had 
been keeping the younger, more hot-headed supporters quiet 
was now himself furious, and was directing his remarks to 
T. Krlkou, a thin, very intense man with a reputation for being 
quick to anger and quick to fight. Ho is the brother of L. Krikou, 
one of the two key UP organisers in Kallo. They are first
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cousins of the powerful Mastia muktar; their half-brother 
is Sklyros, the AKEL leader, and he an they well know is a 
close friend of Pnvloa, whose family has several affinal 
links to Sklyros. '(see Table 22).
The burden of Pavlos1 remarks wan that some unknown UP
supporter had reported to Koshis and derides the recent 
brawl in Kallo between P. Karas and his sister's husband, 
which I described earlier in this chapter, on page 29.
The UP leaders had called youncf Karas in and said "What's 
all this about sore PF people trying to stop UP posters being 
put up, and beating up our supporters and calling Clerides 
.uoul names? p. Karas had denied all knowledge of the 
incident whereupon the UP lenders hod not angry and said "We 
know this for a fact. I’ow tell us all about it." Pavlos 
kept repeatina that some UP poushtis had gone and reported 
an incident between aairbros and kounyiados (ZH and VTfi.) and 
that this was a vrr’ bad thing to have done. "Up till now 
we have held back, we of PF. For instance when I heard about 
the punch-up between P. Karas and my kovmibaros Pyrgos, 1 told 
rr.y kouinbaros Pyrgos that it was wrong of him to get into it.
He insisted that the whole thinr had started out of a joke, 
but then P. Karas had said 'your poove of a boss is better?’ 
and naturally he got annoyed and there was a brawl. I told 
him he should have kept his temper. But now I can see it’s no 
good holding back on our part because the other side doesn't 
play fair. Well, we know a lot of things, many many things 
and once we start I'm telling you for a fact shall write
things which will never be rubbed out ... "
There was some confused interchange now between Pavlos
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and T. Krikou who whether he liked it or not by his very 
presence was put in the position of a UP spokesman. Someone 
wade a remark, which drew from Pavlos the reply "If any one 
punches me I'll shoot hire by morning." T. Krikou said 
"You want to hit me?" Pavlos said "I’m not hitting anyone
Things were now extremely tense, vrith people speaking of 
shooting and brawling. One UP supporter said that everyone 
was throughly aaainst the renort to Koshis and Clerides, and 
that everyone condemned it. This was a frank admission that 
someone on his side was in the; wrong and was meant to reduce 
the tension. T). Fanou, a strona PP man, a close friend of 
Pavlos and a specialist in mediation added "Our village has 
this one special crood point; we con have an argument and 
we don’t fall out over it." Pavlos went on muttering dark 
threats about what his side would do once they started, and
D. Fanou kept on condemning the report. The UP supporters 
kept on joining him in condemnation and the end of the 
incident was for Pavlos and T. Krikou, who had once seemed 
on the point of blows, to go off practically arm-in-arm.
Ten minutes later the bicrgest, toughest of the unmarried 
PF supporters, and a first cousin of the deceased Lev^endis, 
got to his feet to hit someone, in tho coffeeshop across the 
way, and was instantly seized by a number of people who 
made him sit down quietly. Another incident had been averted 
Saturday was a day on which all political activity was in 
effect banned by law, and no alcohol was to be sold, as was 
the case for election day, Sunday. The only event of any 
interest was the arrival of an AKEL representative in the 
village to inform the left leaders that there had been an
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eleventh hour electoral pact between AKT'L and EDEK to cross- 
vote. AKEL only had two candidates In the Nicosia district, 
so this gave them ten ’extra' votes, The agreement wan that 
they should vote for the head of EDEK, Vasnos T.yssaridos, 
and the last five men on his slate. The reason given In the 
village by the AKET. representative end passed on by village 
lenders wan that the AKEL leaders hnd been informed that 
attempts wore being made to get an anti-Makarios block of 
MPs into the House, mixed up among the various pnrties. The 
EDEK candidates to be voted for by AKET. members wore those 
who were guarnnteed to bo loyal to Makarios. The AKRL man
also explained that in another electornl district the party
\*as co-operating with PF in a similar deal for similar 
reasons. There was to be no cooperation with UP bocourao
they \tfore the heart of the anti-Hnkarios eroup.
As events were to turn out the cross-voting procedure 
was to provr extremely difficult to operate, and the returns 
showed that the commonest tactic adopted by the AKEL group 
was to toll only their most reliable and sophisticated 
supporters the full details, and with others to greatly 
simplify it, so that for instance they voted both AKISL and 
all. the EDKK candidates. The problem facing AKEL was that 
they might lose votes through spoiled ballots if too many people 
made mistakes, nut their supporters often saw the problem aw 
"supposing so many of our people vote EDEK, but EDEK don’t vote fior 
us backj that their pooplo get in and ours don't?" Rome AKBL ^
voters told me that thoy didn't obey the Instruction to vote 
EDEK for this reason.
Election day in the village was to bo marked by a
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number of minor incidents, which in nearly nil cases, and
all of the cases In which blows were exchanaed, involved
supporters of PF quarrelling with UP supporters. Considering
that there were three other parties involved in the elections,
and in light of the events I have already described, it
cannot be thought that these incidents happened in any sense
randomly. Such information as 1 was able io get about how
the election passed in other villages of the Nicosia district
suggests that such incidents between these two parties'
(10)
supporters were common ,
The first incident set the pattern for the day; the PF 
activist hatis, a brother of the deceased Levendls watched 
his elderly mother go into the voting booth, from an outside 
window. he then saw or thought he saw her Tail to mark her 
slip, and then pop it in the box. lie told the voting inspector 
what had happened and the inspector explained that unfortunately 
there was nothing he could do under the low. Ho could not 
aEow the old woman to vote again, Soon there were a doaen 
of the noisier PF supporters all standing outside the village 
school, where voting wan taking place, shouting. They 
crowded into the doorway where the officials wore, bawling 
comments and suggestions. They said the inspector should 
help the old people vote in the way they wanted, and that it 
was a crime to conduct the elections thin way, and that 
undoubtedly this was happening because the inspector was a 
UP supporter. The senior policeman in charge, after trying 
to get them to move away quietly, had a xrord in the ear of 
Katis1 elder brother, and after a while the crowd dispersed.
But not before they had been threatened with a suspension of
n / r . i
voting. They went off down tho road curoing and comp1a1nine, 
back towards their own booths.
On tho way back, Oligon, n PF nupporter in hiu forties, 
in panning tho UP tab la asked then what: nort of dirty work 
they thought they wore up to, rigqing thinqn .like thin?
A wealthy younn nan at tho table called out "fihufe up you 
traitor". Thin proved to be on unfortunate choice of word a, 
and in tho context an inexplicable one. Oligon leaped at 
him and it took several PF nupportern to drac him away. The 
explanation for hin extreme me® wao uniform on all nidoo: 
Oligor. had been a .leadinn L'OKA activist in the village and 
had boon interned by the IJritluh. In prison camp he wan 
beaten up and nufferod permanent damage to one log. Ho walks 
with a pronounced limp and in not capable of full agricultural 
labour. Hin applications to the poot-colonial government for 
compensation in any fonn had all been turned down. For a while 
he had a low-paid government job but towardri the end of lff*F 
lie was laid of f and failed to get it back in spit© of appealn. 
Hin brother Pahrin wan a PF activist not because of any 
loyalty to Sampson, but b^ecauso of hin connection*? with PI5K 
and PEK’n bona, Azin no. But wlicn Sampson npoko about those 
ex-fighters who had been denied compensation he wan spanking 
about people like Olieos. Everyone in the village roqarded 
Oligos' cane an an injustice, regardless of party viowu, bo 
when the young man unod tho word 'traitor' ho could hardly 
have picked a more cruel or Inflammatory expreanion.
Although no-one nuggonted it to r.rn 1 wan aware that 
close relatives of then® two men had been in a fight about 
six yearn earlier. Oligon' brother Potrin had beaten up the
n/m
young man* a first oousiin for aaying thing® to hlK daughter.
But I do not think thia played m y  part in the incident 
between thus two men, which waa a flare«up directly related 
to relation® between their two parties*, the Inoident which had 
juat taken pXnoe at the voting booths and the choice of the 
word 'traitor* to the older man« Peraona to whom X anggefited 
thia ’'pant" diapute between the two groupa of kin were aura 
it played no role in the recent ona and were even awuned at 
the anggeation*
Outaide tho houae^20*being uaed am a pp centre a crowd 
of people co 1.1 cotad who aeon heard the details of digo^* 
outburst, Since they war® now phyaieally eepareted by 
twenty yarde from the UP tablet there ware two potentially 
hoatile groupra feeing each other* Little side arguments ware 
going on between people who had got Involved, but aftes? ten 
minutea the whole thing died down again*
Thera wa» no doubt but that PIP were eonducitirig the meat 
vigorous campaign all day* Their OflSfia went up and down the 
road bringing votern with prolonged honking of home , which 
no-one elae did. Moreover they punnied people who were knew 
to be Bupportarw of other partien to the doors of the voting 
place trying to pernuade them* People were literally dragged 
ly the arm (though g.ently) from the table of one party to 
J?w*« table, Vhiw caueed a good deal of hard feeling** among 
the other party activiatn and there wa« wtooh grumbling but 
no«one waa inclined to take the matter up *
There were neverel more incident# during the day between 
UP and pp repreaentativea, and iwmally te do with the inspector 
and the voting ayatem. Otherwise people in the ether pArtlee
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seemed to be on good terms with each other, and not inclined 
to take the whole thing too seriously.
The iUnlster of the Interior, Kom.-odromoa saw fit when 
the polls had closed to make an announcement over radio and 
television in which he congratulated the Cypriot people on 
their coolheadednecs, peacefulness and level of political 
maturity. This won explicitly because the elections passed 
off without major disturbances. Someone in Kallo who heard 
this announcement over the television commented "I wonder 
what he's have said if he'd been in Kallo today?"
When the Kallo results came through there wan real joy 
among the PF supporters. A cheer went up which could be 
heard all over the village. But v/hen the results for Nicosia 
district were finally clear, they were downcast for several 
day3, and lay around outside "their" coffeeshop in the 
evenings drinking and brooding. They started to collect 
and retail stories of the partiality of the electoral 
Inspectors in the towns and how UP supporters in all sorts 
of brandies of novemr,ient had used their positions to 
disadvantage PP. My own belief is that these stories are very 
greatly exaggerated when it cones to the actual voting process, 
although I am gu.1t'* sure that before the election the UP used 
all the government patronage powers at its disposal to 
persuade people to support it. The important point here in 
that many PF supporters wore developing a set of views in 
which the UP gained its 16 seats in the Voull by illegitimate 
means. Hut they also said things which suggested how far 
this wan a rationalisation. For instance Pavlos said to me:
"If they had worked in other distrlnts for PF as we did in
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Kallof the result would have been very dif ferent.,J 
(vli) The election and indlvidua.1 rea 1 iqnwent
The elections have been shown to have intensified and 
defined certain cleavages in villao-e social relations.
There were a number of cases where it was clear that the 
elections forced certain individuals to rethink their 
alignments, and to demonstrate their positions.
In March 1st 1969 the Sampson newspaper M&CHI carried 
lists of names of supporters in the village and other villages 
who had signed a letter of support to Sampson. There were 
certain oddities about some names - some were set down two 
or three times,, others we re of known leftists, and. so forth. 
Masonos, a leftist with several younger brothers also thought 
to be leftists had sinned. I heard someone describe him as a 
dhiploprosopos, two-faced. I asked the left leader, Sklyros, 
who said it meant nothing, it was a joke and would confuse 
the rightists. Little more than a year later I thought I 
could see clear sirrns that Masonos was now aligned with the 
PF group in the village ~ he sat around in their coffee shop,, 
attended their planning meetings, and In conversation supported 
their line. Again I asked Sklyros, who said, no, he was sure 
that''Masonos is an ideologist and stable"? but he added that 
he and his family are two-faced and since his brother’s 
daughter was married to a younger brother of the deceased 
Levendis and Masonos was renting a shop next door to this 
young man's coffee shop, he was probably pretending to support 
them to improve his family and business connections, Sklyros 
chanaed his mind three months later when during the elections 
he saw Masonos energetically working for the PF, trying to
il/sn
raXly votes. H© told xm Ishst cl©arly hia oJuumjo waa not
slroulntedt it: warn » Jemal chance, booming* ho wa» actually wojfkin$
for thorn, "lie wasn't Mtable in hia auppojftu SfclyrotJi unid
regretfully? but thin vim eon d©n\nfition? not explanation*
The W*t alno lout the aupport of HawJloM, to the W»
Onco iiffnin the final proof wan that ho waa noon working hard
for them. Thin acowed to ruJe o\*t any notion of fleJ\tned tujppout*
Doth those chancert eawe an a aurprine to tho leftist
leadoruhip. But in other admen the election wnri merely the
formal nonl on n (situation which hud been well known to n
numhor of poople for r> ,1 on<7 time. For inatnnce the poMition 
/ 21)
of d . Fanow ''liflfl ntarted to chance an early «n ! l <?* lie wan 
then in n wtnte of re n 1 conflict, a in ao ho warn an mlTfiirer of 
Vnaaon jyynaaridon, but haw bin career aa wrpiartsly In t ho hands* 
of bin bonn in the Co-operative Department, Andreflw Awinirtw.
By the middle of ho had madm up hiiw wind in favour of Min
latter, but did not ronlly cot .1 chance ho mlnw thin An public 
until thi* formation of the political part lea in February 1')t\fl« 
The eloctiono wore for Fanou a pood oh mi 00 to convince A tin an 
end the village of the reality of hie change of heart. Many 
people commented that ho too# wan •two-faced* end thia impXiOM 
that they have oome notion of whet it we an a to bo one-faced.
For other pooplo in the village the eleotiwiB were a 
chance to repay pant favour mi. The fact that ten yearn had ?/one 
by without elect! o m  to the tetfiMlativo Aawewbly mo lint that 
people had had a long time to find out which political patrona 
wore to bo truwted, and which not. X mentioned in Chapter three 
the cane of indecent aanan.lt in which a mufctar wnm neon to be 
intervening nuccenafully. Xn dune 1970 the two bjrothera who had
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applied tn him for help for their half-sister were to be aeon 
working hard for the HP in Kallo, and the ir.uktar himself out 
in a strong appearance at the Kallo UP npoech by Kcfires.
As I have suggested earlier, the no re sophisticated 
villagers are woll aware of ideological reasons for support 
so they do not readily admit quid-pro-quo situations. They 
use the language of ideology to explain their preferences, but 
at a very low level of complexity. They do not compare the 
formal, printed party programmes, and the promises they contain, 
kut rather attack the leaders and candidates of opposed parties 
as non of no abilities, as crooks, insincere, dishonest and no 
forth. The only issue in which ideology over cornea to the fore 
is tho question of Union with Greece, but here too tho issue 
is confused since all four of the nationalist parties claim to 
want Union, and maintain that their way to it is the only 
correct and responsible way. Xn this nonso, Union Is like 
'economic growth' in European politics - everyone is in favour 
of it, and claims to know the mysteries that will bring it.
I have already noted that sinco most pernorm 1 relations are 
described as 'friendship' and since the values of friendship 
in Cypriot culture exclude overt instrum cntality but include 
mutual support, then it follows tli.it any villager who personally 
knows n political leader in the capital, will tend to support 
him. Only those few villagers who like D. Fanou and the 
deceased Levendls have been on good terms with several leaders, 
face any problem of choice. A villager nay describe himself as 
a friend of a political loader, and he can then bo expected to 
defend this leader in the simple ’ideological" terms I have 
suggested. It Is thus true to say that for the large number of
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villagers, politics is an extension of personal relationships.
For only a few in it first and forenost a natter of a sfet of
abstract ideas about how society should he organised.
Throughout thi^ chapter the struggle between UP and PF
has been the dominant issue, as it was in the elections
themselves. Both at national and local, levels, this st.rucrgle
must be seen as having two aspects. One is that the PF
supporters believe they are true Enoslsts, and that the UP approach to
A
Enosis is hypocritical. The other is that PF supporters believe 
UP is on the way to monopolising patronage power in the island.
It is important to recognise the ease with which one 
kind cf reason nay be expressed in terms of the other, and the 
logic of the fit here. For if it is true that Makarios? 
closest advisors - some of whom lead the UP - believe they 
and only they have the proper approach to obtaining Union, then 
it is natural that they should attempt to exclude from power 
those they believe are irresponsible in their pursuit of Union.
Those who have been excluded readily come to believe that they 
have been excluded because of their dedication to the ideal, 
and not because of doubts about their technical skills in 
pursuing it. Such a situation means that each side must condemn 
the other in the strongest terms, must suggest the others are 
hypocrites, traitors in the pay of foreign powers, fanatics and 
so forth. Because both groups are trying to occupy the same 
piece of ideological space - that is to monopolise the position 
of being the sole begetters of Union - they must necessarily 
fight all the harder to distinguish themselves from each other.
Ehe way in which the Levendis vissue has factionalised Kallo 
expresses the relation of the theme of Enos.Is to the theme of the
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UP monopoly of power, '"ho deceased Leverulis is always 
mentioned by Sampson as a fallen fighter, which stresses his 
contribution to the struggle for Enosis; that his killer 
escaped unpunished is laid at the door of Yorgadjis, the former 
Minister of the Interior who in this version of events 
deliberately used his power to satisfy his personal whins*
Thus the equation implicit in. the manipulation of these 
symbols becomes Levendis : I -i op i s : selflessness on one side, 
opposing Yorgadjis - antl-I'nosis • self-interestedness on the 
other. Such views are then easily extended to parties of the 
chief actors: Sampson, PP leader, who survived the death of
his follower Lavenais, against Clerides, UP leader who survived
the death of his ally, Yorgadjis.
Clearly, for Campson to have available as a political 
resource the memory of a dead fighter is a rather special case.
On his own estimate, some ten fighters were killed after 1960
in circumstances which he believes to be political. That is 
not a very broad base for electoral support. However,from a 
logical point of view death is only an extreme form of exclusion 
from power; Sampson has other examples of the United Party's 
abuse of power to deploy, which may not be as dramatic as a 
killing, but affect more people more of the time. This is the 
point of his stories about the families of ex-fighters going 
unprovided. All over Cyprus are people who believe that they 
made an important contribution to the EOKA struggle which has 
gone unrecognised by those in power, who have rewarded instead 
unworthy people, people who "did nothing* to further the 
patriotic struggle against the British. There is of course a 
basic reduction!sm in their view, which ignores all kinds of
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complexity, and reaches a conclusion on the basis of a fev;
cases. Counter-examples are not considered, or are written 
off as flukes.
So far I have been talking about the meaninc of the 
elections) in to mo of chancres of aunport, and the values 
involved in the rallying of support. But what did the elections
social relations in the vj.llacro? toonfi other thinrrs 
they tested to the limits the solidarity of the village, and 
since this solidarity survived the test, they may paradoxically 
have served to reinforce it.
In Ifc K amir a r.I speech Sampson made a verv strong attack 
on the UP. The anti-Clerides demonstration in Market Town 
which was mounted by Kallo FF supporters came close to starting 
fighting in the crowd, and at the very leant caused derides to 
leave the meeting early. The HP speech in Kallo was again a 
very tonse situation, and although there were no signs of 
fighting starting, the sense of relaxation and anti-climax after 
the meeting were some measure of the tension it produced. The 
incident in which the PF loader Pavlos was so publicly angry 
over the reporting of a pre-election scrap to Clerides was 
again an extremely tense one, in which UP supporters had to 
appear very conciliatory in order to keep him In check. Finally 
on election day itself, a number of small scraps and incidents 
took place between supporters of the PF, and those of other 
parties, but particularly of the UP because the PP people 
believed that the electoral process was being manipulated in 
their enemies’ favour. That they kept up this view after the 
election is important, fox* it is a possible indicator of the 
kinds of issues which will be raised in future elections, issues
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which threaten seriously to erode the legitimacy of government
and civil service in the ©yea of a small but vociferous section of 
the electorate.
Some votes in the village represented personal issues
which had been amplified and distorted by the campaigns of
national politicians. Others used their votes in the factionalist
spirit of deliberately aligning with a party opposed to that of 
(2 2 )an enemy ' . However, there were often several reasons for
the way a person behaved, as the following cases show.
Kyrilis is an ex-fighter who is widely loved and respected 
in the village. He is in his mid-thirties, is the youngest of 
seven popular brothers, most of whom are leftists. I was at 
a pf planning meeting when people were estimating voting 
b""ehav"'iour. When his name arose, someone suggested he would 
support PF. "No-one Jcnows that for sure. He goes where he 
likes", iiis closest friend, and baptismal koumbaros, Pavlos, 
was present and he did not see fit to contradict the remark. If 
anyone could have influenced Kyrilis’ vote it was Pavlos.
On election day, Kyrilis worked for the PF crroup. The most 
compelling reason for this in that he was a close friend of the 
deceased Levendin. He would therefore feel some obligation to 
support Sampson. PAit there is another compelling reason. His 
wife's sister was seduced by a wealthy nan before May 1963.
Kyrilis on learning this thought very seriously about killing him; 
he was partially restrained by Pavlos, who in married to a 
sister of the rich man's v/ife. Now over the years the rich man 
became friendly with several people in the government who 
became identified with the Yorgadjis faction. Since at the 
1970 elections the UP represented that faction, everyone in
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hallo expected him to support UP, and several key persons 
predicted this to me. They were ricrht. Kyr.il is thus had a 
double reason for supporting PF, given that it was unlikely 
he would support either of the left parties, AKEL and EDEK.
From long discussions with him I learned that he believes 
Clerides to be a capable man, and that Sampson does not have 
the personal qualities to hold high office. But for the tiro 
reasons given, he could not end up supporting a party which 
contained his old enemy, the rich man.
A second example of the complexity of alignments. K^nnellos 
before 1954 was apparently a leftist. However for many years 
he has been a nationalist. In the 1970 elections ho. strongly 
supported the PF party. Six months earlier several informants 
had told he would go with his wife's sister's husband Iloustachas 
the former EOKA leader. It was thought at that time that 
although Moustachas kept very quiet about his position, he 
would support Sampson because (1) Sampson is his kourobaros
(2) Yorgadjis had failed to help his daughter get a scholarship 
to university in Greece, and Sampson had helped with this.
Thus,Kanellos would ultimately be rallied to Sampson and PF.
However, if we were to examine the background for evidence 
of factlonallst reasons for Kanellos', position, they exist- 
some years ago, one of Kanellos' two policemen sons (who partly 
owe their jobs to Moustachas) qot into a fight with P. Karas, 
in the coffeeshops. The issue started with Kanellos telling the 
young Karas to do something, the latter refusing and calling 
out some insult, and then a ficrht developing. Young Karas then 
decided to sue Kanellos and his son for assault. However he 
was afraid that the fact that one of Kanellos' sons was a 
policeman would go against him in court, so he made contact
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through his brother with Yorgadjis x-?ho telephoned the 
Market Town police and told their; he was interested that the 
case should go right. In the event, Karas won the verdict 
and damages in court. lie insists that he reduced his share of 
the damages 'tc rake it possible for us to make up'.
Now in 1970 Karas was one of the most active UP workers 
in the village. His older brother, a koumbaros of the deceased 
Yorgadjis was his direct link to the UP. What can be said 
about the alignrrents of Kanellos and Karas? Both were already 
committed through patronage ties to the parties they supported, 
and only very compelling reasons would have made them switch.
The question is, what effect did their previous personal 
differences haw on their positions? The answer rust be that 
while it did not directly cause their alignments in 1970, 
it undoubtedly added a great deal of interest to the contest.
It provided energy for the prosecution of party propaganda.
It was a catalyst for a reaction which had already been 
started by more fundamental material factors. One of the 
commonest complaints of the PF group was that Yorgadjis had filled 
the police force with his own men, and that he ran it as he liked, 
with the result that any friend of Yorgadjis got preferential 
treatment. During the 1970 elections I knew of at least three 
cases where UP supporters in Kallo had successfully sought for 
intervention on their behalf in police cases against them.
One of these cases involved wounding by firearms, and the others 
have already been discussed. Such issues were at the back 
(and occasionally the front) of the PF supporters' minds when 
they attacked the UP for 'ten complete years of corruption*.
To say that they would have acted the same way had they had
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the chance in not to the point, although it in probablv true.
(vi i i) Con c lus ion
National election!? have been a rare event in Cyprus, 
and in 1970 they tested the solidarity of villaoers, if not 
to the limits, at least far enough to have disturbed normal 
social relations quite markedly. In seeking to explain the 
striking difference between the returns In one village and 
those in the district at large, one is led to consider the 
specific ideological resources, the salient issues, and the 
historical meaning of certain currents in Cypriot politico, 
which were already introduced in chapter 7, and the later 
chapters.
The death of a young villaaer who had been an EOKA 
activist, proved a potent political resource in the campaign 
of a nationalist politician; his exploitation of thin event 
made it difficult for clients of his opponent, the Minister of 
the Interior, and many of them changed from one patron to 
another less for short-term material reward, than for the 
relaxation of pressure from kin and friends of the dead man.
In addition, two smaller nationalist parties merged, and since 
a local man was a candidate in one, this merger together with 
the memory of the dead man provided a strong base for the PF 
in the village.
The election speeches, debates, and arguments between UP 
and PF supporters have to be understood in terms of the linking 
of two themes, from the PF point of view - the theme of being 
a oenuine HgHeniut, Greek nationalist, and the theme of b^ing 
excluded from power by usurpers. Tn chapter seven the argument 
was put forward that having little money, being educated in the
Greek language only, and in « (3r««k univsraity, and aubaa^uaiPlsly 
having poor job proapacta ara part off « pattern. Thia pattern 
in different from thosi« whoaa wealth or aonneotionw allow thaw 
to loarn Knglinh, to bo educated in an Kngliah-uipeaking 
environment, and to have hot tor job proapeatt* through proffioienay 
in Rngliah and preferred qualifications. To the endured 
nationalist, finch a contract haa the logic off a ayllogiaroi 
tha wrong poop la are in power; and arc ffolaa nationaliataf 
tho true national i»tn, who nhow thair nincerity for things 
Greek by baing educated in Greece# are excluded Crow power. 
Therefore, to bn poor imd excluded, in to bo a true patriot, 
and vioo wrnfl,
To point to auch patterna in not to argue that auoh 
atruotural aituntiona alwoyn produce tha appropriate political 
outlookn. Poverty nnd Greek aduoation do not alvmyw produce 
ardent right-nation«li«tH# for tha optiona off alignment with 
tha left, or indiff iterance always exiwt, Thare ara alao othar 
reaoona for being a nationaliat* and noma ora neither excluded 
from power nor monoglot. However, tha pattern auggantad exiata 
in many individual onnaw, and tha more paaaionate nationalist 
politicians campaign on linaa which fit thin analyaia* Thin 
partial explanation doa« aomething, it 1m hoped, to taka tha 
mora paaalonata pro-Wnoale nationaliat out off the aphera off 
irrational or free-floating motivea, into a comprehenaible context.
up aupportaru ara not, off coura« , all Bnglialvapaaking, 
allta membera with univaraity degree*. M«riy villagers ara tha 
clienta off political laadara, however, and their relaticmahip 
to membera off tha elite m»y ba thought off aw the1r ataka In tha 
etetua quo. iff n mwn must ba a client, it generally auita him
*¥»+ » 4*-i v i  i i m h i
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bettor to bo tlv» client of a powerful, well-connected person, 
than to bo the client of a marginal elite member, who himself 
suffers exclusion from the core of power. To explain why 
villagers act ns they do in politics, Involves consideration 
of a range of factors - social origins, wealth, education, 
job, patron-client ties, kinship and friendship bonds, and lant. 
but not always least, conscious ideological alignment. That 
is, the understanding of village political behaviour involves a 
range of factors in relatively complex patterns, and perhaps 
is therefore closer to the situation of more industrialised 
countries than might at first sight appear the case.
The elections showed the villagers, already seen to be 
both prospering and interdependent - seeking to apply traditional 
norms of village solidarity, to the increasing complex intrusions 
of national politics. The incidents, sometimes involving limited 
violence, and often involving a groat deal, of hostility short of 
violence, showed the political, culture of the village Jn its 
most exposed state. The elections caused the re-thinking of 
alignments for many people, and some of the tension involved was 
undoubtedly because these alignments boar directly on access to 
key resources - jobs, scholarships, bureaucratic interventions 
of all kinds. The villagers in seeking to ensure the protection 
and prosperity of their dependents, face dilemmas of choice 
which involve calculations of risk profit and loss of groat 
complexity. Precisely because the business of national politics 
involves linkages and decisions which are far beyond the control 
of any villager, the decisions are so difficult, and the tensions 
so great.
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Traditionally villagers competed for scarce resources 
which were, in the main, in the hands of other villagers, and 
the rules of their competition were known, derived from the 
village its?lf* More recently, political competition has
come to involve a set of ever-widening circles, and on their 
perimeters men make decisions of groat moment. If the name 
of a villager is supplied to one of these men, placed on or 
crossed off a list, the villager may lose or crain some 
critical benefit, in ;iicosia, Athens, Pranue, Washington or 
elsewhere. The action is invisible, and without aepeal.
For this reason, the villagers' hostility is so great to the 
carrying of tales or retailing of information about co-villagers 
to these outside men. No 'reasonable' man would do such a 
thing, but not all men are reasonable. Some are 'fanatics' 
or 'ideologists'. That is why ordinary villagers say 'Don’t 
get mixed up in (political) parties".
The village has remained an important area insofar as 
some men can be seen to align with national parties to hurt 
their village enemies, or at least, to express their opposition 
to or avoidance of them. This kind of behaviour has been 
widely reported, both for the Mediterranean area and for less 
developed societies. It is, perhaps, the final measure of 
the fact that the village preserves some inward-looking social 
character, in spite of the volume of transactions which flow 
across its boundaries.
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Footnotes to Chanter 11
«L
(1) Thin man, Pattarc, was described in chapter 2, page 6,
(2) In chapter R, The Cano of tho Graduate*n Club, Mountachnn 
wan again noon intervening in a similar way. Thin wan 
one of the loot occasions hin authority went unchallenged, 
and perhaps contributed to Its erosion.
(3) In chapter 7, page 15-16 none account of those rivalries 
wan given.
(4) Abner Cohen (1969 b) has argued forcefully that analysis 
of the symbolism of power relations in a key tank of 
politicnl nnthropology, and while I do not follow him
in hio more aggreaoivo reduction!sm, I am generally 
sympathetic to hin approach.
(5) Chapter 7, page 10.
(6) For example, a government minister who resigned In 1970 
to become a UP candidate, explained to E. !(. Hammonds 
that at one point he and hin ansociates had connldored 
taking over the right-nationalist farmer'n association 
PEK, but on cloner examination had decided not to bother 
nince they had found little or nothing to take over.
(E. H. Hammondn, personal communication). Thin may of 
courne have been a rationalisation for the fact that the 
job right have proved harder than they thought.
(7) Aglan had been a candidate for the Progressive Front, 
the party basically composted of an alliance bwtween PEK 
and the Mayor of Nicoaia. Thin party had merged, only 
a few days before, with Sampnon's Progressive Party.
(8) Later in thin chapter I nhall describe an incident on
election day in which a Kallotln, Oligon, got into a 
brawl with a young®r man who had called him a traitor.
Oligon won injured by tho British during the Emergency,
and most Kallotos think lie should have receiv'd compensation.
(9) Only Takin Evdokas, tho leader of the extreme right-
nationalist party DEK publicly attacked Makarloo by name 
during the elcctionn. He wan tho man who ran againnt 
Makarion for tho Presidency in 1968, and failed to get 
more than 6Vi of the popular vote.
(1*5) Sampson, for example, continually ntntod that derides
and Dcnktanh kept no minutes of their conforenoon, and that 
the implied reason for thin wan because they winhed to avoid 
Makarion knowing what they were discussing.
(11) I.ipnet (I960, 1967) han written of the tendency for fierce 
ideological competition between small partlen. "This 
divisiveneas encouraged by a multi-party system in 
perpetuated by tho tendency of most partlen to attack
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(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
most virulently those with whom they have most in
t h u r L ™ ? f ' 1 th whom they compete for a similar vote, 
thio magnifying the differences between them" (Lipset, 
in (ed) Macridis (1967 : 65).
whi? ^ r‘Snr» by faYlos nlno w*8 a way of tellincr Sampson 
what his father had done, and at the same time., making
c that his loyalty to PF went as far as persuading 
his father to change sides.
E. If. Hammonds is a lecturer in Government at the 
Polytechnic of Central London (formerly Regent Street 
Polytechnic). Our close association and continuing 
discussion of politics encouraged me to bring him to 
Cyprus in 1970, to observe the elections from the urban, 
elite perspective. I was fortunate in obtaining a 
supplement to a Nuffield Small Grant which enabled him 
to spend three weeks in the island. In this thesis, 
however, I rely on my own fieldwork material throughout 
and whenever information has come from another source, 
this is made clear.
A senior civil servant told me the following storv, which 
shows what can happen when a man like Karas finds 
himself with a powerful patron. My inforemant on first- 
starting work in the government office tried to get a cup 
of coffee. Ills colleagues explained that he could not 
because Karas, who had the coffee concession was a 
friend of Yorgadjis, and felt it was too far to come.
My informant called Karas in and asked him for coffee.
Karas did not bring it and a row developed, during which 
he boasted of his friendship with the Minister, and his 
own readiness to use a cun. My informant's father 
had contributed large sums of money to EOKA. and. also has 
some very loyal employees, so he told Karas to bring his 
gun at any time, and see what happened. But although 
this made him feel better, he did not get any coffee.
It is interesting to see how far the elite share 
the idiom of friends, supporters, guns and power; or even 
if they do not feel committed to the values implied, they 
need to use the idiom of men like Karas to deal with him.
The man in guestion comes from one of the richest 
families in Cyprus and is a university graduate.
It is worth mentioning that Pyrgos in fact eloped with 
Karas' sister, sore years ago, and at the time, her brothers 
were extremely angry and would have done him violence had 
not mediators intervened. Tho matter was resolved, but 
it is possible that such a previous difference helped 
trigger the dispute in 1970. Pyrgos openly boasts that he 
has killed men, and was once involved in a series of 
gang killings In Limassol. Ho is naturally feared in the 
village. lie is a gambler. P. Karas is a gymnasium 
graduate, and full-time farmer; although unmarried he 
works his own land, a very rare situation in the village.
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ana other Jungs, he made it clear that the tough: 
and readiness to do 3uch thincrs were characterise 
admired in young Kallotes.
(17) I mentioned in chapter 9 how this man had been extremely 
active on behalf of his village, Kammari, in its attempt.1! 
to get an illegal bore-hole made legal.
(18) I have not previously mentioned this exchance, which
took place some years after the trip itselfwhich
was described in chapter eicrht.
(19) I do not mean to suggest that there were no violent
disputes between other parties elsewhere. In fact there 
were a number of fights between AKEL supporters and 
right-nationalists, in various parts of the island.
In the villages which surround Kallo I heard of no such 
incidents. It seems likely that disputes between right 
and left would be more likely in villages where the non- 
left were represented by one major party, instead of 
being distributed fairly evenly between several 
nationalist parties.
(20) The house of the villaae priest. The use of this house 
was regarded by other groups as typical of PF cunning, 
since they argued the older women in the village would
be unduly influenced into voting for the PF. In fairness, 
the priest's house-4.5 very close to the school, and 
ideally located.
(21) From the events of the Lyssarides Group, described in 
chapter eight.
(22) Similar behaviour is described by Stirling (1965 : 280-282) 
Boissevain (1965 : 128) and Cohen (1965 :l/46-73).
(2 3) The relation between K. Karas and Yorgadjis was discussed 
on page 39 of this chapter.
(24) Ily debt to the ideas of F. G. Bailey in this analysis, 
is pronounced.
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CHAPTER 12
IpKOX.OGXatf. 1diso>rd
Introduction
gorco general issues In this study 
Two themes have dominated the previous pages. One 
concern a the impact of m o d e m  political ideologies in village 
lj-i.of and the attempts of villagers to contain its divisiveness; 
the other in the organisational tactics employed by villagers 
in their struggle to extract material benefits from the political 
and administrative structures of the modern nation state. It 
will be obvious that the two themes depend on each otheri in
*
few words, m o d e m  politics offer new benefits to villagers, 
but sojnotiir.es at the cost of setting them against each other.
y ;  :■ ? ■ . .  "* f V )  < 1 1
How they seek to obtain maximum benefits for minimum social 
coot Is what most of the material has been about.
The same themes are implicit in many monographs on politics 
in developing nations* It has become a commonplace to read of 
village elders describing some Arcadian state "before politics 
came and spoiled things’ ^ y e t  few writers have directed their 
attention to this issue explicitly* It is also worth remarking 
that the persistence of the village as the dominant reference 
point in the lives of its inhabitants runs somewhat counter 
both to the recent analytic emphasis on transactions across local 
bundaries, and the influence of the centre,on the periphery.
In showing Kallo to be a solidary community, although highly 
involved in the processes of the larger society, two things 
are important! one Is that in place of the vanishing village,
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threatened in Mediterranean ethnography for the last twenty 
years, there is presented detailed analysis of a persistent 
village; the other is that in place of the remote, backward, 
isolated depopulated village, there is presented some 
analysis of a village integrated into a nation, economically 
progressive, prosperous and demographieslly viable^. The 
implications of studying a village which is more closely 
integrated into the nation have not until recently, been 
explored. A number of recent writers have concentrated on the 
gap between the perspective of the political scientist, and the 
anthropologist (see Weingrod, 1967, Fallers, 1<>63, Vincent 
19G9, Cohen 19G9) and rightly point to the difficulties in any 
assumption of the convergence of the two views. Weingrod has 
insisted that
"The village in not the microcosm of the nation:
it is not possible to infer the one from the other.
Studying politics on the village Invel will not
assist in understanding how a nation is ruled" (ibid: 123)
But Weinqrod is settincr up straw men here. Mo anthropologist 
has gone on record as thinking that the nation is the macrocosm 
of the village: but that is not to say that studying politics
from (not on) the village level will not assist in understanding 
how a nation is ruled. Abner Cohen (1969) has forcefully argued 
that the anthropologist faces a challenge from an invasion of 
his traditional subject matter - a social unit which can be 
studied by intensive observation - by political scientists.
He argues that anthropology must take more notice of the role 
of the state in analysis of the units studied, but adds that 
anthropological analysis compensates for limitation of scale, 
by its greater analytic depth. Although I have been carrying 
out part of Cohen's prooramine of 'the analysis of the symbolism 
of power relations' I do not think this need be the only claim
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mad® for anthropological study. The notion of political 
culture, Mentioned only in passing by Cohen, is central here, 
as shown by the work of a political scientist: Waterbury's
3tudv of the Moroccan political elite not only appears to 
have boon carried out by fieldwork techniques similar to those 
used by anthropologists, but also builds on findings by 
anthropolonists to produce the fundamental analytic tools used.
The political culture of the Moroccan elite, with its 
characteristic traits of combining tension with stalemrtra, of 
preserving alliance flexibility, and of the defensive use of 
power are all, it is clear "contingent upon the traditional 
forms of social organisation in Morocco" (^aterbury, 1970 ; 6).
This is precisely the reverse of Welngrod'ra point: it is
only through ananalysis of traditional and local social organisation 
that understanding of elite behaviour (and by implication, of 
the Moroccan ?6:to) can be obtained.
It la in the last respect that this study has a special 
perspective to offer: in many societies the political elite is
also a traditional elite, who because of the previous 
stratification system, have simply remained in position during 
the changes of recent years, studios from India in particular, 
but also frorr Latin America, suggest that the gap between elite 
politicians and peasant electorate, is huge, and it is such 
studies which encourage Weingrod to insist that the village 
study has little to toll us about how the nation :ls ruled.
TSat in many countries there has been no established 
traditional elite. Where the traditional social structure 
allowed competition for power, and the society has displayed 
a competitive egalitarianism, the new elites have often emerged
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very recently from rural origins, and purely local leadership,
This is the case, I argue, among Nigeria's Ihos, among the
Toloi of New Guinea described by Epstein, and elsewhere.
It follows that such elites can scarcely escape in a single
generation the influence of their traditional political culture,
and thus in a very obvious way, this is essential to any
understanding of their behaviour when at the controls of the 
state ^  .
Yet this feature is not limited to acephalous tribal 
societies turning towards modernity. Rural Cyprus provides a 
further example of an elite energing rapidly from rural 
communities, with only a weak indigenour gratification system,, 
Not only must the rural origins of this elite be understood 
before sense can be made of national politics, but also, Insofar 
as the elite succeeds in differentiating itself from the rest 
of the society, then it is equally necessary to understand 
what elite members are trying to escape from, and here again, 
the understanding of rural society is a logical requirement. 
VJhere there is a secure traditional elite, unchallenged, and 
with a social and political culture so developed and self- 
contained that it owes nothing in origins or reaction to 
peasant society, then it may be understood without reference to 
peasant societies although some comparison will be necessary 
to even establish the discreteness of the two systems. It is 
more likely, however, that few political elites can properly be 
understood without close analysis of rural political cultures, 
and thus, the analysis of the state's role in developing 
countries must proceed from prior analysis of smaller social 
units, especially villages.
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From those general considerations, I 
recapitulation, chapter by chapter, of the
s, I turn first to a
in village life,
of the wain argument 
The firct chapter sketched the traditional economy of the 
village, and followed the main changes in population growth, 
agriculture, communication*), and politics. A continuous rise 
in population was accompanied by the intensive cultivation of 
new land, and increased cash-cropping made possible by 
co-operative development of new waterresources. The colonial 
government sponsored improved communications; and mass education. 
Political leadership from elite politicians, already developed 
in the 1920s, was suspended, only to re-emerge in the post-war 
period. Cleavage between right and left in the village began 
to be institutionalised.
The second chapter explored the importance of land in the 
social structure of the village, and the need for supplementary 
occupations, for those whose holding was not viable. The 
relatively even distribution of land x;as noted, the status 
factors involved in different kinds of occupation, particularly 
the high value that villagers now place on givincr their children 
higher education. The change over in the 1950s to capital- 
intensive citrus cultivation was stressed, and how this made 
possible profitable 'white-collar1 farming by men whose main 
occupation is not agriculture.
The third chapter by examining the cycle of property transfer
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brought out the critical cultural importance of provision 
for children at marriage; a consideration of the arrangement 
of marriage provided the other key feature in the status 
syste.Tr, of village society, itself linked to property transfer: 
tho competition for suitable marriage partners for one's 
children, and thee way in which this is a key reflection of the 
inward-looking values of adult villagers. Concerns for the 
provision of dependents, and the competitive arena of marriage 
arrangement are constraints on all political behaviour by 
villagers, and provide one reason why villagers seek to lirr.it 
the scope of political conflict within the village.
Chapter four examined other bases for association in the 
social relations of villagers beyond those provided by kinship 
ana affinity. Particularly, ritual godparenthood (koumbaria) 
friendship, relations based on age, neighbourhood and work were 
analysed. The importance of transactions with outsiders was 
discussed, and some of the links between villagers and 
influential persons described. Gome attempt was made to 
describe the norms of solidarity between co-villacrars, and 
reasons were given for tho prominence of such norms in the 
general desire to keep land, cash and eligible young people 
within the boundaries of the village. This interdependence, 
based on Increasing prosperity is the basic reason for a
(4)
solidarity which limits conflict between political groups .
Chapter five was concerned with the opportunities for 
leadership and power in the village. Formal administrative 
offices - mostly filled by fulltime farmers - reflected trust 
from the village at large in the handling of communal affairs, 
but in themselves were strictly limited in opportunities for
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general exercise of power. Education, wealth, external 
contacts, and the readiness to U3® force were all bases for 
power, which wan not concentrated in a few persons. Power 
can be achieved in. the vi 11 acre, and in competed for closely.
In chapter six the scope of politico waa analysed. A 
distinction between active leaders, their supporters, and 
political spectators, the maligned, cautious or indifferent 
villagers was made. The social implications, in terms of 
values and actionsf of the labels leftist, and rightist were 
examined as well as the costs and benefits of alignments with 
party positions, and extent of political conflict between left 
and right in village politics. I also discussed the role of 
croups of followers in Cypriot politics, bound to national 
leaders bv ties of friendship or clientage, and often involved 
in clandestine, illegal organisation. Finally, the notion of 
obligation and friendship in political behaviour, particularly 
voting,, was mentioned, in which it was arcued that Cypriot 
culture so strongly approved the principle of reciprocity that 
in politic*, obligation often cut across lines of ideological 
cleavage. The gap between village and total in not so great 
that the political broker is deeply mistrusted, and many 
villagers have fairly direct access to literate persons who can 
mediate their needs with the larger society.
Chapter seven briefly reviewed the history of the Greek 
Cypriot community from 1878 to 1970, concentrating on the 
meaning of the quest for Union with Greece (Enosis) both in its 
early phase of elite representations to the colonial government, 
and in the later phase,, 1954-59 of armed struggle bv EOKA*
The importanco of membership in EOKA as the key to the
1.2/0
Independence period was stressed, both for the domands mad® 
on government to reward proven service nnd militancy, end 
for the network of informal political relotlone which resulted 
from the residues the organisation. The intercommunal 
troubles between Greeks and Turk?, which erupted in violence from 
1963 were matched by n strucrgl® for power between Greek 
nationalist leader.*:, which continues: at Jtime of writing with 
Gj.ivar: Intost challenge to Makarios. The increasingly open
rivalry between nationalist loaders resulted in tensions at 
village level botweon their followers. The emergence in 1969 
of a now underground organisation demanding ttnosia, attempts 
on the life of the president nnd the associated murder of an 
ox-minlator were further signs of instability. The whole 
period can bo seen as one in which the mass of the population 
haa had little direct experience of representative politics, 
but has nevertheless been involved in great political chance, 
including their increasing social enfranchisement. Political 
discontinuity has been matched bv steady economic development.
Chapters einht to eleven have examined in detail recent 
political issuers involving different segments of the village, 
nnd different political fields. A number of disputes between 
political groups in the village wore contrasted, followed by 
attempts of five villages to expedite the buildlnor of a dam; 
chapter nine was concerned with the administration of a major 
co-operative, in members of some of these villages were again 
found in opposition to Market Town, and again allowed their 
ovm elite loaders to take most of the important initiative® on 
their behalf. The last chapter examined in considerable detail 
the major election campaign of 1970, stressing thn deep cleavage
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between supporters cf two nationalist parties, stemming from 
the death of a particular village being fed back into the 
village through the amplification of^urban leaders campaign, 
on a ntimber of occasions the fragile peace of the village 
was tested, without major fracture, thu3 providing a basis 
for future control of open conflict.
(ii) ”-e~ : the_awbiCTuit^ipv education
P. G. Bailey has demonstrated that the use of new 
resources in political competition frequently cives rise to 
conflict (1969 : 10)„ Mass education has wade social 
differentiation in rural communities more complex. Villagers 
generally speak of education as worthy of respect, yet they 
deny respect to the educated in certain contexts. What 
factors explain these shifts?
The blocking of a club, which would have symbolised the 
social distance between educated and less educated villagers, 
was a message about preserving the social homogeneity of the 
village, and the personal pre-eminence of a village leader.
The club had no role in external relations, and appeared to 
offer little to the village in generalI iThis dispute is a 
miniature version of the wider striiobral^  cleavage between EOKA 
activists, and the educated urban elite.
In similar vein, a teacher who tifrotc a small article for 
a newspaper describing attempts at ptolitifcal intimidation within 
the village was presented as having fo* Jlcen norms of solidarity 
by taking a village dispute to outsidexteVHis ability to 
do this depended on his educational Bfc.'&'iB; his appeal to 
abstract -notions such as free speech, an<Y right of assembly 
v?ere Similarly novel resources in the ViiJihge arena. Such
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resources have their origins in universal suffrage, first 
introduced under colonial rule. Yet since independence, 
villagers were seen in administrative issues concerning a dam 
and a co-operative, to allow a fev/ leaders, sons of the village 
who had entered the urban elite to take most rajor initiatives. 
Suffrage does not confer consciousness of citizens’ rights.
Men of power are not distinguished by the rules governing their 
roles, and villagers treat civil servants, politicians, and 
elite notables all in the sane way ~ as people to beware of, 
to coax or to imjbloro.
here are certain situations in which the villagers permit 
their own educated men to load then', in contrast to the previous 
cases mentioned: if leadership involves personal risk? if it
invo1vos relations with external authorities; if it involves 
matters of bureaucratic complexity; or if the interests of the 
leaders and the rest of the villagers are seen to be the same. 
Often, several of these factors come together in a single 
situation when for example, a villager needs to deal with a high-" 
status government official. Shaky literacy, peasant speech, 
the insecuritiea of being a family head in a hostile unknowable 
world all make it difficult for a villager to speak out. To 
criticise an official policy seems to the villager like an 
attack on the man who speaks for it, PrOslic and private roles 
are not distinguished. Better to let t* wealthy son of the 
village, educated abroad, an urban resident who ’knows how to 
speak' and who himself has land in the -village, take up such 
matters. In the absence of a feudal or latifundist tradition,, 
and with the knowledge that customary norfrs should act to sanction 
blatant betrayal, villagers can leave their affairs in the hands
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or the elite the village haa produced, with a United measure 
of trust. Self-interest can load to relations of co-operation, 
contrary co Danfield13 well-known description of the society
o f 'amo r al fani1i s 13 ’.
(iii.) ^w_jr080urce£ : committees as controls
Bailey (1965) has examined the role of committees and 
their decision-making procedures, and their consequences for 
the handling of social discord. My data show how in times of 
crisis, the village tends to throw up committees which act both 
to bridge social divisions, and to express tensions, and once 
again, educated men are prominent.
The committee as an institution is not bound to mean the 
sane thing in different societies, and it would be a mistake to 
see village committees an necessarily an aspect of rational, 
bureaucratic management. The Co-ordinating Committee which 
was adopted during the Independence struggle was meant to keep 
villagers from recourse to courts controlled by the colonial 
government. They were then instruments for internal aooial. 
control and for ensuring political solidarity. In 1964 the 
re-emergence of thin committee was in direct response to a 
threatened break in solidarity, a loss of political confidence 
by the villagers in their defenders.
During my fieldwork, an Advisory Committee emerged during 
a period of agitation by villagers over water resources. An 
educated nan chaired it, and maintained an orderly procedure. 
Numbers of villagers used the committee to discuss their 
views on the water problem, and my interpretation of their 
participation is that there was a general anxiety that the 
committee would check the exploitation of the dam issue for part
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political benefit, and ensure that the villagers themselves 
had scree control over tho conduct of the issue. Like the 
Co-ordinating Committees, it arose during a crisis of confidence 
in the village, triggered by external events. Such cornmlttoon 
have as one latent function the control of potential social 
or political division within the village, through a ceremonial 
re--imposition of behaviour expressing solidarity. In all 
eases these committees failed to become established, and in the 
case of the one I observed, it was not possible to decide how 
much this failure was due to its being swamped national 
political forces, and how much the three meetings themselves 
had served their expressive purposes without further action.
(iv) New resources : political demonstrations
In all cross-cultural compnrioons there is Implicit the 
problem of hov; far cultural items, institutions, units-, customs 
are similar or different. It is too often assumed in discussions 
of politics in developing countries that if the forms of 
representative government are being follower], then the 
functions and cultural meanings follow the forms. Through 
the influence of the mass media, Cypriot villagers have certainly 
been exposed to images of political protest from other countries. 
Moreover, in certain phases of colonial rule, notably the Uprising 
of 1931, and the Independence struggle of 1954-59 certain kinds 
of political demonstration occurred, which might arguably be 
said to have been the models for tho events of the late 1960s. 
Therefore it is proper to ask, what were the underlying 
implications of tho dam demonstration, and the electoral 
demonstration in Market Town, 1970?
The demonstration at tho Presidential Palace was, to my
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knowledge, the first time the villagers had attempted fco
further their economic ends by an overtly political message
to the government. The event itself was guided and stimulated
by the efforts of an educated elite politician, although he
was not able to exercise the control over it he wished to do.
Eince a demonstration could nean many things, such as a servino
of notice to a government to quit,, a show of physical power,
a challenge to the authorities, and so forth, it must be
stressed that insofar as it is possible to talk of the
character of a demonstration, this one had elements of a plea 
(*5)for attention rather than anything more threatening;
this was suggested by certain things actually said by key
members of the demonstration, by the ease with which it was
deflected from an open namino of Market Town as the source of
its discontent, and by the readiness with which it dispersed.
The demonstration was for many of those taking part, a message
Iff)to the government, through Makarios as Chief Patron about its 
dependents' needs. It was only secondarily, and for relatively 
few of the participants, the calculated use of a new resource 
in the arena of national politics. My information in inadequate 
to say how the demonstration appeared to the government, 
which in any event appeared to support the building of the dam. 
In subsequent meetings between village committees and senior 
civil servants there was evidence of serious friction, but no 
sign that the civil service intended to alter its basic policy* 
Certainly demonstrations by agricultural interest groups, as 
well as trade unions were common after this, though it is not 
possible to say more than that the Five Villages were among the 
first off the mark.
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a he 3 970 election, campaign was, I have argued, a new 
political expo.ionce in the simple sense that few opportunities 
have arisen since 1930 for Cypriots to choose national
representations. Since it followed an anomalous period of
political violence and unrest, no-one really knew bow the 
patter would pass« At the election meetings I attended it was
rare for members of the audience to ask questions after the formal
speeches. This is partly the legacy of caution, the avoidance 
of exposure to personal risk, which is a characteristic of adult 
village conduct. It is oartly too a reflection of the gap between 
the usually educated candidates, with their command of the 
Greek language at sophisticated levels, and the relatively 
insecure, unsophisticated audience which mistrusts its own 
ability to speak coherently.
The demonstration in Market. Town against the United Pfrfcy, 
add the interrogation of an educated and distinguished United 
Party candidate by a young village farmer are therefore remarkable 
At first sight one might be tempted to use the language of 
political development, and sneak simply of increased participation 
democrat!sation and so forth. X would argue that this would be 
misleading, without consideration of certain background events.
In particular, both actions wore carried out by young rnen who 
had been heavily influenced by the death of one villager who 
had been a local EOKA fighter of distinction. They saw 
themselves as carrying out a particular form of attempt to redres 
the balance the election was thus a highly personal matter, a 
control led form of revenue, satisfying to personal honour, 
somewhat dangerous because its consequences were unknoxm* yet 
not as dangerous as an actual vengeance killing. The fact that
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those prominent in these two situations were all unmarried 
(although one wan engaged) is significant in this? respect. 
Dehind them were mature men, married friends of the dead man, 
who rather than risk such open exposure which would have been 
irresponsible in terms of their family obligations, were 
nevertheless able to work hard in the electoral campaign of 
a nationalist leader synpathetic to their cause.
These demonstrations then npy^enr as a new resource 
employed by villagers in the national political arena. To 
the observer who stresses the institutional form of an act, 
the language of political development will seem appropriate; 
but the anthropologist is bound to point out that underneath 
that form are principles of traditional rural society - the 
expression of dependency, the search for protection, in one 
case, and in the other, the vindication of personal honour, of 
loyalty to a dead man.
political change : conflict in the traditional village
From the limited evidence available to me from the pre- 
1930 period, the nature of conflict in the village can onlv be 
guessed at. A form of political contest centred on the 
elections for the post of rmktar but it is not clear how stable 
were the factions supporting candidates. Nor are the linkages 
to national elections at all clear? villagers speak as if 
there were two factions, which wore exhaustive and opposed each 
other in all matters. The little evidence I collected did 
not support so clear a view. The only thing on which 
information permit certainty is that the factions did not 
have anything that should be dignified with the title ideology, 
that they did not seem to have any clear institutional basis,
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and that recruitment to them on mixed or diverse principles.
Finally, there waa no suggestion that villagers committed
important resources to such factional contests, although urban
politicians at national elections opent money on buying village 
voto
From the same period there is the Important came of the
Two Companies, remembered predominantly as an economic natter.
Hero both oides committed v«ry nubatantial amounts of money
to the dispute, which wan settled by o court decision, merging
the two parties in a single company* The fact that this dispute,
while economically costly, was settled without violence is
noteworthy for rr.y argument, in light of the fact that violence with
the closest village over wntor wan still occurring thirty yearn 
in
later. Since/the name period violence and occasionally killings 
took placo within tho village, between individuals or limited 
kin groups, the tentative conclusion is that there was a conscious 
avoidanco of violent conflict between major groups within the 
village. Insofar a» this tendency seems to continue to the 
presont day, it is worth emphasis; but the quality of evidence 
is not good enough to know if such a pattern in tho traditional 
village la a chance one, or the result of conscious restraint by 
the- villagers. Comparative studies can help settle this.
I'ecau.jo of a number of factors, but particularly, the 
suppression of institutional and representative politics by 
tho colonial government for the whole of the 1930s, the entry of 
national party politics into village lifo appears to take 
placo suddenly In the early 1940s. Yet individual villagers 
had already taken up ideological positions before this. 
Accompanying the change towards increased occupational
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differentiation, improved roads and transport, war-tine wage 
labour outside the villagers, the growth of trade union activity 
took place. Left wing unions re-emerged, after being banned 
in the 1930s, and nationalist right-wing unions, though on a 
smaller scale, followed to challenge their power. These 
institutionalised parties penetrated the village, and in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s, there were a number of national 
elections which allowed them to test their strength. In the 
village contests between the activitsts of these parties took 
place, and at the same tire, new administrative units, such as 
the Co-operative Retail Shop provided scope for party competition.
Par the most important aspect of the change was that the 
parties carried ideological overtones and had a decrree of 
permannnce outside the village itself. The ideologies involved 
differences not only over the Church, the distribution of wealth, 
and the general form of the economic system, but also involved 
positions on the nation, independence, and relations with 
other states such as the USSR and Greece. Because of the 
relative institutional stability of the local units, membership 
or allegiance created the basis for relationships outside the 
village. The entry of ideological politics into village life 
must be seen as presenting additional social identities for 
villagers. Before this, conflicts between individuals, 
families or factions were within a common framework of values? 
party politics called this common framework into question.
They did not destroy it, but they strained it to the limits.
Since it has been stressed throughout that the village 
is strongly enmeshed in a larger society, it is essential to 
state that in my view political conflict in the village is not
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United by any putative homeostatic mechanism which can act 
independently of external situations. There is no mysterious 
tendency to equilibrium in a system, which can foe abstracted 
from observing the village. The factors limiting conflict 
within the village result from the values and actions of 
individual villagers, who see certain clear benefits in so 
acting. Changes in the external political environment intensify 
political cleavage in the village, and here it is important to 
note that continuously since 1955 there has been a political 
factor dampening conflict between leftist and nationalists at 
all levels and that is the issue of the relation between the 
Greek and Turkish communities in the island. V?hile relations 
between the two ethnic categories are hostile, and con s ti t u i on a1ly 
anomalous and while the appeal for ethnic unity among the 
Greeks continues to be made by national leaders of all political 
complexions, then there is a continuing restraint on cleavage 
at the village level.
But such a comment leaves a great deal of leeway, both
for the analyst and the actors. Political leaders do not give
up all attempts to test the opposition, simply because an appeal
for ethnic unity exists. Above all, institutional units need
the occasional exercise of contest to preserve their identity,
(7)boundaries, and morale . Thus leaders in the village can be 
thought of as acting under contradictory restraints. This is 
borne out in the process of factional conflict on a number of 
occasions.
For example when both leftists and nationalists had agreed 
not to contest the elections for a village administrative 
committee, they then failed to agree about the precise form that
12/19
the apportionment of posts should take. Th.tr, form of content 
Involves no commitment of valued resourcen, and in the control 
of the committee .Tien little opportunity for economic 
favouritism or advantage to the winner; the reason why finch 
side attempted to stop the other one gaining advantage thus 
eludes a material interpretation, and suggests tho leaders 
long-term goals related to maintaining political vmita at 
strength, and their own positions.
What in the threat or cost involved in a fully contented
election for such a committee? Since the political teams are
of roughly equal size, one result of a full content la that
ovoryono in the village will have to bo aligned. Largo
numbers of people have cross-cutting ties# and such an exhaustive*
contest undoubtedly ntralns many social relations in the village.
Furthermore, it might involve the temptation to use outside
resources. Hero a particular danger would be that one a£d©
(8)might call in extra supporters to intimidate its rivals 
Since tho institutions exist linking party units both across 
villages and to major centres, it is not difficult to arrange 
a few extra supporters, with no important relations to members 
of the village community, who can use strong-arm methods. Some­
thin# of this wan happening in the illegal activities earlier which 
resulted in a muktar of another vlllace getting an involuntary 
haircut.
It is thus fortunate from several points of view that the 
village administrative elections usually had a low turn-out, and 
that they were not often the subject of serious party contest.
Since such elections are governed by government regulations, 
they may in any case take place within a framework of control,
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which can bs used as a resource or as arbitration, depending 
on specific circumstances and the actor's point of view.
Other forms of factional contest took place in tho period 
19 54-70 however which involved some of the ideological and 
institutional factors discussed here, but which lacked the 
rules of competition and governmental framework. They also 
involved different <7roupin<~r3 f only some of which are r>arties 
to the conflict just discussed. The dispute involving the 
followers of Dr, Lyssarides with a number of nationalists 
threatened to bring -- and in some versions, did bring ~ violence 
into village political groupings. The incident occurred during 
a period of unrest and intense activity at the national level, 
involved the continual use of outside arbitrators, and a period 
of open breach within the village itself; the values invoked 
by the two sides i:ore, I have already stressed, in conflict. 
Unlike the committee elections, the result of this incident 
was a loss of supporters for one side, and a loss of authority 
for tho leader of the other side. TTot only this, but the 
incident formed n lastincr impression on many people in the 
village, as a dangerous precedent of ’fanaticism1. Once 
again the prizes at stake are not particularly clear or tangible, 
but clearly related to ideological vidws, to group strength, 
and leadership ambitions; but as in sc many village disputes, 
the situation was undoubtedly agcravated by pre-existing 
enmities between some of tho individuals involved and by the 
desire of village clients to please or impress their patrons 
who are political lenders at the level of the nation.
In such situations however, there is an additional factor 
which undoubtedly serves to moderate political conflict, ano
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this is the punitive potential of the state. Roads, carp, 
and telephones, as veil as the expansion and professionalization 
of the police force, to some extent make it more likely that 
the state will intervene in the case of violence or the threat 
of violence. This is not a simple matter, since I have also 
argued that individuals with powerful patrons may sometimes 
flout the law with impunity - the material on the Kthnikt:on
- *>u— T< tlii3 - but on balance the state deters rather
than encourages violent political conflict and this was made 
clear by the behaviour of the police and villagers during 
election day 1970.
A further set of factors which limit political conflict 
in the village are those related to a conscious preservation 
of village solidarity on the part of leaders. A3 Bailey has 
pointed out (19G5 : f>) many village communities, particularly 
in India tolerate violent conflict, and are well characterised 
as 'back-to-back communities'. Swartz, commenting on a 
study of factionalism in a Burmese village by Spiro (Swartz,
1968, 1969 pp. 4-5; see also paper by Spiro in the same 
volume) notes that the villagers have a shared goal - the 
continued existence of the village; furthermore they 
refuse to allow factional conflict to extend into economic 
activity. In considering factors which might directly affect 
such a value it is worth noting in passing that in some 
societies the fission or secession of village units is a practical 
possibility, related to factors of population, availability of 
land and other resources, and the security of groups from attacks. 
In rural Cyprus although individuals and occasionally whole 
households leave villages after severe dispute, the lack of
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free land would make the departure of large numbers of villagers
most difficult, although they might move in small groups to 
a town.
The reasons why villagers in general should value the 
continued peaceful existence of the village, some measure of 
solidarity, and limited conflict, have already been suggested 
by noting the extent to which the villagers look inwards for 
their children's marriage partners, for land for cash,, They 
are conscious of this interdependence. Thus, in spite of the 
economic integration of the village in a national and inter­
national economic system, it continues to be a relatively 
discrete unit for the achievement of status. One consequence 
of this is that while conflicts between individuals are fairly 
freely tolerated, those between oolitical groups arey" limited.
Conflict between individuals *■ even when in serious breach 
of kinship norms -- is recognised as something "natural" when 
it is over material resources or social reputation. It is of 
course subject to informal rules, open to mediation, and may be 
modified by those ceremonial opportunities which normallv 
present themselves through the cycle of the family's development ~ 
engagements, weddings, baptisms, and funerals. It is widely 
considered mo3t unreasonable for close kin to dispute over politics.
Conflict between political gro\ips is regarded with profound 
disquiet by villagers, and something which is likely to occur 
but which must be avoided and controlled. Moreover, the rules 
for the settlement of political disputes aro not an agreed code, 
but an emergent one. Indeed, in some situations, political 
ideologies make it unlikely that any basic agreement about such
rules can be made.
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Politics is not seen as a natural activity, and
especially when it involves parties, it is to be avoided. Much
verbal activity seeks to control the possible disruptions of
party politics by the assertions of a norr (disguised as a
statement of fact) that this particular village is one where men
are not fanatic, and do not allow politics to divide then 
seriously.
This norm is a prophesy which by repetition fulfils itself. 
On every occasion when a serious breach is threatened but 
avoided, the norn gains power for it shows that people are what 
they say they ore. This seems to me to raise a theoretical 
issue of some difficulty.
Gluckman (1968b)has reviewed the issue of determining 
structural change and of the use of the notion of equilibrium.
He intends these concepts to be of use in analysing institutions 
and large social systems. But there are difficulties in deciding 
what the tendency is in a village, or indeed if a social system 
can bein Gluckman's sense abstracted from a village at all.
There are three logical possibilities. First, a tendency 
towards an increased solidarity - a success spiral would be 
nn appropriate metaphor. Secondly, a continuation of the existin 
level of solidarity. Thirdly, a tendency towards increased 
cleavage. Whether the continuing appeal to a norm of solidarity 
is a case of the second or third of these possibilities, seems to 
me beyond dacision. It is easy to see what is happening at the 
extremes. Movement from some putative midpoint in one direction 
or the other is much more difficult to determine.
It is reasonable to suppose that a particular village moves 
in one direction or another largely as a result of a particular
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historical occurrence, which then becomes the basis for a norm.
This does not rule out the importance of predisposing factors
such as the strength of cross-cutting ties produced by
economic, affin?l or ritual interdependence? it suggests
however, that structural factors alone will not determine the
limitation of political conflict. The actions of particular
individuals, and the consequent use of such actions bv their
incorporation into norms, will play an important role.
In this respect it is curious that Boissevain (19G9) in
seeking to account for variations in the political organisation
of Maltese villages considers only structural variables while
elsewhere he insists that
"This study has focused upon a village, but what 
has now ernerged in the importance of the individual.
He, not the village, emerges as the important unit 
in the process of social comnunication and cultural 
integration." (p.96)
In his earlier analysis he suggested (1965) that one 
explanation for the existence of secondary festa partlti ~ those 
factions which forn to celebrate the secondary, rather than 
the patron saint of a village ** was that with changes in the 
occupational structure of the villages, individuals sought 
positions of leadership or prestige which were already filled 
in the titular saint's confraternities. TThile such individuals 
acted within a framework of structural constraints, their actual 
motivation, energy, and distribution are particular historical 
events, and Boiseevain's analysis would have been more consistent
had he explicitly acknowledged this.
The specific historical occasions on which the villagers 
learned lessons they were to convert into nows of solidarity 
would be the Too  Companies dispute; the initial nationalist
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b o y c o t t  o f  t h e  Cc-o p e r a t i v e  Retail Sho?? and the Lyssarid.es 
G ro u p  d i s p u t e .  In e a c h  c a s e  villagers oonrdtted s^ ibstantial 
r e s o u r c e s  t o  t h e  dispute but later were reconciled after a 
p e r i o d  o f  o p e n  breach. At each of these points the dispute 
c o u l d  h a v e  escalated, been prolonged, and became emended in 
t e r r a s  o f  w h a t  Spiro {1968 : 419} has tensed factional scope.
Ivhen a conscious goal of preserving village solidarity 
exists, certain other tactics will be adopted to n»v«> this 
easier. A clear exarple of this is the narrov? definition of 
politics useo by villagers. Their behaviour msv be sunsarissd 
by saying that they seek to include as little as possible within 
the definition of politics. Thus, only the rest blatant and 
unequivocally political acti’r'lties are defined as political, 
such as the actions of party loyalists at election tine. In 
a number of other areas, there is the explicit that
politics is relevant to issues — good examples beinc the early 
stages of the unbuilt das, the vreeh—t-O—veeh activities of 
village administrative cars'! ttees r a^d -the managezsent of rTmT ? 1 
Since in fact elections to village coiandttees to C2TC0QF- 
in fact take note of party politics (eves though 43sey are sot 
dcBrinated by then) villagers are clearly svare of the possible 
politicisation of such issues. This is precisely the thing they 
wish to avoid by their assertion that natters are ‘village 
business* or * economic ratters * and therefore *act politics**
I have emphasised the importance of special historical 
factors, and the part played by individuals is linitlsg political 
conflict. The villager’s definitions of areas of conduct as 
'not political* are not in theisselves sncugh be prevent their 
politicisation. The tendency far national political dhang&s to
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swamp or engulf such village controls has already been noted
with recard to the dam issue. From accounts in other situations
there is evidence that cross-cutting ties and norms of village
solidarity can be broken down in times of intensive conflict
at national or regional levels. For instance discussing the
consequences for a village of a national political conflict
in Spain between 1931-36, Lison-Tolosana (1966 5 48) has written
"In practice, the community was divided into two 
croups characterised and led by two very actively 
antagonistic minorities, especially that of the 
left ... Dedication to the cause and party conscious­
ness broke former bonds of friendship and kinship; 
there was a tendency to greet and be friendly 
towards reir.bers of the same group, while 
systematically avoiding the others. Ouarrels, rivalry 
and hatred developed out of these estrangements ...
During the strike already mentioned brothers struggled 
against brothers and nephews struck uncles ..."
Lison-Tolosana makes clear conditions which undoubtedly
aggravated such conflict, such as a large group of economically
discontented people (ibid : 42}; but comparative studies are
still rare which would refine our understanding of the
conditions allowing one community to be disrupted by violent
political conflict, while another manaces to keep such conflict
withir certain formal limits. Although I have here stressed
factors which limit conflict, the possibility of a break-down
in village solidarity cannot be ruled out; it seems reasonable
to suggest there are two situations which are discrete. In one,
norms and behaviour favour solidarity and restraint; in the
other they favour cleavage, and encourage acts of overt hostility.
The same organisational bases and ideologies can exist in both
situations. A critical question for further research is what
factors, structural, historical, cultural or environmental
produce the radical change of polarities.
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Footnotes to Chapter 12
(1> an g ' t o a L CrsOT1Ple' "U O l V * to & S a » £ * S
(2) There ore in fact other recent studies of such similar 
villages, such as that by Lison-Tolosana.
(3) In a culture where Ministers become implicated in 
assassination attempts on heads of state, and are 
themselves assassinated, such questions as traditional 
views of power relations become particularly relevant, 
ana this is cogently argued by Waterbury.
(4) Weber's views on forms of solidarity, and Barth's 
description of relations of incorporation have been 
helpful to me here.
(5) Davis has made a similar point about strikes in 
Pisticci (Davis 1969).
(6) A favourite elite anecdote about Makarios' role as
Chief of Patronage is this: a man applied for a civil
sorvice job, but proved to lack the relevant 
qualifications. lie was turned down. lie applied a 
second time, and insisted on being interviewed.
At the interview a telephone call from Makarios stated 
that he wished the man appointed. "lie isn’t properly 
qualified, your eminence”. "But nevertheless, 1 
wish him to be appointed.''
The officials turned to the man, and started to take 
down his particulars. Place of birth. He gave the 
name of Makarios* village. The officials sighed.
"Why didn't you say so in the first place and save 
us all this fuss?"
(7) Cohen (1969) and Bailey (1969) both make this point 
strongly.
(8) Boissevain (1965) has described how in confrontations 
between parties in Maltese villages, large numbers of 
outsiders cone into a village to support their own 
party. The potential for dispute between persons with 
no obligation to avoid dispiite is thereby increased.
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Appendix 1 
THE TURKS OP KALLO
In this thesis I do not consider the Turkish community 
in Kallo, for several reasons. First, they wore a tiny group, 
which during ny fieldwork scored to play little part in village 
life; secondly, since the political climate wan delicate, it 
scored to ire not in the boct interests of the Turks to single 
them out for special attention, or even to take too great an 
interest in their position. I collected information about 
then as it occurred in normal conversation and with certain 
trusted informants, sought more detailed infomatlon. I took 
genealogies from several Turkish men.
nevertheless, some comment on them, however incomplete, 
is necessary. The most striking fact about the Kallo Turks is 
the decline in their numbers since 1891, in contrast to the 
gradual increase of the Greek population. In 1091 there wan 
one Turk in Kallo for every 3 Crooks. In the 1960 Census, 
this ratio has dropped to 1 Turk for every 18 Greeks. During 
the sane j>erlod, the notional ratio of Turks to Greeks had 
changed from roughly 25$ s 73?. (1801) to 18$ : 80% (1960) no 
the Kallo change is out of all proportion to the relative 
decline in the proportion of Turks to Greeks. Kollo Turks 
themselves explain the decline in terms of many of their 
numbers having married out. However, villagers also told mo 
that numbers of younger Turks left Kallo during the Inter- 
communal disturbances of 1964-5 and went to the Turkish 
enclaves in the towns. In 1968-70 there were almost no Turks
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in Kallo hotwoon the n<TQ!i of xs ami 45> ^  ^
l.oadii'r, and one youncr nan of dull intelligence.
Although I did not m m -  -
Carry out a conous of the Turkish residents,
if amenably sure that thoir numbers were lower than the 
72 recorded in i960. There were about twenty adults, in all 
cases they seemed to be rather poor. As might be expected, 
they took a very quiet, passive role in Kallo affairs, and nt 
various points in the thesis, I mention incidents which Involved 
the. i (nee particularly, the first two cases in chapter oioht).
The UN Police made patrols to the village roughly once a 
month to make sure the Turks were not in difficulties. 
Occasionally, Turks resident in the Turkish enclaves visited 
the village to see kin, tend to property and so forth, and T saw 
them cordially oreeted by Creek villagers on a number of 
occasions. Put as I mention in chapters 1 and 0, there have 
been episodes whore individual Creeks attacked the persons or 
property of Kallo Turks and one factor which probably has 
contributed to the decline of the Kallo Turkish population has 
been a feeling of insecurity in face of the increasing and 
prospering Greek population.
Nevertheless the Turks of Kallo seemed very much part of 
the Greeks’ consciousness, and not always in a negative way. 
Numbers of older Kallo Greeks spoke some Turkish, and had had 
economic relations of all kinds with Turks both in and out of 
the village. During my fieldwork several Kallotes wont to a 
Turkish wedding in a mixed village some fifteen miles away, 
and the leftist leaders in Kallo in particular did small favours 
for Kallo Turks, to show their goodwill.
The Greeks however also have a "foundation myth’ about 
how the current situation camo about. It is roughly thisi
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was n *??r qreat ?randfathers Kallo
the Ln i £ village.The Turks owned all 
i "1.  ^ they v;erelazy. They had
fev at f?r r rMinCT f°r theE1 03 lab°urers, a rev, at fiist, then rore. The Turks would pav
therr by giving them a piece of land here
another piece there ~ poor land of course - but
brouahi th° Christians B™eci up, nnd then
' Jn wornent got married, worked hard and
I'voL, ?ir r envw r k  hard and bou^ht ™ore land 
! y ov1ght UP nearly all the land 
i om the lazy Turks who neither worked them-
*In the time of our ar 
was a Turkish village.
,   iiu nc K ­
selves nor let their women work. And that's 
now things came to the roint they are today ...*
Slender support for the view that K~”
dominantly Turkish village (.in spite of its Creek name) is 
supplied by Papadopou^os (1965) who published the djize 
tax records for 1825-6. These show Kallo as having "27 + 2"
payers of the d;jize tax, paid by adult non-Muslims. Although 
It is not clear who qualified as an adult, and thus had to 
pay tax, the suggestion is that the Creek population was much
to the size of the Turkish population. The earliest school 
returns from the 1880*s show more Turkish than Creek girls at 
the elementary school, and old people were firm in their insistence 
that Turkish women did not work in the fields when they were 
young (about 1920). They wore working in the fields in 1968,
One other notable event must be mentioned. Old people 
remember that In 1914 three Kallo Greeks were sent to prison, 
one for ten years, for burning a Turkish coffee shop in the 
village. This was apparently triggered, they say, by a speech 
made locally by a mainland Creek nationalist agitator, Katalanos, 
and followed the hostilities between Greece and Turkey in 1912-13. 
This does not seem to have been followed by any marked decline 
in numbers of Kallo Turks (1901 : 104? 1911 s 97; 1921 s 101).
I have no information for what caused the decline to 68 by 1931.
smaller than 329 recorded In 1891. However, it gives no guide
however.
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Appendix 2 
gg-S.pclal origins of KOKZV militants
».y source for this material is Papachrysostomou (1969)
.j’r.r.cnton, Nicosia. The author is director of the 
Museum of the Struggle, anti must therefore he assumed to write 
with sore authority. Although 229 persons are listed an 
having fallen, these are spread over sir categories, of which 
I have here considered only (i) 60 persons 'killed in action' 
(ii) 9 persons 'hanged* (iii) 9 persons who 'died under 
torture'. I have ignored the 50 persons 'killed by Security 
Forces, the 79 'slaughtered by the Turks' and 15 persons who 
were accidental fatalities. My reason for this distinction 
was a concern to examine the backgrounds of persons who could 
bo assumed to be EOKA militants. Obviously there are further 
problems with such an approach, for example, the possibility 
that those militants killed were socially different from those 
not killed, on the linen of 'other ranks' and 'officers’ but 
I have no data to deal with such problems, and no published 
study exists at time of writing.
Papachrysostomou gives certain social data for the (if? 
men ’killed in action'.
By occupation by education by acre
Schoolboys 1C
craftsmen 12 primary education under
farmers 13 41 20 o.e . o . 17
clerical secondary
(ypalllli) 7 education 20-30 ... 39
'various 24
occupations 13 30-40 ... 11
labourers A university
scientist 1 graduates
schoolteacher 1
housowi fe -2 illiterate _1 ,r .
CS 60 67
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ZlioiTtt axe a number of cliifioulties hero. The H4 v.ton of 
secondary education might havo contained a number who would 
hnvo front? on to further education., The breakdown by 
education suggests that at leant 16 of them wore still 
attending Gymnasium when they wore killed.
Another prowler is the meaning of the 13 persons 
Lp.mgolnnttal Olaphorol, which could moan either 'different 
occupations* or 'different professions', My own analysis of 
the data Papachrysostomou provides in his short biographies 
of the dead men (rages 10-30) suaeests ho has used the 
classification for a number of cases where no information was 
available*.
There are difficulties in the interpretation of the 
origins of the nonr in terms of an urban/rural classification, 
f.ix of the B6 (6.3$) in the three classes I examined. (6fi + 9 4 9 «> 
06) wore born in one of the six major towns of the island 
(Nicosia, Famagusta, Limassol, Lnrnaca, Kyrenia, Paphos).
But Michael Attalides (personal communication) on a preliminary 
examination of some data he has coUocted, believes that 
throughout the century, a high proportion of urban residents 
have themselves been born in villanos. That is, place of 
birth is not in itself sufficient indication of elite or non- 
elite status. In 1946 77.4% of the island's population lived 
outside the nix major towns, though this figure had fallen to 
63.61 by I960.
One final difficulty is that there are n number of inter­
mediate communities, v/hich can bo regarded as country towns, 
or overgrown villages. They may have 5,000 or 10,000 residents, 
and nro referred to as Itonopo 1 in in official publications.
They sometimes havo municipal authorities, a doctor, a
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Gymnasium and so forth. My own view is that in terms of 
elite status, residence in a konopolls counts for little.
The hicrhly qualified picture which enercres, then, is 
that the EOKA militants killed wore probably similar in 
general social characteristics to the general population.
They do not seen to have been heavily skewed in the direction 
of the urban elite; but many of them were of rural origins, 
and becoming upwardly mobile through secondary education.
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Appendix 3A
kallo : Questionnaire on Crops and Marketing Methods
Year Crop Amount Price Mesitis Merchant
196 B
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
This year how many mesities did you discuss selling your crop(s) with? 
(names for each mesities for each crop) Other years?
Is any mesities a relative of yours (sincrhenis/koumbaros/other)
Who? Which?
Reasons for changing? (slow payment? Better price? Other?)
DEBT: How much money do you owe at the moment? To whom?
How much do you e:<pect to get from your (citrus/other) crops 
next year?
Do you intend to sell to the nesities next year?
NAME OF RESPONDENTS
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KALLO QUESTIONNAIRE : Crops and Mnrketina Methods 
NM1E OF RESPONDENTS
What crops have yon been growing thin vorr?
% for own use
Five yearn ago?
Ten years aero?
Your father?
TRACTORS
Do you own a tractor?
Whose tractor do you use?
Is ho a relative 
kouinbaros 
close neighbour 
other
Do you pay? How much?
If not, how do you arrange it?
I low often do you une it?
for sale
WORK
Do you ever work for anyone else? 
(state relation »..)
Does anyone else work for you?
Do you make a fired agreement 
on rate before?
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Appendix 3H 
KALLO VILLAGE CENSUS 
final version dec—68/Jan 6f>
full nano: 
vil lacre 
father's name: 
vi 11 acre j 
mother’s names 
village: 
wif e ' s n am.e: 
village: 
w.f. name: 
village: 
w.rt. name: 
village: 
v;ife pregnant: 
livine tor!!ay: 
intention:
persons in inf's avll? show old people separately 
nnno age education occupation
married children and their spouses
paranoman: 
age:
acre:
age:
age:
age:
aae:
born alive: 
died over 15*
n ame aqe residence education occupation spouse*
viTiage
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(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10) 
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
K M jLO village census 
final version Doc 68/Jan 69
ALL jobs and dates;-
Did your wife do paid work before your marriage? 
Do your wife and daughters do paid work now?
Do they work in your fields now?
People who do paid work for the informants
n are relation to inf
Incone: mostly from;
land
inf fror parents at marriage: 
inf's wife at marriane ;
jointly today in vill acre : 
jointly today elsewhere :
land ever sold :
land ever bought ;
land given to children :
property to inherit :
wife's expected inheritance : 
citrus
land;
work
total last year:
k.s. title;
k.s. title;
k.s.
k.s. at;
k.s. whose:
k.s. title whose;
year
planted
no. trees
how acquired
year price k_
does informant intend to plant more? 
water
debt: how much do you owe today?
amount tro whom owed
debt; the most ever owed; 
date amount to whom
reason
why
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KALLO VILLAGE CEUSUS 
final vorsion Dec-68/Jan 69
(16) Is thex*e any rroney owed to you today?
(17) Usual guarantors at Synergatiki:
Property or kinita not already mentioned:
(IB) Household
radio tv fridge washing machine bio gas
motor car tractor pump other
Kin3h5.T link between inf and wife; its role in decision 
(20) Other affinal links; before or after
^  ^ -/.r.ravcn>:; -r;? Frlkosynfonon?
(22) House
who built your house? 
whose was the plot? 
total cost?
(2 3) details of work/costs of house:
groom ancl family:
bride and farilys
(24) who worked on the house?
(25) wedding expenses:
(26) koumbari fron Kallo: elsev/here:
kouxnares fron Kallos elsewhere:
baptisers of inf's children:
name relation occupation residence
(27) children baptised by inf: 
(20) date of engagement 
in f * s a ere
by wife: 
of wedding 
wife’s age:
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KALLO VILLAGE CENSUS 
final version Dec f>8/Jan C>Q
(29) ah a vo cl by harbor at wedding?
(30) how much oxi^^rormta? how much remained?
(31) adoption - any case in family of inf or wife*
(32) broken engagement or divorce - any canoj
(33) inf s politics! his father's*
his petherost
1960 Election - his votet his wife'a:
what did ho nay to her:
(34) Did inf take his fiance outside the village durincr 
engagement?
(35) List any clone kin of inf/wife who have left the villaqe* 
I—i.r ion residence date left
GENEALOGY (where appropriate) inf*a nibs, their names/ages/ 
alive or dead/birth order/property at rarriage/residence; 
same for inf's wife's sibs, Also rough calculation of 
property and status of their parents.
Appendix 3C
Open-ended interview on disputes, etc.
This took place after I had lived in the village for 
0 /1.1 a seai. The informants had all been interviewed in the 
main census, from which I drew a sample to represent the main 
political groupings, also those of age, wealth and occupation. 
They were also picked because I had reason to think they 
would talk freely on sensitive topics. Before interviewing 
them, I went to some trouble to get material on their disputes 
and quarrels, from other villagers. The interviews took place 
in my house, with no other people present. They sometimes 
lasted 4 hours, and rarely less than two.
(a) Warm-up topics: informants were asked to work out: how 
many first cousins they had, and of these how many were 
resident in the village.
(b) They were asked if they had any particular friends, and 
to say who these were, and state any other relationship.
(c) They were asked from whom they would borrow small sums 
of money, and why.
(d) They were asked to whom they would tell something very 
secret.
(e) They were asked which village tailors, butchers and 
barbers they patronised and why; they were asked about 
special relationships with any of these men, and here 
the aim was to see how much kinship determined such 
transactions. In the course of this area of questioning, 
most informants supplied interesting data on a range of 
economic exchanges.
13/14
(f) Informants were asked to describe any sharecropping 
or 'by halves' relationships they could rer,ember.
The kinship, or other basis for the relationships was 
sought.
(g) DISPUTES
Informants were first asked if there was anyone with 
whom they were on bad terms, not speaking, avoiding, 
angry with, and so forth. Once they started giving 
details, they were encouraged to go through all such 
cases in as much detail as they could remember. I 
pressed for information about type of relationship, 
cause of difference, course of the dispute, duration, 
mode of settlement (if any).
If they denied such disputes, they were cither prompted 
with actual cases I knew of, or asked about legal cases, 
debt, property transfer (inheritance, dowry, pre- 
mortem gift etc.).
(h) Informants were asked about cases in which they had 
sought help for some difficulty, particularly with 
government processes, and so forth. Here the aim was
to olicit data about ta mesa (influence through powerful 
friends) patron-client relations and related topics.
Host informants volunteered such instances readily, 
indeed with some pride.
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